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ABSTRACT'
Since the end of the Second World War the privately- 
owned airlines, the so-called Independents, have gradually 
established for themselves a position of major .importance 
within the UK air transport industry. Initially restricted 
solely to charter operations, they have been successful in 
obtaining from successive Governments, especially, but not 
only, Conservative Governments, a relaxation of legislative 
restrictions on scheduled services, until today they operate 
an extensive scheduled service network. Similarly, they 
have been responsible for pioneering vehicle air-ferries, 
air trooping and, more recently, packaged holidays by air in 
the UK. But despite a fairly impressive history of achieve­
ments, the fact remains that since the war the private 
sector as a whole has been characterised by an apparently 
high degree of economic instability. This thesis examines 
the Independents' post-war record and concludes by tentatively 
advancing several possible explanations for their lack of 
stability, in particular the political environment within which 
they have been forced to operate, an absence of sufficient 
financial backing and the ease of entry into the air transport 
industry.
"The problem of flying is not in the air but
only in the fact that sooner or later you 
have to come down to earth again."
Orville Wright
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Errata
Page 114 should include the following footnotes :
57. ’Plight’, 10/8/67, p.204-5.
58. Ibid., 10/10/68, p.557.
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Abbreviations
sI
AA JC Associated Airways Joint Committee ¡1
ABC - Advanced Booking Charter j
APEX
I
Advanced Purchase Excursion j
APT Advanced Passenger Train j
ARB {Air Registration Board jI
ATAC i' - Air Transport Advisory Council j
ATLB Air Transport Licensing Board j
BAB - British Airways Board j
j
BAC - British Aircraft Corporation j
BACA
!
British Air Charter Association 1!
BAP j- British Air Perries !
i
BAS - British Air Services
i
BCAL j- ' British Caledonian Airways i
BEA - British European Airways ;
BIA
.
- British Island Airways
•
BLATA - British Independent Air Transport■
Association
BMA - British Midland Airways
BOAC - British Overseas Airways Corporatioi
BOAC Ltd. - British Overseas Air Charter Ltd.
BR - British Rail
Britavia - British Aviation Services
BSAA ! - British South American Airways
BUA - British United Airways
BUA (CI) - British United Airways (Channel 
Islands)
BUAP - British United Air Perries
BUIA - British United Island Airways
BU(Manx)A - British United (Manx) Airways !
CM. - Civil Aviation Authority {
CAA - fCentral African Airlines !1
CAB - Channel Air Bridge j
CAB - Civil Aeronautics Board (US) Î
HSDT - High Speed Diesel Train ji
IATA — !International Air Transport j 
Association j
ICAO - International Civil Aviation j 
Organisation i
IT - Inclusive-Tour j
ITX - IInclu3ive-tours on scheduled 
air services
JA - Jersey Airlines
LAC .. Lancashire Aircraft Corporation Î
LAMS - Lohdon Aero and Motor Services Ltd¡i
Pan Am - Pan American Airways |
Q/3/VT0L —
- • i 
Quiet/Short/Vertical Take-Off and 1
Landing
RAS - Railway Air Services
UTA Union de Transports Aeriens
VLB - Very Low Pares
Definitions
Operational Data : 
Passenger-miles
Seat-miles available
Available capacity short - 
ton-miles
Passenger load-factor
Overall load-factor
Load in short ton-miles
Stage flight 
Tons
$
\
{|
the number of passengers carried j
i
multiplied by the distance they flew.I
}
the total, for all revenue flights, I 
of the number of seats actually !i
available on each flight, multiplied | 
by the route-mileage of that flight.
the total,' for all revenue flights, 
of the usable capacity available (in 
short tons) on each flight, multiplie 
by the route-mileage of that flight.
the percentage of the revenue 
passenger-miles to the available 
seat-miles flown.
the percentage of the total revenue 
short ton-miles flown to the usable 
capacity short ton-miles flown.
the load carried (in short tons) over 
each stage, multiplied by the route- 
mileage of that stage.
that part of the flight between two 
consecutive stopping places.
usually ’short’ tons of 2,000 lbs.
Categories of Operation :
International services - services flown wholly outside the UK
or wholly or partly between the UK 
(including Great Britain, Isle of 
Man, Channel Islands and Northern 
Ireland) and places outside.
services flown entirely within the UK.
services shown in published timetables 
and flights supplementary thereto.
Domestic services 
Scheduled services
Cabotage services services flown wholly within or 
between territories controlled by 
the UK.
Non-revenue flights - operations (including training, test
and positioning flights, and flights 
or parts thereof not completed) 
and traffic for which no remuneratici 
is received, and including such 
flying in connection with charter 
and special flights.
Non-scheduled services - all air transport flights for
remuneration other than scheduled 
services.
Separate-fare charters - those where the charterer re-sells
part of the capacity of the aircraft, 
eg. to the public at large, to an 
organisation, etc.
Inclusive-tours - " separate-fare charters where the
cost to the passengers includes the’ 
cost of accommodation.
Advanced Booking Charters - separate-fare charters that must be
paid for at least 90 days before 
departure.
Affinity-group - a group of persons which has an
entity of its own and which is not 
formed or constituted primarily for 
the purpose of air travel.
Exempt services - single-entity charters and charters
to Government Departments.
Single-entity charters - those where the charterer has
exclusive use of the whole capacity 
of the aircraft and does not dispose 
of any of it to third persons for 
reward.
Sub-charters ' - charters to other British or foreign
operators.
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
Since the end of the Second World War civil aviation has experienced 
one of the fastest rates of growth of any industry in the world, scheduled 
services averaging an annual increase of almost (see Table 1.1).
Despite its relatively small size in the U.K. economy, with an average 
annual level of gross domestic fixed capital formation of less than 
£50 million in recent years and by 1970 a workforce of only some 75iOOO , 
civil aviation in fact has been, and remains, of considerable economic, 
political and strategic importance to the country. Throughout most of 
this period British air transport has been dominated by the two nationalised 
air Corporations, B.O.A.C. and B.E.A. But increasingly over the years 
the privately-owned airlines, the so-called 'Independents', have been gaining 
in size and importance, until today they account for well over of total 
U.K. output, in terms of load ton-miles performed. This thesis is 
essentially concerned with this development and its implications for civil 
aviation generally in Great Britain.
Table 1.1 Scheduled World Air Traffic Trends
1950 I960 1971 Annual increase 
1950-1971 (&)
Passengers carried (m) 31 106 328 11.9*
Passenger-kilometers (m) 28,000 109,000 1408,000 13.6
Average trip length (km) 875 1,030 1,2*45 1.7
Total tonne-kilometers (m)* 3,1*90 12,3^ 0 50,690 13.6
Excludes USSR and People's Republic of China 
* includes passengers, baggage, freight and mail.
Source: International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) 1
1. Thompson and Hunter The Nationalised Transport Industries. 1973 P»37 .
2An ’independent airline' in this context has been taken to refer to 
a privately-owned British company primarily operating fixed-wing air 
services, both scheduled and charter. But of necessity it has not been poss­
ible to adhere too pedantically to such a definition. For example, airlines 
in which the Government or a State Corporation has a minority, or even a 
controlling, interest have usually been included in the study, since on the 
whole they exhibit the same general characteristics as those operators 
that are completely owned by private individuals or companies. Similarly, 
no definite limit on the minimum size of a carrier has been stipulated.
The distinction between an airline and an air-taxi operator is, naturally, 
blurred at the margin and has changed markedly over the years. A fairly 
large airline in 19^6 would probably be regarded as very small by 1970s' 
standards. As a 'rule-of-thumb' measurement those companies that today 
operate scheduled services and/or aircraft of the minimum size of a DC-3 
have been included.
Aims of the Study
When one examines the post-war history of the private sector of the 
British air transport industry one factor seems to stand out above all, 
namely the very large number of bankruptcies and forced mergers that have 
taken place among the Independents. During the late 19*40 's some 100-150 
privately-owned airlines were established in the U.K. Appendix II lists 
some 70 such companies in existence in April, 19*+9, of which today only 
one is still operating in approximately the same form, Cambrian Airways,
i
and even that is now publicly controlled. The number of airlines operating, 
of course, was rapidly reduced to manageable proportions. But the key 
characteristic of the private sector has remained the fact that each year
3several companies are forced to suspend operations, and almost as 
quickly new carriers are established. The primary aim of this study, 
therefore, is to examine the development and economic characteristics 
of the Independents in an attempt to explain this high degree of instab­
ility.
One of the main problems encountered during the study has been a lack 
of sufficiently detailed or comparable statistics. The private airlines 
have traditionally been very secretive about their work, primarily, they 
claim, because of the highly competitive nature of the air transport 
business. Much of this tradition still remains. Official data published 
by government departments or regulatory bodies likewise leaves much to be 
desired, although a considerable improvement has taken place relatively 
recently. Britain compares unfavourably in this respect with the United 
States, where, in a far more competitive environment, a huge amount of 
airline date is published each year. This short-coming in the available 
statistics partly explains the historical nature of the thesis. But an 
examination of the history of the private sector of the air transport 
industry can also be justified in its own right. Longfellow wrote:
Look not mournfully into the Past.
It comes not back again. Wisely
Improve the Present.
Such a position is most definitely not taken in this study. An 
examination of the way in which the existing situation came about, it is 
suggested, is extremely important in understanding the Present and in 
improving the Future.
One factor that has made the post-war development of British civil 
aviation so unusual and interesting is the political environment within 
which it has taken place. Lennox-Boyd once remarked ;"We agree with the 
distinguished pilot who said a few days ago that ice and the politician
bwere the greatest menaces which civil aviation had to face today."
Similarly, Sir Myles Wyatt, when Chairman of Air Holdings Ltd., wrote:
" In most well-conducted industries the assessment of 
future prospects is determined by considerations of general 
economic growth, technical efficiency, purchasing habits and 
so forth. Political considerations are important, but by 
no means overshadow all else. In the British air transport 
industry, by contrast, political considerations are paramount 
and other factors, although of fundamental importance, are 
relegated to second place." 3
There appears to be a certain lack of appreciation and serious study 
of the implications of governmental interference in air transport. The 
Edwards Report, for example, after noting on its very first page that 
"the structure of world civil aviation has been fashioned by many forces 
amongst which economic logic has played only a modest part," went on to 
comment: "We have been surprised how often the evidence we have received 
has appeared to overlook the historical and political factors which make 
up the institutional basis of the air transport industry." It is hoped 
that this study, in addition to its primary aim, will go some way towards 
filling this gap.
Following from this, a further point should be made. Throughout the 
study quotations by politicians and by those employed in the civil aviation 
industry will be used extensively to illustrate certain points. It is 
important to remember the situations in which these statements were made. 
Rhetoric is the politician's tool of trade. But, as will become clear as the 
thesis progresses, there is often a wide margin between what politicians say, 
especially when not encumbered with the problems of power, and what they 
actually do when in office. A similar dichotomy is also to be found among
2. Hansard, House of Commons Debates, Vol 1*22, col. 6l8, 6/5/b6.
3. Sir Myles Wyatt;.'Is there a Government Air Transport Policy?' 
Modern Transport. 25/1/6bt p. lh-15.
b. 'British Air Transport in the Seventies' Cmnd. h0l8, p.1 
(Hereafter referred to as the Edwards Report). *
spokesmen for the independent airlines. Because the Independents are 
part of the private sector, often competing with larger, State-owned 
companies, there is a tendency to regard them as aggressive upholders of 
a competitive economic system, and indeed this is the image they usually 
attempt to present to the public. But it is not always strictly correct, 
as Mr. Roy Jenkins aptly pointed out when he was Minister of Aviation:
"The picture sometimes built up of the independents as 
rugged free enterprisers of the air, anxious in open compet­
ition to meet and beat everyone on the tarmac, is to a large 
extent a fallacy. Cnee in, they want protection as much as 
anybody else... This is a field in which poachers turn into 
gamekeepers more quickly than in some other fields." 5
Justification for the Study
Is it really of any great importance that each year several private 
airlines are forced out of business? A number of factors would, it is 
suggested, lead one to answer this question in the affirmative. Firstly, 
it seems reasonable to conclude that a very high level of economic 
instability, such as that experienced by the Independents since the war, 
is a reflection of something inherently wrong in the make-up of the 
industry. The isolation of the causal factors involved, therefore, would 
in itself be of interest to civil aviation and perhaps even to other 
industries. Secondly, each airline failure results in a considerable 
amount of inconvenience to the public and the company's employees, as well 
as often involving the owners and creditors in financial loss. There 
have been numerous occasions when large numbers of passengers have been 
stranded abroad as a result of an airline ceasing operations. Similarly, 
there must be a strong feeling of job insecurity among employees. When 
visiting independent airlines one is often struck by the very high 
proportion of managerial staff who have worked for several extinct carriers.
5.
5. Hansard, op.cit., 1/3/65» Vol.707, col.957.
6One pilot fairly recently, for example, having been made redundant on 
numerous previous occasions, got only as far as being measured for his 
uniform before his new employer in turn went bankrupt.
But the most important factor is the possibility of a connection 
between economic instability and air safety. Such a correlation is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to prove, and some commentators have denied 
that it exists at all. Cooper and Maynard, for example, describe the issue 
of safety as a large red herrings "The main safeguard will remain that a 
bad safety record results in no-one flying with the airline in question (or, 
more to the point, no-one being willing to fly the plane.)"^ The sugges­
tion that waiting until large numbers of passengers and crew are killed in 
aircraft accidents is a satisfactory way of dealing with the problem of air 
safety appears, to say the least, extremely pessimistic and to be approach­
ing the subject from the wrong direction. On a rather more realistic level, 
Wheatcroft comes to the following, and today more widely accepted conclusion:
"Some years ago I held the view that adequate safety 
levels could be achieved solely by a regulation and 
inspection of technical standards in airline operations.
But I am now persuaded by the opinions of many people who 
have spent their lives in the field of safety regulation 
that there is a direct connection between technical 
standards and economic stability in airline operation.
There seems to be a real danger that technical standards 
will begin to slip when an airline is in serious financial 
difficulties." 7
Although it is probably impossible to prove categorically that such 
a correlation does in fact exist, there is strong circumstantial evidence 
that appears to point in this direction. A special review of U.K. air 
safety by the Board of Trade, covering the period 1955 to 1967, concluded 
that the record of the independent operators as a whole was inferior to 
that of the State Corporations so far as causal factors involving short­
comings of the flight crew, the airline and airworthiness were concerned:
6. M.H. Cooper and A.K. Maynard: »The Price of Air Travel', Hobart Paper 53,
7. S. Wheatcroft: "The Influence of Operational and P«^5-6.
Technical Factors on Air Transport Regulations^' The Aeronautical Journal
August, 1970 P.621+.
7"The inevitable and relative instability of the climate in which the 
smaller operator functions introduces problems of staffing and provision­
ing which militate against the attainment of high standards... The lack 
of financial resources has a significant and far-reaching effect on 
environment and morale, leading inevitably to some effect on operational 
standards."® The ratios of deaths per 100 million passenger-miles in 
BOAC and BEA were 0.35 and 0.53 respectively, while the corresponding 
figure for the Independents was 2.99; in terms of actual numbers of 
passengers killed these three ratios represented 1 1 *+, 110 and 620 deaths 
(see table 1 .2).
Table 1.2 Accident Rates for U.K. Operators, 1957-196*+
Notifiable 
’accidents per 
100 m.aircraft- 
miles
Notifiable 
’accidents per 
100,000
aircraft-hours
Notifiable Passengers 
’accidents per’killed per 
100,000 100 m. 
stage flights passenger-miles
BOAC 3-71 1.3*+ 5.03 0.35
BEA 9.78 2.19 2.92 0.53
BOAC & BEA 6.12 1.78 3.*+5 0.1+1
INDEPENDENTS 15.12 3.1+1 1+.01 2.99
ALL OPERATORS 9.27 2.1+3 3.7*+ 1.15
Source: Board of Trade: "The Safety Performance of U.K. Airline
Operators: Special Review," Appendix G , l
l
8 '  l i lV - i* !0™ ™ ot “ A i r l l M  ° » « 1“ ” “
8Table 1.3 Accident Rates for UK Airlines on Scheduled 
and Non-Scheduled Operations, 1963-1967
Notifiable accideris 
per 100 m.aircraft- 
miles
Notifiable accidents 
per 100,000 air­
craft-hours
Notifiable accidents 
per 100,000 
stage flights
Scheduled
Services
BOAC 2. W 1 . 1 3.5
BEA 8.25 2 .1 2 .6
BUA Group it. 36 1 . 1 1 .0
BUAF it. 83 0.7 0.»t
British Eagle 8.02 1 .8 2 . 1
Other Independents 31.8it 5.2 5.1
All Operators 6.77 2 .0 2.7
Non-Scheduled
Services
BOAC - - -
BEA 7.73 2 .1 3.^
BUA Group 5.8it 1 .6 «t.O
BUAF - - -
British Eagle 8.98 2 .6 10 .1
Other Independents 18 .2 2 it. 1 11.3
All Operators 10.60 2.8 7.7
Source: Edwards Report, p. 208,
To a large extent the relatively poor record of the private airlines 
can be explained by the fact that a greater proportion of their output is 
accounted for by charter flying (see Table 1.3). Between 1957 and 1966
9one out of every 212,000 scheduled passengers was killed in an air crash,
9against one in every to,000 on charter flights. Charter operations tend 
to be less safe because of the more likely use of small airports, where • 
navigational and visual aids are inadequate or non-standard and compare 
unfavourably with those at larger airports; because of the irregularity 
of the services, so that pilots are unable to become fully accustomed to 
the route; and so forth. But in addition it would appear that the 
Independents as a whole also have an inferior safety record than the 
nationalised airlines on scheduled services and that the charter safety 
record of the Corporations is better than that of most of the private
<|Qoperators. This is not to suggest, of course, that individual privately-
owned airlines do not have a safety record as good as, if not better than,
either B0AC or BEA, as can be seen from Table 1.3; Mr. Freddie Laker,
for instance, claims that since the war there has not been a single fatality
on one of his airlines, although between 15 and 20 million passengers have 
11been carried. But overall the air safety record of the Independents has 
undoubtedly been inferior to that of other British airlines, and a possible 
explanation may well be found in the excessively high level of economic 
instability that has characterised the sector since the war.
9. Ibid. Particular care should be taken when comparing air transport 
accident statistics. They lend themselves to widely different inter­
pretations. The main problems arise from the small number of observa­
tions each year, especially for individual or small groups of airlines, 
and the lack of a universally accepted yardstick. Recent figures suggest 
that charter operations are now safer than scheduled services. This 
would partly reflect the greater participation of the large national 
carriers in the charter market and the domination of that market by 
inclusive-tour services (in operational terms these are now virtually 
scheduled services). A longer period is probably needed before the 
true situation becomes totally clear.
10.See also R. Doganis: 'How Safe are Air Charters'. Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy. January, 1968. ~  c---
11. T.V. Interview, B.B.C. 1 , 8/10/72
10
Structure of Thesis
The thesis is divided into two fairly distinct sections, although 
there is a measure of over-lap. The first part, Chapters two to six 
inclusive, contains a historical narrative of the post-war development 
of the Independents, paying particular attention to the airlines' 
attempts to establish themselves as scheduled service carriers and to 
the political environment within which they have been forced to operate.
The second part deals in detail with certain aspects of the Independents' 
operations: finance, scheduled services and the three main areas in which, 
they have specialised since the war, vehicle-ferry services, trooping 
and inclusive-tours. Throughout the study the main, although not the 
exclusive, emphasis will be placed on an examination of the economics 
of airline regulation rather than operation, for it seems logical that 
the principal causal factors of economic instability are to be found in 
this area. By this we mean that there is really very little difference 
between publicly and privately-owned airlines in the actual operation of an 
air service; British Caledonian's services from London to New York do not 
differ in any meaningful sense from those of BOAC, except in the restric­
tions imposed by the licensing authorities. It is more relevent to direct 
one's attention to the regulatory field, to determine why certain airlines 
are favoured, why others are refused access to the more lucrative markets, 
and so forth. This is the approach adopted in this study.
Chapter II
11
NATIONALISATION AND A LABOUR GOVERNMENT 
19 5^-51
The period of the first post-war Labour Government, 19^5-1951 » was 
crucial to the development of air transport in Britain, for it was during 
these years that the basic structure of the industry was established. The 
'mixed' two-sector type of economic system that had evolved by the end of 
1951, comprising the two nationalised Corporations on the one hand and 
numerous privately-owned operators on the other, survived the next twenty 
years remarkably well, despite periodic attacks and reforms. It is, 
therefore, important to examine in detail the policies and incidents that 
resulted in the establishment of this particular type of system, especially 
as it could be persuasively argued that it is the structure of the industry 
that has been largely responsible for many of the problems which British 
air transport has had to face since the war.
The Swinton Plan
Long before the end of the Second World War it was quite obvious that 
when peace eventually came a new civil aviation policy would be required. 
Consequently, upon his appointment as the first Minister of Civil Aviation 
in October, 19H ,  Viscount Swinton rapidly set about preparing the 
necessary blue-print. The document that emerged, known as the Swinton 
Plan, was presented to Parliament as a White Paper in March, 19^5«
Although published by the Coalition Government, the Plan, in fact shows all 
the signs of being a Conservative brain-child. Before the war Tory policy, 
as evolved by Kingsley Wood, had favoured the concentration of the nation's 
effort in the international field behind a single, publicly-owned airline, 
leaving most domestic and charter services to private enterprise. 1
1 . "British Air Transport," 19^5 , Cmd 6605.
2. Corbett: ' Politics and the Airlines', 1905,p. 105-6..
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As a result the British Overseas Airways Corporation was established in 
1939 with the exclusive right to receive a State subsidy for overseas 
services. The problem with this scheme, as Brancker points out, was 
that the Government effectively became the owner of an air operating 
concern without giving itself very many safeguards.^ A single 'chosen 
instrument' was also felt to be too unwieldy to be operated efficiently 
in the post-war world, and instead three new Corporations were proposed, 
linked together by a common denominator, the participation of BOAC.
The underlying philosophy of the Swinton Plan is summarised in the 
White Paper as follows: "It is.... the essence of the Government's plan 
that those interests concerned in transport by sea and by land should be 
brought into a real and effective partnership with the organisations
"  . i f  .which will be responsible for transport by air." The same principle,
together with that of regulated competition, have remained at the heart 
of Conservative policy throughout most of the post-war period. The first 
of the three Corporations, basically the existing BOAC, was to be respon­
sible for the North Atlantic and Commonwealth routes, with extensions to China 
and the Far East. The airline was to be wholly State owned, but allowance 
was made for the participation of shipping companies in subsidiaries and in 
certain routes on which it was thought they could make a "useful contribu­
tion".^ The exact extent of any maritime participation, however, was 
never enunciated.
The second Corporation, expected to be the most profitable and in 
which the Government intended BOAC to have a substantial, though not a 
majority, shareholding, was to serve the European and domestic routes.
J. Brancker : "The Effect of Nationalisation on Air Transport." Journal 
of the Institute of Transport, I9A9 , p. 109. ”
Cmd. 6605, p.^.
5. Ibid, p. *t-5.
13
The pre-war rigid division between internal UK and Continental opera­
tions was abandoned, permitting the development of connecting services.
The main shareholders, apart from BOAC, were to be the railway companies, 
short sea shipping lines and travel agencies, although other pre-war 
operators were offered the chance either of sharing in the capital of 
the new Corporation or of joining with it to form joint subsidiaries to 
run particular routes. In addition, the door was left ajar for the
participation of outside carriers in the development of new routes,
6while the operation of charter aircraft was left open to anyone.
The third Corporation was to be responsible for the development of 
routes to South America and owned primarily by the four British shipping 
companies engaged in the South American trade who, in January, 19^, had 
joined together to form British Latin American Airlines Ltd. Again 
BOAC was to be a shareholder, but with a smaller interest than in either 
of the other two Corporations. In addition to the common participation 
of BOAC, the three airlines were also to co-operate in the overhaul of 
aircraft and in the establishment of a combined training organisation.
The Plan provided for the Minister of Civil Aviation to "have a general 
control over broad aviation policy"; he had the right of veto over 
appointments to the boards of the two non-nationalised airlines and re­
tained the power to appoint the directors of BOAC. The three Corporations 
would be required to continue operations on all the routes assigned to
them and could not terminate a scheduled service without the Minister's
. . 7permission.
The Swinton Plan was, of course, a compromise, a hotchpot of policies 
designed to satisfy a large number of conflicting pressure groups. Herbert
6. Ibid, p.5-6.
7. Ibid, p.6-8 ; "The Economist", l?/?/^, p. 337-8.
1*+.
Morrieon summed up the views of the Opposition and at the same time
emphasised the compromise appearance of the White Paper during the 
debate on the 19^6 Civil Aviation Act:
"(Lord Swinton) said, 'What can I do to get some 
scheme through this Cabinet of conflicting points of 
view?' He said, 'I will have three corporations, 'and 
he had three. He had one with substantially, if not 
•predominantly, a railway interest. He said to himself, 'That 
will square the railway interests.' He had another with 
a very strong shipping flavour about it, and he said 'That 
will square the shipping people, the Conservative believers 
in private enterprise.' It was real political genius. It 
satisfied both the railway Conservatives and the shipping 
Conservatives. Finally, he produced a public-ownership 
corporation, the BOAC, and he said, 'That is for the 
Socialists'... That was the Swinton Plan, one for the g 
railways, one for shipping and one for the Socialists."
Whether or not the proposals were "real political genius",
certainly in practice many of them would have had to be radically modified.
The Plan affords several examples of policy proposals that did not make
economic sense, the inevitable result of trying to reconcile too many.
diverse pressures. This is particularly striking in the attitude taken
towards the important question of subsidies. The White Paper states:
"It is the intention that the agreed schedule of services on the European
routes and the Latin American Service should be operated without subsidy...
(The Commonwealth routes, however,) are so essential in the interests of
Commonwealth communications that His Majesty's Government will be prepared
9to afford the necessary financial help to enable BOAC to operate them." 
Likewise, challenged to say what would happen if the Corporations lost 
money, Sir Stafford Cripps, Minister for Aircraft Production, replied: 
"First of all the Corporation bears the loss. If this exceeds its reserves 
it will have to give up the service and somebody will take it on."^
8. Hansard, House of Commons Dehates, Vol. ^18, col ^25, 2 V V ^ ^  .
9. Cmnd. 6605, p.8.
10. Longhurst: "Nationalisation in Practice", 1950,p.78,
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Thus, it would seem that there was a total failure to appreciate 
a fact that was obvious to most people in the industry, namely that all 
the operating companies, even the European airline, would inevitably 
need subsidising after the war, and indeed that in the short run the 
subsidies would have to be considerably greater than they had been 
before 1939- Who exactly was going to take on the routes that the 
Corporations abandoned, since almost every company of any size who had 
ever shown any interest in air transport had already been included in 
the Plan, was anyone's guess. Overall, therefore, the thinking 
behind the Swinton Plan was vague and lacked an appreciation of the 
immense changes that the Second World War had brought about in civil 
air transport.
Labour's Plans:
Although the Labour Party was strongly represented in the Coalition 
Government, and indeed Sir Stafford Cripps was Minister of Aircraft 
Production and often spoke in the Commons on behalf of Viscount Swinton, 
the principles embodied in the Swinton Plan were very different from those 
that had become associated with Labour during the war. Social-democratic 
parties throughout the world had for some time been discussing the feas­
ibility of 'internationalising' air transport, as distinct from the pre­
war pattern by which each country established and protected its own 
airlines and often used them for the exercise of national power (Lufthansa 
probably being the best example of this type of development). The first 
positive move towards the internationalising of air transport came with 
the Australia-New Zealand Co-operative Agreement of 19^^, which proposed
the formation of a world authority to own and operate the main trunk air
12routes. The French Government had supported a similar approach at the 1
11. Ibid.
12. Cooper: "Some Historic Phases of British International Civil Aviation 
Policy." International Affairs, 19^7, p. 198; Worcester: "Roots of 
British Air Policy," 1966,p .130-1.
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1932 Disarmament Conference, while the Canadians suggested not 
complete internationalisation of civil aviation, but an authority 
«'to ensure that, sa far as possible, international air routes and
services are divided fairly and equitably between various member states."
It was with this background, therefore, that the Labour Party published 
its post-war blueprint for air transport, "Wings for Peace".
Thus, "Wings for Peace" was inevitably a rather idealistic document, 
very much in the mainstream of left-wi ng political thinking at the time. 
Labour saw it as "the only programme which can adequately safeguard the 
world's peace against the dangers that result from the use of civil 
aviation as an instrument of national policy." Basically, it made 
three proposals:
i) the establishment of a World Air Authority with wide- 
ranging functions, including the provision of various 
international services, such as weather reports, health 
control, etc.
ii) the establishment of a unified World Airways, owned and
operated by the World Air Authority, or, as a second-best
solution, a system of Eegional Air Unions.
■ iii) the immediate internationalisation of civil aviation in Europe,
while the ground was still particularly fertile for such a 
15
development.
Despite its undoubted importance, "Wings for Peace" had a number of serious 
short-comings. For example, it failed to foresee, perhaps not unexpectedly, 
the appearance of the post-war phenomenon of third-world nationalism, which
13. Thornton: "International Airlines and Politics," 1970, p. 126;
Wassenbergh: "Post-war International Civil Aviation Policy and the 
Law of the Air," 1957, p. 76.
1*U The Labour Party: "Wings for Peace", 19^, p. 18.
15. Ibid, p. 1 5 ; see also Jenkins: "British Airlines", Fabian Research 
Series, 1953»
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was later to have a considerable effect on international air transport. 
Secondly, it did not really face up to the problems created by the very 
close association between civil aviation and national defence, especially 
in relation to a country’s aircraft manufacturing potential. But 
probably more important in the short-run was the fact that the implementation 
of such a policy was quite outside the control of any single government.
The latter point was clearly illustrated at the Chicago Conference of 
19*+U. An international meeting to determine the future development of 
civil aviation had become necessary because, in the words of Schenkman:
"As a result of war-time expansion, the technical development of air 
transport had outdated the political framework available to accommodate 
this new and revolutionary means of transportation."^ At Chicago the 
motion proposing the full internationalisation of air transport was vetoed 
by the United States and Brazil, although the U.S. statement did admit that 
while such a solution was right in principle, in an imperfect world it was 
more a matter for later consideration and not in any case relevent to a 
fledging industry.1"^ The U.K.'s position, set out in a White Paper, 
was broadly in line with that of Canada in supporting an international
16. Schenkman: "International Civil Aviation Organization", 1955» p.60,
17. Worcester, op.cit., p. 130-1.
17a. "International Air Transport," 19^. Cmd. 6561. The positions taken 
at Chicago by the U.S.A. and Britain largely reflected the relative 
economic power of the two countries in the field of civil aviation 
and were, of course, a reversal of their historic economic policies. 
America's predominance stemmed primarily from the fact that during 
the war it had achieved a near-monopoly of the production of 
transport aircraft and its airlines had continued to operate 
relatively normally. It is interesting to note that by the early 
1970's the positions had apparently been reversed, with Britain 
favouring a more liberal approach and America insisting on 
restrictions, (see Chapter X).
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authority with power to issue licences and control rates and frequencies.
It is interesting to note, however, the influence that the Labour 
members appear to have had on the Coalition Government in this sphere of 
policy, and perhaps the bargaining that must have taken place explains 
the apparent acceptance of the Swinton Plan by Labour Ministers. Adolf 
A. Berle reported back to the U.S. State Department the following 
discussion with Winston Churchill and the Lord Privy Seal, Beaverbrook:
"My private opinion is that the British never really intended to press 
for complete international control of aviation but made the contention for 
the benefit of certain members of the British Cabinet who have taken 
advanced public positions in favour of internationalism not only in aviation
” 18but in general.
Nationalisation:
Thus, partly as a result of the Chicago Conference, by the time that 
the Labour Government came to power in July, 19^5, it was widely accepted 
that a more practical solution to the problem of the future development of 
British civil aviation than that contained in "Wings for Peace" had to be 
found, and not surprisingly thought tended to revolve around the already 
prepared Swinton Plan. Indeed, it was reliably reported that up to 
October 2*+th (Labour's policy proposals were published in the form of a 
White Paper in December) the Cabinet intended to adopt the Swinton Plan 
with only one modification - that the shipping and travel interests, while 
participating in the two new Corporations, should do so as minority rather 
than majority shareholders. On that day, however, a group of Labour back­
benchers threatened to organise a revolt in the Parliamentary Party, and
18. Quoted in O'Connor:"Economic Regulation of the World's Airlines: 
a Political Analysis," 1971,p.28.
the Government, fearing the kind of split in the ranks that had 
recently occurred over the National Insurance Bill, capitulated and 
proposed complete public ownership» It is difficult to visualise 
how a Government apparently so committed to the internationalisation of 
air transport and the nationalisation of all internal public transport 
could have done anything but effectively exclude private enterprise from 
civil aviation. But on the other hand, the policy finally adopted did 
differ from normal Labour nationalisation practice in two significant 
respects: there was no single, central body to control the administration 
and management of air transport, and the question of co-ordinating civil
aviation with other modes of transport was almost totally ignored.
20The White Paper, "British Air Services", followed Conservative 
policy in proposing the formation of three separate airlines, each with 
its own geographical area of responsibility. Thus, routes between the 
U.K. and other Commonwealth countries, the U.S.A. and the Far East were to 
be operated by the existing BOAC. U.K. domestic services and routes to the 
Continent were given to a new company, British European Airways (BEA), formed 
by the amalgamation of the European division of BOAC and those independent 
airlines operating scheduled services within Britain. Finally, routes to 
South America were to be the responsibility of another new company, British 
South American Airways (BSAA), These three operators became Britain’s 
'chosen instruments.' They had the exlusive right to fly regular services, 
the only competition allowed being from foreign carriers on international 
routes. Within the U.K. those private airlines not absorbed into BEA 
were permitted only to carry out such functions as charter operations, 
aircrew instruction, and ambulance and rescue flying. The idealism of 
"Wings for Peace", however, was not entirely abandoned; the White Paper
*■>I:
I
iX
llij
19. 'The Economist,' IO/II/L5 , p. 669. and p. 673; see also Hansard, 
op.cit., 6/5/*i6,Vo1. b 2 2 , col 620.
20. Cmd. 6712.
20a BSAA was absorbed by BOAC in 19*+9 following a series 
its Tudor IV aircraft. . BSAA Report, 19I18/L9, p.lQ. of accidents involving
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opens with a pledge to work towards a single international owning and |
Ioperating body and goes on to say: "The plan His Majesty's Government now |
present to Parliament is necessarily a national plan, but it has been so |
formed that it can be readily fitted into any future scheme of international | 
21organisation." |
The Civil Aviation Act received the Royal Assent in August, 1946. |
BEA had been established in February of the same year as a Division of |
BOAC so that a nucleus organisation could be built up by August 1st. On |
!
that date BEA took over the European services of 110 V/ing, 46 Group, RAF, whichf 
had operated for a short.time under the aegis of BOAC. Domestic services, |
however, continued to be operated by a group of independent airlines under |
I-
charter to the Corporation. When war had broken out in 1939 an organisa­
tion known as 'National Air Communications' was set up to operate in pool 
all air transport services within the UK and to the Continent. This was
absorbed into the RAF in May, 1940, while most of the remaining carriers,
mainly railway-sponsored, formed the Associated Airways Joint Committee
(AAJC) to operate skeleton services. The only airlines outside this group
were Allied Airways (Gandar Dower) and, of course, BOAC, both of which
22operated services throughout the war.
BEA eventually absorbed the AAJC airlines on February 1st, 1947.
The purchase price was £550,000, of which £305,529 represented "the excess 
of the cost of the shares in the AAJC companies over the estimated value of 
the net tangible assets of those companies at the date of acquisition." ^
21. Cmd. 6712 p.3. If the plan could in fact have been fitted into a 
future international scheme it was, as we have seen, a fortuitous 
accident.
22. Masefield: "Some Economic Factors in Air Transport Operation." Journal 
of the Institute of Transport, 1951,p. 84-5; Ministry of Information: 
"Merchant Airmen," 19^0^ .  3T-3 .
23 BEA Annual Report, 1946/7tp.l4.
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The eight carriers involved were:
Great Western and Southern Air Lines
Highland Airways
Isle of Man Air Services
North Eastern Airways
Railway Air Services
West Coast Air Services (ceased operations, June, 19^6) 
Scottish Airways 
Western Isles Airways.
2kAllied Airways was added to the list on April 12th . The only other 
privately-owned scheduled carrier was Channel Islands Airways, which 
began operations in June, 19^5» and was registered in Jersey. The 
States of Jersey and Guernsey rejected nationalisation and insisted on 
preserving the identity of their own airline. When, however, the British 
Government refused to allow Channel Island Airways to operate to and from
25the UK, the Insular Authorities gave in and the airline was nationalised.
It might be relevent here to quote at length the main Conservative 
criticism of the 19^6 Act, for to a large extent it foreshadowed later 
civil aviation policy, both Tory and Labour. Lennox-Boyd, speaking in 
reply to Herbert Morrison during the Bill's Second Reading in the House 
of Commons,said:
"First and foremost, we deplore the monopolistic feature 
of this proposal. No one is to be allowed to start a scheduled 
service...We believe that there should be an executive council, 
an organisation similar to that in operation in the United 
States where the Civil Aeronautics Board have contrived to 
give competition and service within the framework of a general 
Government supervision. We favour an independent tribunal to 
which any independent operator can apply in regard to routes 
at home and overseas. If the tribunal is satisfied that there 
is inadequate service, or no service at the moment, on a 
particular route and the tribunal is also satisfied as to the 
financial soundness of a proposal and technical ability of the 
people concerned, they would have the power to grant a licence 
to operate over that route." 26
2*+. Ibid, p.^#
25« Scott-Hill and Lehrend: "Channel Silver Wings," 1972^.8,
26. Hansard, op.cit., 6/5/Ji6 t Vol. ^22, col 622.
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The Charter Companies
By 19*46, therefore, both the main political parties had been forced 
to tone-down their earlier civil aviation policies, although a large gap 
still separated them. The task now is to examine how the airlines, es­
pecially the Independents, reacted to the new political and economic 
environment. It is important to remember that the Second World War 
had an enormous effect on air transport development throughout the world. 
According to Brogden, in six years the aircraft manufacturers and the 
airline industry achieved the equivalent of twenty years normal peace- 
time development. Similarly, Frederick estimates that "at the close 
of hostilities we found ourselves probably fifty years further ahead 
in air transport techniques, in aeronautical knowledge, in the develop­
ment of flying equipment and devices which could be adapted to commercial use,
and in public acceptance of this new means of getting about the world than
28we would have been if the conflict had not taken place."
The immediate post-war period was marked by the appearance of numerous
small air charter companies, just as the end of the First World War had
seen the mushrooming of private bus operators in and around London.
During 19*46 and 19*47 hardly a week went by without the establishment of
another airline; on the small island of Jersey alone there were over a
29dozen registered charter companies at this time. For the country as a 
whole it is very difficult to say with any certainty how many carriers 
were in existence; no reliable estimate has ever been made. But during 
the period of the Labour Government the total probably approached 150.
The casualty rate, of course, was almost as high, and indeed, Mr. Peter
27. Brogdens 'Australia’s Two-Airline Policy,' 1968, p.J*+#
28. Frederick; 'Commercial Air Transportation,' 1961 p.v. 
29« Behrend: 'Jersey Airlines, ' 1968^ .  1 1 t
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Masefield's description of the pre-war British airlines "flitting like
30brief shadows across the scene" applies even more to their post-war
successors. A similar situation appears to have evolved in several
other countries. In France, for example, by the end of 19^6 there were
already some 30 charter companies operating mainly between North Africa,
France and the U.K., while in the U.S.A. the Civil Aeronautics
Administration later estimated that approximately 3|600 carriers were
32established during the immediate post-war years.
Two factors in particular favoured this rapid growth. Firstly,
during the war large numbers of men had been taught how to fly aircraft
and had become interested in the possibilities of air transport; most of
them now suddenly found themselves in the labour market. Secondly, the
Allied governments began to dispose of thousands of surplus aircraft at •
very low prices. In total over 13,000 DC-3s had been built (including
some 2,000 in Russia), **,000 of which were disposed of by the U.S.
Government alone at the end of the war. Between 19**2 and 19*+6 1,163
DC-*+s were also built, as well as thousands of bombers that were
capable of conversion to civilian use. It was possible, for example,
to buy Halifax bombers from the Ministry of Supply for between £100 and
3**£1,700 each, with spare engines selling for a little over £10 each.
Thus, with a very small amount of initial capital it was relatively easy 
to set oneself up as an air charter operator. The trick was to stay 
in business.
Most of these companies, of course, were small, almost 'one-man' 
affairs. But some had become relatively large and well-established,
30. Masefield, op.cit., p.8 3.
31. Sundberg: 'Air Charter,' 1961, p.25.
32. Thayer: 'Air Transport Policy and National Security,' 19 6 5, p.93.
33« Miller and Sawers: 'The Technical Development of Modern Aviation,' 
19 6 8, p. 10 3, p.1 2 ** and p.1 3 1*.
3<*. Laker: 'Private Enterprise in British Air Transport'. Journal of 
the.Royal Aeronautical Society, I966, p.332.
such as Airwork, Hunting Air Travel, Lancashire Aircraft Corporation 
(LAC), Scottish Airlines and Skyways. With the introduction of the 
Civil Aviation Act their field of operation was effectively limited 
to various types of charter activity. In fact, the Independents were 
positively encouraged to seek this type of work: "We give to independ­
ent charter operators freedom of enterprise, and freedom of competition 
against these publicly-owned undertakings... We genuinely desire that
private enterprise should have a fair field in charter flying and 
35good luck to it." Given this encouragement and the current demand 
for air transport services, it is not surprising that for those airlines 
that managed to stave-off bankruptcy the immediate post-war years proved 
to be a period not only of expansion, but of near-boom. During 19^7 
member companies of the-British Air Charter Association (BACA) flew 
eight million aircraft-miles, compared with four million in 19^6, and 
carried .136,357 passengers. If the figures for Airwork, Skyways and other 
non-members are included, the private sector in 19**7 flew approximately 
15 million aircraft-miles and carried 250,000 passengers and 3,000 tons of 
cargo. The three nationalised Corporations, on the other hand, managed to 
fly a total of bO million aircraft-miles and carry 585,000 passengers and 
It,700 tons of freight,^ although of course they were still in the midst 
of reorganisation. From the residue of work left for the Independents, 
ambitious operators were able to gradually rebuild a private sector in 
the industry, primarily by adapting themselves skilfully to the new 
situation and to new opportunities. The reasons for the early success 
of the sector as a whole, despite individual failures, can probably 
best be seen by examining the type of work to which they turned.
35« Herbert Morrison; Hansard, op.cit.,col 615.
36. 'Aeroplane, 1 9/7/Ji8,p. 56.
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A major factor in civil aviation at this time was the considerable 
amount of capacity shortage that existed on scheduled services (a 
reflection of the continuing war-time disruption of air services and 
the problems of obtaining new equipment) and the State airlines were 
finding it very difficult to meet demand. It was often necessary to book 
months in advance to fly to European destinations and a year for South
70
Africa and Australia. To a large extent, this explains the amount of
work given to the charter companies by the Corporations. We have
already mentioned that between August, 1946,and February, 194?, U.K.
domestic services were operated by several independent carriers on behalf
of BEA. But numerous other similar arrangements continued long after
these particular companies had disappeared. Skyways, for example,
operated BEA's once-weekly flight to Helsinki, and Scottish Airlines
operated the same Corporation's Prestwick-Belfast, Renfrew-Belfast
and Aberdeen-Renfrew-London services. BEA did not inaugurate its first
regular all-cargo service until August 10th, 1947; prior to that date a
number of charter companies had been used, and indeed continued to be
39widely used for some time afterwards. According to its Annual Reports,
BOAC spent £321,799 during 1946/47 on the 'charter of aircraft and crews'
and a further £180,62** in 1947/48. The corresponding figures for BEA
were £104,370 (August-March) and £173i651. There is also some evidence
to suggest that the Government turned a purblind eye to the open flouting
by many companies of regulations concerning charter flights, mainly no
doubt because of the excess demand situation. For example, after an
accident to an aircraft belong to Spencer Air Lines at Croydon early in
1947 it was found that none of the passengers had apparently chartered
40the aircraft and all had paid separate fares.
38. Ibid, 30/5/V7,p. 573.
39. Ibid., 17/1/47, p. 83;27/6/47, p. 689 and 15/8/47,p. 199.
40. Ibid, 30/5/47, p. 573.
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The nationalised Corporations were far from the only customers
for this type of charter work. A number of British airlines found a
valuable market in providing services and advice to foreign companies
and governments. Airwork, the largest private air transport company
in Britain, had contracts for the technical management and operation of
fleets of aircraft in Iran, Iraq, the Sudan and Ecuador; in December,
19^8, it signed a three-year agreement with Pakistan Aviation Ltd., to act as
technical consultants in the development of aircraft and engine overhaul
workshops and a training school that eventually involved about 200
. itlAirwork personnel being-sent to Pakistan. Scottish Airlines flew 
regular scheduled services for Icelandic Airways, KLM, Air France,
Compagnie Beige des Transports Aeriens and Faroe Airways, as well as 
providing all the equipment and technical assistance for the new carrier, 
Luxemburg Airlines.^ London Aero and Motor Services Ltd. (LAMS) had 
subsidiaries operating in Australia and South Africa and in January,
19^8, signed a contract with the Jewish Agency in Palestine for the
i+3establishment of Jewish National Airways.
Several companies also managed to obtain a number of fairly large-
scale general charter contracts, an important pre-requisite in attaining
any degree of stability. For example, following a critical shortage of
milk in Britain during the autumns of 19^7 and 19^8, the Ministry of
Food chartered a large number of aircraft to supplement the shipping
services in transporting extra supplies from Northern Ireland. The
operation involved the movement of a daily average of 12,000 gallons in
19^7 and 30,000 in 19^8, employing eleven charter carriers. A further
airlift was necessary in 1950 when milk supplies in Britain were again 
it ^getting low. Similarly, Airwork gained a long-term contract to carry
iti. Ib id .,  15/8/it7, p. 195-5; 'F lig h t ' ,  30/12/i*8,p. 775. 
it2. 'F lig h t ' ,  2 2 /lA 8 ,p . 90. 
it3. Ib id , 8 /l / it8 ,  p.i(8.
itU. Swann: 'ftO Years of Air Transport in Northern Ireland,' 1972,p. 37-8,
Muslim pilgrims the 1,900 miles from Mombasa to Teddah. Skyways was 
chartered by the Colonial Office to fly a weekly service from Nairobi to 
Mauritious carrying passengers, freight and mail, while Hunting Air 
Travel signed an agreement with the Overseas Food Corporation (of the 
'groundnuts scheme' fame) which between November, 19* *8,and October,
19**9, involved the movement of 2,000 passengers between London and
„ 1*6East Africa.
Most of the work mentioned so far, of course, primarily involved 
the 15 to 20 larger carriers. The smaller companies had to rely on 
the fairly bouyant, but less certain and probably more competitive, 
general charter market, and despite the relative prosperity it was 
mainly these airlines that faced financial difficulty and bankruptcy.
For those with initiative, however, opportunities still existed. Olley 
Air Services, and later Solar Air Services, for instance, built up a 
quite successful business flying passengers to all the major horse-race 
meetings and the Isle of Man T.T. races. A number of airlines developed 
close ties with shipping companies, flying crews and spares around the 
world. Two further events must have also aided the general development 
of the charter operators. One was the establishment in August, 19*6,
' of the British Air Charter Association to act as spokesman and pressure 
group for the industry; its original membership of 23 had increased 
to 1*1 by the end of 19*7^? The other was the opening of the Baltic 
Exchange air freight section in August, 19*7, making it easier to 
'marry' cargo and aircraft and so obviate the common diseconomy that 
arises when one-way cargoes have to bear the cost of the return flight
**5. 'Flight', l0/10/*7,p. *33.
**6. Ibid., 22/ l M p .  90 and 3/H/*9,P- 581.
1*7. Ministry of Civil Aviation: 'Civil Aviation Report,' 19*6/1*7.
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without pay-load.
The charter airlines' period of relative prosperity, however, 
proved to be short-lived. By the spring of 19^8, most companies, 
especially the smaller ones, were beginning to feel the strain of a 
slack winter period. Business activity continued at a fairly low 
level and it seemed inevitable that some of even the larger carriers 
would be forced into liquidation. The smaller operators were hit by 
a disappointing fruit season, previously a major source of income for 
them; it was far too short and rates were only half those charged in 1 9 k ? ,  
As the major airlines recovered from the immediate post-war chaos it was 
only to be expected that they would have less use for the charter companies 
services. The fact that the supply of scheduled service seats was 
catching up with demand may well explain the more stringent enforcement 
of charter regulations. In May, 1948, for example, Ciro's Aviation 
became the first company to be prosecuted under the Civil Aviation Act 
for failing to furnish documents and information concerning flights to 
South Africa required by the Minister. On the whole, therefore, the 
situation looked rather bleak for the Independents. They were saved by 
two important developments during the second half of 1948. Probably the 
more significant in the long run was the decision by the Government to 
allow certain privately-owned airlines to operate scheduled services 
within the U.K. as 'associates' of BEA. But in the short run even more 
important was the Berlin Airlift, which created, in Mr. Freddie Laker's 
words, the "launching paid for private operators."^
48. ’The Economist', 30/8/^7i P* 380 ,
49. 'Aeroplane', 2377/^8, p. 112,
50. Ibid., 14/5/48 p. 590.
51. Laker, op.cit., p. 331.
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The Berlin Airlift was not the first operation of its kind in which
the Independents had participated. During the autumn of 19^7, for
example, BOAC and several charter companies had carried out two major
airlifts between India and Pakistan. The first, "up to that time the
biggest air charter in the history of civil aviation," involved the
carriage of 7,000 employees of the Pakistan Government and their
families from Delhi to Karachi, as well as 1,500 passengers in the
52reverse direction and over 50 tons of food and medical supplies.
During the second operation, "the greatest civil air evacuation which
has ever been attempted," a total of 35»000 people were airlifted between
the two newly independent States.^ Altogether, well over 1,200,000
aircraft-miles were flown and the two evacuations produced a gross
53arevenue of £435,840 for the charter companies. Similarly, in May,
1948, Airwork secured a contract valued at £1 ,200,000 for the time
charter of five DC-4s to the International Refugee Organisation of
Geneva. During the first year of the agreement some 17,500 displaced
54persons were carried between Hamburg and Montreal. .But such operations
almost pale into insignificance when compared with the Berlin Airlift.
The British civilian side of the Airlift, officially described as
"the greatest and largest air supply operation ever attempted, or
55ever likely to be attempted againf" began on July, 27th, 1948, with 
the deployment of two Lancaster tankers belonging to Flight Refuelling; 
other companies began operations from August 4th. The blockade of Berlin 
by the Soviet Union was finally lifted early in May, 1949, but civilian 
flights continued until August 15th in order to build up strategic 
reserves in the city. At its peak 48 British civil aircraft of all types
52. BOAC: "Operation Pakistan," 1948, p.1-3,
53« Ibid: 'Operation India,' 1948, p. 3-4.
53a Ibid Annual Report, 1947/48, p. 13.
54. 'Aeroplane', 28/5/48, p. 649.
55. H.M.S.O.:"Berlin Air Lift", 1949, p. 6.
The Berlin Airlift:
30.
were involved, including even a few flying boats. The reason
for using the independent airlines to such an extent was quite simply
that there was no alternative. Neither the R.A.F. nor the U.S.A.F. had
lythe capability to perform the whole task without serious/impairing their
operations in other parts of the world, while the sole use of the
(Torporations would have caused severe disruption to their scheduled
services. Altogether 25 British carriers took part in the Airlift,
57including ESAA, BOAC and Flight Refuelling (see Table 2.1), under 
the direction of E.P. Whitfield, BEA manager in Germany.
56
56. Wyatt: 'Eritish Independent Aviation - past and future'.
Journal of the Institute of Transport. 1963» p. 109.
57. As neither the R.A.F. nor the U.S.A.F. had any tanker aircraft 
in service, Flight Refuelling Ltd., a private company founded in 
1936 by Sir Alan Cobham and not really an air transport operator, 
had to be extensively used to carry fuel in modified bombers. 
Rodrigo: "Berlin Airlift," I960, p.W.
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Table 2.1: Berlin Airlift Civil Operators
Company and period 
of operations.
number of
aircraft
employed
Sorties Hours Tonnage
carried
1. Air Contractors 
4/8/48-10/1 l/tf8 3 386 1,066 1,376.6
2. Airflight 
3/9/48-12/7/49 3 967 2,669 8,416.6
3- Air Transport 
Charter (C.I.) 
4/8/48-10/11/48 1 205 562 742.6
4. Airwork
10/11/48-12/2/49 2 74 218 370.6
5. Aquila Airways 
4/8/48-15/12/48 3 265 700 1,409.2
6. Bond Air Services 
4/8/48-15/8/48 12 2,577 6,425 17,131.4
7. British American 
Air Services 
11/12/^8-12/7/49 3 661 1,985 4,462.9
8. British Nederland 
Air Services 
21/9/48-14/11/48 1 76 230 276.4
Q PAAP
* 20/10/48-25/11/48 3 81 224 294
10.BSAA
- 23/9/48-10/8/49 7 2,562 6,973 22,125.2
11. Ciro’s Aviation 
6/8/48-10/11/48 2 328 930 1,177.4
12. Eagle Aviation 
2 6/8/48-15/8/49 4 1 ,054 2,471 7,303.8
13. Flight Eefuelling 
27/7/48-10/8/49 12 4,438 11,611 27.114.6
14. Hornton Airways 
24/9/48-18/11/48 1 IO8 3OI 397.5,
15. Kearsley Airways 
4/8/48-20/11/48 2 246 679 888.6
Table 2.1 (cont'd)
16. X*.A. C.
52.
16/10/48-12.7.49 13 2,760 8,715 16,413.2
17. Scottish Aviation 
4/8/48-14/8/48 and 
19/2/49-12/7/49 5 497 1,514 3,174.7
18. Silver City Airways 
18/9/48-5/2/49 4 213 619 896.4
19- Sivewright Airways 
13/10/48-15/11/48 1 32 87 116.1
20. Skyflight
.17/9/48-6/10/48 2 40 105 276.1
21 Skyways
16/11/48-15/8/49 8 2,749 7,3'i8 23,488.3
22. Trans World Charter 
23/9/48-14/11/48 2 - 118 332 415.4
23. Trent Valley Aviation 
4/8/48-10/11/ 48 1 186 504 665.5
24. Westminster Airways 
• 4/8/48-23/11/48 and 
15/12/48-12/7/49 6 772 2,314 4,343.9
25» World Air Freight 
6/10/48-8/10/48 and 
24/12/48-15/8/49 3 52.6 1,212 3,703.2
Total 21,921
approx
60,000 1^6,980.2
Source: Stroud: 'Annals of British and Commonwealth 
Air Transport, 1919-60,' p. 649-50.
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Table 2.2: Berlin Airlift, Total Sorties and Tonnage,
Total sorties RAF
U.S
65,857
189,965
British Civil 21,98**
Total 277,80*1
Total tonnage RAF
US
39^,509 
1, 785,573
British
Civil 1**7,727
Total 2, 325,809
Source: Rodrigo: 'Berlin Airlift', I960, p. 215.
Nb. figures given in Table 2 .2  do not exactly correspond to those 
given in Table 2.1. There are several different estimates of the 
quantities involved, but Stroud's figures are more likely to be 
correct. Compare also Donovan: 'Bridge in the Sky', 1970, p. 198j 
HMSO, op.cit.,p 50,’ and Merer: 'The Berlin Air Lift'. Journal of the 
Royal Aeronautical Society. 1950,p- 519*
’ It is difficult to over-estimate the importance of the Berlin Airlift, 
especially if viewed together with the change in Government policy towards 
the Independents that began in 19^8. During the Airlift British airlines 
had transported almost double the total tonnage of mail and cargo carried
58by all UK civil aircraft on scheduled services over the previous 23 years. 
Wheatcroft lists three ways in which the status of the private companies was 
changed. Firstly, it gave them an accumulation of operating experience which 
would have taken them many years otherwise to acquire. Secondly, it 
persuaded the Government of the value of the privately-owned airlines as a 
military transport reserve, and indeed their later extensive use in the 
field of trooping can to some extent be seen as a direct outcome of the Berlin
58. Merer, op.cit.,p. 519
Airlift. Finally, it considerably increased the financial strength 
of the companies, since they were able, for the first time, to engage in
59a really large-scale transport operation. Even those airlines that 
were not directly involved in the Airlift benefitted from the general 
bouyancy of the charter market. Shortage of aircraft, especially the 
larger ones, was often so acute that rates were pushed up dramatically.
Associate Agreements:
The second major development during 19^3 was the introduction of
'associate agreements'. Since the passing of the 19*+6 Civil Aviation Act the
Government had remained quite adament that all scheduled services within the
UK were the sole preserve of BEA. As late as July, 19^7, Mr. George Lindren,
Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Civil Aviation, had said that
"it would be at variance with the Act to allow charter companies to run
60scheduled services where the Corporations were unwilling to do so."
Despite such statements, however, by May, 19!i8, the Government had back­
pedalled somewhat and allowed a number of independent airlines to operate 
certain regular services as 'associates' of BEA, for an experimental period 
of six months (which was later extended.) Such associate agreements 
were drawn up by BEA and defined exactly how the services were to be run.
The main reason for this change of heart seems to have been a realisation 
_that the Corporation would not be in a position within the immediate 
future to maintain all the domestic routes which had been taken-over in 
19^6/1+7 and for which a demand apparently existed without incurring very 
heavy losses. This was a period when the Government was finding it 
difficult to raise the capital needed for the rebuilding of the economy
59. Wheatcroft: "Air Transport PolicyJ' i9b,t, p. 33-3^«
60. Quoted by 'Flight', 3/7A?, p. 17.
61. Ibid., 27/5/W, p. 572. '
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and in particular for the vast new public sector, so that any short-term
62means of tapping private risk capital must have appeared attractive.
The device of making companies associates of one of the Corporations 
was provided for under Clause 14, sub-section 4, of the 1946 Act, 
probably originally intended to cover the need for one of the nationalised 
airlines contracting for temporary or emergency operations.
It states:
"In this Act the expression 'associate' in relation to any 
of the three Corporations means any subsidiary of the Corporation, 
or any undertaking which (a) is constituted for the purpose of 
providing air transport services or engaging in any other activities 
of a kind which the Corporation has power to carry on; and (b) 
is associated with the Corporation under terms of any arrangement 
for the time being approved by the Minister as being an arrangement 
calculated to further the efficient discharge of the function of 
the Corporation." 63
During this trial period associate services were restricted to 
routes on which the demand was seasonal, such as routes to holiday 
resorts, and to short-distance ferry services. Cambrian Airways became the 
first Independent to be awarded a licence, for the route between Cardiff 
and Weston-super-Mare, which had been closed down by BEA as uneconomic.
Altogether 20 charter companies were licensed to operate scheduled services on
- ,, 6411 routes and inclusive-tours on 13.
In June, 1948, Lord Pakenham succeeded Lord Nathan as Minister of 
Civil Aviation. One of his first official actions, on July 21st, was to 
appoint Marshal of the RAF Lord Douglas of Xirtleside to undertake an 
investigation into the operation of associate agreements and their relation 
to the Civil Aviation Act. Lord Douglas' report recommended that until
62. Corbett, op.cit.,p. 152“3 .
63. Civil Aviation Act, 1946, 9 and 10 Geo.6, c.?0.
64. Ministry of Civil Aviation, op.cit., 1948/49, p.23.
BEA was in a position to provide all the scheduled services in the 
country for which there was a justifiable demand, charter companies 
should continue to be allowed to operate certain routes as associates of 
the Corporations. The Government announced that the Air Transport 
Advisory Council (ATAC), under the chairmanship of Lord Terringtcn, 
was to consider each application for a licence and recommend acceptance
65or rejection, although the final decision had to rest with the Minister.
In order to assist and guide the Council along the lines of Government 
policy Lord Pakenham issued a directive. This laid down that when 
applications for licences were being considered the ATAC should pay 
attention to the cost of supplying ground and navigational facilities 
and avoid recommending the route if such additional expenditure seemed 
necessary. The Minister also insisted that the Council should have the 
right to fix the maximum and minimum fares to be charged, but that in 
general fares should not be less than those charged by the Corporations, 
except by agreement with them. Provision was made for the submission 
of applications to the Corporation for comment, and also that any company 
granted permission.to.operate scheduled services should not employ its 
staff on terms less favourable than those offered to the employees of the 
nationalised airlines. Finally, the Council was directed not to recommend
the award of an associate agreement licence for more than two years at
. . 66a time.
The ATAC had been established under the 19*+6 Act to consider, 
firstly, any representation from the public about the facilities provided
65. 'Flight', 3/2/** 9, p. 129.
66. Hansard, House of Lords, 26/l/**9, Vol. 160, cols. 350-35**;
ATAC Report, 19**9, P- 13-1*+.
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by the three State Corporations and the charges made for them, and, 
secondly, any question concerning air transport which the Minister might 
refer to it. As there had been very few representations from the public 
.the Council had had little to do during the first two years of its 
existence. But that now changed. In 19^9 it received a total of 231 
applications for licences and finally recommended that 2k independent airline 
should be made associates of BEA to operate 59 scheduled services (two 
were subsequently rejected by the Minister) and 26 inclusive-tours.
The following year, out of 177 applications the Council recommended the 
licensing of 80 scheduled services and l6 inclusive-tours, nearly all of 
which, like the previous year's, were for periods of one year only. This
/'n
time the Minister rejected four of the proposed routes.
By 1950, however, increasing dissatisfaction was being voiced by the
Independents about the period of operation granted to them. One year,
or even two, was not enough, they argued, to enable them to plan ahead
with any degree of certainty. They were particularly worried about the
difficulty of raising capital to finance the purchase of new equipment.
As a result of these protests, and after consultation with BEA, it was
decided that associate agreements should be extended to a maximum period of
68five years. This only partly solved the problem. The ATAC Report for 
1951 commented:
"It has...become even more apparent that there is only a 
limited field in which Independent Companies can hope to 
operate associated services economically under the present 
arrangements... The experiences of the past year suggest 
to the Council that the Independent Companies are unlikely 
to seek an increase in the number of scheduled services under 
associate agreements with the Corporations, unless they can 
be given longer tenure and better opportunities to plan 
their operations on a basis giving more economical use of 
their aircraft." 68a
67. 'Flight',Vl/52 , p.l6-17. The ATAC had replaced the Air Transport
Licencing Authority, established in 1938 to rationalise domestic 
air services - Ministry of Information, op.cit., p.30.
68. 'Flight', op.cit.
'68a. p. 11-12,
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For such a development, however, the private operators had to wait 
for a Conservative Government.
Thus, from 19*+9 the basic principle of a Government monopoly in 
British scheduled air transport ceased to exist in fact, although it 
was to continue as a legal concept for many more years. It was, further­
more, a Labour Government that first opened the door, albeit only 
slightly, to the participation of private operators in the provision 
of regular air services. Table 2.3 illustrates the beginning of the 
recovery of the private sector in this sphere.
Table 2.3• The Independents' Scheduled Services,
19^6-19^9 (000’s).
Revenue passenger' 
-miles flown
Passengers
carried
Revenue ton- 
Passengers
-miles
Mail
flown
Freight Total
19*16 30,060 229. *• 2,329 6 7 113 2,509
19^7 1,987 1*1.2 1**9 8 Ik 171
19*18 330 12.9 2k - - 2k
19^9 5,965 . . . 59.1 **63 209 672
Source: Ministry of Civil Aviation: 'Civil Aviation 
Reports,’ 19*^ 6/*»7 and 19**8/*»9.
There is no doubt, of course, that the Government regarded the
associate agreement device as a purely temporary solution to a difficult 
problem. Lord Pakenham warned the Independents that they would be unwise 
to consider the new opportunities opened for them as a thin end of the 
wedge to their benefit. Three principles, he said, guided him in 
allowing the private airlines to operate scheduled services as
associates of BEA:
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"The first was that we must look to the time when the 
Corporations run all the internal scheduled services; 
secondly, that there is a limit to the burden that can 
be imposed on the taxpayer during the period while they 
are cutting down their costs and actually developing 
their network; thirdly, that it would be wrong in the 
meanwhile to deny the public any facilities that can 
be offered under reasonable conditions by private 
companies...(I believe that) nationalised air transport 
is the only conceivable form of air transport in this 
country." 69
But over the next two years this policy began to look more and 
more like a semi-permanent arrangement, and when the Conservatives 
returned to power in 1951 it took on a different complexion and became 
the very 'thin end of the wedge' about which Lord Pakenham had 
spoken.
Depression:
The new scheduled services that the Independents were allowed to
operate, of course, were still relatively few in number and it would be
some time before they would make any positive contribution to the
financial strength of the airlines concerned. In addition, as long as
the Labour Party remained in power there would always be a major element of
uncertainty about such services. A BACA report, for example, noted that
the "Associate agreements are granted only with the approval of the
Minister and are in no way permanent. They have helped the companies
but the companies cannot depend upon a continuence of the agreements.
The Corporation is already .taking over some of the routes which were
70started and developed by the companies." Meanwhile, the position of 
the private operators, especially those engaged actively in the general 
charter market, deteriorated markedly.
- - ■ ■ «-- --------------  --------------------
69. Hansard, op.cit., 2 / 2 / 1*9» vol. 160, col. ^93.
70. BACA: 'A Case for the Independent Air Transport Companies in the UK', 
1950, p.9.
The downturn in the fortunes of the Independents showed
itself in a number of ways. In December, 19^9» Hunting Air Travel
lost its lucrative contract with the Overseas Food Corporation to
BOAC under circumstances that led to protests from Hunting and BACA
71about unfair competition from the State airline. Similarly, Skyways
withdrew its services between Nairobi, Mauritius and Johannesburg
72because of uneconomic loads and a lack of government subsidy. Perish­
able fruit and flowers, which had once formed the mainstay of air 
freight traffic, were by 19**9 being carried almost exclusively by rail, 
partly because the airlines had tended to neglect this market during 
the lucrative Berlin Airlift and partly because the railways were
increasingly able to compete in terms of both price and service with the
73use of refrigerated vans'. But the major problem], with the ending of
the airlift to Berlin, was that of over-capacity, and it was primarily
this factor that resulted in 19^9 being a year of cut-backs and general
slump for the private operators. In July, for instance, Skyways was •
forced to lay-off ¿tOO employees because of the depressed state of the
7kcharter market.
Since the war it had hardly been an infrequent occurrence for a 
small independent airline to be forced into liquidation, but now both 
large and small companies were facing difficulties. In December, 19*+9» 
Westminster Airways, which had been formed in 19**6 by four Members of 
Parliament, was wound up as a result of "the restrictive provisions of 
the Civil Aviation Act, 19**6, and other restrictions on the'activities of
71. 'The Economist,' 2*»/l2/*i8t p. l**31-2, and 'Flight,' 3/ll/i*8|p. 581.
72. 'Flight', **/8/**9,p. ik O .
73. 'The Economist', 19/1/52,p. 17** •
7*1. 'Flight', 2l/7/**9,P- 68.
independent charter companies." ' The following March, Kearsley 
Airways went out of business. The company issued a statement, which 
in many ways reflected the general attitude and apprehensions of the 
Independents:
"After thoughtful consideration of the present charter 
market situation and the prospects for the future, the directors 
of Kearsley Airways Ltd., have decided to cease air operations.
The current unstable conditions have been caused by circum­
stances and events which are already well known and could only 
be retrieved, it is thought, by changes which are difficult to 
foresee in the immediate future." 76
Probably the greatest surprise came in June, 1950, when following the
termination of its contract with BOAC to fly a scheduled service to the
Persian Gulf, the largest British independent airline, Skyways, was forced
into voluntary liquidation. The company was re-formed as Skyways (1950) Ltd
to carry on operations, but on a much reduced scale; in March, 1952, it
77was taken over by Mr. Eric Ryland's LAC.
It is not difficult to discover the underlying cause of the private, 
operators' problems. The restrictions of the 19^6 Act, despite the 
complaints from the airlines themselves, can only provide a partial 
answer. Far more important was the excessive number of small companies 
still trying to scratch a living. Appendix II lists some 70 air charter 
carriers registered in April, 19^9, almost half of whom probably had no 
more than four aircraft each. The smaller operators could usually, though 
far from always, manage to keep their heads above water during periods of 
relative prosperity. But when the charter market became depressed, in 
order to keep going they were forced to resort to the only effective 
weapon at their disposal - price-cutting - which proved disastrous 
for everyone in the industry. As T.L. Logan, secretary of the Airbrokers'
75. Ibid., 8/12A9,p. 751.
76. Ibid., 16/3/50, p. 25**.
77. 'The Economist', 17/6/50,p. 1359.
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Association said at the time:
"Rates in any market fluctuate, but bear a mean 
relation to the current conditions. Aircraft operators can 
compete by the shading of their quotations or by offering 
better conditions, but the wholesale slashing of prices is 
not only suicide for the company quoting but causes needless 
depression of the market generally and eventual elimination 
even of the soundest operators." 78
In other words, what was taking place was the long-overdue weeding-out of 
the smaller, less efficient carriers; unfortunately, they also took with 
them some of the less secure larger airlines.
An uneconomic price-level was not the only difficulty facing 
the small and medium-sized independent operators at this time. Those 
that had remained solvent since the war were usually able to cover their 
prime costs and such overheads as salaries, hangars and depreciation of 
existing aircraft based on their original cost. But the problem vras 
that the original cost in most cases had been artificially low, since the 
planes had been bought very cheaply as surplus war-stock. Even those 
companies making relatively healthy profits found it extremely difficult 
to accumulate sufficient reserves over four or five years to buy replacement 
aircraft at current prices unless they were backed by another company 
prepared to inject fresh capital. An operator of a Dakota (DC-3), which 
might have cost about £ ,^000 in 19 5^» would need £60,000 or so to replace 
it. Fleet renev/al was becoming more and more urgent, partly in order to 
remain competitive in the world charter market and partly because the ex­
bomber aircraft, with which many of the Independents were equipped, were 
nearing the end of their operational life. The situation was made worse 
by the fact that the major scheduled airlines, the normal source of supply
for charter operators, had replacement problems of their own and were
79releasing few of their older aircraft. *
78. 'Flight; 30/2/50, p. 399.
*79» 'The Economist', 26/2/,i9t P» 381
^3
Estimates of the amount of paid flying time needed to remain solvent 
varied considerably, but on the whole indicate why the smaller company 
found it difficult to finance the purchase of new equipment out of retained 
profits. One company operating Dakotas reported that each plane had to 
earn at least £5,000 a month to meet all operating expenses and the cost 
of replacing the aircraft at current prices. This would involve flying 20,000 
miles each month, or more than 100 revenue hours, and such figures were 
rarely attained by the smaller carriers. Other sources suggested that a 
similar aircraft would have to operate for at least 700 revenue hours per 
year to cover prime costs and provide for new equipment at a rate somewhere 
between historic and replacement cost. Since by 19^9 there was a year- 
round excess of capacity in small aircraft and a seasonal excess in larger 
planes, it is not surprising that many companies faced severe financial
go
strain when forced to modernise their fleets. The American charter
market, on the other hand, was booming and a number of British operators
took advantage of the high prices being paid there for second-hand aircraft
to sell out and leave the industry during 1950/51* By the end of 1950
81the membership of BACA had already fallen to 25. The larger companies, 
of course, were in a more favourable position, partly because they often 
had access to sufficient financial resources to ride out a slump and re­
equip their fleets, but partly also because they were usually more efficient 
and able to achieve higher aircraft utilisation figures. The York aircraft 
owned by Skyways, for example, were flying 2,500 revenue hours per year 
(compared with 1,800 for BOAC's Yorks), while the same company's DC-^s 
achieved 3,600 paid flying hours a year (against 3,000 by BOAC's
Op
Constellations). But then even Skyways was forced into bankruptcy.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid, 19/1/52,p- 17*; 'Flight; 31/8/50,P. 2*9-50.
82. 'The Economist', 26/2/*9, p. 381 .
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The general economic situation in which the Independents found 
themselves is reflected in the experiences of numerous individual 
companies, several of which were to become famous in later years. For 
example, East Anglian Flying Services (Channel Airways) had been founded 
in 19^6 by Sqn. Ldr. R.L# (Jack) Jones. By 1951 business was so poor 
that Jones was forced to dismiss the entire stuff with the exception of one 
boy, and the airline was only kept ticking over by carrying out pleasure
83flights. Eagle Aviation was established in 19^8 by Mr. Harold Bamberg
with a single Halifax bought for £500. After a period of flying fruit from
Spain and Italy Bamberg bought two more Halifaxes to take part in the
Berlin Airlift. By the early 1950s, however, the general downturn in the
charter market had caught up with him and he sold his entire fleet,
reportedly saying that he did so as a personal protest against the
8*+Government's civil aviation policy. But probably the best-known aviation
entrepreneur of the era is Mr. Freddie Laker. He was a trained engineer
and at the end of the war, after serving in the Air Transport Auxiliary, worked
for BEA and LAMS. In 19^7 he founded Aviation Traders to buy and sell
aircraft and spare parts. When the Allied aiflift to Berlin began he
bought 12 Halifaxes from BOAC for £*i2,000 (of which he borrowed
£38,000 from a friend); half were operated on the Airlift and half used
for spares. With the end of the Berlin emergency, during which he had
made a handsomeprofit, Laker correctly foresaw what was about to happen
in the charter market. Unlike most of his contemporaries, therefore,
he withdrew completely from air transport operations and instead began
buying up some 6,000 surplus aircraft engines'and 100 bombers, which he
85melted down and sold for scrap. The wise investment of the money he 
made from this operation was to prove a very important factor in financing 
Laker's later aviation activities.
83. 'Aeroplane', 29/9/66,p.5. Channel eventually went bankrupt in 1972.
'8*4. Jackson: 'The Sky Tramps', 1965« p.?8-9. Eagle closed down for the final time, after a chequered history, in 1968.
85. Ibid., p. . 77-78; T.V. interview, BBCl, 8/10/72.
The Slump in the charter market lasted throughout 192i9 and into 
1950. But for those companies that managed to remain solvent 1950 in 
fact proved to be far from unrewarding. In November, 1950, Eric Rylands, as 
Chairman of BACA, commented: "It is becoming abundantly clear that if 
the independent operators are to survive, a proportion of their work must
, gg
come either directly or indirectly from the Government." This is 
exactly what had already begun to happen, and is the major factor behind 
the 1950 recovery. The Korean War, which began in June, gave new 
opportunities to a number of carriers, as well as pushing up charter 
rates generally. More important, however, was the beginning of air troop­
ing on a large scale, a development that was to prove the main source of 
income for the Independents over the next decade or so. In 1950 the 
Government spent a total'of £250,000 on chartering aircraft from the 
private airlines; during 1951/52 contracts worth £i.5 million were placed.^ 
By the end of 1951. therefore, after six years of expansion and
depression, optimism and gloom, a much slimmer, healthier independent
industry •
airlin^emerged, one that had achieved a foothold in the operation of
scheduled services, could look forward to large, profitable government
contracts, and, perhaps above all, saw the return to power of a Conservative
Government committed "to restoring a wide measure of private enterprise in
88the air." But the real importance of these six years lies in the fact 
that out of the political, economic and social disruption of post-war 
Britain emerged a civil aviation structure that, with its many problems 
and contradictions, was to last for the next twenty years.
86. 'Flight; 9/11/50, p. M l,
8?. Hansard, op.cit., 16/7/52, Vol. 503, col. 2157; 'Flight', 16/3/51,p.522. 
88. Lennox-Boyd, 'Flight', 16/11/51, p« 631»
Chapter III
NEW. BUT SCRUBBY PASTURES, 1951-60
Despite the fact that 1951 proved to be a relatively prosperous 
year for the privately-owned airlines in the UK, at least for those 
that managed to remain solvent,' the Independents as a group were far from 
satisfied with their situation. Hr. Eric Rylands, Chairman of the 
British Independent Air Transport Association (BIATA& which replaced 
BACA in 1951, claimed that the airlines had been living in what was 
virtually a "Gestapo police-state".1 Government policy, it was argued, 
was still far too restrictive, especially with regards to scheduled 
services. Apart from actually obtaining work, however, the main 
problem was that the Independents did not have the stability nor 
prospects to attract large-scale financial backing, and without capital ' 
they were not able to purchase more modern equipment and expand their 
activities. Thus, the victory of the Conservative Party at the 1951 
General Election was generally welcomed in private air transport circles.
The Tories were after all firmly committed to an expansion of the 
opportunities open to the independent operators. Their 1951 policy 
statement had been suitably vague, merely saying: "For civil aviation
we favour a combination of public and private enterprise."1 2 * But that 
of 19A9 had gone much further: "For the full development of mercantile 
aviation, scope must be given to the pioneering spirit of free enterprise. 
Ve shall, therefore, review the structure of the Corporations and of the
1. ’Flight', 16/11/51» P* 631.
2. Conservative and Unionist Central Office: ’Britain Strong and Free,'
1951, p.22.
Ministry itself, so as to eliminate unnecessary functions and restore 
as wide a measure of private enterprise as possible." ^ On acceding to 
office, the Conservatives quickly re-affirmed that this was still their 
policy.
"The private operators have...been allowed to get a 
foothold - though only a small one - in the field of the 
scheduled services. But there are some of us who feel 
that the private operator can play a more important part in 
the development of civil aviation...It is the intention of 
tne Government to help forward the sound development of 
civil aviation, to reduce the cost of air transport to the 
taxpayer and to give greater opportunities to private 
enterprise to take part in air transport development, 
without in any way impairing the competitive strength of 
our international air services." k
F o r its part, BIATA issued a public statement setting out in detail
the administrative changes it v/ould like to see introduced. The main
demands can be summarised as follows:
i) the amendment of existing legislation so as to restore a
wide measure of freedom to private enterprise.
ii) Ihe reservation of charter operations primarily for the
independent companies as long as scheduled services were
mainly reserved for the nationalised airlines.
iii) the establishment of an independent Statutory Licensing Body for 
the examination and approval of applications to operate regular 
services.'*
In November, 1951, the new Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, T.S. 
Mackay, informed BIATA and the ATAC that he was about to consider future 
policy with a view to giving the Independents more scope. Meanwhile, 
approval to operate new scheduled services as associates of the Corporations 
was temporarily restricted to a maximum period of one year. Over the *5
3• Ibid. 'The Right Road for Britain,' 19^9« p.?9.
b . Lord Leathers: Hansard, House of Lords, 15/12/51, vol.174, cols.82.1-?.
5. BIATA Annual Report, 195''/52,P*''2.
following few months Mackay and, from April, his successor, Lennox- 
Boyd, held a series of meetings with BIATA and other interested parties 
to assist in the formulation of such a new policy.
The'New Deal'
The Conservatives' civil aviation policy, the so-called 'New Deal', 
was eventually introduced in May, 1952. It is interesting to note that 
the process of easing the restrictions on charter companies was to a 
large extent an international-phenomenon. For example, in France, Europe's 
other major air transport nation, a similar development had already taken 
place. As Sundberg points out, throughout Europe and, to some extent,
North America "the previous division of air carriers into scheduled 
airlines and the irregulars came to be abandoned more or less completely 
and the latter category was in many respects assimilated to the former. " * 7 
This trend is clearly reflected in the' number of former charter companies 
that became members of the International Air Transport Association (IATA), 
such as Transports Ae'rians Intercontinentaux and Union Ae'romaritime de 
Transport in 1952, Hunting in 1955, Airwork in 1955 and Eagle and Skyways 
in 1957.8 The formation of BIATA, to replace the British Air Charter 
Association, might similarly be viewed as part of the same process; the 
private carriers no longer wanted to be identified solely with charter
operations.
The primary intention of the new British policy, according to 
Lennox-Boyd, was to "tilt the emphasis on greater competition in the air. " 9 
The opportunities open to the private carriers were enlarged, although
6- Ibid., p.11-12.
7. Sundberg: 'Air Charter,' 1961, p. 31~2.
8. Ibid., p.32; 'Flight', 19/7/57,p.95.
9. 'Flight', 6/6/52 p. 596.
within the framework of the existing law, partly because of the Govern­
ment's heavy legislative programme. In other words, the associate 
agreement device was retained, as was the ATAC as a quasi-independent 
licensing authority with powers of recommendation only. Under the 
Conservatives, however, associate agreements emerged as something rather 
different than had been originally envisaged. In Corbett's words, they 
became a "hunting licence for privately-owned airlines to catch what 
traffic they could" from the State Corporations.^
The main points embodied in the New Deal were:
i) the broad field of charter operations was reserved primarily 
for the Independents; the Corporations were not permitted 
to maintain a fleet of aircraft specifically for this type 
of work; 10a
ii) in future associate agreements would be granted for periods 
of up to seven years (ten. in special cases) to give the 
security required for the acquisition and outlay of capital;
iii) the Independents could apply along with the nationalised 
airlines for any new overseas or domestic service not forming 
part of the Corporations' existing networks, providing such 
new services did not "materially divert traffic" from 
existing operators; they could also apply for any route 
from which a British airline had withdrawn for other than 
temporary or seasonal reasons;
iv) the Independents were particularly encouraged to apply for 
licences to operate all-freight services (the Corporations 
were refused permission to apply for such services for one 
year) and other special services (such as vehicle-ferries, third- 
class services on certain routes, inclusive-tours, etc.) that 
were not directly competitive with the nationalised airlines. 11 10
10. 'Politics and the Airlines', 19^5,P* 153- The Corporations no longer, 
of course , had any say in the granting or terms of any associate 
agreement.
10a. In fact, BEA had wound up its separate charter section in 1950:
"Our policy is...to operate charter flights only as extensions of 
our normal scheduled services and then only in so far as aircraft 
and crews are available which will not be required for scheduled 
services or duplicates." BEA Annual Report, 1950/51, P* 12-13.
11. ATAC Annual Report, 1952/53, Appendix E, p. 29-35»
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There can be little doubt that the policy eventually decided upon was
a compromise solution. It promised the private operators the possibility
of a larger and more secure share of British air transport, but a fairly
moderate rate of growth and the continuance of the Corporation s* supremacy.
In addition to the heavy legislative programme, an important factor in
determining the make-up of the new policy may well have been a desire to
establish something relatively permanent that would not be immediately
reversed should Labour return to power. BIATA, for example, following
its meetings with the Minister, reported:"It was clear, as these talks
developed, that the Government were anxious to avoid a head-on conflict
12with the Labour Party on Civil Aviation policy." But like most
compromises, the 'New Deal' failed to fully satisfy anyone. Certainly
the Opposition disliked the proposals,regarding them as the thin end of
the wedge in an attempt to reduce the relative importance of the State
airlines. Likewise, despite the similarities between the Government's
policy and that of BIATA, the Independents were far from over-joyed.
The main complaint of the private operators still revolved around
the problem of finance. They argued that a type of 'vicious circle' had
been created: the new opportunities were neither wide nor secure enough
to attract sufficient capital, and without large-scale financial backing it
was impossible to take full advantage of the new policy. Mr. Eric Rylands,
on behalf of BIATA, expressed "profound disappointment that the door to
the development of British air transport is to be left little more than
ajar." He went on to criticize the Government's continuation of the
15"Socialist policy of wet-nursing the Corporations." . But this initial 
reaction was soon followed by the more considered judgment that the 12*
12. BIATA Annual Report, 1951/52, p.12.
13« 'Flight', 6/6/52,p. 696,
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Independents would fully exploit the new areas opened up to them, while
pressing for a more liberal policy. By the end of 1952 even Mr. Rylands
had to admit that although the 'New Deal' still seemed to provide too much
protection for the 'haves' and not enough opportunity for the 'have nots',
the privately-owned airlines had nevertheless gained ground and approached
14
1953 with more hope than earlier years had given.
Growth of Scheduled Services;
Despite their initial disappointment the independent airlines did 
indeed take full advantage of the more permissive legislative environment. 
Trooping and vehicle-ferry operations expanded rapidly, but it was the growth 
of scheduled services that was seen as most significant and which attracted 
most attention. Apart from strengthening their domestic scheduled services, 
the Independents also pioneered various 'cut-price' operations. One of 
these was the introduction of Colonial Coach Services on certain cabotage 
routes. According to the terms of reference given to the ATAC by the 
Minister, any British airline could operate such 'third-class' services 
"providing the proposed service is of such a nature as to generate a new 
class of passenger traffic without material diversion of traffic from the 
•normal scheduled services' of any other previously approved UK operator."
In order to prevent traffic diversion from an established carrier,
Colonial Coach services had to?
(a) provide a lower class of service than that of normal 
scheduled services, for example as regards type of aircraft, 
shorter stage lengths, passenger amenities, baggage 
allowance, etc., and
(b) be operated to a stated frequency cloeely related to the 
requirements of the new class of traffic in the territories 
in which rights may be exercised and at a fare not 
exceeding a fixed sum (without rebates) low enough to 
ensure dependence on the new class of traffic." 15 *15
1^. BIATA, op.cit.,foreword.
15. ATAC, op.cit.,p.3 1.
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The idea, therefore, was to give the private carriers the
opportunity of providing international scheduled services, while at
the same time minimising the effect on the Corporations. The new
services were designed to cater for those passengers unable to afford
full air fares but who were prepared to accept less comfort and
convenience. The first Colonial Coach service was operated jointly by
Airwork and Hunting once a week from June, 1952, between London and
Nairobi. Both companies had been active for some time on this route,
using the device that later became known as affinity-group charters.
Operating a 25-seat Viking, the journey took nearly three days, compared
with some 2*+ hours by BOAC; the fare, however, was £98 single, £180
return, against the Corporation's £lhO and £252 respectively. The
success of the initial venture (by mid-June it was already fully booked
each way until the following November) led to its extension to West and
Central Africa and Gibraltar.1^
A rather similar development was the introduction of so-called
'Coach-Air' services between England and the Continent, inaugurated by
Skyways in September, 1955. The concept had been devised during
the late 19hO's by Mr. Eric Rylands for use between Blackpool and the
Isle of Man. 17 T.R. Hawkes, of Silver City Airways, argued that the
object of this type of service was "to offer an entirely new form of
integrated public transport; one which differed in method, fares and
18service from anything at that time in existence." The first Coach- 
Air route involved a coach journey from London to Lympne, a flight by 
a DC-3 aircraft containing 32 seats (the same number as the coach) to
16. 'The Economist,' 31/6/52, ?• 8^0-3; 'Aeroplane' , 17/V59, p. *»52;
Wyatt: 'British Independent Aviation - Past and Future'. Journal of the 
Institute of Transport, 19&3,P* HO.
1?. 'Aeroplane', 23/9/65, P* ^-5.
t
18. Hawkes: 'Air Ferry Integration with Surface Transport for the
Carriage of Passengers'. Journal of the Institute of Transport., 1958 ^
p. 381.
Beauvais, some 80 miles north of Paris, and finally a train journey 
into the French capital. Again the intention was to 'create' rather 
than 'divert' traffic by offering a less comfortable service at a 
cheaper price than ordinary scheduled flights. As in the case of the 
earlier vehicle air-ferries (see chapter IX) the total cost was kept 
down by minimising the actual distance flown and maximising the Use of 
surface transport. The cheapest fare by Skyways was £7-25p* night 
tourist return, compared with £9-95p* by BEA, (the Independent 
also offered a £6.5p. 'no passport' day return with six hours in Paris);
travel time between city centres was 5s'-6 hours, against the usual
_ If3-3? hours.
It soon became obvious that a fairly large latent demand existed 
for this type of operation; in its first year Skyways carried over 
50,000 passengers between London and Paris. Despite a measure of 
opposition from French Railways, a number of other routes were inaugur­
ated over the following few years with varying success: Skyways also 
operated to Brussels, Vichy, Nice, Dijon and Tours; Silver City began 
'Silver Arrow' services to Paris and Brussels; Air Kruse a 'Blue
Arrow' service to Lyons; Eagle a 'Swiss Eagle' service to Basle; and
20Air Charter routes to Calais, Rotterdam and Ostend. Thus, the 
development of both Colonial Coach and Coach-Air operations can be viewed 
as attempts by the Independents to gain a foothold in the scheduled
r
sector of air transport by exploiting a demand for cheap travel. It 
might be said that government policy had forced them to discover that 
a large section of the travelling public are highly cost-conscious, 
something which it took the larger established operators a considerable
19. Davies: 'A History of the World's Airlines', 1964,p.316-7;
'Flight; 29/7/55,P- 1*6.
20. 'Aeroplane', 1/7/60, p. 13-5.
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time to discover. Equally, however, it could be that in the case 
of Coach-Air Services the Independents were competing not so much with the 
scheduled carriers by means of price-cutting, but with surface transport 
concerns by offering improved service at a small premium cost. Coach- 
Air services were considerably quicker than their raiVsea counterparts
_ Viie'her. The truth probably lies somewherewith fares only marginally nigner.
between the two.
In announcing the 'New Deal' policy the Minister of Transport
and Civil Aviation had placed particular emphasis on the opportunities
open to the private sector in the field of scheduled all-freight services.
, • i in fact were not allowed to e x p a n d theirThe nationalised airlines in lact wci
scheduled freight network during the twelve months up to July, 1953.
Here again the Independents were far from slow to exploit the possibilities. 
Both Airowrk and Hunting applied to the ATAC for authority to operate on the 
North Atlantic. Airwork was successful and received a ten-year licence, 
adding US Presidential approval in April, 1 9 5 V ^  This was rather un­
fortunate for BOAC, which had itself intended to inaugurate a freight
* • fMct mute in the near future and was already negotiating to buyservice on this route in
special freighters. At the request of the Minister the Corporation and 
Airwork held discussions on the possibility of co-operating in the running
of the service, and there appears to have been a move in this direction,
22
although with no discernible results.
Other scheduled all-freight services were also soon established.
In January, 1955, for example, Airwork began operating between London 
and Frankfurt, while Hunting-Clan (as it was now called) followed in July 
with a freight service between the UK and Africa, in association with 
BOAC. 25 In November, 195*+, Skyways had similarly entered into an agreement
21. Ibid, 25/V5^, P-5C3.
22. ’The Economist’, 13/2/5**, P* ^2-^.
23. ’Flight’, 7/V55,P- 29 and 8/7/55,p*62.
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with the state airline to operate the latter's freight services to 
Singapore and Hong Kong (from Singapore Qantas took over as far as 
Australia). The Corporation had been losing between £1^0,000 and 
£200,000 per annum on these routes, primarily because of the excessive 
cost of keeping a small unit of York aircraft just for freighting
chartered to carry any freight that could not be
2 b
purposes. Skyways was 
accommodated on BOAC's scheduled services.^ In fact, the Corporation
wanted to purchase a holding in the private carrier. The Minister at 
first agreed, but four days later withdrew permission "when it had 
become clear to me that the proposed agreement discriminated against
* n25other independent operators.
A further sign that times »ere improving for the privately-owned
• • «I - several of them were able to finance theairlines was the fact that sevcia
. such as Viscounts, to replace their obsoletepurchase of modern arrcraf *
equipment. Theirinitial fears an this count largely proved groundless 
beoause of the considerable influx of capital from a number of shipping
, . ... „_rlv 1950's. In Hay, 1953, for example, Hunting-companies during the earij 7 s~
,h Viscount 700's (later increased to five), the Clan was able to order tnree
. , .;„ + ™^u'ed on domestic and international routes infirst of which was introduced
June, 1955.26Air»ork soon followed with an order for three Viscount 700's 
for delivery in the first half of 1956, and in June, 1955, Transair 
ordered two of the extended Viscount 800’s . 27 Thus, the private operators, 
especially the larger ones, appeared to be enjoying a rapid and relatively
a«! mirht be expected, their initial rate of growth prosperous expansion, a s 6
 ^ o ew, Nationalised Industries: 'The Air Corporations',
Annual K eport- 1961/62' p -5 3 -
25. Hansard’, House of Commons, S / V S 1*, vol. 526., col.9 (Written answer).
26. 'Flight', 22/5/53, p*61’'l and 29/V55, P’51*1.
27. 'Aeroplane', 27/8/51*. P- 2 «  and 1 /7 /5 5 ,P-23.
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far exceeded that of the Corporations (see Tables 3.1 - 3.3).
TABLE 3.1 : Scheduled Services Operated by the Independents
1950/51 - 1959/60 (Percentage increases in bracket«,)
Passengers
carried
Passenger- Freight(ton- Mail(ton-miles)
miles(ÔOO’s) milesKOOO's) (OOO's)
1950/31 55,512 ( -  )* 10,732 (
1951/52 74,426 (34 .0)*  14,598 (36
1952/53 123,957 (6 6 .7 )  29,2^5(100
1953/54 244,791 (9 7 .4 ) 56,481 (93
1954/55 337,228 (3 7 .7 )  86,038 (52
1955/56 506,331 (5 0 .1 ) 123,312 (43 
1956/57 637,^13 (2 5 .9 )  149,456 (21 
1957/58 755,617 (1 8 .5 ) 173,013 (15 
1958/59 769,878 ( 1 .9 ) 188,955 ( 9 
1959/60 950,029 (2 3 .4 ) 218f 700 (15
-  )* 44o ( -  )* 9 ( -  )*
.4)* 941 (113 .9)* 11 (22 .2 )*
.0 ) 1,240 ( 31 .8)* 15 (34 .4 )*
.5 ) 2,410 (212 .2 ) 23 (55 .3 )*
.2 ) 2,930 ( 19.4) 44 (9 1 .3 )
.4 ) 9,610 (228 .0) 43 ( -2 .3 )
.2 ) 6,567 (■■31.7) 40 ( -7 .0 )
.8 ) 7,958 ( 21 .2 ) 34 (-1 5 .0 )
.2 ) 11,033 ( 38 .6 ) 34 ( -  )
.7 ) 15,124 ( 37 .1) 17 (-5 0 .0 )
Traffic results for years ending 31st March unless marked with an 
asterisk (30th June). Excludes inclusive tours.
Sources : from BIATA Annual Reports and Ministry of 
Transport and Civil Aviation.
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TABLE 3*2: Passengers Carried by the Independents 1952/53 - 1959/60 •
International
Scheduled
Colonial Coach 
and Coach
UK Domestic 
Scheduled
1
1952/53 7,000 - 68,000
1953/5** **3,200 **,870 100,000
195V55 65,752 10,128 1**8,722
1955/56 92,681 13,**56 218,910
1956/57 178,736 15, **57 283,688
1957/58 239, **1** 15,970 337,103
1958/59 229,179 17,000 229,087
1959/60 27*1,938 19,130 336, **13
Sources: 
TABLE 3.3:
ATAC and BIATA Annual Reports.
Percentage changes over previous years in passenger- 
miles flown by the Corporations and Independents, 
1953/5** - 1955/56 (Scheduled Services).
BOAC BEA Independents
1953/5** +3.6 +28.7 + 93.1
195**/55 -**.2 +22.1 + 53-6
1955/56 +19.7 +22.8 + **3.3
Source: from Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation.
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Retardation
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From the mid-1950's a feeling of frustration began to establish 
itself among the privately-owned airlines. As the decade wore on the 
momentum of the expansion of scheduled services slowed down dramatically, 
and it increasingly became obvious that the 'New Deal' was failing 
to provide the firm foundations on which the Independents hoped to build 
a stable and profitable future. As 'The Economist' noted: "The changes
made in 1952 opened up to the independents a whole vista of new, but as
28it turned out somewhat scrubby pastures." To some extent a retardation 
in the rate of growth was inevitable - the private sector obviously 
could not sustain a very high growth rate for long - but the down-turn 
came so quickly and was so sharp that the airlines were soon demanding 
action on the part of the Government to rectify the situation, and they 
continued to voice their dissatisfaction with official policy through­
out the remainder of the 1950's. As early as December, 195**» for 
example, the chairman of BIATA, Air Commodore Powell, was arguing that 
a review of the 1952 policy was essential, not only to establish the
position of the independent operators on a sounder basis, but also to
29accelerate the overall expansion of the air transport industry.
The following year, M.H. Curtis, the new BIATA chairman and 
managing director of Hunting-Clan, returned to the same point 
and summed up the principal complaint of the Independents:
"The compromise policy of 1951 (sic) has in application 
shown itself to be at best a 'shot in the arm'. It has kept 
a sorely sick patient alive, but it still remains to be 
seen whether the doctors considered that they had then 
finished their job so that the patient was merely now suffer­
ing a longer drawn-out, and very costly, demise. Or 
whether the doctors were in the meantime investigating the 
root causes of the disease and getting ready to administer 
a further 'shot' which would not only restore the patient
28. 23/2/55,p. 657-9.
29. 'Flight; 10/12/5 ,^ p. 817. .
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to competitive fitness - but ready him for starting a 
whole family of healthy off-spring! At the present an 
atmosphere of disillusionment is developing among the 
independent operators and the patient anxiously hopes for 
some straight talking from its doctors - in this case the 
Government." JO
The 1956/57 BIATA Annual Report similarly repeated the demand for a re­
examination of current policy:
"The broad background of the year which is now under 
review... clearly emphasises, once again, the urgent need 
for considerable re-thinking on the question of the future 
of the independents and of British air transport. More 
than anything, perhaps, it indicates that the limits of 
current Government policy have been reached in all but a 
few cases as far as the independent airlines are concerned." 31
The available statistics appear to support the private operators*
view that their early gains were increasingly being threatened. During
the second half of the 1950's the Independents' rate of growth was
appreciably less than that of the Corporations; their share of Britain's
total air transport effort fell from approximately one-third in 1956 to
one-quarter in 1959. Such activities as trooping, vehicle-ferry
operations and inclusive-tours, of course, continued to record rapid
advances. But, on the whole, the expansion of scheduled services reached
a peak in 1955/56, and thereafter was relatively static until 1959
(see Table 3.1). This is important-because a large proportion of
scheduled activity, with its high revenue rates, was regarded as essential
for an airline's continued security and profitability. By 195^/59
scheduled services still only accounted for 22» of BIATA-member companies'
total output, compared with air troopings The proportion of UK
scheduled capacity produced by the private sector rose from l.&° in
1952/53 to in 1955/56, but fell to 6.6/4 the following year,^2 although
the share began to recover towards the end of the decade.
30. 'Financial Times', 5/9/55, P*7*
31• p. 6 .
32. BIATA Annual Reports.
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As far as domestic services were concerned, the main problem for 
the Independents centred on the fact that most of their output was 
concentrated on the 'holiday' routes, primarily to the Channel Islands and 
the Isle of Man. As the decade wore on the situation improved somewhat, 
but not nearly fast enough.
TABLE 3.i+: Number of Passengers Carried by the Independents on UK 
Domestic Scheduled Services, 1953/5*+-1955/56 (000's).
1953/5*+ ' 195V55 1955/56
Channel Isles *+9 69 98 .
Isle of Man ' *+2 5** 67
Other 9 25 5*+
Source: BIATA Annual Reports .
The inevitable result of this situation was that the private operators 
experienced very severe peaking problems, since most of the traffic 
would naturally be concentrated during the summer months. Thus, their 
peak month/trough month ratio for domestic services was 32.3 : 1 in 
1953/5*+ and 23.1 : 1 in 1955/56, compared with BEA's *+.1 : 1 and 
'3.2 : 1 respectively.^ There had been only a marginal improvement by 
the end of the decade. In 1959 privately-owned airlines were operating 
just two trunk routes, London-Newcastle (BKS) and London-Liverpool 
(Starways). Table 3*5 shows the results of a survey carried out by 
'Flight' in 1959; the Independents' peak/trough ratio was still 12 : 1, 
against 3 t 1 for BFA .
33. From Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation: 'Operating and 
Traffic Statistics of the UK Airways Corporations and their 
Associates.'
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TABLE 3.5: Sample Capacity Offered on UK Domestic Routes, 
February and August, 1959-
Seat-miles available Seat-miles available Peak/trough
(OOO's), February, (000's), August, ratio,
1959. 1959-
BEA 19,803 55,573 3 : 1
BKS 496 4,945 10 : 1
Jersey Airlines 1+53 4,715 10 : 1
Silver City 66 4,609 70 : 1
Cambrian 250 2,045 8 : 1
Derby 130 1,886 14 : 1
Channel W  . 1,669 -
Scottish - 497 -
Transair - v 353 -
Starways 310 310 .1 : 1*
Morton 24 297 12 : 1
Eagle - 156 -
Don Everall - 86 -*
Total 25.532 77,141 3.5 : 1
Independents
only 1.729 21,568 12 : 1
* = Starways only operated a single route, the business-orientated 
London-Liverpool service.
Nb. The above figures relate to capacity offered; since BEA's load- 
factors were generally better than those of the Independents, the 
peak/trough ratio of traffic actually carried would be even less 
favourable to the latter.
Source: 'Flight) 8/4/60, p.480-1
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Scheduled freight services appeared to have enjoyed a more 
buoyant expansion, despite the considerable decline in 195&/57 
following Airwork's withdrawal from the North Atlantic (see below). 
Unfortunately, some of this growth may be fictitious, since it seems 
probable that on certain major long-haul freight contracts 'load ton- 
miles' and 'capacity ton-miles' were treated as synonymous. The more 
likely situation is that freight traffic also rose to a peak in 1955 
with Airwork's Atlantic service, dropped dramatically the following 
year, and by 1959 had only risen slightly above the 1955 level.^
The Set-Backs
Airwork's attempt to establish itself as a scheduled all-freight 
carrier on the North Atlantic illustrates the frustrations felt by the 
Independents at this time. As we have seen, freighting had been 
singled out by the Government in 1952 as an area of activity particularly 
suitable for participation by the private sector. Yet, according to the 
airlines, when licences were eventually granted they were so riddled with 
restrictions as to be of little commercial value. Inaugurated on March 
1st, 1955, Airwork's thrice-weekly North Atlantic Service was abandoned 
just over nine months later because of continuing losses. According 
to a statement issued by the company the deficits were primarily the result 
of four factors. Firstly, although BOAC and foreign airlines serving 
Britain under bilateral agreements were allowed to carry mail, and the 
Post Office had informed Airwork that it was willing to use the Inde­
pendent's services, the Government had refused to grant the necessary 
permission. Secondly, in order to make the most economical use of its 
aircraft, Airwork also wanted to operate passenger charters, but the
3 b , BIATA Annual Report, 1958/59; ’Flight,' 20/H/59,p. 37b
British Government had refused to take action to obtain US authorisation. 
Thirdly, Airwork's licence had included Milan and Stuttgart; the 
Government, however, had failed to negotiate traffic rights on the airline's 
behalf to these points and there had been a long delay in obtaining rights 
for Düsseldorf. Finally, a large amount of traffic which otherwise might 
have moved through London had been diverted to Continental airports, 
such as Frankfurt or Amsterdam, because of the lack of British duty-free 
zones for cargo in transit; the average load-factor on the outward 
journey, for example, was considerably higher than that on the return 
flight.^
The following March all the remaining Airwork scheduled freight
services were withdrawn : "Experience since December last has shown
conclusively that the Continental, services (which have been serving
London, Manchester, Birmingham, Frankfurt and Düsseldorf) cannot be
economically operated separately from the larger North Atlantic cargo 
■zg rservice."-^ It is probable that Airwork exaggerated some of the 
difficulties involved and was itself far from blameless for the failure 
of the services. After all, it was well aware of the restrictions 
placed upon the operation before it decided to go ahead. But to most of 
the Independents the episode was indicative of the situation in which the 
Government had placed itself and of the problems that the private sector 
f a c e d . Having expanded the opportunities open to the Independents, and 
in particular delineated certain areas of operation in which the private 
airlines were encouraged to partake, the Government appeared to be un­
willing to carry through its policy to its rational conclusion, and instead 
seemed to be creating new difficulties.
6 3 .
35. 'Flight,' 23/12/55, P* 9^9 and 30/12/55, p. 979.
36. Ibid., 16/3/56, p. 305.
A rather similar situation arose over the Colonial Coach 
services. When Airwork and Hunting-Clan were initially granted seven- 
year licences to operate to Africa they were permitted to use only 
obsolescent aircraft, such as Vikings, in order to minimise the threat 
of competition to BOAC. They accepted these conditions, but confidently * 
expected to be allowed in time to operate more modern types. Unfortunately, 
the ATAC kept rigidly to its terms of reference, with the result that 
both companies had to sell-off new equipment purchased primarily for 
these routes.^ Originally BOAC had also operated relatively old 
aircraft to Africa, Argonauts and Canadair IV's, because of equipment 
problems of its own. But by early 1957 the Corporation was preparing to 
introduce more competitive Britannias. The situation was made worse for 
the Independents because of two'further developments. Firstly, several 
African colonies were gradually obtaining their political independence, 
which meant that air services to them would no lo n g e r  be classed as 
cabotage. Colonial Coach services, therefore, would shortly not be 
permitted to these States. Secondly, early in 1958 the IATA-member 
airlines were due to introduce on the Atlantic routes a third-class 
(known as T.3A) standard of service and fare, in addition to economy 
and first-class standards. T.J4 would undoubtedly spread to Africa
sooner or later and would be priced at about the same level as Colonial
»Coach services. The problem for the Independents was that under the 
existing terms of reference to the ATAC they would not be allowed to 
share in this new class of traffic, while their own Colonial Coach
-¡O
services would be severely undermined, if not destroyed. . Thus, the 
outlook for the private sector as far as international scheduled 
services were concerned was not very bright.
37. Ibid., 6/1/56, p . 2 7  and 5/V57, p.^57.
3 8 . 'The Economist', 23/2/57» p.657-9.
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Supporters of a strong private enterprise system of air
transport suffered a further blow in the mid-1950's with the beginning
of what appeared to many as the gradual absorption of a number of the
larger independent operators by the nationalised airlines. The first
privately-owned carrier in which a Corporation purchased a shareholding
was Jersey Airlines (JA). In March, 1956, BEA withdrew its old Rapides
from service"^ and handed over the routes on which they had operated,
between the Channel Islands, Alderney and Southampton, to JA, at the
same time acquiring a 25& interest in the Independent's parent company,
Jersey Airlines Development Corporation. The intention was obviously to
rationalise the operations of BEA and JA on the Channel Island routes by
transferring the local services, which had been losing money heavily,
to an airline that was,, hopefully, better suited to operate them. JA
AOwould then ’feed* traffic into the Corporation's trunk routes. In 
fact, the arrangement did not prove completely satisfactory and was 
terminated in 1961. BEA's 1961/62 Annual Report records : "This decision 
followed the introduction of the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act of i960 
when it became evident that conflicts of interest might arise as a 
result of BEA being both a shareholder and a competitor of Jersey 
Airlines." Shortly afterwards JA was absorbed by the Air Holdings 
Group.
BEA made a similar type of arrangement with Cambrian Airways. In 
May, 1956, it was announced that a ten-year agreement had been signed 
between these two airlines for the integration of certain services to
39. In fact, BEA continued to operate Rapides on the routes between 
Lands End and the Scilly Isles until the mid-1960's.
^0. Wheatcroft : 'Air Transport Policy', 1961*, p.^; Scott-Hill and 
Behrend ; 'Channel Silver Wings', 1972, p,13-l*t.
p .63
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the Channel Islands and in the Vest Country. Cambrian took over 
responsibility for all Liverpool-Channel Island routes and agreed to
• . L2introduce a service linking Manchester with Cardiff, Bristol and Jersey.
This was followed in February, 1958, by BEA's acquisition of one-third of
i+3the shares of the Cardiff-based airline. Again BEA was using an 
Independent to operate unremunerative feeder services, although an 
additional factor may have been the need to answer criticisms from 
Welsh nationalists that the Corporation had virtually ignored Wales 
(especially when compared with Scotland, where there was a separate BEA 
division.)
Cambrian itself must have realised that serious financial problems 
lay ahead and that a major injection of new capital would be needed.
Over the previous five years the airline had experienced an annual rate of 
traffic growth of the order of 50$, so that the forecast of a 1^> increase 
in 1958 implied a considerable retardation. In fact, even a 1 ^  growth 
rate proved quite unrealistic, and traffic actually fell. Cambrian
blamed its difficulties on the world-wide recession in the travel
business and on the fact that the Empire Games were held in Cardiff,
which encouraged people to stay at home. But the airline's problems must have
been more serious and deeper than these explanations suggest. It was
forced to cut-back its operations drastically, including at one point the
sale of the entire aircraft fleet, although the position began to improve
from the spring of 1959 and services were resumed with aircraft leased
from BEA. There appears to have been an unwillingness on the part of the
private shareholders in the company to provide further funds (this was
admittedly a period of credit squeeze), so that it fell to the Corporation
kk . .to bail out the Independent. It is interesting to note that BEA did not
**2. 'Flight', 25/5/56,p. 658.
*0. Ibid., 1V2/58, p.221.
bh . Ibid., 19/9/58, p.502 and IO/IO/58, p. 6 0 b ; Cambrian Airways Ltd#
'Report and Accounts, 196'* ; History of the first 30 years', 1965, p. 1*»-15.
feel compelled to dispose of its shareholding in Cambrian after the 
introduction of the i960 Act. Similarly, the purchase of interests in 
Cambrian and Jersey Airlines contrasts with the failure of BOAC to 
obtain permission to invest in Skyways in 1951»
The affair of the purchase of Central African Airlines (CAA) by 
BOAC may not have been vital to the post-war development of Britain's 
private, airlines, but it must have been even further confirmation to 
the Independents, if any were needed, that the Government was not 
prepared to take their side at the expense of the Corporations. In 
February, 1957, it was announced that the Hunting-Clan group of air 
transport companies and the British and Commonwealth Shipping Company 
were negotiating in Salisbury with the Central African Government for 
the purchase of a controlling interest in CAA, which the previous year 
had incurred a loss of over £250,000. Hunting-Clan was probably 
primarily interested in the African company's traffic rights to London, 
South Africa and the Middle East; in other words, as a way round the 
British licensing regulations, especially in the context of the grov/ing 
threat to Colonial Coach services.
BOAC and South African Airways made no secret of their opposition 
to the deal, and the following May the Corporation entered into an 
agreement which guaranteed the African airline a total revenue of 
£1 ,750,000 over a ten-year period in return for the right to operate 
its services between the UK and the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
These services had been operated by BOAC and CAA for some years in pool, 
and it was apparently the latter carrier that had initiated the 
negotiations. Nevertheless, the terms of the agreement certainly 
appeared very generous. For little or no effort on its own part, CAA *16
67.
*5. 'Flight', 22/3/57, p. 260; 'The Economist', 16/2/57, p. 587-8
16. Hansard, op.cit., 29/5/57, vol.571, col. 398.
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was being guaranteed a profit of £175»000 per annum, three-times
BOAC's total net operating surplus in 1956* The Corporation, on the
other hand, argued that in fact such a sum "is within the earning
47capacity of the pooled operation of the route." It was rumoured
that Pan Am. was also interested in CAA, and it may well be that the
British airline's action was primarily intended to prevent an American
incursion into a traditionally European domain. But inevitably the
Corporation's investment was seen as an attack on the private operators,
an attack, further, that was .sanctioned by the Government. The
Conservative Bow Group issued a Memorandum pointing out that the deal
would involve the payment to CAA of between 20 and 25 new pence out of
every £1 revenue earned by BOAC on the route!
"It would appear that no airline today, and certainly 
not BOAC, is so profitable as to offer such terms for 
acquiring new business. The inescapable conclusion is that 
BOAC has deliberately, as an act of long-term policy, 
undertaken to incur heavier losses, or reduced profits, 
for the express purpose of avoiding competition from 
private enterprise British companies." 48
Some Improvement
Despite the overall poor performance of the private sector, there
is some evidence of recovery towards the end of the decade. In
particular, important developments took place in the field of Colonial
Coach services. After repeated protests from the airlines about the
doubtful future of their international services on cabotage routes, the
Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation eventually asked the ATAC, in
49
February, 1957, to advise him "urgently" on the situation.
47. Ibid.; 'Flight', 24/5/57,P. 685.
48. Bow Group: 'Private Enterprise and British Air Transport', 1957 p.J.
49. 'The Economist', 25/2/57, p. 657-9.
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The Council reported in June and its recommendations were accepted by 
the Government. In the short term, Airwork and Hunting-Clan were given 
permission to use more modern aircraft, such has Viscounts and Hermes, 
on their routes to Nairobi and Salisbury, although the approved frequency 
was slightly reduced to take account of the increased capacity. Further, 
because Ghana was no longer a colony, the two Independents were allowed 
to operate tourist-class services to Accra via the West African route 
(Bathurst and Freetown) with no restriction on the type of aircraft 
employed. In the longer-term, Airwork and Hunting-Clan were to provide 
(third-class) instead of Colonial Coach Services on their existing 
routes to Nairobi, Salisbury and Accra, on the basis of BOAC having 7 $ ° and 
the two independents together of the UK share of the total capacity 
needed for the new class of service. It was estimated that these were 
the approximate proportions in which tourist and Colonial Coach traffic 
were then divided between the three airlines. BOAC was to continue to
50
cater for the UK share of the higher classes of traffic on these routes.
The new proposals were a disappointment to many people on both side 
of the political spectrum. In the House of Commons Mr. Paul Williams 
summed up the feelings of a large part of the private sector. "I... 
come to the conclusion on this alteration that the independents are losing a 
proportion, and quite a severe proportion of the traffic which they 
pioneered, in which they'risked their all and are being forced to let 
go this traffic to the Corporations which previously had shown little
51
interest in this field."
The Opposition, on the other hand, regarded the proposals as yet 
another example of the erosion of the State airlines' services for the
50. Hansard, op.cit.,26/6/57, vol. 572, cols.jS-'iO (Written Answers)
51. Hansard, op.cit., 22/7/57, vol.57^i col.lJO.
70.
benefit of private enterprise. BOAC employees even threatened to
52
strike over the matter. Similarly, the Select Committee on
Nationalised Industries noted: "An arbitrary division of traffic
between BOAC and the independent companies, based on a definite
percentage of traffic, will hinder the efforts of BOAC to improve the
53
efficiency of this service and to expand their activities." Never­
theless, while such arguments were proceeding, Airwork and Hunting-Clan 
took full advantage of the new regulations; at least they now knew 
exactly where they stood. Viscounts were introduced on the Colonial 
Coach 'Safari' services to East and Central Africa in October, 1957i and 
on the IATA-rate tourist services to Ghana the following January. ^
Both companies placed further orders for new equipment during 1958.
Before the second part of the proposals could be implemented, however, 
further developments took place. In December, 1958, Eagle dropped 
what was described at the time as a ' bombshellby applying to the ATAC 
for licences to operate services on certain British cabotage routes 
at about half the current scheduled air fares. The routes involved 
were London to Aden/Singapore, Nassau/Kingston, Trinidad, Kano/Lagos, 
Nicosia, Malta, Gibraltar, Nairobi and Aden/Hong Kong. There is little 
doubt that these very low fares(VLF), as they were known, not only 
surprised and embarrassed the Government and the ATAC, but also the other 
private operators. Yet, despite their unpreparedness, the following 
February Airwork and Hunting-Clan announced a scheme that was to all
55
intents and purposes a replica of Eagle's. Again operating in
52. 'Flight', 6/12/57, p. 868.
53* 'The Air Corporations', para. 208.
'Flight', 25/10/57, p. 666 and 29/11/57, p. 851.
55. Ibid.,26/12/58, p. 986 and 13/2/59, p. 232.
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partnership, they proposed, for example, a return fare to Hong Kong 
of £2^5, compared with BOAC's £*(15-80p., while Eagle wanted to charge 
£19 return to Malta, against BEA's £52.60p. The Independents claimed 
that by using aircraft such as Britannias and DC-6s, cutting standards of
56
seating and eliminating catering they could make the services pay.
The VLF proposals placed the Government in a difficult situation 
and were probably a major factor in forcing it to realise the failure of 
current policy. To permit the Independents to operate VLF services 
would have severely undermined the competitive position of the Corporations, 
but equally how could the Government justify politically the maintenance of 
what now appeared to be an excessively high fare structure? The dilemma 
was solved with the introduction of the i960 Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act 
(see following chapter), .after which the private operators were far less 
interested in cut-price services. Nevertheless, the problem of finding 
a replacement for the old Colnial Coach services still remained. From 
October 1st, i960, international second-class fares were due to be 
reduced by between 10 and 16& on all routes other than the North Atlantic.
The Government announced that British airlines (both Independents and 
Corporations) were also to be allowed to run additional third-class 
services to certain colonial territories at prices a further Ik to l£$ 
below the new 1ATA tourist fares. Traffic was again to bo pooled, with
57
BOAC taking 70.% of the British share.
Continued criticism of civil aviation policy by the independent 
airlines inevitably had an effect and eventually even the Government was 
forced to see the need for reform. The 'New Deal’ had obviously failed 
to provide the private sector with stability and direction. The VLF affair 
had shown that the Government was still not prepared to face up to the inevitabl 
result of a pro-independents policy, namely a curtailment of the public sector.
56. 'The Economist', 21/3/59, p. 1091.
57. Ibid., 9/V60, p.185.
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In August, 1959, Harold Watkinson, Minister of Transport and Civil 
Aviation, indicated the general direction in which the Government appeared 
to be heading: "At home... my thoughts are turning very much to the 
concept of a freer pattern of air transport. This, I think, would be best 
achieved by the concept of a new, more independent licensing authority. 
This, of course, would need legislation and no doubt changes in existing
58
legislation. It is, therefore, a matter for the next Parliament."
Thus, the ground was prepared for the 19&0 Civil Aviation (Licensing)
Act, although there was surprisingly little evidence to suggest that the 
Government had learnt the real lessons of the previous decade.
The Fifties •
It is important to keep the criticism of Government policy in 
perspective. During the 1950's the private sector made considerable 
advances. Between 1953/5^ and 1960/61, for example, their annual 
scheduled traffic (measured in load ton-miles) increased approximately 
6'J-times, compared with a 2^ -fold growth by the nationalised airlines. 
During the same period their share of total British scheduled traffic 
rose from h to over 8» . In addition, of course, trooping, vehicle-
ferry operations and inclusive-tours expanded even more rapidly. But 
such statistics do not really give the whole picture; the fact remains 
that the 'New Deal' policy of 1952 failed to create the right political 
and economic conditions for the continued progress and stability of the 
private airlines, which was presumably one of its main aims. A 'Flight' 
editorial in 1953 commented: "Civil aviation in all its branches has 
great expectations from the present Government... (But) still there
58. Speech at annual luncheon of Air Registration Board - 'Flight',
1V8/59, p.26.
59* ATAC Annual Report, 1960/61, p.1*.
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remains this most debilitating atmosphère of transcience; the feeling of 
no stability, a continued leaning towards temporary expedients in place 
of long-term planning." One can only add that nothing that occurred 
during the remainder of the 1950's would have altered this view as far 
as the independent airlines were concerned.
By 1959 the Independents, although as a group and, on the whole, 
individually much larger than in 1952, still lacked the "long-term 
security and opportunities for expansion," of which Lennox-Boyd had 
spoken when introducing the new policy. A possible explanation for this 
failure is not difficult to discover. Harris argues:
"In airways...the Government's main aim seemed to be 
to protect its own industries, accommodating private 
companies with the minimum disturbance rather than 
fostering genuine competition. The 'modus vivendi' 
achieved could only be temporary as the private companies 
continued to seek to expand, thus further limiting the 
operations of the public corporations, themselves already 
under pressure from severe international competition." 6i
We shall return to this point in the following chapter. 'The Economist's' 
view of air transport policy during the 1950's might in the meantime serve 
as an apt conclusion to this chapter:
"Conservative policy in the early 1950's deliberately 
encouraged the independents to think they would get a 
larger share of the cake; Ministers have spent the sub­
sequent nine years trying, with growing embarrassment, 
to find where to cut it from." 62I
61. Harris: 'Competition and the Corporate Society', 1972, p. 201.
6 2 . 1 5 / 2/ 6 0 , p. 6 5 1 .
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Chapter IV
THE CIVIL AVIATION (LICENSING) ACT
By i960 it was obvious to most that a new approach to the problem
of air transport licensing in the UK was needed, or at the very least
a tidying-up of existing legislation. The policy introduced in 1952,
the so-called ’New Deal', had clearly failed to achieve its supposed
prime aim, the establishment of a large, prosperous and stable private
sector without materially harming the nationalised Corporations. This,
however, was only one of the pressures tending towards a new look at
civil aviation policy. An additional factor of some importance was a
growing realisation of the unsatisfactory state of the law governing air
safety in the area of charter operations, which were not fully covered
by existing regulations. In particular, considerable publicity resulted
from the crash of a Viking aircraft belonging' to Independent Air Travel
1at Southall in 1958, in which seven people lost their lives. The 
report of a public inquiry into the accident indicted the airline 
concerned, concluding that its operating and maintenance standards left 
much to be desired. Although Independent Air Travel was soon forced 
to close down, the damage done to the image of the private carriers 
was substantial. Thus, the Government was pushed towards a policy of 
tightening up the regulations controlling air safety, as well as 
liberalising the restrictions on the operations of the Independents.
The Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act was introduced in February,
I960. It repealed the statutory monopoly that the nationalised airlines 
had enjoyed since 1946 over the scheduled routes they operated and 12
1. Hansard, House of Commons, 2/3/60, vol.6l8, cols. 1225 and 1248-9,
2. Board of Trade : 'The Safety Performance of UK Airline Operators:
Special Review', 1968,p.8-9.
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granted licenses to all British carriers, Corporations and Independents-
alike, to operate their current route networks. In other words, the
device that Wyatt described as "a mistake in concept and farcical in
practice,"^ the associate agreement, was abolished, and with it the
Corporations' automatic assumption of priority in UK air transport.
Having thus cleared the ground, the Act stated that in future any British
operator that wished to inaugurate a scheduled service would have to argue its
case before a new licensing authority, the Air Transport Licensing Board
(ATLB). The latter was to be an independent body under the supervision
of the Council of Tribunals, appointed by the Minister but in no way
directly responsible to him. Thus, unlike its predecessor, the ATAC,
which was only advisory to the Minister, the new Board had executive powers.
To assist it in the consideration of licence applications, the ATLB was
directed to pay particular attention to the following matters:
i) the technical and financial competence of the applicant,
ii) insurance provisions,
iii) fair terms and conditions of employment,
iv) existing or potential need for the proposed service,
v) the adequacy and tariff of any similar service already operating,
vi) any wasteful duplication of or material diversion from existing 
services,
vii) any expenditures or commitments reasonably incurred by existing 
operators.
k
viii) any objections raised to the grant of the licence.
»
3*'British Independent Aviation - Past and Future', Journal of the 
Institute of Transport. 1963» p. 109 .
Gwilliam: 'The Regulation of Air Transport'. Yorkshire Bulletin, 1966, 
p. 20-21; 'World Airline Record', 1965, p. 2^2; Hansard, op.cit., 
cols. 1225-1233.
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The only significant difference so far, therefore, between the old 
and new licensing procedures was that now the Corporations and Independents 
were treated as equals; the Act abolished the 'shot-gun marriage' anomoly 
of the associate agreements. It also attempted to close a loop-hole that had 
been found in the previous legislation and exploited by a number of airlines, 
that of 'closed-group' charters; these now came under the control of the 
licensing authority, just as inclusive-tours always had.^ In order to 
tighten-up the air safety regulations, the Act provided that in future all 
commercial carriers, without exception, would have to obtain an 'Air 
Operator's Certificate', proving that they were fit to operate commercial 
services.^ But the real innovation was that the Board was instructed to 
'consider' all the aspects of a proposed service mentioned above - having 
considered them, it was perfectly entitled to discard them. Thus, 
unlike the ATAC, the Air Transport Licensing Board was not obliged to 
reject a new service simply because it might materially divert traffic
<7from an established operator. This obviously gave the ATLB considerable
liberty of action, if it chose to use it.
The only guidance the Act itself gave as to how the Board should
perform its overall duties was that it should exercise its functions "in
8such a manner as to further the development of British civil aviation."
In fact, the legislation specifically states that the intention was to leave 
the ATLB substantially unfettered in interpreting the Act. The new Minister 
of Aviation, Duncan Sandys, laid particular emphasis on this point during 
the Second Reading of the Bill : "The essence of this Board is that it 
5» Wheatcroft: 'Air Transpat Policy,' 19^^» p.131-2. ! " " ' '
6. Hansard, op.cit., col.1226,
7. 'The Economist', 20/2/60, p.73^»
8. 8 and 9 Eliz.2, c.j8, p.1 .
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will enable everybody to go before it and to argue out their case...
The future pattern of British aviation will emerge progressively from
the decisions of the Board and from the results of appeals to the
qMinister. A kind of case law will gradually be built up." This is 
exactly what the ATLB attempted to do, although with limited success.
The Act also stipulated an appeals procedure. Any party disagreeing 
with the Board's findings could appeal to the Minister, who, after hearing 
the report of an independent Appeal Commissioner, was empowered to 
instruct the ATLB to take action on any licence or application as he saw 
fit. The problem was that neither the Act nor the regulations governing 
the procedure for appeals were specific about the grounds upon which an 
appeal could properly be made. For example, there were no clear rules 
about what new evidence’was admissable, and so there was little to
prevent an appeal case from becoming simply a re-hearing of the original
10application arid objections. This greatly increased the power of the
Minister at the expense of the ATLB and was to be a cause of consider­
able criticism of the 19^0 legislation in later years. The Select 
Committee on Nationalised Industries was particularly critical:
"So long as the Board of Trade have power to settle 
appeals against the ATLB and against the advice of an 
appeal Commissioner any advantage of apparently independent 
judgment evaporates. It would appear that the present 
system might almost be described as creating the ATLB in 
order to have a body from which to appeal to the Ministry 
The Board of Trade accepted that this was very largely 
what the system had come to in practice." 11
It is not intended here to examine in detail the way in which the 910
9. Hansard, op.cit., col. 1231.
10. Wheatcroft, op.cit., p. 139-1^0 •
11. 'BEA', 1966/67, Report, p. xlviii. The Board of Trade took over 
the responsibility for air transport licensing in 1967,
e-
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Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act worked in practice, nor the reasons for 
its eventual failure; that should become evident during the following 
chapter. It is intended, however, to look at two particular aspects of 
the Act that appear to be of immediate relevence: firstly, the movement 
towards a greater degree of rationalisation among the privately-owned 
airlines that coincided with the introduction of the new legislation; and, 
secondly, the way in which the i960 Act fitted into the general pattern 
of post-war attempts to evolve a satisfactory air transport licensing 
policy.
Rationalisation:
It was the Government's view that an important part of the answer 
to the problems facing the Independents in the late 1950s was the 
elimination, either by bankruptcy or merger, of most of the smaller, less 
secure British airlines and the establishment of a select group of relatively 
large and financially stable companies. Lord Manscroft, Minister without 
Portfolio, had made this clear in a speech in the House of Lords as early 
as 1957:
"The Government would welcome some reduction in the 
number of (private) companies if this is likely to result 
in the formation of larger and more firmly based companies.
Such companies would be better able to afford the high 
cost of re-equipping their fleets with modern aircraft; and 
with a better fleet the companies would be able to bid 
more effectively in the international field for charter 
work, as well as to operate more efficiently the scheduled 
services allocated to them." 12.
Similarly, during the Second Reading of the i960 Bill, Duncan Sandys 
stressed that the granting by the ATLB of an airline's application to 12
12. Hansard, House of Lords, 11/12/57, vol. 206,col. 107*t.
operate a new route would depend to a large extent on "the ability of
the applicant to convince the Board that his company possesses the
resources needed to provide an effective and reliable service. With
this in mind, I have been encouraging the independent airlines to get
together and to form stronger units and I am glad to say that good
13progress is beginning to be made." Thus, like most of the provisions 
embodied in the new legislation, a measure of rationalisation had been 
Government policy for some time. It would be achieved by the combination of 
a stick, to force financially insecure operators into bankruptcy or merger, 
and a carrot, to encourage the formation of larger units.
At first sight it might appear that the policy achieved a measure of 
success. In particular, British United Airways (BUA), whose formation 
was announced on the same day as the new legislation, was just the type of 
company that the Government envisaged, in terms of both size and financial 
backing. It was by far the largest British private airline operating in 
I960, with a total fleet capacity (measured in ton-miles per hour) of 
approximately 60,000, excluding its helicopter interests, or 28$ of
ABOAC's and of BEA's capacity. The financial backing for the new
79-
group came primarily from shipping interests, as the following list of
shareholders indicates:
Blue Star.........   2C$
Furness Withy...........    2C$
Clan Line.........      16$
British and Commonwealth Shipping... 1 &
Hunting..........      8$
T.L.E.B. Guiness...................  1C$
Whitehall Securities............... 10$
100$ 15 *
13* Hansard, House of Lords, 11/12/57.
l^ t. 'Flight,' 11/3/60, p.352; however, both Corporations had a large
number of new aircraft on order, which when delivered would reduce 
the percentages to 19 and 29 respectively.
15» Ibid, 8/7/60,p.^1 .
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Hunting-Clan, whose subsidiaries included Air Charter, Morton Air
Services, Olley Air Services, Transair, Airwork Helicopters, Bristow
Helicopters, Aviation Traders and Straights Air Freight Express of New
Zealand. In February, 1962, the group was strengthened with the
acquisition of British Aviation Services (Britavia), a holding company
whose main operating subsidiary was Silver City Airways, to form Air
Holdings Ltd. Britavia, which had recorded considerable financial
losses in recent years, was owned by P and 0 (7C&0, Eagle Star
Insurance (20/») and Cable and Wireless (1C$) and contributed about 2C$
to the combined assets of Air Holdings. The latter accounted for well
over half of the Independents' total capacity, while BUA was now UJfr
the size of BEA and yCfA that of BOAC. Finally, in May, 1962, Jersey
16 "Airlines was also acquired.
The formation of Air Holdings, therefore, was the most important
result of the Independents' movement towards greater rationalisation
that coincided with the I960 Act. But it was far from the only such
development. Probably almost as important in the long run, although in
a rather different way, was the acquisition in March, i960, of Eagle
Aviation by the Cunard Shipping Company (discussed in detail in Chapter VII).
Several other mergers also took place among the smaller private operators,
for example.* Air Safaris and Don Everall Aviation (November, i960);
Airtech and Chartair (November, 1961); Euravia and Skyways and Channel
Airways and Tradair (both November, 1962). In addition, early in i960,
'tentative discussions' about the pooling of resources (though not
initially full integration) were held between BKS, Cambrian, Derby
Aviation, Channel Airways, Jersey Airlines and Starways, but apparently
17the companies failed to reach agreement. 167
16. Ibid., 1/2/62, p.158; 'Aeroplane', 8/2/62,p.1^3; 'World Airline 
Eecord', op.cit., p.29 .^
17. 'Flight', 22/V60, p. 576, et.al. -
The BUA group was formed by an amalgamation of Airwork and
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Some at least of these mergers may well have resulted directly from
the regulations embodied in the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act or from
Ministerial pressure. Other companies were not as fortunate and were
forced to close down altogether. The ATLB reported that during 1962/62
ten airlines had ceased to operate air services of the kind requiring licences
from the Board and in most of these cases financial weakness was the main
or an important reason for their withdrawal. In addition, there was
evidence of financial weakness in several other companies still operating
18air services and in two cases receivers and managers had been appointed. 
Clearly, a major factor behind this 'weeding-out' of the private carriers 
was the tighter control of British civil aviation that followed the 
introduction of the new legislation; in particular the power given to 
the ATLB to refuse applications for licences to operate services from 
companies with insufficient financial resources, the fact that much of 
the charter business on which the smaller companies depended now also had 
to be licensed, and the improved vigilance of the airlines' safety 
performance that resulted from the issue of Air Operator's Certificates.
It would appear, therefore, that the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act 
was successful in achieving at least one of its prime objectives. Un­
fortunately, two further factors might contradict such a conclusion. Firstly, 
while numerous mergers and bankruptcies were taking place, reducing the 
total number of private carriers in existence, other operators were in 
fact being established. A survey by 'Flight' in August, 19 6 2, found that 
since the introduction of the i960 Act 12 airlines had ceased operations, 
but exactly the same number had begun air services. The survey concluded: 
"There is thus a 'prima facie' case for suggesting that the combined 
effect of the i960 licensing system and the Air Operator's Certificate 
has not been such a deterrent to the 'little' man in independent air
transport enterprise as may have been s u p p o s e d . We will discuss 189
18. ATLB Annual Report, I961/6 2, p.9.
19. 'Flight,' 23/8/62, p. ?Sh.
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why this may have been so in the concluding chapter. In addition, 
however, there is evidence to suggest that several of the bankruptcies that 
occurred during 1960/61 were the result of severe price-cutting on the part 
*of a small group of airlines, especially in the area of inclusive-tour 
charters, and so only marginally related to the new licensing legislation 
(see Chapter X).
The second factor that casts doubt on the effectiveness of the i960
Act is that the process of rationalisation was not limited to the period
immediately surrounding the introduction of the new licensing system. On
the contrary, it was stretched out over a number of years. Figure *U1,
for example, clearly shows how the formation of Air Holdings was the result
of a series of mergers taking place throughout the 1950s. As early as
19 5 8, and probably before, Airwork had started to integrate its affiliates
in order to create a single organisation and the name 'British United
PC)Airways' had already been tentatively decided Upon. A few months later 
Airwork announced that it intended to sell-off most of its fleet and 
dismiss a large proportion of its flying and ground staff, presumably 
in order to become a holding company. This is not to suggest, of 
course, that Government policy and pressure had no effect; they clearly 
did, especially among the smaller carriers. But at least in the case of 
the most important merger at the time that led to the establishment of 
BUA, probably of equal importance was the general economic climate 
prevailing in the air transport industry during the second half of the 
1950s - and in particular the impetus supplied by the extensive investment 
in the Independents undertaken by the shipping companies.
20. Ibid.,26/12/58, p.985,
21. Ibid., W 5 9 1 P- ^75.
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Figure 4.1 î ¡ The Formation of Air Holdings Ltd.
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Licensing Legislation;
A degree of rationalisation among the private operators was an 
important, but not a sufficient, pre-condition for the establishment 
of a more stable independent air transport sector. Just as necessary 
was the creation of the right political environment, in other words an 
effective licensing system. . Since the late 19^0s Conservative civil 
aviation policy had primarily consisted of regulated competition between 
public and private sectors controlled by a quasi-judicial licensing body 
similar to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in the United States. Just 
before the Tories were returned to power in 1951» for example, Lennox- 
Boyd had said:
"We are determined, when the opportunity comes again, 
to restore a wide measure of private enterprise in the air, 
to throw the lines open to private competition under proper 
regulation, and to have some system analagous to the Civil 
Aeronautics Board in the United States, which has given the 
 ^ benefit of co-ordination and the benefit of freedom of
•competition as well." JS2__„
The CAB had been established in July, 19^0, as an independent agency, 
together with a Bureau of Air Safety responsible to theJ3oard for the 
investigation of accidents. It had almost complete control over US 
domestic air transport, granting licences to operate services, encouraging 
and regulating competition and attempting to ensure that the airlines 
received an adequate, but not excessive, return on capital. The UK 'New 
Deal' policy, therefore, might be viewed as a ;'watered-down' version of the 
American system. Its failure led to the replacement of the ATAC by a new 
licensing authority, the ATLB, a much closer copy of the Civil Aeronautics
22. Ibid.,16/11/51, p. 6 3 1.
23» The CAB had replaced the Civil Aeronautics Authority, established in
August, 1938. Davies: *A History of the World's Airlines', 196*1, p.13 8-8. 
Similar quasi-judicial regulatory authorities have been established in 
Australia and Canada. *
8b
Board. The main attraction of the American system, apart from its 
relative efficiency and success when compared with British attempts in 
this field, probably lay in the non-political appearance of the licensing 
hpdy. As we have seen, in theory at least both the CAB and the ATLB 
were independent, quasi-judicial authorities - committees of experts 
arriving at decisions after full consideration of all the relevent facts 
and owing no particular allegiance to any political party or ideology. In 
practice, of course, any attempt to remove decisions of this kind from the 
political arena is fraught with difficulties; any choice between two 
competing demands is a political action, although not necessarily a contentious 
one. This is why air transport licensing legislation clearly provides for 
the final authority (in other words, the right to decide appeals) to rest 
in the hands of the government (the relevent Minister in the UK or the 
President in the USA). As Geoffrey Rippon, Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Ministry of Aviation, told the Commons:
"The matters with which the (ATLB) will be concerned are 
questions ofopinion and policy and not merely of interpretation 
of the law or of fact, as in the case of the air safety 
certificate. Parliament would wish that in the last resort 
■ the Minister should be the accountable authority." 2b
As we shall see, the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act was only 
moderately more successful than the previous policy in achieving its 
objectives. By the mid-1960s its failure had become obvious to all and a 
Labour Government was forced to appoint a committee of inquiry to 
investigate the whole future of British air transport. This raises the 
questions: Why did a CAB-type licensing system apparently work in 
America but not in Great Britain? What were the main differences between 
the US and UK situations? The one factor that, seems to stand out is that
2b. Hansard, op.cit., col.1310. In the case of the US CAB this is only ' 
true of international matters; in the domestic sphere its decisions 
are reviewable by the courts. See Corbett: 'Politics and the Airlines', 
1965, p. 293 and 296.
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without exception the airlines regulated by the CAB are privately-owned,
while in Britain the industry is made up of both private and public
sectors. This means that when two or more American airlines apply for
a licence to operate a particular route, each has »equality of opportunity'.
•
There is no inherent reason for either the CAB or the Government to favour one
company rather than another. As one commentator has remarked! "The regula—
2^a
tion of equals is inherently easier." This equality does not exist
in the UK. It is true that one of the principal objectives of the I960 
Act was to ensure that all British carriers had the same opportunity to 
apply to the ATLB for licences to operate new air services. The crucial 
point, however, is that the final arbiter of the licensing system is not , 
the A TLB but the Minister by way of his appellate function. It would riot 
be surprising if a Labour Minister were to show bias towards the national­
ised airlines. But why should a Conservative Minister do so?
The answer may well be in the fact that the Minister concerned also 
represents the interests of BEA and BOAC in the House of Commons. This
is an over-simplification, since the legal relationship between Parliament,
. . 25a Minister and the Board of a nationalised , industry is extremely complex.
But in general terms it is clear that Parliament holds the Minister 
.responsible for the financial performance of the State airlines. This 
dual responsibility has meant in practice that whenever a Minister has 
been faced with an appeal against an ATLB decision that might materially 
harm one of the Corporations, especially if the latter is at the same time 
also experiencing financial difficulties, he has tended to favour the
2.k&, Silberman: 'Price Discrimination and the Regulation of Air Transport­
ation'. Journal of Air Law and Commerce, I965, p.228. Quoted in 
Fruhan: 'The Fight for Competitive Advantage', 1972, p.159.
25* See, for example, Foster: 'Politics, Finance and the Role of Economics', 
1971, p.ll, 97 and 10 8.
*public sector. Professor Gwilliam, among others, has noted in passing:
’’In the event of a conflict of interests between an independent operator 
and a State corporation the Minister might normally be expected to show 
some special sympathy for the corporation within his department purview;
* 27
the I960 Act gave the ATLB no brief to show such preference." This does
not necessarily mean, of course, that such 'special sympathy' is wrong. As J.K.
Baldwin, President of Air Canada, wrote: "I can find little logic in
government ownership unless the airline is granted and is prepared to
accept a special position in its relationship with the Minister and the
?8government. Otherwise, what is the case for State ownership at all?" ”
But if this/'in fact true, then the airlines obviously do not have genuine
'equality of opportunity' when applying for licences to operate air 
29services.
Clearly, it is impossible to prove categorically that the special 
relationship between the Minister and the nationalised airlines, if 
indeed it does exist, has resulted in the weighting of UK air licensing 
policy against the Independents. One can only suggest that it might 
provide a more or less partial explanation for certain developments 
described more fully in other chapters. The number of incidents involved 
is probably quite small, although their importance and influence have 
been considerable. The Minister's dual responsibility might well explain
26. An exception may be the period immediately following the return to power 
of a Conservative Government. See, especially, Chapter VI.
27. Op.cit., p.21.
28. #The National Airline, the Government and the People'. Chartered 
Institute of Transport Journal, 1971» P* 139.
29» A possible alternative explanation for the behaviour of Tory Ministers 
is provided by Harris: "To understand the role of the Conservatives the 
behaviour, rather than the rhetoric, is particularly vital... For 
Conservatives pre-eminently defend the existing nature of society, 
without necessarily being able to identify unequivocally what the essence 
of the present 'status quo' is...What they defend at any given moment 
depends on what is being attacked rather than any prior assumptions."
'Competition and the Corporate State', 1972, p.13. Similarly, see 
Thompson and Hunter :'The Nationalized Transport Industries', 1973» p*ll6.
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the Government's somewhat contradictory attitude towards the private 
sector throughout the 1950s (for example, with regard to Airwork's 
scheduled North Atlantic all-freight service or the affair of the 
purchase of CAA). An even better example, or at least more blatant, is 
provided by the refusal of the Minister to permit Cunard Eagle to 
operate North Atlantic scheduled passenger services in competition with 
BOAC (see Chapter VII)?0
Two obvious ways of eliminating this bias suggest themselves: the 
total exclusion of private enterprise from air transport (or at least a 
reversal to the situation that existed between 19^6 and 19^8), or complete 
denationalisation. Both solutions would mean that no oneairline or group 
of airlines would occupy a particularly favourable position, all would have 
equality of opportunity. But since neither of the main political parties 
appears prepared to go so far in" the foreseeable future, either to the 
left or to the right, such solutions are obviously impracticable. It 
is the fact that the air transport industry in the UK is, and will probably 
remain for some time, a combination of public and private sectors that 
creates the problem. A solution, however, is needed; to quote Baldwin 
again: "Where a country has established a domestic environment in which 
the state enterprise must compete with similar private enterprises, the 
public at large can suffer if airlines suffer because of lack of clear 
government definition of intended role and relations between the two.
One possible answer might be the delineation of 'spheres of influence'.
In other words, the Government could determine in quite specific terms 
which services were to be provided and which geographical areas served 
by each individual airline or group of airlines, rather like the Labour 
Government did in 19^6 for the three Corporations. This would greatly 
simplify the licensing process by removing a possible sphere of contention.
The ATLB would judge each licence application on its merits, within the
jJO. Despite frequent reports to the contrary, this was in fact the second
appeal against an ATLB decision; the first0was made by Falcon Airv-cys and
rejected by the Minister. 'Aeroplane', 31/o/b1, p.22^»,
?)1 . On.cit*. p .136*
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constraints of Government policy and Ministerial directives, while the 
possible reasons for appealing against a decision would be reduced.
The more overtly political decisions, such as the relative size of the 
public and private sectors, would be taken at Government level. In this 
•way the likelihood of periodic Ministerial intervention for short-term 
political reasons is minimised, since the award of an additional route to 
an Independent is unlikely to materially harm a Corporation, and if the 
Minister does intervene he will clearly be seen to do so and have to 
explain the departure from policy. As the economic and political situa­
tion .changed, of course, it might be necessary to re-define policy 
objectives. But this presents few problems, providing it is done in 
such a way and at such intervals so as not to create an atmosphre of 
uncertainty, which, as we have seen, has been one of the major faults 
of post-war British air' transport licensing.
In conclusion, the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act was the most 
important piece of legislation concerning air transport introduced during 
the 1950s and 1960s. But despite its importance and partial success, 
overall it must be judged a failure. As will become apparent in the next 
chapter, the i960 Act did not bring about the hoped-for long-term 
rationalisation among the private operators and, perhaps even more important, 
it failed to find a satisfactory answer to the problems created by a 
mixed-sector industry. In the words of Roy Mason, the Civil Aviation 
(Licensing) Act created "a licensing system that was little better than 
an elaborate framework enclosing a policy vacuum." ^
3?. Hansard, op.cit., 18/3/70, vol. 798, col.l»31 .
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Chapter V
FURTHER SCRUBBY PASTURES, I960 - 1968
•
To a large extent the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act of i960 was a 
major piece of 'buck-passing'. Apart from the general instruction to 
"exercise their functions in such a manner as to further the development 
of British civil aviation," there was no declaration of Government policy 
to assist the ATLB in deciding long-term objectives. It was left to the 
Board, therefore, to interpret the Act as it saw fit. Mr. Clive Jenkins 
aptly summed up the uncertainty that this entailed: "I confess on a first 
examination that Mr. Sandys' Bill could have been worse. But then, on 
the other hand, perhaps it will be." As we have seen, it was intended 
that a series of 'guidlines'would gradually evolve, based on ATLB decisions 
and appeals to the Minister, and that these would eventually clarify UK 
long-term air transport policy.
The first ATLB hearing of licence applications began in June, 1961,
and dealt with intra-European routes. Not unexpectedly, a number of
private airlines took advantage of the opportunities now open to them
and applied for permission to operate extensive scheduled networks.
But the expansionist plans of the majority were dwarfed by those of the
two largest Independents, EUA and Cunard Eagle. When the hearings began
there were altogether 78 applications (and 283 objections), of which h i
2were from the two principal, Ehipping-backed carriers. BUA issued 
a statement claiming that it was prepared to spend £1? .5 million on new 
British aircraft should its applications be successful and that In their 
entirety its plans "would involve no more than ?.<$& of the corporations' 12
1 . 'Flight,' 1/V60, p.bi>3.
2. 'The Economist', 2V 6/6I, p.■1396.
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traffic growth for the years 1961-65"! assuming an annual average increase 
in passenger traffic of lh% for the public sector. In fact, a rather 
more objective observer estimated that the diversion would be more in 
the region of 5 ^  of the Corporations' growth, of which 70% would be 
•on BEA routes.^ This, of course, -was the diversionary effect of the 
plans of a single airline, so that overall the Independents were clearly 
staking a claim to .a major role in the future expansion of UK air 
transport.
In May and June, 1961, BUA took steps towards fulfilling its 
pledge and placed orders for two BAC VC-lOs (plus an option on the 
purchase of a further two) and for ten BAC 1-lls (plus 5 options), the 
first airline to order the latter type of aircraft. Shortly before the 
ATLB hearings were due to begin it was announced that Cunard Eagle and 
BUA had come to a compromise agreement over their route applications. 
Broadly speaking, Eagle agreed to concentrate on UK domestic services 
and about a dozen Continental routes and BUA on the remaining UK-Europe 
routes. Their long-range spheres of interest had already been determined, 
BUA concentrating on Africa and Eagle being primarily interested in the 
North Atlantic, Consequently, Eagle withdrew 15 of its original j/i- 
applications and BUA 9 of its original 3ii although the two operators 
still overlapped on routes from London to Nice, Milan and Dublin. ■
The ATLB published its decisions on the European applications the 
following November. Most of the new services were awarded to the two 
principal Independents, BUA receiving licenses to operate trunk routes 
from London to Paris, Genoa, Amsterdam, Milan, Zlirich, Madeira, Basle, 
Athens, Barcelona, Torbes, Palma and Malaga, and Cunard Eagle between 
London and Glasgow, Edinburgh, Belfast, Dublin, Venice, Geneva and 
Stockholm, between Liverpool and Dublin and between Manchester/Birmingham *5
3•.'Flight27/ l/ 6 1 , p. IBS.
Ibid., 3.8/5/61,p, 67^ and 8/6/61, p. 8ll,
5. Ibid., 15/6/61,p. 8hl.
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and Nice. All the licences were for a period of seven years and the
airlines were told that they could not inaugurate the new services until
April, 1963» in order to soften the blow on BEA.^ In round figures, Eagle
was granted approximately a third of the capacity it had requested and 
•
BUA one-half. The ATLB estimated that during the first three years
of operation the new licences would divert from BEA some*»6.8# of its
forecast growth on international.routes and about 17 *5# on domestic 
7routes.
The Board declared that it was "in no doubt that some carefully 
regulated competition must, sooner or later, become a feature of the 
routes over which British aviation operates. The difficulty is to
8determine the point in time at which a route is ripe for such competition."
This is the first example of the way in which the ATLB was forced, because of
the lack of guidance in the I960 Act, to introduce its own interpretations
and views; in other words, the beginning of the creation of a 'case-law*.
The word ’competition' does not, in fact, appear anywhere in the Civil
Aviation (Licensing) Act and, further, Ministerial statements in the
House of Commons during the passage of the Bill specifically denied that
it was the Government's intention to promote competition between British
carriers for its own sake. The Act made possible increased competition,
but did not positively encourage it. In its 1960/61 Report the ATLB
justified its interpretation by saying that it was "a popular view" that the
new Act should encourage competition among British operators on a much
10 1greater scale than hitherto. 678910
6. 'World Airline Record', 1965» p.255 and 260,
7. 'Plight', 30/11/61, p. 838; Gwilliam: 'The Regulation of Air 
Transport', Yorkshire Bulletin. 1966, p.?5.
8. 'Flight; 8/ 12/6 1, p.88?.
9. Wheatcroft: 'Licensing British Air Transport*. Journal of the Royal
Aeronautical Society, 196*», p.l?I. ■
10. p.5 ,
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From April, 1963, therefore, for three years a proportion of 
BBA's estimated accumulated traffic growth on the routes concerned would 
go to the Independents; thereafter, the Corporation's traffic would 
resume its normal growth. This would obviously hurt BEA to some extent, 
but "the benefits of competition cannot be introduced painlessly." With 
regards to the licensing of a second British operator on a particular 
route, the Board declared that "it is a pre-requisite... that the route 
should have reasonably dense traffic and a reasonable rate of growth." 
What exactly was 'reasonable' was not specified, rather the ATLB 
thought it v/as more important to measure the applicant's likely traffic 
and set it alongside BEA's figures of expected growth on the route. If, 
during the first three years, there was no actual decline in the Corpora­
tion's traffic, then the Board's criterion for the introduction of a
11second operator would be satisfied. In the long-run this formula
proved to be untenable and had been abandoned by 1966:
"It was, we consider, valid when applied to a large 
■ number of applications considered at the same time. But 
the circumstances of 19&1 are unlikely to be repeated and 
the validity of the formula becomes more questionable 
when it is applied to one application to obtain a single 
result. In recent cases, therefore, we have tended to 
move away from the theoretical approach and reach our 
conclusions on practical considerations." 12
It is difficult to envisage how a consistent 'case-law' could be
built up without some form of theoretical basis. But by 1966, in any
case, the whole licensing process had been undermined.
The ATLB was thus attempting to find a satisfactory formula that
would permit the expansion of the Independents but have only a very
limited, short-term effect on the Corporations, something that the
Government had failed to accomplish during the previous decade. The 12
11. 'Flight}'op.cit.; 'The Economist', 2/12/61, p.9^5-7.
12. ATLB Annual Report, 1966/67  ^p.5.
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reactions of the private operators were mixed. On the whole, they 
welcomed the opportunity to considerably expand their scheduled net­
works and to compete with BEA, though they were disappointed that the 
.new services granted were hardly sufficient to support a fleet of jet 
aircraft. BUA issued a statement saying: "Naturally we shall examine 
every possibility with the utmost care, but even taking the most optim­
istic view, it is certain that the Board have left us no margin."
Similarly, Cunard Eagle said: "We welcome the decisions of the
licensing board...(But) the licences granted to us today will provide
13sufficient work for two or three short-haul aircraft only." To a 
large extent, the history of the European and domestic licence applica­
tions of these two airlines over the next few years is very much the 
story of attempts to expand and liberalise these initial licences. BEA. 
naturally appealed against most of the awards. The Commissioner, Sir 
Arthur Hutchinson , recommended that two of the licences should not be 
ratified, although in the event the Minister only refused to grant one 
of these, Cunard Eagle’s London-Geneva route. In addition, however, he
reversed the ATLB's decision concerning BUA's London-Zurich service,
1 ^because of the difficulty of obtaining traffic rights. .........
Further Expansion:
Once the licences had been ratified where necessary, the Independents 
took full advantage of the new opportunities. British Eagle (as it 
was now known) began domestic services in competition with BEA in 
November, 19^3* But the private operators also continued to press for a 
liberalisation of the restrictions placed on their licences. In November, 
1962, for example, a full year before the inauguration of its new domestic 13*
1 3 . ’Flight,’ op.cit,, p.888.
1 *4. Ibid., 20/9/62, p.515. Difficulties in obtaining traffic rights also
prevented the establishment of EUA's London-Paris service, (see Chapt. VI)
trunk routes, Eagle applied to the ATLB for an increase from one to two
round-trips per day on its services between London and Glasgow and
Edinburgh, arguing that the initial permitted frequency was insufficient
for economic utilisation of aircraft. The Board refused the applications:
"We accept that there is a level of activity below which 
it is impossible to sustain the central organisation, with its 
many and varied specialist skills, which is essential for 
successful airline operation; but it is within our knowledge 
that some other independent airlines have achieved viability 
with a fleet capacity much less than that nov; planned by 
British Eagle."
On appeal, however, Eagle received permission to increase the number of
weekly flights on the Edinburgh and Glasgow trunk routes from seven to ten
and from seven to twelve respectively. In addition, the carrier was also
awarded a licence early in 1965 to operate 1? services per week between
Glasgow and Dublin, while British Eagle (Liverpool) (formerly St&rwaya)
was given permission to inaugurate a service between London, Chester and
15Liverpool at unlimited frequency. Other airlines similarly attempted 
to expand their route networks and increase frequencies. But these decision 
relating to British Eagle were to prove particularly important over the 
next few years.
Outside Europe there were three main areas of expansion for the 
Independents’ scheduled services. Eagle's aspirations on the North 
Atlantic and BUA's routes to Africa are discussed elsewhere. The other 
region was Latin America. BOAC had originally withdrawn its South 
American services i n 195^ because of capacity shortages following the 
Comet crashes. They were resumed early in i960. But a number of 
countries continued to impose severe restrictions on the services. Brazil, 
for example, limited BOAC to two 70-seat Comet IV flights per week 
between London and Rio and Sao Paulo, refusing permission to use the 15
15. Ibid., 2h/lO/63,p,682, et.al.
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better suited/larger Boeing 707* Sir Giles Guthrie estimated that the
Corporation, with load-factors of approximately was losing £1.25
million per annum on the routes. Consequently, in September, 196*+, BOAC
16again decided to withdraw from South America.
* The Government announced that it would welcome attempts by other
airlines to operate the routes. The possibility of this happening,
however, seemed unlikely, since no company had attempted to take them
over as 'lapsed routes' between 195^ and I960, although BOAC had
approached a number of Independents with a view to operating to South
17America on its behalf. Nevertheless, BUA now took up the challenge.
The airline offered to fly a twice-weekly service using VC-lOs (it 
ordered a further one in May, 1965* at a total cost of £2.8 million), 
estimating that it would be able to break-even on the routes by the 
second year. Services were inaugurated in October, 196*+, after the 
Minister had granted a licensing exemption (because of the need to start 
as quickly as possible) and reached agreement with the relevent govern­
ments for the use of VC-lOs, although BUA was still forced to schedule 
its flights at odd hours to avoid diverting local carriers' traffic.
Thus, the Independents experienced a fairly rapid expansion of their 
scheduled services, during the first half of the 1960s. As we have seen, 
there was also large-scale rationalisation within the sector and numerous 
airlines were forced out of business (while other companies were just as 
quickly established). But for most of those that remained the period 
appears to have been one of growth and relative prosperity, especially 
when compared with the late 1950s. (see Tables 5.1-5.3). To take a 1678
16. Straszheim: "The International Airline Industry", 1969, p.2*+; 
'Flight', 10/9/6*+, p. Mi6~7; 'Aeroplane', 29/1/60, p.125*
17. BOAC evidence to ATLB. 'Flight',15/6/61, p.337-8.
18. Ibid., 1/10/6*+, p.580 and 13/5/65, p. 727-8; Straszheim, op.cit., 
p. *+5 ; ATLB Annual Report, I96V 65, p.7.
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few examples, in I965 BUA flew 202,3*0»000 passenger-miles on scheduled 
services, (compared with 112,629,000 in 1963)» Cambrian flew 62,923,000 
(against 49,612,000 in 1963) and BKS 103,701,000 (60,234,000)19 It is
difficult to discover the actual financial situation of BUA and its 
associated companies since figures were usually only published for the 
group as a whole and even these results were influenced by extensive 
fiscal transactions and disposal of fixed assets, a by-product of 
rationalisation. In i960 it seems likely that the airline itself lost 
almost £200,000, but was probably profitable thereafter. By 1964 the 
BUA group was returning a profit of £860,000 (£1.4 million po.st-tax, 
after adjustments), compared with £377,400 in 1961. Similarly, Cambrian 
recorded net profits of £35,557 in 1961, £54,849 in 1962 and £52,837 in 
1963. After being placed in the hands of a receiver in 1961 with debts 
of almost £400 000, BKS managed to earn a surplus of £127,000 in 1962.20 21
The Labour Government;
The election victory of the Labour Party in October, 1964, as one might 
expect, was not widely welcomed in independent air transport circles. The 
new Government's policies were confidently expected to discriminate against 
private enterprise aviation, indeed against private business in general.
Mr. Fred Lee, a Labour spokesman on aviation, for example, had said in a 
speech early in 1963 that although a Labour Government would not national­
ise the Independents, with the exception of BOAC-Cunard (see Chapter VII), 
the private operators would probably be confined to non-scheduled and
ferry services, leaving the Corporations once more with a monopoly of 
. V " 2"\ordinary scheduled routes. The inevitable atmosphere of uncertainty
19. Board of Trade.
20. 'Flight* and 'Aeroplane', various dates.
21. 'Aeroplane', 27/2/63, p.H.
9 7.
and lack of confidence in the future that established itself among
British carriers at this time is reflected in the announcement by Mercury
Airlines in October, 196*1, that it was to close down, despite the fact
that it had just completed its best-ever season. Lord Calthorpe,
/'anaging Director, said that hopes of a 'considerable injection of
further capital' needed to keep the £5j5,000 company solvent had been
quashed because of the formation of a Labour Government; "The syndicate
who had been interested naturally wanted high returns for a high risk
investment... but the syndicate felt that any high returns would be
whittled down by various forms of taxation they feared from a Labour 
22Government."
The new Minister of Aviation, Mr. Roy Jenkins, announced Labour's 
air transport policy in the House of Commons on February 17th, 1965.
The vagueness of the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act was such that no new 
legislation was felt to be necessary. In fact, the new policy proved to 
be much less radical than many had feared (or hoped). Private enterprise 
air transport was dealt with under three headings. Firstly, there would 
be no additional restrictions on the operation of inclusive-tours; indeed, 
the Minister said that he would ask the ATL3 if its procedures for dealing 
with applications for this type of service could be simplified and ex­
pedited. Secondly, Jenkins said that he was not convinced that the 
national interest was generally served by more than one British 
airline operating on the same international route; "I do not, therefore, 
propose to re-open with foreign governments those cases where the ATLB 
has licensed parallel international services by British operators and 
it has so far proved impracticable to secure the necessary traffic rights
22. 'Flight,' 5/11/61», p.775. The assets of Mercury Airlines were
eventually acquired by DMA.
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on acceptable terms." Any British carrier could, however, begin a genuinely 
new service with the full support of the Government. Finally, with regard 
to the thorny question of domestic scheduled routes "there may be a case 
for more enterprising development of *air services by independent airlines 
and for giving them reasonable security of tenure," but such services 
would have to be co-ordinated with the country's general transport system, 
which was currently being studied by Lord Hinton. On domestic trunk 
routes, however, where the Independents were flying in competition with 
BEA, no increase in the frequencies of services would be permitted:
"In the short run, unrestricted competition might produce 
a better service to passengers, but probably at the cost of all 
the operators serving the routes in question doing so at a 
loss. The longer term results could well be to force up fares, 
or to lead to a lower frequency after one operator had been 
eliminated....In these, circumstances it will be for (the 
independent airlines) to consider whether they wish to 
continue as at present, or to withdraw completely from these 
routes. Should they choose the latter alternative, BEA will 
revert to being the sole operator." «23
On the surface, therefore, the new policy was apparently intended 
to 'tilt' the licensing system once again in favour of the nationalised 
airlines. It is noticeable, for example, that following the Minister's 
statement BEA virtually ceased to object to applications for licenses to
pi,
operate inclusive-tours, presumably because the Corporation no longer 
felt threatened by the incursion of the Independents into its own principal 
sphere of activity, scheduled services. But despite earlier threats to 
limit the private carriers to charter and ferry operations, the new policy 
really changed the 'status quo' very little. The initial fears of the 
private sector on the whole proved groundless, primarily because of the 
changes that had taken place since 1951 in the attitude of the main body 
of the Labour Party towards public ownership. Nationalisation in itself was
23» Hansard, House of Commons, 17/2/65, vol. 706, cols.1186-89.
2*t. Select Committee on Nationalised Industries: 'BEA', 1966/6?,
Heport, p. xliv. ■
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no longer regarded as a vital part of a future government's platform; 
instead, growing emphasis was placed on more indirect forms of economic 
planning to control the economy and achieve social and political aims.
The writings of a number of left-wing intellectuals during the late-19503 » 
illustrate this change of attitude. In 1958, for example, Peter Shore 
had written:
"If Socialists have been right to assume that private 
ownership of industrial property is the key to a capitalist 
society, they have been wrong in assuming that public 
ownership leads necessarily to a classless society. It does 
not. The power of industrial property remains, under public 
no less than private ownership,and the shape that it gives to 
society depends upon who controls it and the purposes for which 
it is used." 25
Similarly, C.A.R. Crosland maintained that:
"Post~19^5 experience in the planning field strongly 
underlines...(the fact that) ownership is not now an important 
determinant of economic power... It can hardly be denied that 
public-monopoly nationalisation, despite considerable achieve­
ments in certain exceptionally difficult industries, no longer 
seems the panacea that it used to." r 26
Revisionism such as this must have meant, despite the rhetoric to
the contrary, that while the Labour Government would probably still tend
to favour the public sector, it v/as much less hostile towards private
enterprise.
’ Thus, the change in emphasis towards the private airlines that followed 
the return to power of a Labour Government was more apparent than real. But it 
was sufficient to bring strong protests from the Independents, and in 
particular from British Eagle. As we have seen, the latter company had 
been trying for some time, with only limited success, to persuade the 
ATLB to increase its permitted frequencies on the domestic trunk routes.
25- In Norman Mackenzie (ed.): 'Conviction', 1958, p.52-3.
26. 'The Future of Socialism', 1956, p • L68 and ^70. See also Douglas Jay: 
'Socialism in the New Society', 1962, and Socialist Union: 'Twentieth 
Century Socialism', 1956.
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There was no way of making these services profitable, argued Eagle,
unless the economic minimum of three round-trips per day was allowed
27(previously it had argued in favour of two such daily flights).
Eagle’s reaction to the new policy was immediate; it announced that it would 
.cease to operate all domestic trunk routes from February 20th. In retro­
spect, there is little doubt that this move was over-hasty and mistaken.
Even without a new policy guidance, for example, it is not at all 
certain that the ATLB would have sanctioned further frequency increases, 
it certainly had not up till then. Some suggested that Eagle's Chairman,
Hr. Harold Bamberg, was simply using the change of policy as an excuse to 
abandon unprofitable routes. During the first year of operation, that is in 
the twelve months up to October 31st, 1964, Eagle's new domestic services 
had lost some £300,000 and passenger load-factors had averaged only 2 l$
on the London-Glasgow route, 2(8° on the London-Belfast route and a mere
27a1 y ° between London and Belfast. Mr. Roy Jenkins noted that "the
alacrity with which (Bamberg) took (the decision to abandon domestic
trunk services) suggests that he was not altogether sorry to withdraw
28from> his commitment," while Mr. Anthony Millward, Chairman of BEA, 
thought that Bamberg was "the happiest man in Britain tonight".^
27. In fact, there is an economic justification for Eagle's attempts to 
gradually increase the number of daily flights on the trunk routes, 
although the airline does not appear to have used it in arguing its 
case before the ATLB. It is widely accepted today that an increase
in the permitted frequency of a carrier facing competition on a partic­
ular route will usually result in that carrier gaining a proportionately 
larger share of the market. Thus, the airline with the fewer daily 
flights is at a considerable disadvantage. See Hall; 'The Relationship 
between Frequency Share and Market Share in Air Transport.' Unpublished 
M.A. thesis, Centre for Transport Studies, University of Leeds, 1969.
Also Wyatt's evidence to Select Committee on Nationalised Industries; 
'BEA', 1967, paragraph 1834.
27a. 'Flight', 19/11/64, p. 858, and 21/1/65, p.84.
28. Hansard, op.cit., I/3/65,vol. 70?, cols. 951-2.
29. 'Flight', 25/2/65, p.280.
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Such suggestions may be wide of the mark. But even if the intention
of Eagle's management was simply to force a showdown with the Government,
it had badly miscalculated. For BUA quickly announced that it intended to
apply to the ATLB for permission to take-over Eagle's discarded routes
(as well as for licences to operate between London and Birmingham and
Manchester), flying at the same frequency, but with jets out of Gatwick
instead of turbo-props out of Heathrow. Eagle immediately decided that
it would resume services to Glasgow, and eventually also to Edinburgh and'
Belfast, using the excuse that the recent award of licences to operate
the London-Chester-Liverpool and the Liverpool-Glasgow routes (see above)
meant that it could now operate three flights per working day to Glasgow instead
30of two, one being via Liverpool. Nevertheless, BUA pressed ahead with 
its applications.
The ATLB announced its decisions the following September, awarding
licences to operate all three domestic trunk routes to BUA. The Board
described the action of Eagle in withdrawing its scheduled services as a
"disservice to the public" and said that the "stop-go" nature of the
airline's operations must be a matter of concern since irregular and, to
that extent, unreliable service on these important routes were not in the
best interests of British civil aviation:
"...it was in our view highly conjectural when, if at all, 
they would in fact have resumed these services, on which they 
said they had incurred heavy losses, if BUA had not applied to 
operate from Gatwick. It is also clear from their evidence 
that the continuation of their services would depend on their 
being able to secure authority for higher frequencies than those 
already authorised." v
Presumably because of the apparent unreliability of the previous operators,
for the first time the ATLB spo]t out a British equivalent of the American
CAB's 'use it or lose it' rule. In granting BUA's applications, the
Board insisted that the airline must produce evidence not later than
January l^th in each of the five years after 19&7 that throughout the
previous calendar year the service had been operated at not less than the
j O T '  i b i d 7 , ’" ” k ' 5 7 5 7 6 ^ 1 '  P *  B l 9  a n d  ";:1“ . 1 ■ ■ ‘ j -  ...
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specified frequency. British Eagle appealed against the ATLB decisions, and 
was in fact allowed to resume services on the London-Glasgow route at a 
maximum frequency of two return flights per day. But BTJA retained its three
. 31licences for domestic trunk services.
The Downturn:
The Labour Government's 'hard line' policy towards the Independents 
in fact did not survive very long. As we have just seen, Eagle was 
allowed to operate on the London-Glasgow route again along with BUA and 
BEA, so that in this instance competition from the private sector was 
considerably increased rather than cut-back. Similarly, late in 1966 BUA 
received permission to increase the frequencies of its services to Glasgow 
and Belfast from 12 to 17 and from 7 to 12 per week respectively. But 
Eagle's applications for a restoration of the Belfast route and increased 
frequency on its Glasgow service were refused, primarily because, operating 
out of Heathrow rather than Gatwick, they presented a greater threat to 
BEA's traffic. 52 In fact, the ATLB made it clear that it basically 
intended to ignore Roy Jenkins' policy statement and continue to act 
strictly according to the letter of the i960 legislation: "We find 
nothing in the Minister's Statement to prevent us from reaching our own 
judgement, in accordance with our statutory duty, in the cases submitted 
to us. " 53
In effect, therefore, as the Board of Trade later admitted, the ATLB 
had "thumbed their nose" at the Minister of Aviation. In its 
second report the Board had said:
31. Ibid., 16/9/65, p.^85; 'The Economist', 1/1/66, p,J(9.
32. ATLB Annual Report, 1966/67, p.IO.
33. Ibid., 196V 65, p.*t.
3*1. Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, op.cit., p. xlv.
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"We must interpret the Act as it stands and not by 
reference to statements by Ministers regarding its intention 
and probable effect. We shall continue to rely upon our 
own interpretation of the Act unless we are overruled by a 
Court of Law." 35,
It seems hardly credible that this was the intention of Parliament in 
I960. Duncan Sandys had specifically stated that a ’case law' would 
gradually be built up, based on ATLB decisions and appeals to the Minister.
The fault clearly lay in the lack of statutory directives in the Civil 
Aviation (Licensing) Act. Even given the Board's unilateral declaration 
of independence, however, it should still have been quite easy for the 
Government to impose its will. Yet the new policy, as enunciated in the House 
of Commons, was not pressed: "Cases dealt with after the Minister's state­
ment, and in which he became involved by virtue of his appellate function,
confirmed his willingness to consider individual cases on their merits and
36not in strict conformity with the 'guidelines'." Thus, the accession to
power of a Labour Government did not prove to be such a catastophe for the
private sector of the air transport industry as many had expected.
To some extent the Independents appeared to be doing quite well out
of the' new Administration. For example, a number of private operators
invested a considerable amount of capital in introducing jet equipment.
During 1965, Eagle ordered five and British Midland Airways (Derby
Airways) two new 1-11 300s, The following year Lloyd International placed
an order for a DC-8-63 (plus an option on the purchase of another), Channel
ordered four 1-11 AOQs (plus two options) and Eagle two 7Q7-320Cc. Finally,
in 1967 Channel converted its options for the purchase of two 1 - 1 1  ^OOs
into firm orders and in addition announced its intention of buying five 
37-Trident lEs. Such a spending spree on new, expensive equipment was a
major departure from the traditional role of charter companies as operators of
35. ATLB Annual Report, 1961/62, p.7. ...
36. Ibid, 1966/67, p.6.
37. 'Flight,' various dates.
obsolescent aircraft. It is partly explained by the very rapid 
expansion of the inclusive-tour market at this time (see Chapter X).
But a few Independents followed the lead of BUA in using jets on their 
scheduled routes and, incidentally , forcing BEA to prematurely retire its 
turbo-prop aircraft.
Despite the impression that such expansion might give, however, the 
private operators were experiencing a number of serious problems. On the 
whole, traffic continued to grow at a fairly healthy rate. But profit­
ability became more and more difficult to maintain as costs and capacity in­
creased dramatically, while the ability to put up fares was restricted by 
the Government-imposed ’freeze' on wages and prices. Domestic scheduled 
services were particularly badly hit. The ATLB reported:
"We have sufficient evidence to leave us in no doubt 
that the general level of profitability in British civil 
air transport, and particularly in the operation of 
domestic scheduled services, is abnormally low, and certainly 
insufficient to finance, or support the financing of, 
successive generations of new equipment. By this we mean 
that airline companies are in many cases unable either to 
finance re-equipment from their own resources, or to show 
a return on current operations sufficient to inspire 
confidence in outside investors." 38
Such a view might appear to conflict with the large number of expensive 
new jet aircraft ordered by the Independents between 19j»5 and 196?. But 
ordering new equipment, usually under competitive pressure, is not the 
same as actually paying for it, as several airlines were to discover at 
their cost. Even the more fortunate found their debt ratios increased 
considerably, perhaps even excessively.
During 1966/67 UK airlines were expected to incur losses on 
domestic services in excess of £1.2 5 million, before meeting fixed interest 
charges of a further £1 million. Consequently, the ATLB was forced to 
grant fare increases intended to reduce the operating deficit
38. Annual Report, 1965/66 , p.5.
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by approximately £1 million, although this still left a considerable 
39annual loss. The following August the Board was again considering
applications to raise domestic fare levels when the Government imposed
its statutory 'freeze', which ruled out nearly all price increases until
ijhe end of the year. During 1967/68 internal air services were
expected to lose £2 .3  million, before interest payments, rising to over
£3 million the next year. With the 'freeze' replaced by a period of
'severe restraint', therefore, fare increases were approved which over
a full year's operation should have produced a surplus of some £1 .7 5  million,
before interest, providing a marginal profit for most of the airlines
concerned. Unfortunately, although most domestic air routes are primarily
business-orientated, their price (or substitution) elasticity proved to
be such that the rise in revenue per passenger was accompanied by a marked
hifall in total traffic, so that the airlines' problems were far from 
solved. BEA, of course, accounted for a large proportion of domestic 
traffic and its losses are included in the figures already quoted. But 
the unprofitability of UK internal air services was undoubtedly an important, 
perhaps the major, cause of the downturn in the fortunes of the Independents, 
although as we shall see, a number of other factors also contributed.
To a greater or lesser extent all the privately-owned scheduled 
operators experienced financial difficulties at this time, but particularly ; 
badly hit was the largest Independent, BUA. During 196h/65 BUA's 
parent company, Air Holdings, recorded a trading profit of just £52,116 
before tax recovery and other upward adjustments, and even this was
39* Ibid., p.2.5-6. 
iiO. Ibid., 1966/67,p.7.
Al. Ibid., 1967/68, p.1 3 . For example, during 1968/69 in terms of the number 
of passengers carried, BEA*s international scheduledtraffic increased by 
$$>, while its domestic traffic showed no growth. BEA Annual Report, 
1968/69, p.20. For a more detailed discussion of these fare increases 
see Gwilliam: "Domestic Air Transport Fares',' Journal of Transport Economics 
and Policy, 19 68, p. 203-h.
arrived at only after "taking to credit the sum of £ 1 ^1 ,96?,
Being liquidated damages received in respect of a claim for late 
delivery under a contract for the purchase of aircraft." The 
company blamed its difficulties on the "continuing but reducing" 
loss on the operation of the South American services, the cost of 
cr'ew training with the introduction of jet aircraft, the dis­
organisation resulting from the late delivery of the BAC 1-11 
fleet, high interest charges and increases in labour and other 
costs. The airline's problems, however, were rather more deeply 
rooted and of a longer-term nature than these excuses might suggest 
and a firm of consultants was engaged to carry out a thorough study 
of its activities. In 1966 Air Holdings recorded a group profit 
of over £500,000, but the UK airlines within the company lost almost 
£330,000., The forecast, loss for 1967 for EUA was £532,000, rising 
to an estimated £ 1 . 1  million in 1968 and £ 1 .^ million the following 
year. By mid-1967 the carrier was describing its domestic trunk 
services as "heading for disaster." In an attempt to reduce costs,
extensive economies were introduced; office staff, for example,
2were mdved from central London to Gatwick.
The smaller UK regional carriers within the group were similarly 
losing money and an effort was made to rationalise their operations. 
BUA (Channel Islands), en amalgamation of Jersey Airlines and 
Silver City Airways Northern Division, lost £280,000 in 19&7 and 
the deficit for the following year was expected to be at about the 
same level. In November, 1968, BUA (Cl), BU (Manx)A and Morton 
Air Services were merged, despite strong staff opposition, to form 
British United Island Airways (BUIA). It was rumoured that the 
parent company had in fact attempted to sell-off one or more of these 
smaller subsidiaries; presumably, and not surprisingly, the move
■ 43was unsuccessful. Apart from its financial problems, the EUA
k Z . 'Flight', 3/11/66, p. 7^3, V 1/ 68, p.6 , et.al.; 'The 
Economist', 3/8/68, p.58.
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group a lso  experienced considerable unrest among i t s  employees.
A s e r i e s  of  s t r i k e s  during 1968 has been described as "probably 
the most acrimonious pilot-management c o n f l i c t s  that UK c i v i l  
a v ia t io n  has ever experienced." The r e su l t  of  the troubled  
period through which the company was passing,  as well  as of  the 
apparently unattract ive  future for  private  en terpr ise  a v ia t io n  in  
B rita in ,  was extensive  ownership changes. As early  as October,
1965, for example, three of  the shareholders in Air Holdings, owning 
29/o of  the company, announced that they were p u l l in g  out o f  a i r  
transport a l together ;  th e ir  shares were absorbed by four of  the 
remaining f i v e  in v e s to r s .  In 1968 two of  those shareholders bought 
BUA and other re la ted  a v ia t io n  undertakings from the Air Holdings 
group for approximately £16 m i l l i o n .  Air Holdings reta ined Air 
Ferry, Aviation Traders, B r i t i sh  Air Ferr ies  and SAFE Air, while  
the new company, BUA (Holdings) L td . ,  owned 9?-% by B r i t i sh  and 
Commonwealth Shipping and 8% by Eagle Star Insurance,  now contro l led  
BUA, BUA (C l ) ,  BU (Manx)A, BUA (Serv ices )  and Morton -Air S e r v ic es ,  
together  with 51% of  Bristow H el icop ters ,  70% of S ierra  Leone 
Airways, 60- 65% o f  Uganda Air Serv ices  and 60% o f  Gambia Airways.
Appendix VII c l e a r ly  shows that although the Independents' 
revenue continued to increase ,  th e ir  f in a n c ia l  p o s i t io n  as a whole 
deter iorated  markedly. As a general r u le ,  those most h e a v i ly  
engaged in the provis ion of  scheduled s e r v i c e s ,  e s p e c i a l ly  on 
domestic routes ,  fared worse, To take a few examples, in  addit ion  
to - th e  BUA f ig u res  already quoted, desp ite  the fa c t  that Cambrian's 
t r a f f i c  increased in 19 6 5 , p r o f i t s ,  at £A-6,912, were some £75*600
h k * Blain: ’Pilots and Management', 1972, p.285,
Mfa,:'Flight', op.cit.; 'The Economist', op.cit.
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l e s s  than the previous year.  Net trading p r o f i t  recovered some­
what to £66,110 the fo l low ing  year,  but even t h i s  respresented only a 
2% return on turnover.  Cambrian's chairman, John Morgan, commented 
s trongly  in the company's 1966 Annual Report on the inadequate returns  
at current fare l e v e l s  and sa id  that " losses  are in e v i ta b le  i f  the 
a i r l i n e  i s  not allowed the rate  for the job." He went on to point  
out th a t ,  with a few exceptions ,  there had not been an increase  in  
domestic t a r i f f s  s in ce  Apri l ,  1963* during which time co s t s  had r isen
¿4.5
by approximately 30%. J  BKS again ran into  f in a n c ia l  trouble and 
BEA was forced to come to the Independent's a id ,  r a i s in g  i t s  share­
holding from 30% to 50% . Lloyd In ternat iona l  l o s t  £44,548 in 1966, 
compared with p r o f i t s  of  £665  in 1965 and £46,033 1964. Channel
Airways was able to take only three out of s i x  1 -1 1s and two out 
of  the f i v e  Trident 1Es i t  had on order, which cost  the a i r l i n e  
£300,000 in l o s t  depos i ts  (BKS acquired two of  the Tridents with 
the help of  BEA f in a n ce ) .  F in a l ly ,  BMA had to turn to i t s  main
shareholder,  Minster A sse ts ,  again for further  c a p i t a l  when i t  came
46to paying for i t s  l - 1 1 s .
TABLE 5 .2  s UK A ir l in e s '  In ternat iona l  Scheduled Serv ices
(excluding v e h ic l e - f e r r y  operations)  (expressed  
in  m i l l io n s  of  passenger-m i les ) .
Corporations Independents Total Independents' Share(%)
19 6 3 4,343 249 4,592 5 .4
1964 5,212 262 5,474 4 .8
1965 6 ,28 8 349 6,637 5 .3
1966 6,694 419 ■7,113 5 .9
19 67 7 , 08? 428 7,515 5 .7
Source; from Board of Trade.
45.
46.
• F l i g h t ' ,  19 /5 /66 ,  
I b i d . ,  24 /11 /66 ,  p
p. 8 2 6 , and 18 / 5 / 6 7 , p. 
. 864, 28/ 9/ 6 7 , p.534-5
780.
, and 1 6 /1 /6 9 ,  p . 8 l .
1 0 9.
TABLE 5»3i UK Airlines' Domestic Scheduled Services
(excluding vehicle-ferry operations) (expressed 
in passenger-miles) (millions)
Corporations Independents total Independents' 
share (%)
1*963 613 200 813 24.6
1964 690 253 943 2 6 .8
1965 756 289 1,045 27.6
1966 769 375 1,144 3 2 .8
19 67 789 411 1,205 3^.1
Source; from Board of Trade
Thus, while  the Independents were recording very rapid ra tes  
of  growth in the f i e l d  o f  i n c lu s iv e - t o u r s ,  as far  as scheduled se r v ic e s  
were concerned they were experiencing considerable  d i f f i c u l t i e s .
Table 5 .2  in d ic a te s  that in  terms of  passenger-miles  performed the 
private  s e c t o r ' s  share o f  in te rn a t io n a l  scheduled t r a f f i c  remained 
r e l a t i v e l y  constant between 1963 and 196?, d esp i te  the tra n sfer  to  
BUA of  the South American routes ,  which accounted for approximately 
20% o f  t h i s  t o t a l .  ( On UK domestic routes (Table 5«3) the 
independent a i r l i n e s  were more s u c c e s s f u l ,  increas ing  th e ir  share of  
the market from 19% in i 960 to over 3^ % in 196?. But, o f  course,  
for  most operators domestic s e r v ic e s  were far from p r o f i ta b le  at t h i s  
time because of  the Government's ' f r e e z e '  on wages and p r i c e s .  
Altogether ,  the Independents' scheduled serv ic e  t r a f f i c  grew three ­
fo ld  between 19 6 0 /6 1  and 19 6 7 / 6 8 , though t h i s  s t i l l  represented  
only 10% o f  t o t a l  UK scheduled t r a f f i c  compared with 8% in i 960 .
Their share of t o t a l  UK c i v i l  a ir  transport output (scheduled and 
charter) increased from 25% in 19 6 1/ 6 2  to 32% by 1967/63,  b u t , as the
47. Bristow: 'The Independent Airlines', The Aeronautical Journal, 
1970, p . 6 3 2 .
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Edwards Committee was to note ,  " i t  i s  c lear  that t h i s  o v e ra l l  growth
of t r a f f i c  has not brought general f in a n c ia l  s t a b i l i t y  to the pr ivate
JlfSse c to r  o f  the in d u s tr y .”
The C iv i l  Aviation (Licensing) Act, designed as i t  was to in j e c t
a^fee l ing  o f  s t a b i l i t y  and confidence into  the pr ivate  sec tor  of  an
industry that c le a r ly  lacked both of  these  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s ,  had
obviously  f a i l e d .  The in tervent ion  of  a Labour Government could
have made, at most, only a marginal contribution to that f a i l u r e .
Rather the f a u l t  lay in the contrad ict ions  embodied in  the whole
approach to UK a ir  transport l i c e n s in g  and t y p i f i e d  by the i 960 Act,
in part icu lar  the fa i lu r e  to f u l l y  understand the d i f f i c u l t i e s  inherent
in  regu lat ing  a mixed-sector industry .  The bankruptcy o f  the old
p o l icy  and the need for something new were widely accepted,  both
within and outs ide  c i v i l  av ia t ion  c i r c l e s .  The S e lec t  Committee on
Nationa l ised  In d u str ie s ,  for example, recommended that the ATLB
should be deprived of i t s  l i c e n s in g  and f a r e - f ix i n g  fun ct io n s ,  and
s in ce  t h i s  would leave i t  only with the ro le  of  a Consumers' Council,
that the Board i t s e l f  be abolished; "Your Committee b e l ie v e  that the
ATLB have, on balance, not provided s t a b i l i t y  for  B r i t i s h  c i v i l  
if 9
a v i a t i o n . ” .
In evidence to the same Committee BUA summed up the objec t io n s  of  
the privately-owned a i r l i n e s  to the l i c e n s i n g  procedure, and i t  i s  
worth quoting t h i s  testimony in some d e t a i l .  As far as scheduled  
s e r v ic e s  were concerned, argued BUA, the current system gave c i v i l  
a v ia t io n  the worst of  both worlds. The Independents were s u f f i c i e n t l y  
w ell  organised to make an impact on the Corporations' b u s in ess ,  but 
were too fru stra ted  and in h ib i te d  by the l i c e n s in g  procedure and 
other matters to be able to operate properly.  Each l i c e n c e  ap p l ica -
k 8 .  The Edwards Report, p.21 and 23.
^9. O p . c i t . ,  p. x l i v  and x l v i i i , .
t io n  was considered and judged by the ATLB on i t s  own part icu lar
merits  without any background of  evolving p o l i c y ,  and there was hence
no guidance as to whether any underlying po l icy  had emerged, was
emerging or was l i k e l y  to emerge from the Board's d e c i s io n s .  S ir
Myles Wyatt described the p o s i t io n  of the Independents thus:
•
"What i s  cer ta in  i s  that unless  there i s  a m odif icat ion  
to the present p o l icy  there i s  no room in B r i t i sh  a v ia t io n  
for a pr ivate ly-operated  a i r l i n e . . .What i s  abso lute ly  
fundamental to the whole thinking of  anyone connected with 
c i v i l  av ia t ion  today i s  the n e c e s s i ty  of  the B r i t i sh  
Government, which i s  the only body that can do i t ,  to think  
out exact ly  what i t  i s  i t  wants and then make i t  poss ib le  
for  i t  to happen.. .{This  uncertainty)  has been a feature  
from the day the war ended, but i t  has become an increasing  
ly  ser iou s  factor  year by year and now i t  has reached a 
proportion, due s o l e l y  to the magnitude of the money we 
are ta lk ing  about, where i t  i s  abso lu te ly  v i t a l . "  50
This was a considerable contrast  to the way in which the Independents
had i n i t i a l l y  welcomed the i 960 Act: "tWe) look upon (1961/62) as
a year o f  t r a n s i t i o n  : t r a n s i t i o n  p a r t ic u la r ly  from a f e e l i n g  of
being not unreservedly welcome to a p o s i t i v e  acceptance that private
enterpr ise  has and w i l l  continue to have a major r e s p o n s ib i l i t y  in
the general development o f  B r i t i s h  a i r  transport ,"  5/
•Yet again, th ere fo re ,  the Government was c a l l e d  upon to s tep  in
and ' f i n a l l y '  s e t t l e  the problem. On t h i s  occas ion ,  the Government
chose, in August, 1967, to appoint a Committee o f  Inquiry under the
chairmanship of  professor  Ronald Edwards to i n v e s t ig a t e  the whole
organisat ion  of  a i r  transport in the UK and recommend reforms*
Praisworthy as t h i s  ac t ion  may have been, one cannot help thinking
that i t  was in fa c t  yet  another example o f  the buck being passedj in
other words, an excuse to put o f f  the time when a d e c is io n  would 
51 sihave-to be made. One immediate r e su l t  o f  the establishment of
the Edwards' Committee was that the larger  pr ivate  operators began 
56T ibid.'7" Evidence i’" p .2 4 6 ' and 250.
51. BIATA Annual Report, 1961/62, p . 7.
51a. As 'The Economist' once noted: "Appointing Committees i s  no 
su b s t i t u t e  for p o l icy ."  2 9 /1 0 /6 0 ,p.
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to manoevre in an attempt to stake their claims to a major
role in a reorganised industry. This was the 'raison d'etre' for
the applications to the ATLB by British Eagle, BUA, Caledonian and
Transglobe in August, 1967, for licences to operate North Atlantic
scheduled services. BUA and Transglobe withdrew from the contest
^following a directive from the President of the Board of Trade, but
Eagle and Caledonian pressed ahead. The latter carrier wanted to
operate services between London, Prestwick and New York and London,
Prestwick and Toronto from May, 1969, and between UK and San
Francisco/Los Angeles from Kay, 1970, while Eagle similarly applied
for services from London to New York, Montreal, Toronto and San
Francisco/Los Angeles. The Board announced its decisions the
following May, refus ing a l l  the app l ica t ion s  on the grounds that the
route was not yet ready for the licensing of a second British operator
and that neither applicant had e s tab l ished  a s u f f i c i e n t l y  strong
f ina n c ia l  pos i t ion  from which i t  could embark on a major expansion
53of "this costly and exacting type."
The Collapse of British Eagle
■The announcement on November 6th,  1968, that B r i t i s h  Eagle was
to cease operations as from midnight that day came as a severe shock
to the industry, primarily because of its suddenness. The fact,
however, that a l l  was not w e l l  within the company had been more than
evident for some time. I t  transpired that unsecured cred itors  were
owed well over £6 million and, up to November, 1972, were unlikely to
5 breceive  more than 15 pence in  the pound. I t  i s  important to  
examine the factors  behind the bankruptcy of  B r i t i sh  Eagle in some 
d e t a i l ,  partly because o f  the r e la t iv e  s i z e  o f  Eagle within the 
private sector  o f  the industry ,  but mainly because of the l i g h t  that
52. 'Flight', 17/8/67, p. 246-7 and 28/12/67, p.1057.
53. Ib id.  20 /6 /68 ,  p ,915-7» In f a c t ,  the a pp l ica t ion  of Caledonian 
Airways "only narrowly.. . f a i l e d  to s a t i s f y  the Board." ATLB 
Annual Report, 1971/72, p 10.
54. British Eagle International Airlines Ltd.,' Letter dated 30/11/72 to 
unsecured creditors from F.S. NcV.'hirter,British Eagle's liquidator.
B~tlwiTn~.an:'|rT^T^T iH :'r ''j '~ Y r'T m ‘ •~TtTi|riifir~tiTr~TTn;»uini ij'L~~iB ~ "T “r*,''".'*"*'.T**r.r” 'T""*r —if—r* rr t-* ‘*'~r**~riir*it“  i"*r t*'*'**"*’■ r ■ ■ j*      iini‘" 1,11 iin 1 1 ,11  ■■'■■■*■
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the airline's collapse can shed on the general problems facing the 
independent carriers. Eagle was the second largest privately-owned 
airline in the UK, with a staff of 2,300, including 220 pilots, and 
a fleet of 25 aircraft: k Boeing 707s, 5 SAC 1-11 300s, 12 Britannias 
.and h Viscounts, of which only two Britannias and two Viscounts were en­
tirely free of charges. The reconstruction of the airline after the 
debacle of its association with Cunard (see Chapter VII) began in 
February,1963, when Mr. Harold Bamberg bought back 60$ of the company 
from the shipping line. Since then Eagle had expanded at a considerable, 
if somewhat erratic, rate, much faster than BUA. But most of this growth
had been based on charter work, while BUA had been by far the more success-
55ful airline m  the field of scheduled services.
With the benefit of hindsight, it is fairly easy to see that Eagle
faced almost insuperable difficulties, and as time went on the problems
it was encountering became more and more evident. In 1966 the airline,
like BUA, had been forced to seek the help of consultants. In November
of the same year three senior executives resigned. 'Flight* commented
at the time:"The actual loss to the company of the experience and
enthusiasm of these men is bad enough; what is worse are the signs of
56strain within the company that their resignations reveal." The air­
line was re-structured following the purchase of the remaining of the 
shares from Cunard towards the end of 1966. A holding company, Eagle 
International, was formed to control British Eagle International 
Airlines, British Eagle (Liverpool), Eagle Aviation (a charter sub­
sidiary), the Knightsbridge Air Terminal, Eagle Aircraft Services and 
Sky Chef. During the summer of 1967 Eagle suffered a 20^ fall in 
holiday traffic and was forced to declare redundant 31 pilots, 8
55. 'Flight', 28/ 11/68; 'The Economist’, 12/8/67, p.593.
56 . 17 / 1 1 / 66 , p .8 26 .
57 Just over a year l a t e r  anavigators and 9 f l i g h t  engineers.
further 4l8  employees were sacked and the Speke (Liverpool)  main-
58tenance base c lo sed .  Thus, B r i t i s h  Eagle's  troubles appeared to be 
gathering momentum, although i t  must be remembered that most other  
pr ivate  operators were a lso  experiencing severe problems, not 
l e a s t  BUA.
Table 5 .4 :  Output of  B r i t i s h  Eagle In ternat iona l  A ir l in e s ,
1963-1967 ( in  thousands of  passenger-miles;  
passenger lo a d - fa c to r s  in brackets ) .
Scheduled Services  Separate In c lu s iv e  Exempt Services
In ternat iona l  Domestic Fare Charters -  Tours and Sub- Charters *
19 6 3 ' 32,.448(6o.3) 1 ,398(15 .8 ) 2*,111(79.9) 24,021
(82 .1 )
3,270
1964 36 ,622(40 .4 ) 16 ,654(22 .5) 77 ,421(61 .5) 104,051
(81 .4 )
5,897
19 6 5 4-1 , 4-4-9 (4-4-. 9 ) 8 ,3 5 5 (2 9 .7 ) 178,171(89.9) 131,665
(82 .7 )
8,732
1966 51 ,732(48 .0 ) 12 ,737(42 .7 ) 264,435(68.5) 295,153
( 8 2 . 3 )
9,517
19 6 7 59 ,453(44 .9 ) 17 ,281(51 .9 ) 2 2 8 , 6 30 ( 6 2 . 9 ) 254,482  
(7 7 .4 )
8,526
* measured in  a i r c r a f t - m i le s  ( 0 0 0 ' s )
Source: Board o f  Trade.
The more immediate fa c to r s  that led to B r i t i s h  Eagle’s 
bankruptcy are f a i r l y  easy to discover:
( i )  Eagle was very heav i ly  committed, perhaps even over-committed,  
to trooping work, which accounted for 52% of  i t s  t o t a l  output in  
19 6 7  and 55% the previous year.  The company's share of  t h i s  market 
by 1967 at  33% (42% i f  the Corporations are excluded) was the la rg e s t  
of  any B r i t i sh  a i r l i n e  and almost double that of  i t s  nearest  
competitor, BUA. By the second quarter of  1968  i t s  share had 
f a l l e n  to 2 1%, but t h i s  was s t i l l  considerably greater  than any 
other s i n g le  o p e r a t o r . ^  By the mid-1960s trooping wo.s no longer
59« Board of  Trade C iv i l  Aviation S t a t i s t i c s .
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a very p ro f i ta b le  operation and was usua l ly  costed on a short-run  
marginal b a s i s ,  as W.H. Hudson, Eagle’s Commercial Director  to ld  the 
House of  Commons' Estimates Committee: "When v/e consider these  
trooping tenders ,  they are always contested on what we would c a l l  a 
marginal bas is ;  in other words, you add them on top o f  what you have 
got in other a c t i v i t i e s  and they very rare ly  c o l l e c t ,  because of the 
competit ive nature o f  them, the f u l l  overhead a l l o c a t i o n . I n  the 
long run, such a large  commitment to what was e s s e n t i a l l y  an unprof i t ­
able type of  business  must have weakened Eagle’s p o s i t io n  to a consider  
able ex ten t .
There was in fa c t  one par t icu la r  trooping contrac t ,  won by
B r i t i sh  Eagle from BUA in Apri l ,  1964, that came in for  a great deal
of  c r i t i c i s m .  This involved f i v e  f l i g h t s  per week, or 28,000
passengers a year,  between the UK and Singapore and Hong Kong. I t
was suggested that in order to obtain t h i s  £ 3  m i l l io n  contract the
a i r l i n e  had been forced to quote an e x c e s s iv e ly  low r a te ,  although
61such suggest ions  were s trong ly  denied by Eagle i t s e l f .  A l e t t e r
published in ’F l i g h t ’ , for  in s ta n ce ,  claimed that bankruptcy was 
" inev i tab le  from the day Eagle undercut BUA on the Far Eastern troop­
ing contract .  Those o f  us who knew the p r ice s  quoted knew i t  could
6 2not be done with a decent margin of  p r o f i t ."  Such a l l e g a t io n s
contain an element of  truth;  the Far Eastern trooping contract was
probably^phofitable by i t s e l f .  But in October, 1964-,' the a i r l i n e  was
also chartered to operate a series of UK-Australia migrant flights
■ 63
in a s s o c ia t io n  with Qantas. Since the contract involved carrying
60. Estimates Committee: ’The Movement of  Service Personnel and Stores  
1966/67, Evidence, Q.3 8 2 . ;
6 1 . ’Aeroplane’ , 9 /6 /6 4 ,  p . 11; ’F l i g h t ’ , 19 /11 /64 ,  p . 8 58 .
62. 5 /1 2 /6 8 ,  p.935» written  by G.T. Abrahams.
6 3 . ’Aeroplane' ,  22 /10 /64 ,  p . 1 5 .
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passengers in one d ir ec t io n  only ,  although a return f l i g h t  was 
paid for ,  Eagle was able to hire  out the a i r c r a f t  for the journey' 
back to B r i ta in .  Fortunately the Far East garrison was being  
reduced, so that the flow of  troops and th e ir  fa m i l ie s  was markedly 
greater from Singapore and Hong Kong to the UK than in the other  
d ir e c t io n .  Eagle found i t  quite easy, there fore ,  to obtain a double 
payment for  most of  these f l i g h t s .  The Far Eastern trooping contract  
only r e a l ly  became unprofitable  when the Australian agreement was 
ca n ce l led .  N evertheless ,  the fa c t  remains that o v e r a l l  trooping was 
not very remunerative (see  Chapter V III ) .  That Eagle was l e f t  with 
such a large proportion o f  the t o t a l  trooping market probably r e ­
f l e c t s  i t s  i n a b i l i t y  to gain other types of  work or r e ta in  work i t  
already had. In other words, too large  a proportion of  the a i r l i n e ’s 
t o t a l  output was accounted for by marginal work, 
i i )  Because of  the decreasing s i z e  and poor p r o f i t a b i l i t y  of  
government co ntrac ts ,  Eagle t r ie d  very hard to d i v e r s i f y  i t s  
a c t i v i t i e s ,  e s p e c i a l ly  into the expanding in c lu s iv e - t o u r  (IT) market, 
but vyith only l im ited  su cc es s .  Large increases  in in c lu s iv e - to u r  
and separate fare charter t r a f f i c  were indeed achieved in  1966 
(see  Table 5«*0. The fo l low ing  year,  however, the a i r l i n e ’s share 
of  the IT market f e l l  from 19*75$ to 1 whi l e i t s  average load-  
fac to r  on these  se r v ic e s  a lso  dec l ined ( to  77.^% compared with an 
industry average of 8 2 /0 .  There i s  some evidence to suggest  that  
Eagle only managed to maintain t h i s  share with the aid o f  extremely 
competit ive  p r ic in g ,  which again must have eaten in to  i t s  p r o f i t s .  
C erta in ly ,  i t  su ffered  IT c a n c e l la t io n s  during the summer of  1968 
valued at £1 ,075 ,000 .  A major problem for operators such as
6>u ’F l i g h t ' , i y i l / 6 8 ,  p . 7 6 7 .
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Eagle in this respect was the fact that vertical integration 
between airlines and tour organisers was increasingly pre-empting 
a large slice of the market, leaving relatively little work to be 
put out for tender (see Chapter X). Although Bamberg had long­
term contracts and even owned tour companies, they were not sufficient
9 '*
and hence his attempts during 1968 to form closer links with the
65Transport Holding Company.
iii) Unlike BUA, Eagle never really succeeded in fully establishing 
itself as a scheduled service operator. Its expansion in the field 
of international services was relatively limited and achieved at the 
expense of a marked decline in load-factors. The problems it ex­
perienced on domestic routes have already been discussed. Eagle lost 
a considerable amount of money on the internal trunk routes, (although 
Bamberg claimed that the London-Glasgow service was just becoming 
profitable by the beginning of 19 6 8 ) ^  while the London-Liverpool servic 
was badly hit by increased rail competition. Undoubtedly, for most 
of the 1960s, the scheduled services were cross-subsidised by 
charter work. Bamberg also attempted to get round the restrictions of 
the British licensing system by establishing or helping to establish 
subsidiary airlines in the West Indies, Switzerland and Luxembourg 
but again with very limited success.
(iv) In late October, 19 6 8 , the ATLB announced that it intended to 
revoke Eagle's licence to operate IT charters between London and the 
Caribbean after an application by BOAC alleging irregularities in the 
conduct of the services. The Corporation also claimed that the 
operation was running at a loss. ' This revocation was to be an 
important factor in the failure of the Independent to secure 
additional finance to keep going through the winter of 1968/69.
6 5. 'Flight', l V H / 6 8, p.7 6 7.
66. 'Flight', 15/2/68, p.2l6j ,whether this statement was strictly
correct or not would largely depend on the allocation of overheads.
67 Ibid., 7/ 1 1 / 6 8, p.7j53.
(v) Finally, although more difficult to prove, there were quite
evidently serious short-comings in the management of British Eagle.
For example, 'Flight' published the following letter from Alan T.
Ashwin, senior personnel officer at Eagle, one of several letters the
magazine received making the same point:
"...I believe that British Eagle's collapse v/as due to 
poor management at senior and executive level...Harold 
Bamberg and the staff were sold up the river by a severe 
lack of communications within the company. I believe the 
chairman v/as insulated from the true picture by senior 
executive and senior management bumbling." 68
Similarly, offers of financial support from two merchant banks, Hambro
and Kleinwort Benson, were tied to demands for managerial changes. In
particular, the banks criticised Eagle for being production- rather
than market-orientated, something which the airline's management
69apparently found difficult to accept.
These five factors that helped to push British Eagle into 
liquidation, however, were really only the superficial causes of the 
collapse. It may be a truism, but the basic reason for the bankruptcy 
was that the airline ran out of money. In other v/ords, it did not 
have access to sufficient financial support to continue to operate and 
ride out the storm. Ever since its separation from Cunard, Eagle had 
been something of an anachronism among the larger Independents in its 
lack of capital backing from a stronger parent company; Mr. Harold
I
Bamberg and his wife held 910,000 of the one million issued shares 
in the airline. To expand, therefore, it had to rely upon borrowed 
finance and re-invested profits, both of which have been notoriously 
difficult for a British private operator to obtain since the war. The 
problem worsened, of course, during the 1960s as the airlines were 
forced to purchase expensive jet equipment; even the second-hand 
Boeing ?07s Eagle obtained from Qantas coot some £1.5 million each.
68. Ibid., 5/12/68, p . 935.
'69. Ibid., 28/11/68, p.88 7.
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Eagle's profit record was probably better than that of many
other private carriers, but it was not that good. After losing £80,000
in 19 63, the company was consistantly profitable up to 19 6 7, recording
net profits of £330,000 in 1965 anc* £385*000 in 1966. These figures
however, cannot be taken completely at their face value. As the ATLB
pointed out the 1966 profit was largely the result of receipts and
adjustments of a capital nature, while three-quarters of the estimated
1967 surplus of £350,000 would eminate from a capital gain on the sale
of an aircraft. Operating losses in excess of £500,000 were forcast
for 1968 and 1969. In addition, the ATLB had been warning Eagle
for some time that it was considerably under-capitalised; between
January, 1966, and October, 19 67, for example, long-term ihdebtedness
increased from about £2*7 million to over £5 .5  million, and there v/as
a bank overdraft by the latter date of more than £*K)0,000r During
the ATLB hearings of the applications for licences to operate North
Atlantic scheduled services an interesting light was shed on the
relative financial strengths of Eagle and a rapidly growing private
operator, Caledonian. The latter stated that its ten shareholders,
who included companies such as Great Universal Stores, had firmly
committed themselves to provide an additional £3 million worth of
capital for the airline if the licences were granted. Eagle, on the
other hand, could only tell the Board that plans were being drawn up
72 ’to raise £1 million through the issue of unsecured stock. Given the 
company's financial condition it is difficult to imagine investors 
falling over themselves in the rush to provide Eagle with additional 
capital.
70. Ibid., 20/6/68, p. 915-7, et.al.
71. Ibid., 22/5/69, p. 820; ATLB Annual Report, 1968/ 69, p.l6.
72. 'Flight', 8/2/68, p.180 and 15/2/68, p.212.
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It was British Eagle's attempts to raise further financial
support from two merchant banks to tide it over the bleak autumn
and winter seasons that eventually forced it into l i q u i d a t i o n .
Negotiations with Kambros and Kleinwort B e n s o n  had s t a r t e d  in March
and by October 30th a deal had mobe or less been agreed upon, whereby 
#
the company would receive an injection of £ 1 ,750,000 (of which
Bamberg would provide £250,000), plus a further sum in 1970. It was
then that the banks heard about the revocation of the Caribbean IT
li cence and decided to withdraw. The licence in fact represented
only 1,000 hours out of the total 37*000 hour 1969 programme. But
it proved to be the straw that broke the camel's back. Hambros and
Kleinwort Benson had totally lost confidence in the ability of the
management to carry out effective reforms and of the airline to climb
73 ’ -back into solvency. There was no alternative but to go into
voluntary liquidation. Thus, it might be said that the collapse of 
British Eagle in November, 1968, was far from unexpected. The 
Independent's position as one of the leaders of the private sector of 
the UK air transport industry had really been untenable ever since 
19 63. In its attempts to maintain that position it had become 
involved in too many marginal enterprises, and eventually forced into 
the type of desperate action typified by its flouting of the Caribbean 
licence rules.
As one might expect, the effect on the industry of the collapse 
of the private sector's second largest company was considerable. The 
uncertainty and loss of confidence that resulted brought the viability 
of a number of other carriers into question, including EUA. The 
situation was made worse for the Independents by the fact that many
73. Ibid., 28/11/68, p.88?.
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of them were finding it even more difficult than usual to raise 
additional finance since most banks and potential investors were 
awaiting the recommendations of the Edwards Committee on the future 
shape of the industry. It is indicative, for example, of the 
prevailing atmosphere of uncertainty that as a result of rumours of 
British Midland's need for further working capital, Manchester Airport 
foreclosed on a BMA Viscount which had been diverted there in bad 
weather. The aircraft was impounded for seven hours while the air­
port authorities demanded payment of £ 16,000 outstanding, much of 
which had been incurred by other airlines handled by BMA. When this 
was paid the airport demanded a further £5*000 for charges not yet
invoiced. In the event, BMA received a capital injection of £150,000
7 k , .from Minster Assets.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the imminent closure of 
several other operators was rumoured, especially as many airlines 
depend to a large extent on credit from their suppliers to tide them 
over rough patches. But in fact only one other major Independent was 
forced into liquidation, Transglobe. Formed in 1959 as Air Links, 
Transglobe was a relatively prosperous company, primarily owned by the 
Ocean Steam Ship Company (27%) and the Bolton Steam Shipping Company
me
(3^%)* although a loss of £500,000 had been forecast for I968/6 9,
In 1966 an American CAB Examiner had commented that "Transglobe appears 
to be in a sound financial condition and is conducting its present
76operations on a profitable basis," while the ATLB later noted that 
the airline had "survived shaky beginnings to achieve what appeared to 
be a relatively strong financial position for the scope of its opera­
tions, and we were surprised by the sudden decision of the shareholders to
7 k , Ibid., 5/12/68, p.9 2 3.
75» Ibid. ,
.7 6. Ibid., 31/3/66, p.50?f.
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put the company into liquidation." The company itself
attributed its losses to the use of propeller aircraft in competition
with jets, especially on the North Atlantic, and said that it had been
78unable to raise the £1.5 - 2 million needed to keep going. It seems 
more than likely, therefore, that the main reason for the collapse of 
the airline v/as a loss of confidence on the part of the two principal 
shareholders in the future of private enterprise British aviation 
in general and of operators such as Transglobe in particular. It was in 
this atmosphere that the Edwards Committee reported on UK air transport.
7 7
77. ATLB Annual Report, 1968/69, p. 16 .
78. ’Flight', 5/12/68, p. 923.
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Chapter VI
THE EDWARDS REPORT
The Report of the Edwards Committee of Inquiry into CivilI
*1Air Transport has received extensive publicity and criticism since 
its publication in May, 1969. The principal recommendations of the 
Committee are set out in Appendix V, while further reference to 
the Report, especially to its extensive research, will be made in 
subsequent chapters. Here we need only concern ourselves with those 
sections directly relevent to the activities of the independent airlines 
While noting that in many respects the performance of the 
Independents had been admirable, especially their role as commercial 
innovators and as a 'ginger group' to spur the Corporations, the 
Committee pointed out that their rapid growth had not brought general 
financial stability to the private sector. In particular, attention 
was drawn to the way in which the activities of the private airlines 
had been circumscribed by government policy. One of the main aims 
of the Report, therefore, v/as to eradicate this instability (p.21-3)*
The serious under-capitalisation of the private sector cf the airline 
industry was also noted (p.3^)»
With regard to the economies of scale and specialisation the 
Committee concluded that there is no case for making airlines 
artifically larger than they need to be to secure the major advantages 
of size. Nevertheless, large scale is advantageous because cf the 12
1. 'British Air Transport in the Seventies', Cmnd. ^018,
2, See, for example, Sir W. Hildred: 'British Air Transport in the 
Seventies', Political Quarter3y , 1969; The Aeronautical Journal;
'A Symposium: Is There a Future for British Air.Transport? A 
Discussion on the Edwards Report', March, 1970; and Thompson 
and Hunter: 'The Nationalised Transport Industries,' 1973»
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economies that can result from a standardised aircraft fleet and 
the output of a standard type of service and when marketing strength 
demands a widespread geographical coverage of routes and sales 
outlets. Large airlines are also usually better placed to ride 
out periods of adverse economic results and to sustain the costs 
dissociated with technological innovation. But in all sectors of the 
air transport industry the quality of management is probably much 
more significant in determining performance than any of the factors 
related purely to airline size (p.78).
Next the Committee turned its attention to the problem of 
competition between carriers on particular routes. There can be no 
hard and fast definition, the Report says, of the point at which a 
route becomes capable of carrying competitive services. The licensing 
authority must be free to consider each case on its merits, and 
properly equipped to take all the relevant factors into account.
Of the domestic air routes only those from London to Belfast, Glasgow 
and Edinburgh are capable of sustaining competitive services, and even 
in these cases not more than two airlines should be licensed for each 
route. Scheduled services to the Channel Elands and Isle of Man can 
and should be rationalised. On the routes where competition is 
authorised, growth of traffic should, in the initial stages, be 
shared between the two airlines through frequency regulation 
imposed by the regulatory authority on both carriers. On internation­
al routes, despite the obvious practical difficulties involved, the 
Committee concluded that double designation is desirable on the 
London-Paris and London-New York services, given a competitor who 
is equipped to hold his own in the *big league* (p.98)* -
On the basis of these conclusions, the Report proposed that
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by 1975 the shape of the UK a ir  transport industry should be 
as fo l low s:
(i) A long-haul scheduled airline essentially based on EOAC’s 
present world-wide network of operations and serving all 
present BOAC points except those conceded to the second 
* force.
(ii) A European and domestic trunk route scheduled airline 
essentially based on BEA’s present network of services 
with the exception that non-trunk domestic services will 
•be transferred to the British Air Services (BAS) group, 
and perhaps subject to some rationalisation in the negotiations 
over the second force.
These two carriers would be linked to ensure the most effective use of 
their resources and franchises.
(iii) A second force scheduled airline which should be licensed 
to operate a viable structure of both long-haul and short- 
haul routes providing an additional source of management 
experience, expertise and initiative and serving as the 
second UK operator in those cases where double designation . 
is in the British interest.
All three of these airlines would also provide capacity for inclusive- 
tours and other passenger charters and freight operations.
(iv) A group of provincially-based airlines operating jointly 
with the common services of a parent company developed 
along the lines of British Air Services. This group of 
airlines would operate secondary domestic services in the 
UK, might also operate scheduled services to some European 
destinations and would compete for traffic in the European 
inclusive-tour market.
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(v) A small number of airlines specialising in the
operation of inclusive-tour and other charters and, almost 
certainly, developing close relations with the major tour- 
promoting companies. One or two of these carriers might 
• concentrate on freight charters (p.ll4).
Both BOAC and BEA should continue to be publicly owned. There may, 
however, be scope through BAS for airlines to which both the public 
and private sectors can contribute. The second force airline 
should be primarily privately controlled (p.125) .
The Committee clearly recognised the need for rationalisation 
v/ithin the private sector. It therefore proposed that the second 
force airline should be formed by an amalgamation of the two largest 
Independents, BUA and Caledonian, with by 1975 a fleet of 4^-50 
aircraft and a scheduled route network of at least 4,000 million 
seat-miles to achieve the minimum scale necessary for economically 
viable operations. Some Corporation routes would have to be trans­
ferred to make this possible, in return for which there should be a 
public stake in the second force, the actual size of which would be 
related to the size of the concession. The Report maintained that 
there is an important role for several private companies in the 
operation of inclusive-tour and charter services and no reason why 
operations of this kind should not be profitable by themselves with­
out the backing of scheduled services. Certain other fairly small- 
scale air transport activities, such as freight charter operations 
and third-level and air-taxi services, should be left for private 
companies to develop (p.10 7,142 and 150).
Finally, the Committee turned its attention to the problem of 
licensing. It was quite critical of a number of aspects of the role
and actions of the ATLB, particularly with regard to the duration of 
issued licences and the appeals procedure, although the fact that the 
Board had been operating within severe constraints was recognised.
The Report, therefore, recommended that the future licensing system 
should allow appeals to a judicial body rather than to the Minister, 
but only on the grounds either that the licensing authority had acted 
'ultra vires' or that its decision was perverse - that is,could not 
reasonably be brought within the Government's declared aviation policy 
as set out by the Minister in a statutory instrument. Provision 
might also be made for the suspension of action on licensing decisions 
for a limited period in certain circumstances pending a review of 
policy. The future licensing system should take a more positive 
responsibility for the economic regulation of the industry; should 
make more searching examinations of the airlines' financial prospects 
and results; and should work closely with those responsible for 
their technical regulation to ensure that safety standards are not 
impaired by financial or managerial weakness (p.l6l).
. In order to achieve these objectives, the Report continued, a 
Civil Aviation Authority should be established responsible for almost 
all the technical and economic regulatory functions performed by the 
Board of Trade, the ATLB and the ARB, for the civil side of the joint 
National Air Traffic Control Services, for operational research, for 
long-term airport planning and for the main work of traffic rights 
negotiations. The Authority should work to broad policy-lines 
determined by the Minister, who would also retain specific functions 
related to accident investigation. From time to time the Government 
should work out and state clearly and publicly its policy for civil
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aviation. To allow flexibility, the duties of the CAA should be 
laid down in general terms in statute and the Government's policy 
directives should be in the form of statutory instruments (p. 256).
"To sum up we recommend a better integrated but flexibly-organised 
public sector, a second force mainly privately-owned, a mixed owner- 
ship group of small regional airlines, a private sector of inclusive 
tour and charter (including freight) operators; an industrial and 
financial structure conducive to competitive efficiency, safe opera­
tions and good human relations; and a semi-autonomous Authority 
devoted to holding and strengthening Britain's place in world aviation. 
These recommendations should, to quote our terms of reference, enable 
the industry to make its full contribution to the development of the 
economy and to the service and safety of the travelling public " (p. 267) .
Reactions to the Report.
With the publication of the Edwards Report a great deal of 
relief must have been felt within the private sector of the industry.
Not only had the economic situation been poor, but the bankruptcies 
of British Eagle and Transglobe had resulted in what the ATLB described 
as a crisis of confidence in independent air transport in which the 
future of several other airlines was uncertain.^ Furthermore, the 
doubts surrounding the Committee's possible recommendations resulted 
in a marked unwillingness on the part of many investors to provide 
additional capital for the Independents until their future was finally 
settled. Despite the relief, however, a number of airlines, in 
addition to BOAC and BEA, were far from overjoyed at the proposed 
special position that the second force carrier would occupy. But 
it was the reactions of the two largest private operators, BTJA and 3
3 . ATLB Report, 1968/9, p. 16.
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Caledonian, together of course v/ith that of the Government, that 
were the crucial factors.
Although in terms of passenger-miles flown per year BUA 
find Caledonian were roughly equal in size, they were very different in 
outlook. BUA was orientated primarily towards scheduled services, 
despite a solid charter base, and towards European and African markets. 
Caledonian, on the other hand, operated only charters and was mainly 
interested in the North Atlantic. In terms of staff and facilities BUA 
was much the larger of the two because of its wide-spread, labour- 
intensive scheduled service network and because of Caledonian's policy 
of buying various peripheral services from other companies (much of 
its aircraft maintenance, for example, was carried out by Sabena).
Thus, the task of merging two such divergent airlines would have 
been difficult enough. The attitude of the two operators concerned 
hardly helped.
BUA adopted the more positive stance,although overall it probably 
over.-reacted. It presented a six-year plan for route expansion, 
arguing that there was no need to join forces with Caledonian as 
the company had sufficient capability to become the second force 
airline alone. The plan involved the operation of unlimited frequency 
London-New York services from 197^ and. the progressive transfer to BUA, 
between 1971-75i of BOAC's African trunk services. This would give 
the Independent , it was submitted, a rational route network and by 
the end of 1975 the minimum output on long-haul services of ^,000 
million scheduled seat-miles per annum which Edwards had decided was 
essential for the creation of a viable major international airline. 
Financial requirements were assessed to be about £60 million for ... 
new aircraft and £25 million for ground facilities and working capital.
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Of the *f,000 million seat-mile target, by 1975 BUA expected that its
current .long-haul scheduled services would be generating some 900
million: "Britain has no other independent long-haul carrier. To
reach *f,000 million scheduled seat-miles implies the acquisition of 
•
another 3,100 million... of which something like 2,300 million...
. bwill have to come from BOAC."
Caledonian's approach to the recommendations contained in the 
Edwards Report was radically different and made the likelihood of an 
amalgamation even more remote. It was framed rather more subtly 
than that of BUA and fell entirely within the Government's subsequent 
White Paper. "We have never asked," Caledonian maintained, "for the 
transfer of a single route from a State airline, nor for any prefer­
ential treatment - merely for a reasonable measure of equality of
5opportunity in future growth." The company's main reaction to the 
Report was published in the form of an article in its house magazine 
by chairman and managing director, Mr. Adam Thomson. He wrote in 
terms of "supplementing" BOAC on the North Atlantic and made only 
passing reference to the formation of a second force carrier. He 
described the Report as "unfortunately too full of emotive words like 
'territorial concessions' " and argued that such an attitude leads 
to increased pressure from the Corporations and "the more hysterical 
pro-natinnalisation unions," which in turn would, if accompanied by 
political timidity, lead to more airline failures. Caledonian also 
believed that the proposed route awards would not be sufficient to 
permit the second force airline to grow to the envisaged minimum size 
by 1975* Equally, the benefits of scale were not as great as Edwards 
thought and a smaller operator would be an equally viable proposition. *56
b . »Flight; 25/9/69, p.^78 and ^80.
5. Ibid.,26/3/ 70, p.¿+53.
6. Ibid., 23/10/69, p.629-30.
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Thus, the reaction of both the main private operators was far
from encouraging for the implementation of the Committee's proposals,
although tentative discussions between them continued. What of the
attitude of the Labour Government? Its White Paper, 'Civil Aviation
Policy', was published in November, 1969» The Government accepted
many of the Report's recommendations, but with important reservations.
The White Paper stated that the Government supported the concept of
a second force carrier and that "there is a continuing and promising
role for independent airlines having the necessary financial strength
7and managerial competence." There would not, however, be any 
transfer of routes from the Corporations. The second force would 
have to exist on the basis of charter work and dual designation, in 
particular on the North Atlantic. This was really not much of a 
concession, since without the incentive of extensive route transfers 
it is very unlikely that sufficient capital could have been attracted 
to enable the establishment of a second force airline on anything like 
the scale envisaged by Edwards; and only a very large carrier would 
have been able to compete effectively in the North Atlantic market.
The White Paper also acknowledged the need to establish a Civil 
Aviation Authority to
"regulate the whole economic, operational and technical 
environment of the industry within the terms of a published 
statement of objectives and policies. The Authority will 
implement the more positive economic policies that are now 
to be followed and will be responsible also for all aspects 
of air safety.,.There will be a limited right of appeal 
to the Board of Trade, on grounds that a decision cannot 
reasonably be brought within the terms of the policy then 
in force." 8 78
7. Cmnd. h 2 1 3 , p.37
8. Ibid.
There was to be little change, therefore, in the much critisized
area of the appeals procedure. "The Government has equivocated,"
commented a 'Flight' editorial, "conceiving an authority that will
have all the p a n o p l y  and ceremonial of power but not much of its
r.eality. There will continue to be, in effect, two licensing
gbodies".
In fact, the whole approach of the Government to the Edwards
Report might be regarded as equivocal, or schizophrenic as Mr. Leslie
10Huckfield M.P. described it. While realising that a solution had
to be found and on the whole accepting the Report, there was clearly
an unwillingness to carry out some of the more controversial aspects
of the Committee's proposals. Further, as the General Election
approached and pressure from the back benches built up, the Government
appeared less and less inclined to make any concessions to the private
sector. Thus, one is left with the impression that had Labour been
returned to power in 1970 the 'status .quo' in the air transport
industry would not have been radically altered, nor the economic
stability of the Independents markedly improved. This conclusion is
reinforced by a report a few months later in 'The Sunday Times' of a
statement by an un-named ex-Minister in the Labour Government to the
effect that "there was never any intention of helping to create a
11second force. We only put the idea in to knock it down."
The Sale of BUA
Before the General Election could take place, however,
the situation changed dramatically with a press leak that the
majority shareholder in BUA, British and Commonwealth Shipping, was to » *1
9~. 207vt7 oST,.P .73^ . : ~ ~  ' ~
10. 'The Times', 11/3/70, p.29.
1 1 . 9/8/70.
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sell the airline to BOAC for approximately £9 million plus liabilities,
and that the Government had approved the deal. As we have seen, like
many airlines in the private sector BUA had for some time been
experiencing financial difficulties end at one point appeared to be 
•
heading in the same direction as British Eagle. 'The Economist' noted
that for many years "the only option for privately-owned airlines
12in this country has been v/hether to go with a bang or a whimper." 
Obviously BUA decided to bow out v/ith just a whimper. British and 
Commonwealth had clearly lost confidence in the future of private 
enterprise air transport in the UK. After the publication of the 
Government's V/hite Paper it was evident that the likelihood of BUA 
being awarded the necessary territorial concessions to establish 
itself as a viable international carrier was extremely remote. Further, 
on the basis of their past record there was little reason to expect 
the Tories to be any more generous towards the Independents than Labour 
had been. Thus, British and Commonwealth was unwilling to continue 
any longer tying up capital in a venture that at best would show only 
a very modest rate of return in the foreseeable future. The company 
had after all waited a number of years for the promised break-through 
that would finally establish the private airlines on a viable basis, 
a break-through that always appeared to be just around the corner.
A take-over by BOAC, on the other hand, would conveniently 
get the Government off the hook with regards to the implementation of 
some of the more contentious recommendations by the Edwards Committee, 
just as the previous administration had welcomed BOAC's deal with 
Cunard in the early 1960s (see Chapter VII). The nationalised 
Corporations would have eliminated a troublesome competitor (especially 
if BEA had absorbed the Independent's domestic and European services)
1 2 . 1V3/70, p .?2
and extended their own route networks. BUA's considerable charter
traffic and large base at Gatwick might have been even more useful;
BEA had recently established its own charter subsidiary, Airtours,
while BOAC would soon have to follow suit in order to meet the greatly • -]increased competition from non-scheduled operators on the North Atlantic. 
One of the many ironies that were to emerge from this proposed merger, 
of course, was the fact that the Government had already rejected 
Edwards1 suggestion that the Corporations should have a financial stake 
in a second force carrier.
The immediate reaction of the other privately-owned airlines was 
dramatic and bitter. There was wide-spread condemnation of 'back­
door nationalisation' and various groups were organised to make counter­
bids. "The death knell of British independent aircraft operators," 
said Mr. Freddie Laker, "is now being rung, unless this BOAC/BUA take-
*i i|.over is stopped in its tracks." Caledonian announced that it was
applying immediately for licences to operate BUA's entire scheduled
route network. Criticism from the Conservative Party was just as
vocal. For the Government Mr. Roy Mason, President of the Board of
Trade, firmly rejected such opposition and at the same time indicated why
the formation of a second force carrier was unlikely under Labour;
"How can there be a take-over bid when BUA has come 
to the State-owned airline and asked to be bought out?...
The critics say that:the Government should have given 
more routes to BUA; that 'then' they would raise the 
cash and buy the planes. But that could only be done 
by cutting into BOAC and BEA, both of which are running 
profitably and competing very efficiently against rivals 
abroad." 15
It may well have been that the force of criticism of the proposed 
merger took the Government by surprise. In any event, within a matter 
of days of the initial announcement the Board of Trade performed an
13. For an expansion of the argument in favour of a BOAC/BUA merger 
see article by L. Huckfield M.P, in 'The Times', op.cit.
l h .  'Flight', 12/3/70, p.3C9.
15. ■. Ibid/ ■' . ' '
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abrupt about-turn. Mr. Mason, despite back-bench opposition,
told the.House of Commons on March 18 that he had been misled by
British and Commonwealth Shipping as to the prospects of forming a
second force airline. He had not been aware that negotiations between 
•
BUA and Caledonian were still in progress. Consequently, approval 
for a BOAC/BUA merger would be withheld until matters had been 
clarified."*"^ Thus, the 'status quo' was restored and various 
interested groups, in particular Caledonian, again given the opportunity 
to bid for BUA, although this time in competition with BOAC. Before 
anything could be finalised, however, the General Election intervened.
The New Conservative Government and the Formation of EGAL:
It is important to remember that the Conservative Government elected 
in June, 1970, v/as markedly different from any other Tory administration 
since the war. It v/as different primarily because of the degree of its 
commitment, at least initially, to a competitive, private enterprise 
economic system. The stated policy of the Government included the 
hiving-off of peripheral nationalised concerns, a limitation of the 
trade union powers and the reversal of many of Labour's social policies. 
Such a commitment contrasted significantly with the so-called 
'Butskellism' of previous Tory administrations. Under these circum­
stances, therefore, it is not surprising that the new Government should 
favour a strong private sector civil air transport industry and be
prepared, unlike its predecessors, to restrict the growth of the public
17 ......sector in order to achieve this aim. The 'shadow' Minister of
16. Hansard, Hous'e of Commons Debates, vol, 798, cols. k 3 9 ~ k Q  ,
17. John Seeking's pamphlet: 'Guidelines for the Airlines', published 
by the Conservative Political Centre in October, 1970, proposed a 
private shareholding in BOAC and BEA.
Transport, Mr. Enoch Powell, had even gone on record some time earlier
18supporting the complete denationalisation of BEA. Thus, the stage
was most definitely set for the implementation of the Edwards Committee's
proposals.
This new political environment is reflected in the announcement just 
four months after the General Election that from November 30 Caledonian 
was to acquire the entire share capital of BUA, so finally establishing 
the second force carrier. Caledonian paid £6,900,000 for BUA and its 
subsidiaries, with the exception of British Island Airways (BIA), and 
also agreed to buy from British and Commonwealth Shipping three BAC 1-11s with 
spares, costing over £5 million, which had been obtained in March, 1970, 
for use by the scheduled Independent.British and Commonwealth was to 
continue various other aircraft loan and leasing arrangements that it had 
previously arranged with BUA. The new merged carrier had capital and 
reserves totalling some £12 million, and with its staff of A/lOO and 
fleet of 31 aircraft (seven Boeing ?07-320Cs, four V.C.-lOs and twenty 
1-1 1s) was comparable in size with Sabena, Swissair or Qantas . Total 
output during 1970 amounted to almost 500 million capacity ton-miles 
(see Table 6.1 ). Approximately kQ/o of total revenue was derived from 
scheduled passenger and freight services. British Caledonian (BCAL), as 
the new operator was to be called, also stated that it was planned to ’go 
public' in due course. Thus, to say that the second force airline was 
the largest Independent is a considerable under-statement; it over­
whelmed every other UK carrier except the Corporations.
The take-over was clearly the result of a 'volte-face' on the part of both 
companies. Neither had initially been particularly interested in a merger
18. Hansard, op.cit., I/3/65, vol.?07, cols,1057-8.
19. 'Flight; 29/ 10/70, p. 660.
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because of the apparently irreconcilable differences between them.
Even with the resumed talks, following the attempted purchase of BUA
by BOAC, there seemed little chance that a second force airline would
in fact emerge. The crucial factor was the availability of substantial
financial backing, which in the event BCAL appeared to have little
difficulty in obtaning. The Independents have hardly been renowned for
excessive profitability since the war. Yet the l8 new investors in the
20second force were almost all insurance companies or investment trusts, 
who must surely have been aware of such a record. The explanation, of 
course, lies in the large carrot dangled by the Government, in the form 
of ample, and profitable, territorial concessions. Although a detailed 
policy had not yet been officially announced, there was little remaining 
doubt as to its general content and leanings.
The Conservatives' air transport policy was in fact outlined in a 
speech by the Minister for Trade, Mr. Michael Noble, to the House of 
Commons in November, 1970. The relatively brief statement included the 
acceptance by the Government of Edwards' proposals for the establishment 
of an Airways Board to control BOAC, BEA and BAS and a Civil Aviation 
Authority which "will bring together within a single independent authority, 
the responsibility for both the economic and the entire safety regulation 
of the industry." In a more controversial vein the Government also 
announced its intention to transfer routes producing £6 million in annual 
revenue from the Corporations to BCAL. It.was this proposal that attracted 
most of the criticism from the Opposition. Mr. Boy Mason warned that the
20. ibid.; l.$$ of BCAL's capital was foreign owned, chiefly by ex-patriot 
Scotsmen living in North America. Hansard, op.cit., vol.oOo, 27/10/70, 
col. 89 (written answers).
2 1. Hansard. Vol.807, cols.2j6-7.
Labour Party "will not be bound by this shameful act and will, on
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return .to office, return these routes to BOAC and BEA, without 
22compensation." Mr. Mason denied that Labour had ever had any inten­
tion of launching a second force independent airline "on the basis of
23 . 2hstealing profitable routes from the Corporations." The Bill under
debate "is primarily concerned with annunciating Tory philosophy for
25the 1970’s, hiving off State assets to feed private speculators."
British Caledonian's position was further strengthened in December with 
the announcement of the ATLB's decision to permit unlimited frequencies 
on its UK trunk services, despite the fact that BEA's domestic services 
were losing over £2 million per annum.
The New Policy
More details of the Government's policy were given in March, 1971, 
with the publication of the Civil Aviation Bill, which provided for the 
establishment of the British Airways Board (BAB) and the Civil Aviation 
Authority. One of the immediate tasks envisaged for the BAB was a review 
of the Corporations' affairs and organisation, and the Bill implicitly 
admitted the possibility of a BOAC/BEA merger. The CAA was charged with 
the task of regulating the air transport industry as a whole. But, 
against the advice of the Edwards Committee, Government departments were 
to retain responsibility for all international civil aviation relations, 
the investigation of accidents and all matters concerning aircraft noise. 
The Bill also provided for control to be exercised over the CAA by the 
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, who "may from time to time.. . 
give guidance to the Authority in writing with respect to the performance 
of the functions conferred on it " (p.3). But a draft of any such written
22. ibid., col, 257. " 23. ibid., col. ? k 9. " " ’'l~r"":T
c h . Civil Aviation (Declaratory Provisions) Act 1971; effectively gave the 
Government rights to transfer routes from one airline to another.
25. Hansard, op.cit., col.2^5. ?.(>. 'Flight', 17/12/70, p. 930.
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gil idance had first to be approved by Parliament. Again at variance
with the Edwards' proposals, the right of appeal to the Minister against
a decision by the CAA was retained. The Civil Aviation Act eventually
became law on August 5th, 1971, and the CAA came into existence on April
271st the following year.
The broad objectives of Government policy for the British civil 
aviation industry were set out in Section 3(1 ) of the Act. These were:
(i) to secure that British airlines provide air transport services 
which satisfy all substantial categories of public demand (so 
far as British airlines may reasonably be expected to provide 
such services) at the lowest charges consistent with a high 
standard of safety in operating the services and an economic 
return to efficient operators on the sums invested in providing 
the services and with securing the sound development of the civil 
air transport industry of the United Kingdom;
(ii) to secure that at least one major British airline which is not 
controlled by the British Airways Board has opportunities to 
• participate in providing, on charter or other terms, the air 
transport services mentioned in the preceding paragraph;
(iii) subject to the preceding paragraphs, to encourage the civil air
transport industry of the United Kingdom to increase the contribu­
tion which it makes towards a favourable balance of payments for the 
(UK) and towards the prosperity of the economy of the (UK); and
(iv) subject to the preceding paragraphs, to further the reasonable 
interests of users of air transport services.
27. The Civil Aviation Act 1971, c.?5; 'Flight,' 23/3/71, p. *i07-9.
28. The Civil Aviation Act 1971, p.2-3.
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The more detailed instructions to the Civil Aviation Authority 
concerning its role and duties were contained in the Civil Aviation 
Policy Guidance,2^ published in February, 197?. In the area of licensing, 
the CAA was charged with maximising "the opportunities for the industry 
profitably to increase its share of the world civil air transport market 
(para.10)... The Authority should not reserve any particular type of 
operation exclusively to public or private enterprises by reason of their 
being publicly or privately owned or impose any particular balance as 
between public or private enterprises (para.12)••.The British Airways 
Board Airlines should remain the principal providers of scheduled services. 
British Caledonian Airways...should continue to be the principal independent 
airline. The Authority should seek to ensure that these airlines have 
adequate opportunities to compete effectively in the world civil air 
transport market. For this reason it will need in general to limit, at 
least for some years to come, the grant to other British independent air­
lines of licences to serve additional international scheduled routes 
(para.15).*«The Authority should encourage mergers that will, in its 
judgment, strenghen the industry in pursuit of the objectives without 
unduly impairing competition (para.18)"
On the thorny problem of licensing more than one British airline on 
a particular route, the Policy Guidance laid down four criteria to be 
satisfied:
(i) the traffic is likely to be sufficient to support competing services 
profitably within a reasonable time;
(ii) the choice and standard of services available to the public are 
likely to be improved and, in the case of an international route, 
either
29. Cmnd. ^899
(iii) the aggregate share of total traffic that is secured by the
British airlines is likely to be increased to an extent
that will more than offset any lasting diseconomies, or
(iv) where the British share of capacity is pre-determined, the
licensing of a second airline within that share is likely to
increase the total traffic secured by British airlines more
rapidly than would otherwise be likely (para. l6)
In addition, shortly afterwards the Government had a change of mind and
handed over to the CAA, rather than the Department of Trade and Industry,
30responsibility for the approval of IATA fare resolutions.
Route Transfers
While the new legislation was being drawn up and introduced British 
Caledonian had rapidly established itself as the second force airline. 
With the support of the Government it had greatly expanded its scheduled 
service network by means of dual designation on the North Atlantic and 
the transfer of certain routes from the Corporations. BOAC was forced 
to hand-over its services from London to Lagos, Kano and Accra in West 
Africa, valued in terms of revenue at approximately £*» million per 
annum. BCAL began operating these routes from April 1, 19?1. The 
following June BOAC’s service to Tripoli was added to the list. From 
BEA the Independent obtained a portion of the considerable London-Paris 
traffic. British United had held a licence for a scheduled service 
between Gatwiek and Le Bourgct £ Paris ) for some years, but had been 
unable to implement its plans because of the unwillingness of the French 
authorities to allow an expansion of the British share of the total 
market. This problem was overcome by giving BCAL a proportion of BEA’s 
permitted capacity, leaving Air France’s share untouched, Thus,, the
second force was granted up to ?$ flights per week from November 1, 197 V  
5°. ’Flight* £/V??, r. } .
giving it some 12-13$ of total traffic on the route. It stated that 
it did not want to join the BEA/Air France pool. Total revenue from the 
second force's new services, it was stated, amounted to some £6 million
31per annum.
Caledonian, along with British Eagle, had applied unsuccessfully to 
the ATLB early in 1968 for licenses to operate scheduled services to 
North America. However, on the basis of its merger with BUA, the 
recommendations of the Edwards Committee and the fact that BOAC's 
share of UK-USA air transport market had continued to fall from 3^*1$ to 2A.i$ 
between 1966 and 1970» the Independent re-applied in October, 1971» It 
asked for services with unlimited frequency from London to New York and 
Los Angeles, with Birmingham, Manchester, Prestwick and Chicago named 
as additional optional points. The ATLB granted BCAL's applications in 
full, awarding a 15-year licence from April 1st, 1973» considerably longer 
than the norm. In its decision the Board reported:
"Financial information...from shareholders convinced 
us that British Caledonian would have little difficulty in 
raising the money needed to cover any shortfall on these 
• operations... Taking this vital factor into account, along
with the drive and skill of British Caledonian's management 
which has impressed us most favourably, we are in no doubt 
that our proper course is to grant the applications now before
us." 32
The award of the routes to North America was probably the most 
important single economic factor in the establishment of a viable 
second force carrier, and it was certainly something that Caledonian, 
and before it British Eagle, had been seeking for a number of years.
But while the potential was considerable, so were the possible dangers.
31. ibid. 21/1/71, p. 82, and 11/11/71, p. 753» Nb. approximately 5$ 
of London-Paris traffic is carried by 12 'fifth freedom' carriers, 
BUA had operated the London-Amsterdam route for some years in 
competition with BSA and KLM (see Chapter V). Edwards Report, p. 
322-3. In August, 1973, BCAL also received licences to operate 
scheduled services from London to: Singapore via Bahrain; Boston, 
Atlanta and Houston; and Toronto via Prestwick.
32. ATLB Annual Report, 1971/72, p.10-1 1 .
BCAL estimated that it would lose money for the first three years on
the routes and that profits (with full allocation of overheads) would
be achieved after five years. Only a large airline with extensive
• financial support could afford to take on such a challenge. Initial
development costs (excluding the purchase of aircraft) were expected
to amount to £3 .1 million, including £700,000 for promotion and
33advertising and £800,000 for new equipment.
A Critique
We have refrained from offering any opinions on the recommendations 
of the Edwards Report until this point so that an overall view of both 
the Report and subsequent Government action could be attained. The 
Conservatives implemented most of the Edwards' proposals, although with 
some reservations. The most important results, as far as this study is 
concerned, were the establishment of both the second force airline and 
the Civil Aviation Authority. There is no doubt that the Edwards Report 
has proved to be a major contribution to our knowledge and understanding 
of the air transport industry and the Committee deserves a vote of 
.thanks from anyone concerned with research into British civil aviation. 
Nevertheless, since its publication 'British Air Transport in the 
Seventies' has been subject to extensive criticism from a number of 
quarters, some at least of which would seem to be justified.
A great deal of criticism obviously came from those who were 
adversely affected by the implementation of the Committee's proposals.
33. 'Flight; 2/3/72, p. 311.
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BEA, for example, concluded "from a practical point of view, and
til©having regard to the realities of/mternational regulation of air
transport, we doubt whether Britain would benefit (from the suggestions
of the Edwards Report); on the contrary we believe serious harm would
be likely to result." The Trades Union Congress complained that in
terms of revenue the Government had given more routes to the second
force carrier than had initially been promised. It calculated that the
gross revenue from the routes transferred from BOAC amounted to £7>^
million a year, plus a further £2 million from 3EA. In addition, BCAL's
new North Atlantic services will cost BOAC £11 million over the first
five years. Thus, already, said the TUC, BOAC routes worth a total of
£9-10 million gross revenue per annum and BEA routes worth £2 million
had been given to the second force carrier. BOAC agreed with some
of these calculations, and also pointed out that it would have achieved
a small profit in 1971/72 had it not been deprived of its lucrative West
36 .African and Libyan services. On the other hand, ’The Economist’
described the routes transferred to BCAL as "only a quarter of a loaf...
the baie minimum to keep them alive, not enough to guarantee them a
37commercial future".
The establishment of a strong, privately-owned carrier was intended 
to introduce a largerelement of competition among British airlines, 
especially of course ’vis-a-vis' the Corporations, and to increase Britain's 
share of particular air markets. In fact, neither of these objectives were
J>h. BEA Annual Report, 1968/69» p.3^*
35. 'night; 1/6/7 2, p. 789.
36. BOAC Annual Report, 1971/72, p. 3 and 1J.
37. 'The Economist; 8/8/70, p. 57.
achieved in any meaningful sense. In the case of the West African routes
BCAL merely replaced BOAC, with the result that there was no alteration
in Britain's share nor the competitiveness of the market: indeed,
competition decreased on the service to Lagos since previously both BOAC
38and BCAL had operated the route. BCAL's share of the total capacity of 
•the Paris route resulted in a proportionate reduction in BEA flights, so
again there was no overall gain for the UK.Competition was increased,
however, on both the Paris and North Atlantic routes. In the latter case,
because of the large number of carriers already in the market the addition
of BCAL cannot be expected to have any major effect, although Britain's share
of the total traffic available will probably rise somewhat. Further, in
recommending dual UK designation on these routes the Edwards Committee almost
totally disregarded the considerable body of opinion to the effect that
licensing-more than two airlines on a single route is a 'double-edged
39sword', with the resultant costs outweighing the benefits. The
Committee did note, however, that the introduction of competition on
domestic trunk routes during the 1960s led to higher costs and fares, as well
39aas improved service. Thus, overall the formation of a second force 
operator has so far only marginally changed the degree of competition among 
British airlines and the UK's share of total air traffic.
38. 'The Economist,' 9/1/71, p.6? ironically , the CAA has since again
licensed BOAC to operate to West Africa, but only with Concordes on the 
way to South Africa. 'The Financial Times', 10/5/73» P*33*
39* The most famous proponents of this thesis are probably Gill and Bates 
('Airline Competition', I9L9) who wrote: "The type of competition which 
this study has found to be most consistently ineffective or adverse as 
regards all the aspects of public interest considered has been that 
where more than two carriers have been authorized to serve major markets " 
(p.630). Similarly, Wheatcroft concludes: "There is a good deal of 
evidence to demonstrate that all the claimed advantages of airline compet­
ition are achieved where there are two operators, and that advantages tend 
to be offset by cost penalties when more than two airlines provide parallel 
services. There is no evidence that parallel licensing of.British airlines 
will lead to a larger share of the total traffic for this country" ('Air 
Transport Policy*, 196^, p.171; see also same author's: 'The Economics of 
European Air Transport', 19136, p.286). Caves ('Air Transport and its Regulator 
1962) and Jordan ('Airline Regulation in America', 1970) disagree with this
-.view and propose a more competitive environment, while Thayer ('Air 
Transport Policy and Notional Cecurity', favours regulated monopoly.
39a. 'p.82-4. •
As yet the Civil Aviation Authority has hardly had sufficient time
to establish itself and make its presence felt, although it has already
adopted a more positive regulatory role than the passive, quasi-judicial
one preferred by the ATLB, especially in the new field of Advanced
Booking Charters (see Chapter X). The CAA is undoubtedly a major
improvement on previous licensing bodies. Nevertheless, there are
weaknesses in its make-up that may eventually create problems. Probably
the most important of these is the possibility of Ministerial intervention,
particularly via the appeals mechanism. The ATLB noted that "it is
generally agreed that the machinery and history of appeals against the
Board's decisions have been unfortunate, and have gone far to undermine
kOthe Board's authority." The Government has stated that this danger
is recognised and the intention is to make the CAA as independent as 
possible. We have already discussed why an appeals procedure is 
necessary (Chapter IV), and the periodic publication of the Government's 
civil aviation policy in the form of White Papers is clearly an advance on 
the earlier situation. A great deal still depends, however, on the 
interpretation rather than the letter of the law. The possibility of 
regular Ministerial intervention for short-term political reasons, so 
common in the post-war history of British air transport licensing, is still v 
much present. The fact that when introducing the I960 Civil Aviation 
(Licensing) Act Mr. Duncan Sandys gave similar assurances about the 
independence of the ATLB does not give one any more confidence in the 
likely success of the CAA.t1a .
Our main criticism of the Edwards Report, however, concerns the 
general approach of the Committee to the difficulties facing the air
LO. ATLB Annual Report, 1970/71, p.* t 
M .  Hansard, op.cit., eols.PjG-Mu
*f1a. "It is my intention that the Board shall be as independent as it is 
possible to make it, for that is one of the primary purposes of 
the Bill. I have therefore kept down the Minister's powers to the 
minimum." Hansard, op.cit., 2/3/60, vol.6l8 , col,1228.
transport industry. It is one of the main themes of this study that
since the Second World War there has been a failure on the part of those
in authority to recognise the problems inherent in a highly regulated
industry made up of both public and private sectors. The Edwards
Committee was no exception, and from this resulted several major defects.
•
There was a tacit acceptance of a mixed-sector industry with very little 
adequate consideration of the problems involved or the alternatives. From 
the point of view of the independent airlines, one of the major problems 
has been the ease with which the small, marginal operator can be established 
and the disruption that often results. (This point is discussed further 
in Chapter XII). The Edwards Committee appeared to accept this and suggested 
that there should be "fewer private airlines than the present number." But 
it went on to say that "civil air transport should be organised so far as is 
practicable and economic to give opportunity for new entrants to the industry." 
Clearly, these two proposals appear to be largely mutually exclusive. Vaguely 
talking in terms of scrutinising a company's financial position and encouraging 
mergers is of little use, and has been shown not to work. The very real 
problem of the marginal operator will still remain and until this is solved 
there is little chance of the creation of an economically stable situation 
among the privately-owned airlines.
The whole approach of the Committee appears to have been coloured by 
its attitude to competition. Certainly Professor Edwards himself was a 
very firm believer in the merits of a competitive environment. The
result is that having read the Report one is left with the feeling that very 
different conclusions could have been drawn with equal validity from the 
same evidence. The justification for the establishment of a second force 
airline, for example, seems to be reduced to "a sense ofJair play"; "We 
are most anxious, if it can be done without damage to the total British
^2. p. xiii and 11,
h j . See,; for example, the report of his lecture, 'The Case for Competition', 
in The Times, 3/11/70.
aviation effort, to give those who have ventured their resources in the
hkbuilding up of air services a fair chance to go on doing so.” Clearly
the Government did not share the same 'sense of fair play' towards
the public sector when it refused to compensate the Corporations for the
loss of routes and traffic to the second force. Pryke has compared the
attitude of the Edwards Committee on the advantages of competition and
private ownership to that of economists associated with the Institute of
Economic Affairs: "... such decisions and declarations derive almost
entirely from an ideological commitment to private ownership and from its
i+5equation with competition."
It is not surprising, therefore, that the more controversial 
recommendations contained in the Edwards Report failed to find marry 
supporters in the Labour Government (and even the initial White Paper 
probably went beyond what the majority of Parliamentary Party members would 
have wished.) It was fortunate for the supporters of such proposals that 
a more conservative Government was returned to power in 1970» a Government 
firmly committed to a policy of restricting the expansion of the national­
ised sector - fortunate also that civil aviation reform was sufficiently 
high on the Tories' list of priorities to be implemented before the 
Government itself was forced to tone down a number of its policies. In 
other words, the major justification for the establishment of British 
Caledonian was political rather than economic. T.D. Keegan, Managing 
Director of Transmeridian Air Cargo, aptly summed up the situation;
"Our second force will be an odd baby born out of forced wedlock by a shotgun- 
wielding father who foreclosed on the mortgages of the taxpayers who 
paid to develop the routes, and who presents these as a dowry to the( 
bride of this rather uninspired wedding."
h 5 . 'Public Enterprise in Practice*, 1971, p.167-8.
16. 'Flight; 5/11/7Q, p. ?06. '
TABLE 6.1 British Caledonian (and Antecedents*) Traffic,1967-72
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Scheduled Services* Charter Services
Passengers Available Available Weight Car>acity ton-miles (000's)
1967
•
carried seat-miles 
(000's)
capacity 
ton-miles 
(000*s)
load-
factor Cale­donian
BUA Total
320,393 575,553 89,605 53.0 50,^33 91,161 141,596
1968 3^5,076 627,8 15 93,721 52.2 93,918 72,827 166,745
1969 302,233 695,951 100,920 53.6 ' 180,336 112,878 293,214
1970 630,256 8 18 ,16 1 117,123 50.5 274,967 107,791 382,758
19 71 783,632 1 ,134,642 148,295 . 43.1 - 516,269
1972 1,017,212 1 ,461,724 194,458 45.2 — - 513,783
* = before merger scheduled services were operated by BUA alone.
Sources: Board of Trade and Department of Trade and Industry
Given its importance in the private sector, therefore, v/hat of the
future development of this 'political animal'? At first sight its
prospects appear to be fairly good. By 1971, with a fleet of 33 jet
aircraft, BCAL v/as carrying more passengers than BOAC and flying more
passenger-miles than BEA. In 1970/71 a profit of £1.7 million was 
• Zj.O
recorded, ' achieved during a period of reorganisation , when most other 
international airlines were returning poor financial results and following 
a loss the previous year by BUA. BCAL claims to be making profits on its 
UK domestic trunk and South American routes and the new V/est African 
services. The improving buoyancy of the Worth Atlantic market has meant 
that the second force has been able to operate 19  flights per week to the
. k 8United States from the summer of 1973» compared with the Initial 12.
47. Although additional losses of £1.1 million were reported from the Blue 
Car tour subsidiary and hotel operations and as a result of the 
devaluation of the Argentine Peso.
48. 'Flight' 3/8/7 2 , p . 156-16 0 , 4/1/73» p. 10 -1 2 ' and 12 / V 7 3 , P.56 8; 
Financial Times. ^A/73, p.4. Wb domestic services are not now (1973)
- profitable. During 1971/72 BCAL lost £190,000 on a turnover of £53 
million. 'Flight', 20/9/73» p»466.
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But against this trend neither the Tripoli nor the Paris routes 
are yet profitable; the latter in particular has not come up to 
expectations. In addition, to start operations on the North Atlantic is 
a very expensive business and at least initially BCAL will be competing v/ith 
* inferior equipment and frequencies against firmly entrenched opposition.
The routes between Europe and North America are no longer the gold mine 
that they used to be and most airlines appear to be losing money on them 
(see Table 6.2). IATA summed up the current situation thus:
"The North Atlantic is a route on which a relatively 
elaborate fare structure has enabled the volume of traffic 
to be developed very considerably, but on which the 
extended use of special fares has reduced the average yield 
to a point where it is already below costs. It is an instance 
where the carriers may have been over generous to the public 
and. have gone beyond the economic constraints which must 
apply to scheduled services."
British Caledonian, therefore, may well find it extremely difficult to 
make profits on the North Atlantic in the foreseeable future.
Table 6.2 North Atlantic Air Passenger Load-Factors {%)
• 1965/66 * 1972/73
First Class 36 30
Required ** First Class 61 59
Low Class 57 5^
Required ** Low Class 52 70
* = includes Mid-Atlantic traffic.
** = required passenger load-factor for economically viable results, 
including reasonable return on investment.
Source : IATA.
^9.IATA 'Agreeing Fares and Rates', 1973, p . l l A .
Perhaps even more important, however, is the suggestion that the
second force is under-capitalised. 'Flight' analysed detailed financial
information for 1971 which the airline had been forced to file with the
CAB in Washington in order to obtain a US Foreign Air Carrier permit
(the same information is not publicly available in the UK), and
concluded that BCAL "has to make more; profits to attract private money
for expansion and re-equipment." The Independent itself, on the other
hand, has strongly denied that this is the case. There are ample funds
available, it claims, to satisfy future plans for growth, and in
awarding the North Atlantic scheduled service licences the ATLB appeared
to agree (as indeed more recently did the CAA).*^ But the main problem
that British Caledonian is likely to face in the foreseeable future stems
from the fact that politics will remain more important than economics in
the continued viability of the airline . The Labour Party has said that
it will re-nationalise the transferred routes v/ithout compensation when
it returns to power, which effectively might well bring into doubt the
survival of BCAL in its present form. Although too early to say for sure
Labour does appear to be moving to the left of the political spectrum and
to be taking a more aggressive stand in favour of the public sector. By
the time of the next General Election, however, the second force will be
firmly established. Given its relative importance in British civil
aviation, the size of its work-force and the past record of political
parties in fulfilling their pre-election pledges in the field of air
transport, British Caledonian's future, while not completely assured,
51does not appear quite so bleak.
50. 'F lig h t', V 1/7?, P-10-12; ATLB Annual Report, 1971/72, p .11;
'Financial Times', 21/8/73» P*9. BCAL might also care- to note that 
kindness can hurt, as US experience has shown. The Americen CAS's 
generosity to the smaller trunkline carriers in the 1950's , for 
example, resulted in Capital Airlines being over-extended in terms 
of managerial ability and financial resources and forced to seek a 
merger with United in 1961. See Corbett: 'Politics and the Airlines
1965, p.?9i,
51. Other recent developments in the areas of scheduled services and the 
air holiday market are discussed in Chapters XI and X respectively.
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Chapter VII
SHIPPING INVESTMENT
The first half of the thesis has examined the general development 
of the private sector of the UK air transport industry since 19^5» paying 
particular attention to scheduled services and government policy. It now remain 
to look at certain other aspects of that development in detail. This 
chapter considers the problem of investment in air transport companies 
and especially the role played by the shipping industry.
Since the war Britain's privately-owned airlines have been notocbusly 
under-capitalised. The Edwards Committee pointed out that the Independents 
have relied heavily on loans and credit for additional capital and that 
this has been one of the reasons for the sector's problems. The proportion 
of shareholders' funds to net assets employed declined progressively from 
b&o in 1963 to 37$ in 1967* Over the same five-year period only some S° 
of the additional finance required was provided in the form of permanent 
capital, while approximately came from borrowing. Current assets 
increased by £5 million, but liabilities by £1^ million, thus involving 
a net contraction in working capital of £9 million, "This suggests that 
the independent airlines have, in effect, relied to a large extent on
1 ■extending credits from suppliers and others as a source of working capital,"
There are obvious dangers inherent in this type of situation. Airlines • 
can probably survive longer than most companies on credit and by hiring 
services and equipment, but certainly not for ever. Relatively large- 
scale financial backing is required for two main reasons, ^Firstly, most 
airlines find it necessary to periodically re-equip their fleets with more 1
1 . TheEdwards Report. p.J^.
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modern aircraft; this problem was exacerbated during the 1960s as
many Independents adopted the policy of buying the very latest
equipment rather than employing the cast-offs of the larger national
. flag-carriers. Secondly, and perhaps a more important factor, air
transport is a highly cyclical industry, so that finance is needed
to support operators during the inevitable ’trough* periods. A recent
American study of 23 categories of consumption expenditure found that
income elasticity was greatest for air transport. In other words, as
incomes rise, spending on air transport increases proportionately more
than most other forms of spending; when spending falls, therefore,
2any recession will be very sharp. Unlike the larger airlines, very 
few private carriers are able to build up sufficient reserves during the 
relatively prosperous periods to carry them through the depressions.
To quote Edwards again: "No airline without adequate financial resources 
can expect to ride out the periods of temporary difficulties which are
3
certain to afflict businesses of this kind from time to time." Signif-
■ ■ i .
icantly, no British airline since the war has obtained further capital 
by Stock Exchange flotation in its own right. Finance has, however, 
been forthcoming from a number of sources, by far the two most important 
of which have been tourist interests (see Chapter X) and shipping 
companies.
Maritime concerns had taken an interest in aviation even before 
the Second World War and under the Conservative Party's plans for the 
post-war reorganisation of air transport they were destined to play 
a major role. With the complete nationalisation of British scheduled 
air services, of course, the Labour Government effectively excluded 
private companies from participation in the main stream of aviation 23
2. Heien: ’Income and Price Lags in Consumer-Demand Analysis'.
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 1969, P. ¿68-9. Short and 
long-term income elasticities for air transport were both found 
to be 2.910 (price elasticities =-0.305).
3. Op.cit. .
development. During the second reading of the Civil Aviation
Bill, Herbert Morrison explained Labour's objections to the participation
of other modes of transport:
"It is not desirable in our judgement that there should 
be an interlocking of managements between private railways 
and private shipping and publicly-owned air transportation.
We are utilising the services of a certain number who are 
experienced in railway and shipping transportation, but we do 
not wish to be suspected of putting air transportation under 
the thumb of the surface means of communication." k
Nevertheless, shipping interests maintained a foothold in the industry,
albeit on a relatively modest scale. Several of the numerous charter
airlines that were rapidly established, and almost as rapidly wound up,
in the second half of the 19**0s had close connections with the shipping
industry, such companies as Chartair, Kearsley Airways and Culliford 
5
Airlines. But it was not until the early 1930s, with the return to
power of a Conservative Government, that maritime interests were to play
a major part in the development and financing of the Independents.
The British Labour Party was not alone in objecting to the participation
of other modes of transport in civil aviation. In the United States it has
long been held that there is a 'prima facie' case against the control of an
air carrier by a surface carrier, although the Federal Aviation Act does
6not specifically prohibit such an arrangement. The President's Air
Policy Commission in its famous 19^8 report, 'Survival in the Air Age',
recommended that;"the Civil Aeronautics Board prevent the control by
surface carriers of the United States air transport system or any important 
7
segment thereof". Similarly, a fear that shipping interests, especially
V. Hansard, House of Commons "Debates, b/3/^6 , vol." ^22,'’col.' 6lC, T""" 7':
5. 'Aeroplane', 15/6/if?, p. 6 3 1-2 and 1 2 /9 A 7 , p.3?6; 'Flight', 23/10A7, p.^80,
6. Wheatcroft: 'Air Transport Policy', 19 6^, p',36-7 .
7. Quoted by Schnorr; 'Participation of Steamship Companies in Air 
Transportation', Cornell Lav/ Quarterly, 19^9, p.395»
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British, would achieve a dominant position in civil aviation
was one of the major factors leading to the Labor Party's attempts
8to nationalise Australian air transport after the war. But on 
the whole, with the noteable exception of the United States, most 
countries later relented and today shipping interests have large 
investments in aviation in such countries as Canada, France, Holland, 
Germany, Norway, Greece and Portugal, very often providing the main 
competition for a nationalised airline. In Canada, for example, 
Canadian Pacific Airlines, owned by the famous railway and ship­
ping company, 'competes* with Air Canada, itself for most of the 
post-war period controlled by the nationalised Canadian National 
Railway. In France, the second largest airline, UTA, is controlled 
by the shipping Company, Chargeors Reunis. There is an obvious 
potential danger in such a situation, which explains American and 
early left-wing opposition, that unless effectively regulated a 
surface carrier will restrict to its own advantage the development 
of an airline over which it has gained control. It has been suggested 
that this is exactly what happened in the UK before the war, when 
the railway companies acquired a number of domestic air operators.
It is worth examining this episode in rather more detail in order to 
see the dangers that do in fact exist.
The Railways and the Pre-V/ar Airlines
During the decade following the end of the First V/orld War 
the railway companies increasingly had to face competition from a 
new and rapidly developing mode of transport, the internal combustion 
engine. Eventually the degree of competition began to hurt and, 8
8. Brogden: »Australia's Two-Airline Policy', 1988, p. A8-9.
This antagonism between the Labor Party and foreign chipping 
companies dated back to pre-war days.
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from about 1928, the railways began to move into the road transport 
industry. By the end of 1931 they were associated in one way or 
another with some b7% of the total of 41,500 buses in the country, 
although they were not so successful in the field of road haulage,
9
, primarily because of the more atomistic structure of the industry. 
Similarly, in the area of air transport, the railways had received 
powers from Parliament to operate services as early as 1929, hut it 
was not until April, 1933, that the Great Western Company inaugurated 
the first experimental service. The following March saw the estab­
lishment of Railway Air Services (RAS), owned equally by the four 
railway companies and Imperial Airways, to undertake air transport 
operations. The new company agreed to confine its activities to 
Great Britain, and for its part Imperial Airways undertook not to 
operate domestic services. Financially, the venture proved to be 
far from a success. Losses were incurred every year and between 
1934 and 1938 the total deficit amounted to almost £200,000. The 
railways' aviation activities, however, were not confined to RAS. 
They invested widely in several other small airlines, so that by 
1938 they had secured a financial, though not necessarily a control­
ling, interest in all but five of the 16 companies operating air
10services within the UK. 910
9. Aldcroft : 'Innovation on the Railways'.Journal of Transport
Economics and Policy, 19 6 9 , P« 104. Many of the early road 
transport companies at this time also established pioneer air­
lines, the so-called »busmen's airlines'. See, for example, 
Parke: 'Britain's Internal Air Services', 1952, p. 2-3 (un­
published paper in Chartered Institute of Transport Library); 
Swann: »40 years of Air Transport in Northern Ireland’, 1972,
p. 14-15; and Whitworth: 'Some Impacts of Air and Road Transport 
on Railway Economics and Practices*, Journal of the Institute of
Transport, 1959, P* 163-5*
10. Aldcroft: 'The Railways and Air Transport in Great Britain*.
Scottish Journal of Political E c o n o m y 1965 , p.51-6; Parke:
'The Relationship of Rail and Air Transport in Britain'. British 
Transport Review, 1953, p* 459-60,
15?.
The reason for the railway companies active participation in
domestic air transport was certainly not, therefore, simply a desire
to make money. It was much more a matter of insurance. Having made
the mistake of.allowing road transport to firmly establish itself
as a competitor, they were determined to gain a strong foothold in
aviation at an early and relatively cheap stage. But by doing so they
laid themselves open to the charge of restricting competition in their
own interests. For example, to ensure that they controlled a large
proportion of domestic air traffic the railways adopted highly
competitive tactics, not always totally laudable. Their extensive
financial resources enabled them to undercut their competitors for
the Post Office airmail contracts, which were subsequently operated 
11 .at a loss. Similarly, from 1933 a booking ban was operated against
the so-called 'busmen's airlines' then being established. Since
most of the travel agents' business was accounted fpr by the sale of
railway tickets, they were forced, on pain of being denied the right
to sell such tickets, to deal only with certain airlines, namely
RAS, Imperial Airways and foreign operators. This practice was
finally abolished in 1938 after Government pressure had been brought
12to bear on those concerned.
The main criticism of the railways' activities, however, was 
that, having obtained a major say in the development of domestic 
air transport, they chose to manipulate that development in such a 
way as to minimise the potential competition for their own services.
It is true that the railway companies were successful in introducing 
a measure of rationalisation into an industry that sorely needed it. 
Further, there is no evidence to suggest that services deteriorated; 
on the contrary, facilities probably improved in the later 193Cs
11* Aldcroft, op.cit., p.53* -
12. Higham; 'Britain's Imperial Air Routes, 1918-39'» 1?S0, p.270-1 .
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partly as a result of the railways' influence. The Maybury 
Committee (193?) on internal aviation found no reason to indict 
RAS and the Cadman .Committee (1938) felt that the railways were 
making a useful contribution to domestic air transport and that they 
had "provided capital and experience in a proper and constructive 
manner."
But at the same time there was a great deal of contemporary 
criticism of the role of the railway companies, and much of it seems 
justified. For example, although some attempt was made at ration­
alisation, it did not go nearly far enough, and by 1937/38 the 
railways were promoting new companies. Similarly, it is noticeable 
that most of RAS' operations were concentrated in the western half 
of the country in a line running from London to Glasgow, while the 
eastern side was almost totally neglected. It was in the west and 
north-west that the railways faced most of the competition from 
private airlines and where the advantages of air over surface trans­
port were greatest because of the high proportion of over-water routes. 
The five domestic airlines in which the railways did not have a 
financial interest by 1938 were the ones that offered the least 
potential threat. Further, the railway companies avoided wherever 
possible establishing air services on mainlinerail routes. Until 
1938, for instance, RAS refused to introduce a service between 
London and Glasgow via Manchester, operating instead via Belfast.
"The only conclusion we can draw... is that the railways delayed 
introducing a direct service until private operators- entered the 
field. Had they done so alone it would merely have creamed 
traffic from their own ground facilities." ^
13. Aldcroft, op.cit., p.60 and 57*
1/+. Ibid., p.59-61.
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Thus, although the railway companies undoubtedly made a
significant contribution to the development of domestic air transport
in the UK, their efforts were, in fir. Peter Masefield's words,
15"on the whole half-hearted." As Dyos and Aldcroft conclude:
"It might be argued that up to 1939 the railways 
had little time to reorganise their new interests 
efficiently. Far nearer the truth might be the 
suggestion that the railways had little intention of 
doing so. The railways v/ere far more interested in 
acquiring a controlling interest in the airline 
companies to limit the competition than they were in 
promoting orderly expansion." 16
Association with the Shipping Companies
The Conservative Party retained the view that other forms of
transport, and in particular maritime interests, should partake in
the post-v/ar development of British civil aviation. "Experience has
shown", argued John Profurao, a Tory spokesman on aviation,
"that a blend of public and private enterprise is best for this
service. Close co-operation with shipping can often be of great 
* 17value". On returning to power, therefore, the Conservatives
openly encouraged shipping companies to invest in air transport, 
although not on the scale once envisaged. The annual report of the 
UK Chamber of Shipping for 1953 noted :
"In recent months there have been indications 
that the Government is prepared to encourage inde­
pendent operators to participate in the development of 
air transport on routes not covered by or in activities 
supplementary to those of the Corporations...
Shipowners must now consider whether there is open to 
them a sufficiently wide field not covered or likely 
to be covered by the Corporations and capable of 
expansion in which they would further the development 
of British air transport." 18
16. «British Transport*, 1969» p*39i*• 
IV. 'Flight', 20/5/55» P. 677.
18. Ibid., 5/3/5^» p. 2?6
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Clearly the shipowners decided that such a field did indeed 
exist, for between 1953 and 1955 most of the major independent
airlines became associated with shipping companies;
October, 19 5 3 ’ - the Hunting Group (itself a major shipowner)
and Clan Line Steamers formed a joint company, 
Hunting-Clan Air Transport, to take over Hunting 
Air Transport and Field Aircraft Services.
February, 195^ - Furness Withy acquired a ’substantial interest'
in Airwork.
February, 195^ - P and 0, through its subsidiary General Steam
Navigation Company, acquired a controlling interest 
in Britavia.
June, 195^ - Blue Star Line acquired a 'substantial interest'
in Airwork.
March, 1955 Bibby Line acquired a 'minority interest' in 
Skyways. 1Q
Thus, with the exception of Cunard's purchase of Eagle in I960, 
the major influx of shipping capital tcok place within a period of 
just 18 months. As the Independents gradually rationalised their 
operations during the 1950s, maritime investment became concentrated 
in fewer airlines, so that by the early 1960s, it was primarily 
centred on the Eagle and BUA groups. The latter company for 
example, was owned by, among others, the Blue Star Line (20%)
Furness Withy (20%), British and Commonwealth Shipping (16%), Clan 
Line Steamers (16%) and the Hunting Group (8%). With the acquisition 
of Britavia in 1962 P and 0 was added to the list. This group of 
investors, together with Cunard, remained the most important single 
source of finance for the privately-owned airlines during the 1950s 
and early 1960s; their impact on British independent aviation 
was considerable. But over the following years other shipping 
companies also took an interest in air transport. In late 1963,
19. Ibid., various dates; in addition, the London ship-brokers, 
Davies and Newman Ltd., formed a charter airline subsidiary 
in 1952 known as Dan-Air Services. By 1972 Davies and Newman's 
aviation interests accounted for 96.6% of the group's turnover 
and 68.6% of the sCl.03^ million operating profit. Ibid., 
31/5/72, p. 839.
l6l.
for example, the ATLB deferred a number of Caledonian's applica­
tions for inclusive-tour licences, presumably because of doubts 
about its financial standing. The licences were granted when the 
Donaldson Line acquired a 25% interest in the airline for a reported 
£32,000. After Donaldson had gone into liquidation in 1967, another
Glasgow-based shipping company, Lyle Shipping, invested a further
20£123,000 in Caledonian. Similarly, in 1965 Court Line paid some 
£125,000 for Autair, enabling the airline to undertake a major 
diversification and become the market leader in the rapidly expand­
ing field of inclusive-tour charters (see Chapters X and XI). More 
recently the cross-Channel car-ferry group, European Ferries,
acquired control of Invicta International, which had been experiencing
21financial difficulties.
What motivated the shipping companies to invest so widely in
aviation in 1953-55» and why were the Independents so willing to
accept their help? As far as the airlines were concerned, their
situation was basically the same as that of Caledonian in 1963»
Autair in 1965 or Invicta in 1973» except perhaps on a larger scale,
namely a lack of * sufficient capital backing for expansion. By the
early 1950s the private carriers found themselves presented with at
least the promise of better, more secure times to come, but they were
still equipped with obsolescent, even obsolete, aircraft. An
editorial in 'Aeroplane' remarked: "The Independents have, in fact,
gone about as far as they can go, unless and until the major
22financial problem of aircraft re-equipment can be solved," Thus, 
the airlines found themselves caught in a maelstrom of aircraft 
obsolescence and equipment financing and welcomed investment capital
20. Ibid., 12/11/63, p. 828 and 1*1/9/67 , p. *hS9.
21. 'Financial Times', 2*i/2/73, p.22 .
2 2. 3V7/53, p. 129.
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from any source. The smaller operators in other countries
appeared to be experiencing similar problems and to have found
the same solution. In France, for example, Chargeurs Reunis
acquired UAT and Cie Generale Transatlantique secured control of
23Cie Air Transport.
The motives of the shipping companies were rather more complex. 
Some may well have envisaged a day when their investments would 
produce large dividends, although there was very little sign of this 
in the early 1950s. Most, however, like the railway companies in 
the 1930s, probably regarded the whole affair as a relatively cheap 
insurance policy. Harold Watkinson, Minister of Transport and Civil 
Aviation, had hinted at this in July, 1956:
"I wonder whether the air can go on developing at 
this rate without in.the end - nobody knows when - 
making serious inroads into the shipping.business. If 
that be true, is it really.wise to impose a tight 
monopoly to keep those great companies, with all their 
knowledge and expertise, out of the air altogether." 2h
In fact, aviation had already made serious inroads into sea transport,
especially passenger traffic. By 1957 the number of persons carried
across the North Atlantic by lATA-member airlines was almost exactly
the same as the number carried by sea, and the following year the
•number of sea passengers actually declined for the first time
since the war. With the sole exception of 1962, North Atlantic
sea passenger traffic has continued to fall, both in absolute and
25relative terms, ever since. On the whole, however, the
main interest and fear of the shipping companies during the early 
1950s probably centred on freight rather than passenger traffic.
Air freight was very much of an unknown at this time, with a number of 
experts making what turned out to be highly optimistic predictions 
about its future development and growth, as indeed they have
23. Sundberg: ‘Air Charter', 1961, p.32.
2h . 'Flight', 2/8/56, p.177.
25. See figure 7,1 and Appendix III; for a discu 
success of air transport on the North Atlant 
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ic see Brancker: 'Air and £ea . 
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Figure 7«1 : North Atlantic Air and Sea Passenger Traffic
Figures shown are in millions 
Source : See Appendix III .
continued to do. In 19'*9» example, the United States Civil 
Aeronautics Administration predicted that by 1955 US air cargo 
would equal the value of passenger traffic*
26. ’Financial Times’ ll/ld/^9»
1 6 ^
Wheatcroft points cut that the operations of the airlines in the
BUA group (and presumably this is also true of the constituent
companies of pre-BUA days) had remarkably little overlap with the
sea routes of their-shipping shareholders. There was little scope,
27therefore, for a conflict of interest to arise. An important
factor here may well be that whereas the shipping companies were
usually geographically quite specialised, the airlines, being still
primarily charter operators, were forced to fly wherever there
was a demand for their services. But there were a number of cases
where the interests of an airline and a shipping company coincided.
The most obvious and important example was probably that of the
Cunard-Eagle partnership (see below). Similarly, Furness Withy's
passenger and cargo services were particularly concentrated on the
routes between the UK“ “and North America, the same routes on which
Airwork attempted in the mid-1950s to develop scheduled air freight
and charter operations. The Blue Star Line provided agency and
sales functions in Brazil, Uruguay and the Argentine, and Pacific
28Steam in Chile, for BUA's South American services. The Bibby 
*
Line, the principal troopship operator, admitted that a major
reason for its interest in Skyways was the fact that the latter
29.held a number of air-trooping contracts.
But there are certain differences between the situation in
which the railway companies found themselves before the war and
that in which the post-war airlines were forced to operate. The
railways were able to acquire a large proportion of domestic air
traffic and so exert considerable influence on the development of
that traffic. It would have been impossible for the shipping
companies to have done the same with regard to post-war domestic or
27» Op. cit., p.36.
2 8 . 'Aeroplane', 12/2/5^, p.190 and 11/11/65, p.6.
29. Estimates Committee:'First Report on Trooping', 196V 0 2,
Evidence, p.91•
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international air transport, for three main reasons. Firstly, 
most of Britain's civil aviation output is produced by the 
nationalised Corporations and, despite the political rhetoric, 
this 'status quo' was never seriously questioned during the 1950s
0
and 1960s. Secondly, the Independents' charter and international 
scheduled services mostly face intensive competition from foreign 
operators, which are impossible to control or even co-ordinate to 
the benefit of the shipping industry. Finally, the whole legislative 
environment surrounding air transport is now much more severe and 
restricting. Thus, Wheatcroft is on the whole correct when he says 
that there has been little scope for a conflict of interests between 
the airlines and their shipping masters, although some of the 
shipping companies may- not have been fully aware of this fact at the 
time of their initial investments. Tho main explanation for their 
involvement must have been the opportunity to invest at a fairly 
early stage in an industry that might one day challenge on a very 
large scale the position of their own industry and into which it 
might be necessary to transfer considerable resources, rather than 
an attempt to restrict or curtail air transport.
There can be little doubt that the financial backing provided 
primarily by shipping interests was of major importance to the 
privately-owned UK airlines. It enabled them to finance new equip­
ment purchases and expansion and often to ride out business depressions 
(although not always, as the case of Transglobe illustrates). The 
shipping companies were also an important force in bringing about 
rationalisation within the private sector of the industry. It is 
more than a coincidence that most of the maritime investment in 
British independent air transport by the early 1960s was concentrated 
in one company, BUA. It was often also argued that the experience
1 6 6 .
and world-wide connections of the shipping firms would be a 
useful aid to the airlines. But at most this must have been a 
marginal factor; there is no evidence, for instance, that Eagle 
fared worse in the field of marketing and sales than any of the 
. shipping-backed air carriers before i960.
The same advantages cannot be said to have accrued to the
shipowners. Despite the fact that they had been openly encouraged
by the Government to invest in aviation, the shipping companies
were extremely disappointed by the concessions granted to the private
sector. The 1957 Company Report of Furness Withy noted: " In
regard to Air, Government policy continues to hamper development
in the manner hoped for when Shipping Companies were encouraged to
50play their part x n expanding British Civil Aviation.” The 
restrictions on their operations merely served to exacerbate the 
Independents' poor financial results. In time, especially after the 
relative failure of the i960 Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act, the 
shipowners responded to this situation by withdrawing from civil 
aviation. Thus, by 1967, of the original group of maritime 
investors in British air transport only the companies within the 
British and Commonwealth Shipping group and Davies and Newman were 
left (although a few other companies had, of course, entered the 
field). But disenchantment with profitability and Government policy 
may not have been the only factor involved. An important develop­
ment in the shipping world at this time was containerisation, which 
completely revolutionised sea freight. It was now quite evident that 
the sea could easily hold its' own in competition with the air for 
the carriage of most types of goods.' Despite palletisation in air 
transport, which preceded the wide-spread use of containers, it .
50. 'The Economist', 7/9/57, p. 804,
increasingly became clear that the airlines were not going to 
repeat with freight the success they had had over the sea with 
regard to passenger transport, at least in the foreseeable future.
In fact, after several years of very rapid and steady growth the 
volume of freight carried by air in the early 1960s was still only 
some 0 ,0 0 k %  of that carried by all forms of transport. Thus, 
the need for an insurance policy had become much less important.
Cunard Eagle.
It can be concluded, therefore, that the investment by British 
shipping companies in post-war civil aviation probably had a bene­
ficial effect on the development of the Independents. But it is 
equally clear that the potential for a conflict of interests did 
exist. The story of Cunard's association with Eagle, and later 
with /JBQAC, as well as forming an extremely important chapter in 
the history of the privately-owned airlines, also illustrates some 
of these possible dangers.
By the late 1950s only Eagle of the larger British Independents 
was not closely associated with shipping interests. Such a position 
of independence, however, was rapidly becoming untenable, especially 
with the reorganisation of the private sector and the possibilities 
for expansion that materialised in I960. Eagle needed large-scale 
financial backing to remain in the forefront of private aviation, 
and realistically this could only mean teaming up with a shipping 
company or merging with another air carrier, probably BUA. Harold 
Bamberg was fully aware of the situation!
31. Brooks and Scarlett: '»Britain’s Mercantile Aviation* , 
Aeronautics, I960, p.91”.' ~
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"There are two ways of getting the fitter, 
stronger companies which the Minister wants. In our case 
we can either merge or else stay separate and get a 
pretty hefty transfusion of finance to enable us to meet 
the necessary development. Quite frankly, to get the 
type of.operation we have had, with a welter of inter­
national agreements, we have a situation in which 
large-scale finance is necessary." 32
Consequently, in March, I960, Cunard announced that it was to buy
3399% of Eagle Aviation from Bamberg for a reported £1 million.
Cunard had been the only large British shipping company without
a stake in civil aviation. One does not have to look far to discover 
why it suddenly took the plunge. As the major British sea passenger-
carrier on the North Atlantic it had been forced to stand by and watch 
as the airlines reduced its share of the traffic, at first relatively, 
but from the mid-1990s in absolute terms as well. As long as BOAC 
was licensed as the sole British scheduled airline to North America 
there was little chance of Cunard becoming involved in this newer 
and increasingly popular form of transport. The I960 Civil Aviation 
(Licensing) Act, however, changed the situation considerably. It 
offered the Independents, at least if the Government was to be believed, 
an opportunity of competing with the nationalised Corporations on 
relatively equal terms. More specifically, it promised dual designa­
tion of British airlines on certain routes. This gave Cunard the 
opening it had been waiting for and it quickly completed the deal for 
the purchase of Eagle, a company well suited to Cunard's needs,
because of its extensive experience on the North Atlantic, especially
• 3**with its West Indian operations.
32. «Flight«, 26/2/60, p.273. .
33. Ibid., 25/3/60, p. 2^5 and 2/6/62, p. 957.
3^. Space has not permitted a discussion of these operations.
Basically, like similar efforts by other private carriers, they 
were attempts to get around British/licensing regulations. Their 
success and life-span were on the v.'hole limited.
Early in .1961 Cunard Eagle, as the new company was known, 
applied to the ATLB for licences to operate scheduled passenger 
services to a number of North American cities. The airline already had 
UK approval, along with BOAC, for an all-freight service. Shortly 
afterwards it ordered two new Boeing 70?-^20s for delivery in 1962, 
with an option on a third, the first British Independent to order 
jets. v The application was based squarely on those sections of the
1960 Act that permitted the designation of a second carrier on a route 
where traffic conditions permitted. If competition between two British 
Airlines could not be allowed on the world's busiest, most important, 
air route, argued Cunard Eagle, where could it be allowed? The ATLB 
chose to treat the case as three separate licence applications; in 
other words, for routes to the US East Coast, to the US Kid-West and
to Canada. Reporting in June, 1961, the Board rejected the latter two 
applications because the traffic on these routes was not sufficiently 
developed, but granted Cunard Eagle a 15-year licence to operate a 
daily London-New York service, with optional stops at Manchester,
3 6Prestwick, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore and Washington.
The application had naturally been opposed all along by BOAC and 
the Corporation now exercised its right to appeal to the Minister, Sir 
Frank Pritchard being appointed Appeal Commissioner to hear the case.
As a result of this review, the Minister announced towards the end of
1961 that he had decided to over-rule the ATLB and rescind the licence, 
arguing that there were "too many seats chasing too few passengers" on 
the North Atlantic. BOAC, he claimed, had ordered sufficient aircraft to 
cater for all the traffic that might reasonably be expected over the next 
five or six years. Such a justification, really fooled no-one and served 
only to gloss over the important underlying factors behind the decision
35- 'Flight », 20/1/61, p. 98 and 2?/»i/6l, p. 57?.
36. Ibid., 29/6/61 , p.907; Wheatcroft, op.cit.,p.137-8 ,
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(as discussed in Chapter IV). John Seekings, in a Conservative
pamphlet a few .years later, described the Minister's announcement
as "the supreme example of folly."
"...(The) government... was unduly influenced by the 
financial situation of B0AC...This action...destroyed the 
Licensing Board as an effective instrument of air transport 
regulation...For good measure, it also threw suspicion 
on the sincerity of the Tories' claimed support of private 
enterprise in aviation." 37
The 'adequate capacity' argument had never in fact been a major part
of the BOAC case, and the Minister omitted to mention the fact (which
emerged at the appeal) that during the ATLB hearing BOAC had ordered
■ 8^three more Boeing 707s.^
Cunard was obviously in a very serious position. It had purchased
£6 million worth of jet equipment and now had to find a use for it.
Cunard Eagle Airways, after making a profit of approximately £100,000
in 1959, incurred a loss of about the same amount in I960; the parent
39company itself lost £1.7 million in 1960/61. , One possible use for the
long-range aircraft was on North Atlantic charter operations. But here 
too Cunard ran into trouble. The American CAB limited off-route charter 
services of both US and foreign scheduled carriers to ic£w of their 
scheduled passenger-miles. Because of Cunard Eagle's West Indian 
activities the CAB insisted that this '1C£j rule' be applied to the 
British operator's charter applications; the inevitable result would 
have been an excessively low level of utilisation for jet aircraft. In 
retaliation the British Government threatened to limit or suspend US 
supplemental carriers' charter operations into the UK.
37. 'Guidelines for Airlines', 1970, p.6.
38. 'Flight', 30/ 1 1 /6 1 , p.859.
39. Ibid., 5/7/62, p.5; 'The Economist', 27/5/61 , p,938.
^0, Strassheimi 'The International Airline Industry* , 1969, p.2l6.
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Thus, the announcement that Cunard and BOAC were to establish 
a joint company to operate North Atlantic air services let everyone off 
the hook. In fact, this was far from a new idea. Shortly after taking 
over as chairman of BOAC in i960, Sir Matthew Slattery had suggested 
to Cunard that the two companies should co-operate in a joint British 
venture on the Atlantic. He argued that shipping and civil aviation were
Itnow complementary rather than competitive. Cunard rejected the proposal,
although not totally dismissing the basic concept, at least judging from
its chairman's report for i960:
"Nothing would give me more pleasure than to see a forecast 
made in 'Flight' of April 1st come true; 'So here we have 
(1) Cunard and Eagle working with.rather than against BOAC, 
and (2) a tripartite British air corporation-independent­
shipping partnership v/hich will be of great advantage to 
Britain on what is after all the world's most important 
route.' " *i2’ '
Indeed, a joint Cunard-BOAC venture on the North Atlantic had been 
suggested to Lord V/inster, Minister of Civil Aviation, by Cunard's then 
chairman, Sir Percy Bates, just after the Second World War. .
To say that Eagle's management, and in particular Mr. Harold 
Bamberg, were not particularly pleased with the new merger is a consider­
able understatement. They thought that Cunard had thrown away several 
years' hard work trying to establish Eagle as a major international air 
carrier. The partnership between the shipping line and the independent 
airline had never been a particularly happy one, especially at the 
managerial level. The two groups came from very different business 
environments. As one former employee put it to me, the Cunard people 
tended to distrust those in air transport, who "had larger expense 
accounts and didn't wear bowler hats." In addition, Cunard had never 
been very interested in the non-Atlantic activities of Eagle, which 
still accounted for most of the airline's output. It came as no surprise,
*11. Select Committee on Nationalised Industries: 'BOAC{ 19oj/6J+, p.63.
Wjp. 'The Economist', p.690.
Jj .  'Flight', 17/3/62, p.771.
therefore, when Bamberg re-acquired 6 C o f  Eagle Airways in February,
1963, renaming it British Eagle International Airways; he purchased 
1/ *  kbthe remaining kOfi in 196?.
BOAC-Cunard
17 2.
Although the outlines of the BOAC-Cunard deal were announced at the 
time, details were not published until December, 1965; not even the House 
of Commons was allowed to see them. Under the terms of the contract, a 
jointly-owned subsidiary was established on June 20th, 1962, to operate all 
British scheduled services on the North Atlantic (except those to Canada), 
including the Caribbean. BOAC contributed of the capital and Cunard 
the remaining 3^»^; authorised capital was £30 million, of which £2.8 
million was subscribed, "£19.6 million by the Corporation and £ ,8 .k million 
by Cunard. The shipping company undertook not to provide any air transport 
services to the agreed area of operations, or to areas through which the 
new carrier's or BOAC's services operated, except within Europe. The 
Cunard Eagle group might continue to operate charter flights anywhere in 
the world, but not in the agreed area unless BOAC-Cunard did not wish to 
undertake them. For its part, the Corporation would not provide air 
transport services to the agreed area, although it was free to transit the 
area as part of longer routes. In the event of BOAC-Cunard
"making a profit on revenue account in any year, after 
proper provision for obsolescence, such profit shall be 
applied in the first instance to the declaration of a 
dividend on share capital up to a.figure of B i in.any year 
before any sums are carried to any reserve account."
BOAC contributed eight and Cunard its two Boeing BOAC-Cunard
kk. Ibid., 21/2/63, p.2 5 1.’
^5* Cunard's share was increased from 25 to 30/ at the instance of the 
Treasury. Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, op.cit., p.6 3.
then leased to the Corporation all its aircraft, engines, etc., for a 
sum per annum equal to "the obsolescence charge in respect thereof in the 
books of the company.1' Subject to various clauses, BOAC agreed to 
provide and sell to the new company - and the latter agreed to exclusively 
purchase from BOAC - "all the aircraft flying hours required to enable
bSthe company to provide the company's services."
Merger is really the wrong word to describe the BOAC-Cunard agreement.
"BOAC-Cunard is not BOAC-Cunard Eagle," commented an editorial in 'Flight',
"a partnership between a corporation and an independent. In the air
. ijo
transport sense the new partnership is 100« BOAC." Similarly, Sir Basil
Smallp^ece, BOAC's managing director, maintained:
"For all practical purposes we are still the same people, 
doing the same work, flying the same routes...As it is the 
intention that BOAC-Cunard should not, at any rate for the 
present, have any staff of its own, but use the staff of its 
parent organisation, BOAC's staff in the new company's area 
will continue to be BOAC staff and do the same work that 
they have always done." ^8
If this was the case, what benefits did the Corporation hope to 
gain from its partnership with Cunard?
One of the principal arguments put forward at the time was 
that BOAC would be able to take advantage of Cunard's extensive 
experience, sales network and reputation, especially in North 
America. The shipping company had, for example, 17 offices in the 
United States, 9 in Canada and 23 in Europe. But such benefits can 
easily be over-rated. Under an agreement signed in i9 6 0, the North 
Atlantic Shipping Conference and IATA-member airlines had decided to
¿(.Q ' ' .operate a system of mutual exchange for booking facilities. Cunard's 
offices, therefore, were already selling BOAC tickets. Even if an
Jf6. 'Flight«, 16/12/65, p. 1035 and 22/9/66, p. 505.
4?. Ibid., 19/7/62, p.77. 
kZ \ Ibid., 2/6/62, p.957.
increase in such sales could confidently be expected, in the 
words of 'The Economist':
"Cunard's mammoth but Edwardian sales organisation... 
needs BOAC rather than the other way round; if it 
could not attract the additional business of selling 
BOAC's tickets, Cunard would be hard put to it to justify 
the present size of its sales force in North America 
and much encouragement for the merger with BOAC has 
come from the American end of the Cunard empire." 50.
At the same time, Cunard did not have a reputation for being one of
the most advanced, go-ahead companies in Britain. The dynamic
element in the Cunard/Eagle partnership undoubtedly came largely
from the Eagle side, and most of these men left with Bamberg.
There were, however, two other advantages for BOAC in the
deal. In the first place, its claim in evidence to the ATLB that
it had ordered sufficient capacity for the next five or six years
had proved highly optimistic. The Corporation now desperately
wanted to purchase additional American aircraft, but was prevented
from doing so by the Minister. Cunard Eagle's two Boeings provided
51a convenient solution to the problem. The other advantage that
accrued to BOAC was the fact that the merger eliminated a competitor 
that had been, and could easily be again, a very irritating thorn in 
its side. The State airline had been successful in denying Cunard 
Eagle a North Atlantic scheduled service licence; but there was no 
guarantee that a future Minister would not reverse the situation.
In addition, there was evidence to suggest that Cunard had opened 
negotiations with certain West Indian Governments with a view to the 
establishment of one or wiore national airlines in the Caribbean.
One jet had already been placed on the Bahamas register in the
50. 2J/6/62, p.123^.
51* Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, op.cit., Evidence,
.. p.88.
name of Cunard Eagle (Bahamas) Ltd., which had licences for the
52Berrauda-London and Bermuda-Nassau-Kmgston routes. This was 
potentially just as serious a threat to BOAC as the original 
ATLB decision, for it offered the possibility of avoiding the 
provisions of the Civil Aviation (-Licensing) Act. A West Indian 
national flag-carrier, owned by Cunard, would be able to negotiate 
traffic rights throughout the world, including the US and Europe.
To a large extent, therefore, the formation of BOAC-Cunard was 
simply a way in which the Corporation paid Cunard to stay off its 
routes. Sir Matthew Slattery referred to these potential benefits 
in evidence to the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries:
"Well, they turned...down (the proposal for a joint 
BOAC-Cunard company) and bought Eagle, and then they 
were very troublesome, being a frightful nuisance in 
the Bahamas, where they had set up a rival airline to 
Bahamas Airways, so that we both lost a quarter of a 
million a year. When they had the licence revoked they 
came along to us and said they had two Boeings on 
order and they did not know what to do with them. I 
desperately needed those Boeings to replace Comets and 
Britannias which were becoming hopelessly uncompetitive,
* - and the combination of all these circumstances led me
to suggest that they went back to my suggestion of I960."
’ Politically one can only describe the whole affair as highly
dubious. Effectively what happened was that a private company had
.been allowed to buy one-ninth of a nationalised Corporation; BOAC
had hived-off 45% of its turnover, the amount earned on the routes in
question, into a separate company over which it did not have full
54control. There was certainly no precedent for such an action* 
Nationalised undertakings had established jointly-owned subsidiaries 
with private firms in peripheral activities, but none had ever before 
allowed private capital to b u y  itself into the public sector. 
Parliament, however, was not permitted to know the details of the
52. 'The Economist’, op.cit.j ’Flight’, 18/4/63, p.589-90.
53« Op.cit., p.146-7*
54. Hardcastle; 'Easy Money*for Cunard', New Statesman, 29/10/65. 
p. 634.
175-
agreement or to discuss its correctness. BOAC-Cunard repeatedly-
refused to allow the contract to be published or even to be shown
to the Shadow Cabinet by the Minister concerned, although the
company had been obliged, under American law, to file a copy with the
5 5CAB before it could fly into the United States. Whether there was
any pressure from the Government in favour of the merger is not
totally clear. The proposal was certainly referred to the Minister,
Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, who took the view that it "might well be of
56benefit to British civil aviation."^ Ian Mikardo, on the other hand,
argued that the Government was more actively involved:
"I was closely associated with (the BOAC-Cunard deal) 
as a member of the National Joint Council for Civil Air 
Transport. The facts, are that, without very heavy 
Ministerial pressure, BOAC would not have entered into 
that contract. There is no question about that. It 
was a shotgunf wedding." 5 7
Both the Government and BOAC's management denied that this was the case.
For Cunard, however, the situation must have been highly satis­
factory. Although BOAC, like most airlines, lost money on the North
Atlantic routes in 1961, they had been profitable for at least the
58previous two years. It is not true, as has often been claimed, that
the North Atlantic services are BOAC's most profitable (the Eastern
and African routes have in fact made profits more consistently^ ),
but at the same time they are far from white elephants. BOAC-Cunard
had agreed to hire all its capacity from BOAC, with the proviso that
it never asked for less capacity than that represented by the ten
original jets. In other words, after a relatively short period
demand would undoubtedly outstrip this minimum capacity requirement
5 5 * 'The Economist', 8/ ? / 6 b , p.530-. '■ ~ l'' ....
56. BOAC Memo to Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, op.cit., 
Appendix 21, p. 275•
57* Hansard, op.cit., 22/11/65, vol.721, cols,69-70.
58. 'Flight', 5/7/62, p.5.
59* Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, op.cit., p.6*+.
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and BOAC-Cunard would never have to worry about excess aircraft;
that was the Corporation's problem. One cannot help agreeing; with
William Hardcastle's conclusion:
' "Carve-up is a vulgar journalistic phrase, but it 
is one that comes irresistibly to mind when one gases 
at the thick 'trenches', that the Cunard Steamship 
Company is slicing off the meaty profits of (BOAC)...
A more solidly copper-bottomed formula for turning a 
profit could scarcely be conceived." 60
Similarly, even 'The Economist' was moved to remark: "Whatever
one's views on nationalised versus private industry, the plain fact
is that the arrangement between the two airlines comes close to
making a gift of public assets to private investors, i.e. the share-
holders of Cunard." Not only did Cunard gain access to an air
route in which it was vitally interested, on a scale that it could
not possibly have hoped to achieve on its own, but the investment
proved to be highly profitable. After an initial loss of £700,000
in 1962/6,2, BOAC-Cunard recorded profits of £2,900,000 and £^,270,000
over the following two years. In 1956/66 Cunard itself would have
incurred a loss of over £ 300 ,000 but for the dividend payments of
62£50^,000 it received from BOAC-Cunard.
Naturally there had been a great deal of opposition to the whole 
affair, not least in Parliament. The Labour Party remained strongly 
opposed to the merger and insisted that a future Labour Government 
would re-nationalise BOAC-Cunard. Yet with the defeat of the 
Conservatives in 196^, the new Government appeared strangely in­
effectual, Labour remained irreplacably opposed to the 'agreement, 
but seemed either unwilling or unable to do anything about it. The 
Minister of Aviation, Roy Jenkins, told the House of Commons in
60. Op.cit.
61. 23/6/62, p. 123^ .
62. Hansard, op.cit., 22/11/65, vol. 721« col.39; 'Flight', 22/9/66, 
P. 505.
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November, 19 65:
"I must say frankly to the House that I do not like 
this arrangement ... But, so far as BOAC was concerned, 
the contract was freely, even if mistakenly entered into.
I have to deal with the situation as I find it. If at 
some fairly early date it were possible to dissolve this 
partnership in a way that did no commercial harm to BOAC 
and was a reasonable bargain from the point of view of 
public property, I would welcome such a development, and 
I have left Sir Giles Guthrie in no doubt; about this." 63
To add insult to injury for the opponents of the merger, Sir Basil
Smallpj/ece, who had been managing director of BOAC at the time of
the contentious BOAC-Cunard agreement and who had subsequently retired
from that position under strong Government pressure, became chairman
6^of Cunard in November, 19o5*
Government and public pressure may well have had an effect in 
bringing about the announcement in September, 1966, that the partner­
ship was to be dissolved. But far more important was the financial 
position in which Cunard found itself. The shipping company was 
faced with serious capital shortages because of the need to modernise 
its container, tanker and passenger line operations. In addition, 
it would have had to find considerable new finance to maintain its 
share of the BOAC-Cunard equity, since the airline was likewise 
about to embark on a major re-equipment phase, in particular with 
.the purchase of Boeing 7^7 'Jumbo' jets. The two partners issued 
the following statement on September l6th:
"On the proposal of the Cunard Steam-Ship Co.Ltd.,
BOAC has agreed to acquire for cash Cunard's' 30%.holding 
in BOAC-Cunard effective on October 15, 1966. The 
purchase consideration of £11,5 million is related to 
Cunard's proportion of the estimated net asset value 
of BOAC-Cunard. After October 15,1966, the air routes 
row operated in the name of BOAC-Cunard Ltd. will be 
100% BOAC... BOAC-Cunard Ltd. came into existence in 
June, 1962',- a^d has traded successfully and profitably.
The purchase agreement provides for the continuation of 
joint selling arrangements. Air/sea interchange will 
continue and bo strengthened." 65,
63. Hansard, op.cit., col.ho.
6A. 'The Economist', 13/11/65, P«755.
65. 'Flight', 22/9/66, p. 505* .
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At the time of the dissolution of the agreement BOAC-Cunard's
fleet capacity, leased from the principal parent company, had
increased from the initial ten 707s to four BAC Super VC-lOs,
eleven 707-^36s and two 707-3360 freighters. Thus, after four
years, ended the "most flagrant example yet of public assets being
66used for the benefit of private shareholders." While probably 
not materially effecting the overall growth and development of 
British civil aviation, the episode clearly had a depressing 
effect on the private sector, eventually contributing to the collapse 
of the second largest independent airline, British Eagle.
66. 'The Economist', 13/9/66, p.1106.
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Chapter VIII
TROOPING
During the 1950s trooping, or the carriage of Servicemen
and their families to overseas bases and back, was increasingly
carried out by air rather than by sea. It was primarily to the
charter airlines that the Government turned to perform the task,
and throughout most of the period covered by this study trooping
accounted for a very large proportion of the Independents' total
effort. The first public recognition of the use of civil aircraft
in this role appears to have occurred in August, 1950, when Hr.
Arthur Henderson, Secretary of State for Air, referred in a speech at
Plymouth to the use by the RAF of the resources of the privately-
owned carriers. He said that charter aircraft were already carrying
Royal Auxiliary Air Force squadrons and other units to their training
camps in different parts of the UK and Germany and he hoped that
1the scheme would eventually have a much wider application. In a
debate in the House of Commons the following March, Henderson
elaborated on the scheme, pointing out that some £ 250,000 had been
spent during the previous financial year on the charter of aircraft
for this purpose from both the nationalised and independent airlines.
"I think that it can be regarded as money well'Spent,, 
not only because of the value of the service received, 
but also because it has helped to maintain a valuable 
and considerable potential represented by the civil 
aviation industry." 2
In fact, the principal reason for the use of civil operators rather 
than the RAF was that the expansion of Transport Command had been 
deliberately held back in favour of Bomber and Fighter Commands. 12
1. ' F l i g h t V  17/8/50. p.204.
2. Hansard, House of Commons, 6/5/51, vol^S?» col,252.
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The carriage of troops by air, of course, was still regarded as 
an experimental, marginal exercise; the overwhelming majority of 
Servicemen at this time continued to travel by sea. But it was an 
experiment that proved successful and which in the long-run was to 
have considerable importance for the independent airlines.
Not long after Henderson’s announcement in the Commons a
number of sizeable trooping contracts were awarded by the Air Ministry
to the charter carriers. In mid-1951, example, Hunting Air Travel
obtained what was claimed to be the largest passenger contract ever
awarded to an independent transport operator. The agreement provided
for the carriage of Service personnel and their families between the
UK and Malta and Gibraltar, involving some 40-50 round-trips per
3month to each destination, or 50*000 passengers a year. Later m  
1951 Airwork received an even larger contract, valued at over £1.25
4million, for trooping operations between the UK and the Middle East,
The return to power of the Conservative Tarty, and the introduction of 
the Tories' so-called 'New Deal' policy for civil aviation, gave an 
added fillip to the Independents' activities. In particular, trooping 
was singled out as one of the areas especially well suited to their 
type of operation; both BOAC and BEA were effectively excluded from 
participation.
Trooping rapidly established itself as an extremely important 
source of traffic and revenue for the private airlines. By 1955 
it accounted for 67% of their total passenger-miles (see Table 8.1), 
and although this figure declined over the following years, it remained 
on average well over until the mid-1960s. The growth of trooping 
operations is similarly reflected in a corresponding fall in the 
amount of general charter traffic carried by the Independents during *4
5. 'Flight', 17/8/51, p. ?-07.
4. Ibid., 9/11/51, P. 585.
the early 1950s. Government contracts increasingly p r o v i d e d  t h e  
•bread and butter' work, so that fewer airlines were forced t o  quote 
very low rates for the carriage of 'fill-up' cargo to keep their 
aircraft occupied. As a result much of this marginal traffic was no 
* longer carried by air.
Table 8.1 : TROOPING OPERATIONS BY BIATA - MEMBER C Q H P A N m i 
1950/51 - 1965/66
lfi2.
Passengers
Carried
% of 
total
Passenger-
miles
performed (000s.
% of total
)
1950/51 *+,926 - - -
19 51/52 53,786 - 109,120 -
1952/53 88,285 - 192,500 -
1953/ 5*4 1*47,825 -• . .  _ 315,607 -
1 9 5 V 5 5 21*4,59*4 - 387,5*46 67
1955/56 20*4,700 - 522,903 -
1956/5? 157,035 - 516,302 - .
1957/58 137,821 10 *i62,60*+ 66
1958/59 1*42,085 10 *419,55? *+9
1959/60 119,58*4 8 *419,3*16 5°
1960/61 171,138 8 520,3*4 6 *¡5
1961/62 31*4,73*4 12 56*4,38? *40
1962/63 396,5*40 1*4 750,72?
1963/6*1 *425,362 13 8*47,893 *4 6
1 9 6 V 6 5 15 6 ,12 1 - 6 *+6,618
1965/66 18*4,068 : 726,918 ~
Nb. The 
but
table includes the 
not all.
majority of 1privately-owned airlim+c, ;
Source; BIATA Annual Reports
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Strategic Importance;
There seems little doubt that throughout the 1950s most of
the larger private operators remained in business only as a result
of the security provided by trooping contracts. The attempt by the
Government to attain a measure of stability in the sector by giving
the Independents a share of the scheduled service traffic was on
the whole a failure. But even given this, initially at least trooping
was in fact a very attractive type of work for the airlines. It in-
volved the provision of a round-the-year service with a guarantee that
every seat would be filled; there were no advertising costs, no sales
effort, no load-factor problems, no peaks, no cancellations. Further,
trooping flights usually took place on weekdays, leaving aircraft free
at week-ends for use on holiday charters. The main attractions,
however, must have been the sheer size of the contracts, making
possible the optimum utilisation of equipment. For example, it was
commonly accepted at the time that a Viscount had to be worked at
least 2,500 hours per annum if it was .to pay its way. Yet, according
to G.H. Freeman, chairman of Trar.sair, there was "no way in which you
can get more than 1,000 hours a year out of seasonal flying...and
you just can't justify the expensive purchase of Viscounts just for
Inclusive Tours and seasonal work." On the other hand, under Transair's
Mediterranean trooping contract, involving between 25 and 30 flights a
month, its two Viscounts could each attain a utilisation rate of over
2,000 hours per annum, leaving less than 500 hours of general charter
. 5and holiday work for profitable operation.
Thus, it is easy to understand the attraction of trooping for the 
airlines. The - explanation of the Government's preference for the use 
of the Independents rather than the RAF or shipping companies was
5 . Ibid., V lO /5 7 ,  p . '532-5.
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partly a matter of cost (see below). But there would also 
appear to have been an element of subsidy involved. Trooping 
contracts were used as a means of supporting a fledgeling private 
sector. This seems to be the only rational explanation for the 
exclusion of the nationalised Corporations from participation and 
their later inclusion when the Government felt that the Independents 
could stand on their own feet. Such support was perhaps rather ironic 
in view of the frequent criticism voiced by the privately-owned 
carriers throughout the 1950s that the State airlines were 'subsidised 
monopolies'. An indirect subsidy was presumably justified on two 
counts: as a 'stop-gap' while the Independents were establishing 
themselves on a viable basis, especially as scheduled service 
carriers; and because of the potential strategic value of an air 
transport reserve.
The strategic; importance of civil air transport has long been
recognised. President Roosevelt described the airline industry as
a "reservoir" of men and machines always available for the defence
effort.^ His' successor's Air Policy Commission noted in 1947:
"The airlines have a fleet of aircraft of great value to the .military
services as a reserve in time of war. As a potential military
7auxiliary, the airlines must be kept strong and healthy." More 
recently, in the UK the Edwards Committee commented: "We take it... 
as axiomatic that a country with a strong and.efficient air transport 
industry is strategically better placed than one without, even though 
it is not to be regarded or financed .as part of the defence reserve," 678
6. Thayer: 'Air Transport Policy and National Security*, 1965, p.48.
7. Wheatc.roft:. 'The Economics of European Air Transport' , 1956, p.203-4
8. p.12.
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The value of the charter airlines in this field was probably first 
fully realised and accepted during the Berlin Airlift, when the RAF 
lacked sufficient transport capacity and the Corporations were unable 
to provide aircraft without severely disrupting their scheduled 
services. After the Berlin episode both Labour and Conservative 
spokesmen repeatedly stressed the military importance of a strong non- 
scheduled airline industry. Although Berlin is the most famous example, 
the Independents were also called upon to support the RAF on a 
number of occasions over the next two decades. For example, several 
private operators, largely under the co-ordination of Airwork, helped 
in trooplifting to the Mediterranean during the Suez crisis. At the 
time it was estimated that approximately 200 privately-owned aircraft 
were available if the^Government should require them, half of them
9large four-engined types.
The role that the British Government envisaged the Independents 
playing in the military field has a number of similarities with the 
post-war development of the American ’supplemental* airlines. It 
might, therefore, be relevent to repeat the Civil Aeronautics Board’s 
estimation in 1955» quoted by Thayer, of the contribution of the charter 
companies to national defence:
"An assessment of the importance of the irregular air 
carrier industry must include reference to the vital 
services rendered by these carriers in the interests of 
national defense... it is evident that the irregular air 
carriers have the necessary flexibility to meet the 
demands of the military, while...the certificated carriers, 
due to their commitments to render adequate service to 
certificated points, are not as flexible in meeting 
emergencies." 10
At the same time, however, Thayer's own assessment of the US 
non-scheduled operators should also be noted: 910
9. ’Flight», 17/8/56, p.2^0,
10. Thayer, op.cit., p.96.
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"Simply stated, the facts of the matter have never 
supported the political image of the supplemental airlines. 
Their economic history demonstrates they had become 
largely superfluous by 19^7, were sustained only by the 
Berlin and Korean emergencies, both of which occurred 
before the US had rebuilt its military strength, and 
are legal and economic anachronisms almost solely 
dependent upon Defense Department largesse". 11
It seems likely that, to a greater or lesser extent, the same 
can be said of the British independent airlines during the 1950s. 
Without indirect Government support the private sector would have 
experienced considerable difficulty in establishing an important 
position for itself in the UK air transport industry, despite large- 
scale backing from shipping companies. Such a policy had the special 
attraction of helping the Independents without significantly affecting 
the nationalised Corporations. Trooping was rarely referred to, of 
course, as a meads of supporting the private operators. The justific­
ation was always economic, as in the evidence of Sir James Barnes, 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Air Ministry, to a House 
of Commons' Committee:
"The basic reason (for air trooping) was the need to 
build up a substantial reserve of air transport resources. 
For example, when the Berlin air lift ceased, the charter 
companies were threatened with a very serious lack of 
business. It is also true that the cost of maintaining an 
air transport reserve of this character in the RAF would 
be very much greater than the arrangements we are now 
undertaking. What we have done is to take existing air 
transport capacity which, without wasting additional 
capital because it is already there, enables us to in­
dulge in the experiments which we are now undertaking." 12
But trooping must really be regarded as a type of 'subsidy', at least
to the extent that the Independents received a monopoly of a
particular field of remunerative work, which otherwise they almost
certainly would not have done. In other words, the justification
for the introduction of large-scale air trooping was based squarelyt
11. Ibid., p.98.
12. Committee of Public Accounts, 1951/52, Evidence, p. 3^8.
on a combination of economic, political and strategic factors, 
although the decision to employ only the Independents was primarily 
a political one. There is no reason to suppose that the Corporations 
would not have been willing to take part in what was clearly at this 
time a profitable area of activity.
Air v. Sea Trooping
By 1951 a total of 21 ships with a combined tonnage of 20*t,000
gross tons were engaged in trooping operations, 16 owned by the
Government and five chartered from private companies. Towards the
end of the same year it was estimated that future overseas military
commitments would require a trooping fleet of 13 ships. Over the
years, except during emergencies, this number was gradually reduced,
so that by early i960 the last of the government-owned vessels on
long sea voyages was withdrawn. This left five chartered ships, plus
three publicly-owned troopships operating between Harwich and trie
13Hook of Holland, a combined tonnage of 92,000 gross tons. The use
of troopships was finally discontinued in 1962. Tables S.2 and 8.3
give an indication of the size and time-scale of the transference of
trooping operations from the sea to the air. By the mid-1960s only
three classes of passengers were permitted to travel by sea ; civilians
employed by the Services, the families of Servicemen and senior
I kofficers of the equivalent rank of Major-General and above.
l*i
13 Select Committee on Estimates: ’Trooping 
Ibid.: ’The Movement of Service Personnel
, 19 6 1/6 2, Evic’on ce , p.1, 
and Stores’ , 3.966/OV, nnraw *  j .' r  '»
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Table 8.2: VOLUME OF TROO PING MOVEMENTS BY SEA AND AIR,
SELECTED YEARS , (000’s)
Sea Air Total
1950/51 423 18.5 441.5
1 9 5 V 5 5 6l6 1 7 2 . 5 788.5
1958/59 323.5 1 3 6 . 5 460
1959/60 298.5 134.5 433
19 6 0 /6 1 225 174 399
19 6 1/ 6 2 115 284 * 399
1965/66 5.5 - -
* = Estimated. Nb. these 
with those in table
figures are not 
8 . 1
strictly comparable
Sources : Select Committee 
Evidence, p.19;
on Estimates: ’Trooping’, 1961/62 , 
Ibid: ’The Movement of Service Persomi
and Stores’, 19 6 6/67, para.44.
Table 8.3: EXPENDITURE ON TROOPSHIPS, COMM;e b c i a l  s e a  p a s s a g e s
AND CHARTERED TROOPING AIRCRAFT SELECTED YEARS, (£000
S©s Air Total
1954/55 10 ,5 6 0 4,549 15,109
I958/59 7,803 5,574 13,377
1959/60 7,555 3,966 1 1 , 5 2 1
I96O/6I 5,694 4,320 10,o4l
19 6 1/ 6 2 4,565 5,478* 10,043
I965/66 1 ,0 2 6 ■- ««*. *"
* = Estimated
Sources: as for Table 8.2
The main public .justification for the increased use of air 
transport was that it saved both money and time and reduced the number 
of people in the 'pipeline' at any given moment. There was, however, 
some disagreement over exactly when the possible financial savings first 
became evident. An Air Ministry witness told the Select Committee on 
Estimates that the cost of air passages became generally less than that of se 
passages about 195^/55« A Treasury witness, on the other hand, argued that 
there was no real turning point, but "the last and most noteable stage" in 
the cheapening of air trooping came with the introduction of Britannia
15aircraft in May, 1959. In fact, as early as 1952 the Secretary of
State for Air had claimed that it cost less to fly a Serviceman to
the Middle East than to send him by ship.^ Similarly, Sir James Barnes
told the Committee of Public Accounts in the same year: "...I have
satisfied myself that in each cose they (i.e. air charters as distinct
from troopships) are actually cheaper as conditions are now without
taking account of the saving of time." Nevertheless, by 1961 there
was absolutely no doubt about the financial and operational advantages
«
of air trooping, as can be judged from Table 8.*!.
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15. Ibid., 'Trooping*, 19 6 1/62, para.8 .
16. 'Flight*, 5/12/52, p.692.
17. Op.cit., p.5^3.
Table 8.h C O M P A R I S O N  O F  C O S T S  A N D  T I M I N G  O F  S E A  AMI)
AIR T R O O P I N G ,  1960/61
1 9 0 *
Route
(UK...)
Approximate cost per passenger (£) ,Journey durotion (da
Air Charter 
(all categories 
of personnel)
Troopship 
(Uniform­
ed person 
nel)
(Adult
family
members)
Air
Charter
Troopship
Gibraltar a 2.7a 1.2a-2a 1 h
Malta b h.1b 1.7b-2.7b 1 8
Cyprus c 3.he l.Ac~2.3c 1 11
Aden d 2.5d 1.5d-2.9d 1 1h
Singapore e 2.1e 1,5e-2.he 1 23
letters substituted for confidential actual figures.
cost per passenger by chartered aircraft includes the 
estimated cost of separate transportation of unaccompan­
ied .baggage.
costs pc-r passenger by troopship exclude the normal cost 
of messing for uniformed personnel and the cost of food 
for family members (which is recovered from latter group),
troopship passages for children are charged at % to 
the adult rate according to age.
Source: Select Committee on Estimates: »Trooping*, 1961/62,
Evidence, p.22.
The disagreement' over the time-scale of the relative cheapening 
of air trooping probably stems primarily from the fact that there 
are two ways of costing troopship operations. During the early 1990s 
it was thought vital, from a strategic point, of view,. to maintain 
a sizeable troopship fleet. Once this had been accepted as a »fait 
accompli* it made sense to use the. 'vessels rather than charter air­
craft to carry troops. In other words, although the real, cost of 
trooping by air was considerably less than sea trooping, the marginal
Notes: (i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
cost of the latter, once the ships had been paid for, was less than
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the cost of chartering aircraft. It was only with the decline in 
the envisaged strategic importance of such a reserve fleet, or the 
growing realisation that aircraft would in future be of more signifi­
cance than surface vessels, that air trooping was able to take over on 
a large scale. As a memorandum from the Treasury put it: "So long 
as it is necessary to keep some troopships to meet possible operational 
requirements, it is obviously desirable to make the maximum use of 
them for normal trooping movements."^ A similar type of argument 
was to be used when trooping operations were transferred from the 
airlines to RAF Transport Command.
Di -'-'.enchantment:
Despite their obvious usefulness for the independent operators, 
trooping contracts also brought problems, and it was not long before 
the airlines were complaining to the Government and seeking relief.
The two principal drawbacks were the short duration and low revenue 
yield of most trooping agreements, both of which meant that it was 
often extremely difficult for the smaller companies to raise sufficient 
capital to purchase more modern, and therefore more efficient, aircraft.
This point was strongly emphasised in the report of a civil aviation 
committee formed in April, 19571 by the Air League of the British 
Empire under the chairmanship of Sir Miles Thomas*
"The question of low yield from the business conducted 
by the independent companies is a dominant factor in their 
present situation. This, coupled with the insecurity of tenure
18. Select Committee on Estimates, op.cit. Evidence, p.?6.
resulting from the extremely short term of the contracts 
granted by the Government..., has prevented them from 
obtaining the finance necessary to re-equip their fleets. 
These at present consist almost entirely of obsolescent 
aircraft. Indeed, so meag re is the return from the 
principal source of the independents' revenue that the 
committee find it difficult to believe that the majority 
of these companies can continue to operate indefinitely 
on their present basis of earnings." 19
Table 8.5 : S O U R C E S  C F  T H E  I N D E P E N D E N T S 1 REVENUE, 1955/96
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Type of 
Service
Load ton- Estimated typical 
miles (millions) revenue rate per
ton-mile (d.)
Total
load revenue (£m)
Trooping 53.8 30 6.725
Charter and
Contract 35.3 36 5. 300
Colonial Coach 6.1 45 1.145
Normal Inter-
national fiched-
uled Services 6.4 62 I .6 50
Vehicle-Ferry 4.6 42 0 .8 0 5
Domestic Sched
uled Services 3.1 0 .70 0
Inclusive-Tours 2.5 35 A '/ C. r.W.yop
Total Traffic
Revenue arrroximately f.l? million
Source; *Fli,ght», 6/12/57» p.868.
To deal first with the question of low revenue yield, Table 8.5
would certainly appear to support the view of the Air League's
committee. In terms of revenue per load ton-mile trooping yielded
1 9 . The Air League of the British Empire; 'The Future of British 
Air Trans;ort1, 1957» p.11»
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the lov/est return of any of the Independents' activities. In 
addition, the charter companies' average revenue rate at approximately 
J6d per load ton-mile was already depressed compared with that of 
. other airlines (the corresponding figures for BEA and BOAC were 64d,
and 62d. respectively). But at the same time it rust be remembered
that trooping was a particularly low cost operation for the reasons 
already stated, so that low revenue yields were not necessarily 
synonymous with low profitability. In any case, there was little 
that the Government could be expected to do, assuming that, apart 
from the strategic implications, one of its prime objectives was 
to obtain the best value possible for the taxpayers' money. If there 
was a problem it was mainly the result of the highly competitive 
environment in which the airlines operated.
The argument that most contracts were of too short duration to 
give companies the security they needed to purchase expensive r.ew 
aircraft appears to be more valid. For most of the 1550s contracts 
were usually awarded for a period of one year, with a customary (and 
invariably exercisedJ '‘option of a further year. The Independents 
pointed out as early as 1952 that the Government was more than will­
ing to award ten-yeer operating contracts to the owners of two new
21troopships then under construction. There w a s , of course, a 
considerable difference-between the capital cost of a new ship 
and that of a second-hand aircraft, but this did not stop- the com­
plaints from the private airlines, which gradually gathered momentum
20. ’Flight', 6/18/57, p. 868.
21. Ibid., 10/10/52, p. h ? 6 .
1 9 ^
over the following years. The Government was certainly aware of 
the problem, and indeed by the early 19o0s the average contract 
length had been extended somewhat to almost three years. From the 
Government’s point of view, however, the advantages of short-term 
contracts were simply too great to be given up to please the 
Independents. The Estimates Committee reported in 1961/62:
"Your Committee would not expect any economy to 
result from committing the Air Ministry to longer 
contracts in the present state of the market. The 
Treasury do not expect any difficulty in obtaining 
tenders for contracts of the present length, and Your 
Committee consider that longer contracts would offer 
no financial advantage and would curb the freedom of 
the Air Ministry to make new arrangements to meet the 
changing requirements of the Service departments." 22
The Government was not, therefore, prepared to come to the 
Independents’ help by awarding longer contracts. But it was 
sufficiently concerned to attempt to help them more directly in 
obtaining modern equipment, if only because the lower operating 
costs of stich aircraft would inevitably reduce the overall cost of 
trooping. Consequently, in 1955 three Britannias were ordered for 
delivery in 1957/5 8 , with the intention of eventually handing them 
over to the charter companies. Once the advantages in operating 
aircraft of this type became evident, it was argued, the airlines 
would experience less difficulty in raising the necessary finance. 
Tenders were called for in 1957» with the option of buying the 
Britannias and obtaining a five-year contract or leasing them under 
a three-year agreement. The tenders against purchase were in fact 
very poor, but on the basis of leasing it was estimated that some 
£1.5 million would be saved annually on the Far East service alone 
compared with the previous Hermes contracts. Thus, the Government's 
action in placing orders for the Britannias appeared to.be Justified.
22. Op.cit., para.21.
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Unfortunately, despite previous complaints about the difficulty
of raising sufficient capital, a few of the larger Independents had
in fact purchased modern equipment. Two or three of these companies
on their own initiative quoted for the contracts on the basis of
using their own aircraft, and this resulted in the saving of an
23estimated additional £250,000 on the routes in question. For 
example, the Far East trooping contract was awarded to Hunting-Clan, 
whose principal shareholder, British and Commonwealth Shipping, 
had bought two Britannias primarily for trooping work. Similarly, 
Transair obtained the Mediterranean contract because it had previously
2 kordered two Viscounts as a "calculated risk." "Since then we have
not really been frightfully attracted by the idea of buying aircraft
25for contractors to buy off us or hire off us."
The Corporations Demand A Share
By the early 1960s the number of airlines engaged in trooping 
had shrunk dramatically, mainly as a 'result of the mergers that had 
taken place in the industry and the run-down of British overseas 
military bases. There were only three major contractors by 1 9 0 1 / 6 2 :
Contract Operator
UK-Singapore/Hong Kong BUA •
UK-Aden/Nairobi/Cyprus BUA
Aircraft
Britannia
Britannia
UK-Gibraltar/Malta/
North Africa Cunard Eagle
Medair (within the
. Mediterranean area) Cunard Eagle
UK-North Vest Europe Silver City
23. Ibid.: »The Movement of Service Personnel an. 
Evidence, Q.1225*. ■,
2 k .  »Flight», Z k / k / 5 0 ,  p. and 5/7/57, p. 29.
25» B. Hum}hrey-Davies, Assistant Under Secretary 
Select Committee on'Estimates, op.cit.
26. Ibid. »Trooping», 1961/62, Evidence, p.23. ,
DC-6
. Viking,,
: lier  mes 26
“¿tores', 1966/67,
of State (Supply) 5
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An important development at this time was the introduction of air
trooping to Germany. A trial one-year contract was awarded to
Silver City in September, i960, involving about 50 flights (3*500
27passengers) a month in each direction. ' It is interesting to
note the way in which Silver City worked out its tender for this
contract. According to the airline’s chairman:
' "the price at which we tendered for this particular
contract v/as unduly depressed because in fact we had 
these aircraft as a residual of the past and we quoted 
a price which in fact did not contain any element of 
depreciation of the aircraft because we had no use for 
them sufficient to occupy the time." 28
This type of marginal, pricing was becoming more and more common 
in tendering for trooping work and was mainly responsible for the 
depressed, and worsening, revenue rates. The initial German experi­
ment was successful and the following year a contract for the
carriage of 11,000 passengers a month, using Viscount aircraft, was 
2°>awarded to BUA. " This finally marked the end of sea trooping on 
a large scale.
The exclusion of.the nationalised airlines from trooping work «1
on the grounds that they had a near-monopoly of scheduled services 
could not be maintained after the passing of the i960 Civil Aviation 
(Licensing) Act. In fact, the Corporationshad for some time parti­
cipated in small-scale ’ad hoc’ trooping operations that were normally
. 3 0arranged at short notice. But they wanted permission to carry 
large numbers of Servicemen and their families on scheduled services 
at reduced fares and to apply for long-term trooping contracts. At 
first the Government procrastinated and then referred the Corporation’s 
application to the Air Transport Licensing Board. The ATLB eventually
27. ’Flight’, 23/9/60, p.522.
28. Select Committee on Estimates, op.cit., p,58. .
29. ’Flight’, 13/7/61,p.6?5 ’Aeroplane’, 5/10/61, p.Mi?,
30. Such work accounted for about 5/ of the total air trooping 
activity by 1963. * Flight' , V V 6 3 *  P* ^56-*?.
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reported that it felt itself unable "to come to any conclusion or to
31make any recommendations." In other words, the problem was
rapidly dispatched back to its rightful place with the Government.
Finally, in November, 196*4 , the new Labour Minister of Aviation
32announced that the State airlines' request was tote granted.
Both the Government and the Independents probably expected 
BOAC and BEA to move into charter trooping on a fairly large scale. 
Indeed, the Ministry of Defence admitted that it would welcome tenders 
from new entrants into the field, since by then the contracts were 
shared by just two airlines. But it later emerged that this was not 
what the Corporations had in mind at all. They were far more inter­
ested in filling up their empty scheduled service seats than in 
bidding for long-term charter contracts. BOAC stated that it "had 
no surplus aircraft for charters", while BSA similarly argued that
it did not want to expand its existing fleet for Service charter 
33work. In addition, the rates quoted for seats on scheduled services 
were not sufficiently competitive, with the result that the national­
ised airlines failed to make any noteable impact in the area of 
trooping. In the first full year of the new scheme's operation, for 
example, BEA carried only ?33 Service passengers at rebated fares, and 
total revenue earned barely exceeded £3,000. Thus, the Independents 
on the whole maintained their monopoly of trooping work.
The RAF takes over '
The RIF, like the nationalised airlines, had always carried a 
small proportion of trooping traffic, amounting to some k - 6 %  of the 
total by the beginning of the 1960s, The Independents had been
31. Ibid., 26/9/63, p. 332.
32. Select Committee on Estimates; 
Personnel and Stores', 1966/67,
'The Movement of Service 
para. 1 3 .
33. Ibid., para. 1*4.
3*. IBid., r: ra 1 6 . •
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worried for some time about the consequences of a possible 
increase in this percentage. As early as December, 1957* the head 
of one airline mentioned in a speech that he viewed "with apprehen­
sion" the large expansion of Transport Command that would take place
not until the mid-1960s that the RAF began to carry a major part 
of the traffic. In evidence to the Estimates Committee in 1961 
the Air Ministry stated that it had carried out a study of the 
comparative costs of making increased use for purely routine logistic 
purposes (i,e. trooping and/or freighting) of the KAF's Britannia 
units or of obtaining the same airlift capacity by chartering civil 
aircraft. The study concluded that charters were in fact more 
economical . J
Nevertheless, the Select Committee recommended "that when the
strength of Transport Command is increased, a higher proportion
of its effortsthan at present should be devoted to trooping or 
37•freighting." There was indeed a partial move xn this direction,
particularly following the order for five VC-lOs for the RAF in
1961. By early 1963 Transport Command had already taken over the
UK-Gibraltar/Malta services from Cunard Eagle, It appears that
at least BUA, who earned some £4 million annually, 55/ of its total
revenue, from trooping operations, saw the writing on the wall. The
airline withdrew from one contract in order to use its VC-lOs,
♦
previously employed on trooping for a while, on the new South 
American routes. BUA chairman, Sir Myles Wyatt, commented in 196*»:
35with the introduction of 13 new Britannia aircraft. But it was
"Trooping as a cut-price enterprise has been success.' 
ful, but for a long time it has been a decreasing propor 
tion of our business and we should like to decrease the 
proportion still further." 39 .
35. »Flight», 20/12/5?, p.969? the numhe 
56. 'Trooping', 1961/62, Evidence, p.$'6. 
3?. Ibid.', para.26.
38. »Flight», 4/4/63» P» 456-7. ;
r was later 3 ncreased t,o 20,
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By the time that the Estimates Committee again investigated trooping,
.¿40in 1966/67, the RAF's share had risen to Y$/°, but this still left the 
operation as a whole very much in the hands of the civil airlines. The 
Ministry of Defence informed the Committee that it had established a 
Working Party to investigate whether Transport Command should undertake 
a larger proportion of the task. The conclusion reached was that a 
considerable expansion in air trooping by the RAF was indeed desirable, 
so that the charter airlines would be excluded from virtually all 
Service movements except those to Germany and of those to the Far East.
The estimated net saving that would result from the increased use of 
Transport Command in this way over the nine-year period, 1968/69 to 19?6/77,
¿1 <1
v/ould amount to f/i, tlO ,000.
Unfortunately, as the Select Committee pointed out, the Ministry's
costing was defective in many respects. For example, it was based on the
premise that virtually all the costs incurred by Transport Command for
trooping would be incurred in any case, whether the actual trooping took
place or not, which is difficult to accept. Similarly, no mention was
> *
made of depreciation of the capital represented by the 1^ new RAF 
VC-lOs, nor of any increased maintenance or servicing costs as the air­
craft get older. Finally» no allowance was made for a reduction in charter
If 2costs in future years, as had consistently happened up till then. • The
Committee was, therefore, highly critical of the Ministry of Defence's study:
"...the decision largely to abandon trooping by charter 
in favour of Transport Command was of an order of magnitude 
too great to undertake without a study of all the relevant 
consequences and the full costing of Transport Command's 
operations should have been an important factor in this study." k j
Trooping, however, was not the only activity that was being transferred; 
air freighting for the Services was also gradually taken
^0. 'The Movement of Service Personnel and Stores', 1966/67, para. 10. 
k ' i . Ibidi , -paras. 2k and Jl, h p . Ibid., paras. 3'A~3ii* •
A3. Ibid., para.36.
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away from the Independents, especially after the introduction of 
the RAF's new Belfast aircraft. The value of such air freight to 
the charter companies fell from £ 2 ,957,000 in 1965/66 to an estimated 
£2,^51,000 in 1966/67, while the RAF's share rose from £2,033,000 to
. 44£3,124,000 during the same year. Thus, in complete contrast 
to the previous report on trooping, the Estimates Committee 
recommended;
"that in considering the future ordering of aircraft 
for Transport Command... the possibility of making 
more use of the civil capacity of the charter companies 
and the Air Corporations, and of including them in 
future contingency plans, should be examined much more 
closely than hitherto." 45
So far the impression has been given that economic evaluation 
played an important part in determining whether or not to expand 
Transport Command. The reality, however, is rather different. The 
decision to cut-back on the use of civil airlines may have reflected 
the changing strategy of defence planners; increased emphasis was 
.placed on the mobility of a UK-based military force rather than on 
overseas bases. It may have been felt that the need to transport 
such a force rapidly to trouble spots necessitated the expansion 
of the RAF's long-haul capacity. Equally, the fact that the 
Independents were now in a much stronger position, especially with 
the growth of their scheduled services and inclusive-tour charters, 
may have been taken into account. But it seems likely that a further 
factor was also of some importance, even if its relevance is not at 
first obvious, namely the decision by the Government to encourage 
BOAC to buy VC-10 aircraft. To see why there might be a connection 
it is necessary to look at the sorry history of this purchase in a 
little more detail.
44. Ibid., paras. 49-50; the value of Transport Command’s airlift 
was calculated in terms of the money saved by not forwarding 
freight by charter.
45. Ibid,, para.42.
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In the late-1950s BOAC was faced with the problem of 
buying a fleet of long-haul jet aircraft to maintain its compet­
itive position. It was permitted by the Government to purchase 
15 Boeing 707s (later increased to 20) for the North Atlantic 
routes, but was w a r n e d  that all future equipment must be British. 
Consequently, BOAC entered into negotiations with Vickers concerning 
the possible purchase of the proposed VC-10 aircraft for its non- 
Atlantic services. The Corporation envisaged a short-term require­
ment for about 25 VC-lOs, plus an option on a further ten. This,
however, was not sufficient for Vickers, who estimated that the
, ll-6break-even figure would be tit least A5 . The result of the 
negotiations was that in April, 1957» BOAC announced that it had 
placed orders for 55 VC-lOs, plus options on a further ten air­
craft, despite the fact that the decision was widely believed in
the industry to reflect a highly optimistic forecast of future 
k otraffic trends.
The Corporation did not want to even consider the possibility
of converting the ten opticus into firm orders until at least 
August, 1962. In January, i960, however, Vickers informed the 
airline that the financial -position concerning the VC-10 was serious 
enough to jeopardise the whole project. The contract would only be 
continued with if the ten options were taken-up immediately. These 
ten aircraft were to be ’Super' VC-10s', a larger version of the 
’Standard' VC-10 capable of crossing the Atlantic. There were 
undoubtedly two pressures operating on BOAC.’s management at this 
time. The one was a fear within the airline that the situation 
which resulted from the Comet -disasters in the .mid-1950s*, when, the 
Corporation, suddenly, found itself drastically short, of 'capacity, 
would re-occur. The other came from the.Government, which at the *
A6. Select Committee on Nationalised Industries; 'BOAC, -1963/«^.♦ P * 1.7-« 
A?* Bee, for example, 'Flight', 7/5/57» ==?
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time was actively engaged in promoting rationalisation within
the UK aircraft industry, and in particular the formation of the
British Aircraft Corporation (BAC), which was to include Vickers'
aircraft-manufacturing subsidiary. In the event, BOAC did place
orders, in June, i960, for ten Super VC-10s; the contract was
later modified to 30 Super and 12 Standard aircraft to keep the
¿18cost with the Treasury's capital authority.
With the appointment of Sir Giles Guthrie as chairmen of EOAC
a thorough review of capacity requirements was undertaken. By then
it had become blatantly clear that too many aircraft had been
ordered. Guthrie estimated that in the foreseeable future the
Corporation would need a fleet of 39 long-haul jets, instead of the
62 currently in service or on order (20 707s, 12 Standard VC-10s,
and 30 Super VC-10s). He wanted to cancel the Super VC-10s and
order immediately a further six Boeing 707s. This, however, proved
unacceptable to the Government. Instead, BCAC was told to take 17
‘Super VC-lOs. To compensate 3AC three more Super YC-lOs were
A 9ordered for the RAF. The connection, therefore.between this
purchase for the RAF and BOAC s cancellation is indisputable. But
* *
■this was the third order placed for VC-10s for Transport Command 
since 1 9 6 1» the previous two instalments being for five and seven 
Standard aircraft. Although difficult to prove categorically, in 
view of the pressure exerted on BOAC to buy the aircraft, the 
financial positions of Vickers and BAC and the desire on the part of 
the Government to see the BAC merger succeed, it seems highly un­
likely that the RAF's orders were placed on purely economic grounds. 
Despite previous purchases of Britannias and Comets, thè addition of
48. Select Committee on Nationalised Industries, op.cit., p.21-22.
49. Hansard, op.cit., 20/7/64, voi. 699, cols, 39-49.
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VC-lOs to Transport Command's fleet was in fact a major departure 
from the role it had been performing since the war. For once those 
aircraft had been ordered, work had to be found for them, which 
could only mean an increase in the RAF's trooping activities, and 
a reduction in that of the Independents. As the Select Committee 
on Estimates remarked:
"It is now unfortunately too late for any change in 
the Ministry's plan to expand Transport Command to be 
made. In a sense it was already too late for any other 
system of trooping to be adopted once the decision was 
taken to buy the new VC-10 for the Services in the 
numbers then fixed, since some peace-time use for a 
proportion of the new aircraft's flying time had to be 
found." 50
Recent Developments:
By 1966/67 the main trooping contracts and contractors were
follows:
Contract Operator Aircraft
UK-Singapore/Hong Kong British Eagle •Britannia
UK-Bahrein/Aden BUA VC-10
UK-Malta/North Africa
and Medair British Eagle Viscount
UK-North West Europe BUA Viscount/:
51.
With BUA gradually withdrawing from trooping, Eagle was left as the 
major operator in the field, until the RAF took over. On its long- 
haul trooping commitments, Eagle employed six or seven Britannia's, 
plus one or two reserve aircraft kept for 'ad hoc' requirements, To 
give come idea of the relative size of these contracts, .British Eagle 
was carrying some 800 passengers per week between the UK and
Singapore, compared with B O A C s  eight scheduled jets each week to
50. Op.cit., para,41.
51* Ibid., Evidence, p.1.
52 Butthe Far East with a total capacity of about 1 ,0 0 0  seats, 
despite their size, trooping contracts were no longer a profitable 
source of business. The Edwards Committee noted:
"The history of competitive bidding for trooping 
contracts does not appear to have been entirely ha 
and we understand that the past rates for this tra 
were forced down to levels which various witnesses 
have said were uneconomically low. It is not surprise 
therefore, that trooping operations have contributed 
very little to the profitability of the independent 
airlines." 53
The' RAF eventually took over responsiblity for most trooping 
operations, so that to-day only two contracts remain. The largest 
of these is the UK-Germany agreement, from which RUA withdrew in 
1969 on grounds of unprofitability. Britannia tendered success­
fully for the £ 1 . 5  million contract, involving approximately 2,000
5/+
hours of Boeing 737 mid-week flying per annum, and claims to be 0 
erating the service profitably. The other contract is held by 
Monarch and consists of one Britannia flight per fortnight (about
2,000 hours a year) to Australia. Trooping accounts for some 9/ 
of Monarch's output and is clearly only profitable if priced on a 
marginal basis.
5 2 . Ibid., Os 301,30b and 3 5 5 »
5 3 - p.2 2 .
♦Flight», 17/ V 69, p. 618 .
Mj 
'
In conclusion, therefore, trooping was a major factor in the 
post-war growth of the Independents, probably as important in the 
1950s and early 19SCs as inclusive-tours have become today. The 
transference of trooping from the sea to the air and the use of the 
airlines rather than the RAF were primarily matters of cost, 
although political and strategic factors also played a part. But 
the exclusion of the Corporations was quite simply a political 
decision of some importance. There appears to be some evidence to 
suggest that it was an indirect means of supporting the private 
sector in order to provide competition for the nationalised air­
lines and a strategic reserve in case of military emergencies. In 
other words, the evaluation of the economic factors involved v/as 
..of. o.nly J.imited .importance.,.....This. is., equally true of the .decision . 
to expand Transport Command in the 19o0s and deprive the Independent 
of most of their trooping work. By then, however, the private 
carriers had a much stronger base on which to build, partly as a 
result of the I960 Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act, but probably 
mainly because of the growth of inclusive-tours and affinity- 
group charters. To a large extent the carriage of passengers in 
sun-hats has replaced those in khaki. Although the Independents 
still engage in trooping, its relative importance is minimal. Two 
points seem to stand out from this examination of trooping services. 
The first is the very low level of control the airlines appeared 
to have over their own environment. They were really only pawns 
in a political game of chess, which reflects the extent of political 
interference in the air transport industry. Secondly, given the 
economics of charter airline operation, the inevitable result of an 
over-competitive market was to reduce trooping to a marginal 
exercise. There are clearly potential dangers inherent in such a 
situation, especially when the marginally-costed work accounts for 
a large proportion of the output of a company or industry.
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Chapter IX
VEHICLE AIR-FERRIES
One of the more unusual aspects of the post-war development 
of the independent airlines has been the rapid growth and eventual 
decline of the cross-Channel vehicle air-ferries. The companies 
that pioneered car-ferry services operated almost on the periphery 
of UK air transport, discovering and exploiting a highly specialised 
corner of the total market. But the development of such airlines 
forms an important episode in the expansion of the private sector 
of the industry and is therefore relevent to any discussion of the 
overall stability of the Independents.
The early history of the cross-Channel vehicle air-ferries 
revolves very much around the airline Silver City Airways, founded 
in 19^6 by an Australian mining group, based at the 'Silver City' 
of Broken Hill, to provide essential transport services while the 
world's airlines were being reorganised. A UK company, British 
Aviation Services (Britvia), initially appointed to manage the new
A
airline, purchased Silver City's entire shareholding in 19^6«
Britavia itself had been formed in 19-:5 to act as technical advisor 
to the British Aviation Insurance Company, and prior to absorbing 
Silver City had been primarily engaged in the ferrying of DC~3s from
PEurope to Canada for refitting by Canadair. On July l^th, 19^8, 
Silver City inaugurated, as an experiment, the world's first vehicle 
air-ferry between Lympne and Le Touquet, using a Bristol 170 Freighter 
on hire from the manufacturers. The service had to be operated 
initially strictly on a charter basis, as the Independents were not 
yet allowed to rur. scheduled services. The two terminal airports
1. Davies: 'A History of the World's Airlines', 196^, *
2. 'Aeroplane', 7 A V /j.?, p.168-9.
207
were chosen because' they offered the shortest possible air link 
between England and France, the air journey taking only some 25 
minutes. The company charged £27 single for a medium-sized car 
and four passengers. This was considerably higher than by surface 
transport, but the sea-ferries were experiencing difficulties in
coping with the increased post-war demand for travel and were fully
3
booked for long periods in advance.
During the ten-week experiment 170 cars were carried across 
the Channel, sufficient to persuade Silver City to repeat the service 
the following year. By then, however, Government policy towards the 
Independents had changed and Silver City became one of the initial 
nine charter companies to sign an 'associate agreement' with BBA 
and receive a one-year licence to operate a scheduled service. Once 
established on a regular basis cross-Channel air-ferry services went 
from strength to strength. During 19^9* the first full year of 
operations, 2,600 cars and 7*900 passengers were carried. By 1955 
the number of cars carried had risen to over A-2 ,5 0 0 and the number 
of passengers to some 166,000 (see Table 9*1) • The airline's licence 
was renewed at the end of 19^9» this time for a two-year period. By 
1951 eight Bristol Freighters were employed on the Lympne-Be Touquet 
route during peak week-ends, and for the first time the service was 
continued throughout the winter. In March, 1951* Silver City gained 
the security that most of the privately-owned carriers had been 
demanding for some time with the award of a five-year licence. Follow*
ing the electoral victory of the Conservatives later the same year
hthe licence was extended to cover a ten-year period. In fact, 
vehicle-ferry services v/ere exactly the type of activity that by the 
early 1950s both the Labour and Conservative Parties saw as most 
suitable for the Independents. Tney required the kind or hrguly 5
5. Daviest op.cit.,p. 31^— 5*
Tue limes Keview of Industry* 'Cross-Channel Air Ferries', 1955 *
specialised equipment and knowledge that BEA did not possess, or 
indeed appeared to be very interested in acquiring. This probably 
explains v/hy vehicle-ferry operations managed to remain relatively 
immune to the political arguments that inevitably arose whenever a 
private airline attempted to enter a scheduled service market 
where the State Corporations held a monopoly; hence, the unusually 
long periods covered by Silver City’s licences.
The success of the Lympne-Le Touquet service resulted in the 
development of further routes, so that by the beginning of the 
1955 holiday season a total of seven routes to the Continent were 
in operation; Ferryfield to Le Touquet, Calais and Ostend; 
Southampton to Cherbourg and Deauville; Gatwick to Le Touquet; and 
Birmingham to Le Touquet. In audition, two services were run to 
Northern Ireland. To operate this network Silver City had 15 car-
5carrying aircraft, including nine Bristol Kk.32 'Superfreighters'. 
The Kk 32s, costing almost £100,000 each, were larger versions of 
the Bristol 170, capable of carrying three instead of two medium­
sized cars and eight extra passengers. It was estimated that the 
replacement of a 1?0 with a Mk.32 would result in a 35% rise in 
revenue per hour compared with an increase in total costs of only 
about half that amount. During 1955 Silver City also experimented
with the use of a Breguet 'Deux Fonts' which carried six cars, three
6on each deck. As we shall see, the economic viability of vehicle- 
ferry operations depends to a very great extent on the use of the 
right type of aircraft, probably more so than with most other types 
of air service.
During the first two or three years vehicle-ferry services 
operated at a considerable deficit, but they eventually proved to 
be a fairly profitable undertaking. Silver City recorded a net 6
208.
3. Ibid.
6. 'Aeroplane', *t/?/52i p.23-** and 5/7/55$ p*28.
profit after taxation of £48,478 in 1951, and a further £35,094
7the following year. The airline's main operating base, Lyrnpne,
rapidly became unsuitable because of congestion, poor facilities
and high landing fees. Consequently, In 1954 the company opened
its own airfield at Lydd (renamed Ferryfield), built at a cost of
£500,000.^ Ferryfield soon became one of the most important, if
least well-known, British airports. During August, 1955« for example
it handled 5 8 % of the total freight passing through UK airports,
five-times the amount handled by Heathrow (13,262 tons against
Heathrow's 2,712 tons), almost entirely a reflection of Silver
City's vehicle traffic. At this time the Independent claimed to
be the largest air cargo carrier in the non~Comrr.unist world, in terms
of freight uplifted, (although not, of course, in terms of ton-miles
performed). Also in 1955 Silver City received the Cumberbatch
Trophy "for magnificent work on the cross-Channel car-ferries." In
nearly eight years of operation the company had made mere than
1060,000 flights without injuring a single passenger. Such a rate
of expansion naturally required extensive financial support, and
in this respect also Silver City had been fortunate. Initially
Britavia had been owned by a group of insurance companies and by
.Cable and Wireless (Holdings) Ltd, In February, 1954, the General
Steam Navigation Company, a subsidiary of P and 0, purchased the
11insurance companies' shareholding. Thus, ample funds were 
presumably available for expansion.
209.
7. Ibid., 9/10/53» p. 525; not all of this profit was made on
vehicle-ferry operations; Silver City was also heavily involved 
in general charter work and later in normal scheduled services. 
The profit fall in 1952 reflected a decline in traffic, primarily
a result of a reduction in p e rso n a l travel allowance in 19 5 2 .*
8 . 'World Airline Record', 1965, p.257«
9. 'Aeroplane', 16/12/55, p. 959.
10. 'Flight', 18/7/58, p.79-83. Silver City’s first fatal accident 
in fact occurred in late 1 9 6 1 , after more than 2 5 ,0 0 0 cross- 
Channel flights. Ibid., 9/1V 6 1 ,  p.?48.
11. Ibid., 19/2/54, p, 198.
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There were, therefore, a number of factors of varying degrees
of importance behind the success of Silver City's vehicle-ferry
operations. The services obviously met a very real demand at a time
when the surface carriers were disorganised and unable to provide
sufficient capacity. Geographically Great Britain was well suited
to this type of activity, perhaps even almost unique (with the
possible exceptions of New Zealand and Scandinavia). Similarly,
the favourable publicity that resulted from an excellent safety
record (a very important factor among small airlines at this time)
and the ownership of its own airfield were advantageous to the
company. But undoubtedly of particular importance was the policy
of repeated fare reductions followed by Silver City. The cuts
announced in January, 1955i for example, were the eighth in seven 
12years. Table 9,1 suggests a strong correlation between price
reductions and increased traffic, although other factors, of
course, also have to be taken into account. The growth in traffic
.carried was not only absolute; Silver City managed to increase its
share of total cross-Channel vehicle movements from 75* in 1952 to
2.0% in 1958. By the winter of 1953/5^ some air-ferry fares were
13below the corresponding sea fares.
12, Jbid., 7/1/55j P*27*
13. »Aeroplane«, 17/7/53, p.87, 6/3/59, p.289 and 11/1/5**, P*?2.
TABLE 9»1 • Vehicle Air-Ferry Operations by Silver 
City Airways, 1948-1957
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Cars Passengers
1948 17 0 350
1949 2 ,6 0 0 7,900
1950 3,253 10 ,8 0 0 fare reductions
1951 7,529 30,137 11 11
1952 6,896 28 ,8 36 travel allowance 
restrictions
1953 24,011 96,625 fare reductions
1954 30 ,966 1 1 2 ,2l4 11 1!
1955 42,589 1 6 6 ,2 1 9 Il II
1956 33,191 1 2 5 ,2 4 3 fares increased; competition 
from CAB
1957 3^,361 1 1 7 , 1 7 8 fare reductions
Source: 'Aer oplane', 1 1 /7/ 5 8 , p. 6 0, et.al.
Competition
-
In April, 1955, Silver City found its monopoly of cross-
Channel air- ferry services challenged when, after a six-week
trial the previous summer, Channel Air Bridge (CAB) began operations
between Southend and Calais. The new carrier, a subsidiary of Mr, 
Freddie Laker's Air Charter, proved to be an immediate success and 
diverted a large volume of traffic from Silver City. By 1958 CAB'S 
output had increased to some 15,COO cars per annum on three routes:
14
Southend to Calais, Ostend and Rotterdam. But entry into the 
vehicle-ferry market was not all plain sailing. In particular,
1 4 .Ibid., 4/3/55, p. 283 and 20/3/59, p.357.
CAB lacked the extensive financial backing enjoyed by Silver City 
and eventually Laker had to look around for further capital to 
finance continued expansion. Thus, in January, 1958, Airwork 
announced that it had "acquired a substantial interest in the air 
transport and engineering group of companies headed by F.A. Laker." ' 
With the financial support and lower overhead costs that resulted 
from being a member of a large group such as Airwork (and from 
I960, of course, BUA), Channel Air Bridge now found itself in a very 
strong position to challenge Silver City's supremacy on the cross- 
Channel routes.
This v/as far from the only problem that faced Silver City
at this time. A potentially even greater threat to its position
came from the resurgence of surface operators. As we have seem,
immediately after the war the sea-ferry companies had experienced
great difficulty in meeting the demand for cross-Channel vehicle
transport. But shortage of capacity was not their only failing.
Being primarily owned by railway companies, the sea-ferries were on
the whole conceived and developed as extensions of railway services
and as feeders to them. Thus, most passengers and cargo travelled
to and from the -ports by rail, usually by special boat trains* the
ports and services were never yeally designed to deal with road
16traffic. . In addition, at first all cars had to be winched aboard 
the ships, v/ith the exception of the small number that might be 
accommodated on the train-ferries. The air-ferry operat ors, there­
fore, enjoyed/¿Wsiderable advantage in terms of total journey 
time and convenience. But eventually the surface carriers began io 
re-orientate and improve their services. The first, 'drive-on drive-
1 5 . 'Flight', 31/1/55» p.157» Laker's other company, Aviation
Traders, was also experiencing financial difficulties, partly 
as a result of the failure of its new aircraft, 'The Accountant',
16. Whitworth; 'Some Impacts of Air and Road Transport on Railway
; Economics and Practices.' Journal of the Institute o f 'Trans-, ort.,
1959, P. 169.
17 Gradually,o f f  dock was opened at Dover in 1953i for example.
t h e  s h i p p i n g  c o m p a n i e s  b e c a m e  m o r e  c o m p e t i t i v e ,  reducing journey
times and lowering fares. Their services changed from the original
function as feeders to the railway network, and increasingly catered
for a rapidly growing traffic separate from a n d ,  to some e x t e n t ,
competitive with rail (and air).
I n c r e a s e d  c o m p e i t i t o n  f r o m  b o t h  C h a n n e l  A i r  B r i d g e  a n d  t h e
sea-ferry companies had a disastrous effect on Silver City. While
CAB appears to have remained profitable, its principal competitor's
f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  d e t e r i o r a t e d  m a r k e d l y ,  r e c o r d i n g  a  c u m u l a t i v e  loss
18of over £114,000 by 1959» Silver City had in effect become in­
volved in a type of 'vicious circle': in order to retain its share 
of the market in the face of more efficient competitors, the airline 
was forced to continue cutting fares, which only s e r v e d  to worsen its 
financial position; but not to have kept prices low would have 
meant the loss of even more traffic. Britavia's shareholders were 
apparently unable or unwilling to provide further capital. Certainly, 
P'and 0 had seen a poor return on its 1952 investment in Hermes 
aircraft for Silver City's passenger services. As a result, Britavia 
began negotiations with the British Transport Commission with a view 
to the latter purchasing a minority interest in the air-ferry
company. Unfortunately, an agreement failed to materialise, prob-
19
a b l y  m a i n l y  b e c a u s e  of B r i t i s h  k a i l ' s  o w n  f i n a n c i a l  difficulties. .•
Britavia continued in its attempt to obtain re-equipment'capital 
from other sources. Finally, in February, 1961, an agreement was reached 
with Silver City's French handling and sales agents, Campagnie Air
17. Clegg and Styring; 'British nationalised Shipping, 1947-1963', ,
1969» p.47; the drive-through t'erminal at Boulogne had been 
opened the previous year.
18 . ’Aeroplane*, 8/2/62, p.l43.
1 9 »'Flight', 15/ 1/60, p.90.
Transport, in which the French National Railways were major 
shareholders. The French company received permission to operate 
three Superfreighters in its own right on vehicle-ferry services 
from Le Touquet and Calais to Lydd and from Cherbourg to H u m .  In 
return, French National Railways agreed to build a two-mile railway 
spur into Le Touquet airport. This agreement did not actually pro­
vide any more capital. But it did make possible a marked expansion 
of Silver City's international passenger traffic. (The airline 
also operated a rail/air link between London and Paris, as well as 
carrying supplementary passengers on its car-ferries). This in turn 
might enable the company to postpone the introduction of new equip­
ment until it was in a sufficiently strong financial position to 
justify the expenditure to its shareholders. In addition, an
association with French National Railways might make more difficult
20any further plans of Channel Air Bridge for expansion into France. 
Silver City's weak position was reflected in the decisions of the 
Air Transport Licensing Board in November, 19&1, on the flood of 
applications from private carriers to operate scheduled services with­
in Europe. Silver City failed to obtain a single new licence for 
reasons that can be summarised by the Board's comments on its 
application for services to Marseilles and Genoa: "It did not 
appear to us that the applicant was willing to invest in the modern
aircraft which will undoubtedly be required if this route is to be
21operated successfully.”
In an attempt to improve the economics of vehicle-ferry opera­
tions and at the same time meet the growing threat from surface 
carriers, Channel Air Bridge announced in 1959 Flans to open 
several 'deep penetration' routes to the Continent* The following
20. Ibid., Z k / Z / 6 1 , p, 259*
21. 'The Economist', 2/12/61, p. 2^5-7*
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year licenses were obtained for services from Southend to Lyons,
Strasbourg, Düsseldorf and Bremen, and in 1962 services to Basle
2?and Geneva were inaugurated. The problem with the shorter routes,
exacerbated by increased competition, was that costs such as landing- 
fees and station charges accounted for an excessively high propor­
tion of revenue. The relatively short time actually spent in the air
also resulted in very low aircraft utilisation rates, averaging only
23some 1,000 hours per annum for a Bristol 170. Turn-round time
at Calais, for example, could be almost as long as the flight from 
Southend. The key to the successful operation of longer-distance 
routes was .again to be the use of more efficient and productive 
equipment. CAB's trump card was the introduction of a new aircraft, 
the Carvair (or ATL 98), a modified version of the DC-4. There were 
ample supplies of obsolescent DC-4s available, at about /20G,CC0 
each,and the conversions would be carried out by CAB's sister- 
company, Aviation Traders. The improved efficiency of the new air­
craft is reflected in the estimate that on a 330-mile round-trip 
the cost of using a Bristol Superfreighter would amount to approxim­
ately £175» compared with £200 for the Carvair. But the latter had 
half as much speed and carrying capacity again as the older aircraft!
2 ifin other words, productivity increased by almost 100^ Thus,
Channel Air Bridge's answer to the expansion of the surface carriers 
was to lessen the inherent economic disadvantages of the air-ferry 
operators by employing more efficient aircraft over longer distances.
CAB's plans only made Silver City's situation all the worse.
The latter's problems were solved, however, in January, 1962, with 
the formation of Air Holdings, a merger of the BUA group and Britavia,
22. 'World Airline Record*, op.cit.,p.256.
23. 'Aeroplane*, 19/6/59» P* 689. .
24. Ibid, j 'Flight', 4/1/62, p. 10-13.
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Channel Air Bridge amalgamated with Silver City to form a single
unit within Air Holdings, known as British United Air Ferries ( B U A F ) ,
with a monopoly of cross-Channel vehicle air-ferry services. This
monopoly was temporarily challenged in January, 196*1,when Air Ferry
received licences to operate from Manston to Le Touquet and Ostend
and from Belfast to Le Touquet. But in Hay of the same year Air
Holdings purchased Le Hoy Tours, Air Ferry’s parent company, so
25restoring BUAF's monopoly. This monopolistic position enabled
BUAF to consolidate and rationalise its operations. Within a
relatively short period, for example, there were two substantial fare
. 26increases.
Decline
Cross-Channel air-ferry traffic reached a peak in 1962 with
137,000 cars transported; by 196*+ this number had fallen to 109,000
a n d  t o  1 0 1 , 0 0 0  t w o  y e a r s  l a t e r .  D e s p i t e  t h e  l a c k  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n
from other airlines, therefore, BUAF still faced serious problems.
In May, 1966, Mr. Stephen. Wheatcroft was appointed to undertake a thorough
r e v i e w  o f  t h e  c a r r i e r ' s  o p e r a t i o n s  a n d  f u t u r e  p r o s p e c t s .  A l t h o u g h  n e v e r  m a d e
public, reliable sources suggested that Wheatcroft’s report came to two
principal conclusions; first, that the deficit being incurred by BUAF
stemmed primarily from the unfavourable results of the deep penetration routes
and second, that these routes could not be made significantly more favourable
by increasing fares or reducing costs, but only by raising more supplemental
r e v e n u e  f r o m  u n a c c o m p a n i e d  ( i . e .  w i t h o u t  c a r s )  p a s s e n g e r s  a n d  
27
c a r g o . *  T h e  r e a l i s a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  p r o s p e c t s  o f  r a i s i n g  e x t r a  
s u p p l e m e n t a r y  r e v e n u e  i n  t h i s  w a y  w e r e . r e m o t e  e v e n t u a l l y  l e d  t h e
25. 'Flight', -16/1/6*», p.79 and 5/ 11/6**, p.775j .numerous other airlines,
both British and foreign, have attempted to break into the vehicle- 
ferry markets to Europe and Ireland, but none achieved any durable 
success.
26. ' W o r l d  A i r l i n e  R e c o r d ' ,  c p . c i t ,  .
27. 'Aeroplane', 5/7/6?, p.*t-5.
S e v e n  d e e p  p e n e  t r a t i o na i r l i n e  t o  a b a n d o n  i t s  l o n g - d i s t a n c e  r o u t e s ,  
s e r v i c e s  w e r e  w i t h d r a w n  i n  F e b r u a r y ,  1 9 6 ? ,  w h i l e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
S e p t e m b e r  B U A F  a l s o  c l o s e d  d o w n  i t s  a i r - f e r r y  r o u t e s  f r o m  S o u t h a m p t o n
t o  C h e r b o u r g  a n d  t h e  C h a n n e l  I s l a n d s ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  u n p r o f i t a b l e ,
28
h i g h l y  s e a s o n a l  n a t u r e .
T a b l e  9 . 2 :  U K  A I R - F E R R Y  S E R V I C E S  1 9 5 1 - 1 9 6 3 / 6 * *
Passengers Cars Bicycles Motor-Bicycles Freight 
(short-tons)
1951 30,000 8,500 - - -
1932/3 51,000 - - - -
1953 A 95,000 - - -
1 9 5 V 5 112,658 31,896 5,000 7,500 6*41
1935/6 l8l,28h 51,*427 3 ,9 15 9,7*45 1,750
1956/7 156,026 /4/4,3/+9 2,399 7,785 3,702
1957/8 173,52/+ ^9 3 05^ + 2,6*42 8/480 2,726
1958/9 22*4,612 65,612 1,935 7/463 5,850
1959/60 291,083 97/455 1,653 6,530 9,65?-
1960/1 358,030 1 1 5 ,3 1 6 1,6*41 6,081 1 2 , 7 1 8
1961/2 366,000 126,295 - - •
1962/3 *409,000 1 3 /4,888 - - -
1963/** 396,000 130,362 - mm -
S o u r c e s :  B I A T A  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s ,
A T A C  A n n u a l  R e p o r t s ,
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Table 9.3 : UK A I R - F E R R Y  SERVIC ES, 1963- 1971 ,
Passengers Passenger- Stage- Freight * Vehicles
carried miles (000s) flights (short-tens) (short-t
1963 391,461 35,207 57,704 204,723 177,719
1964 383,758 37,572 51,665 181,219 150,459
1965 363,068 36,799 43,936 151,954 128,857
1966 377,257 37,345 43,886 160,539 134,210
1967 277,791 22,852 32,520 119,322 96,429
1968 226,453 19,318 22,240 84 ,106 66,700
1969 239,695 21 ,718 21,086 70,538 52,508
1970 283,225 ■27,568 18,582 59,55'+ 41,541
1971 277,629 28,614 13,075 34,216 19,680
* = Including vehicles 
* *  -  Included also in freight figures
Sources : Operating and Traffic Statistics of UK Airlines.
Board of Trade (Department of Trade and Industry) 
Business Monitor CA5
Clearly, the basic problem stemmed from the fact that the
carriage of vehicles by air across the Channel at a competitive
price had rapidly become inviable. For example, the average-sized
car weighs as much as ten passengers, but yields only some 10% of
29the revenue and takes up twice t h e .volumetric capacity. Similarly 
by 1971 a vehicle-ferry airline planned to charge £16 to transport 
a small car to Basle, while under the lowest IATA commodity rate 
the cost of air-freighting such a car to Switzerland should have 
been at least £50. In other words, in terms of revenue per load
29. Ibid.
ton-mile, "ferrying cars just doesn't, and never has, made sense."
Once the surface carriers had reorganised themselves sufficiently, 
the only future for a company such as BUAF lay in the carriage of 
that small sector of the market that is prepared to pay a premium 
fare in return for a marginal, increase in speed and comfort. But 
even this traffic had to be supplemented by the carriage of un­
accompanied passengers and cargo to achieve approximate viability.
By 1968 air-ferry services accounted for only 5% of total cross- 
Channel vehicle traffic, compared with a peak of 2 7 % . ^  BUAF found 
itself unable to compete on price because of rapidly rising costs; 
the average hourly cost of both the Superfreighter and Carvair 
fleets rose by some 25% between 1962 and 1967. In addition, the 
Superfreighters were quickly approaching the end of their structural 
lives and rebuilding would have been uneconomic, while the Carvairs'
capital and maintenance costs had exceeded expectations by a large
. 32margin.
In fact, BUAF only kept going as a result of cross-subsidisation 
within the BUA group, presumably because of its contribution to 
overheads. This contribution, however, was declining, while BUA itself 
was increasingly experiencing financial difficulties (see Chapter V).
In an attempt to relieve the burden, the air-ferry carrier was re­
structured so as to form a more independent unit, and renamed 
British Air Ferries (BAF). The airline concentrated operations on 
just two UK airports, with the Carvairs based at Southend and the 
Superfreighters at Ferryfield. Economies were achieved by reducing 
the labour-force by 25% and removing the central reservations unit
2 1 9 .
6 0
30. Ibid., 11/2/71, p.186 and 2/2/6?, p. 157.
31. Ibid., 15/8/67, p. 2^9.
32. 'Aeroplane', op.cit.
and headquarters from London to Southend. The separation of 
BAF from BUA was finally completed in Kay, 1968, when British and. 
Commonwealth Shipping bought out most of the other shareholders in the 
BUA group. Air Holdings retained Air Ferry, Aviation Traders and 
the two car-ferry operators, BAF and SAFE Air of New Zealand. The 
reorganisation and rationalisation of British Air Ferries appears 
to have been relatively successful. During 1969* for example, the 
company made a pre-tax profit of £6,514 on a turnover of £ 1 ,655,150. 
Although this represented a return on revenue of less than 0.4/, 
it was an improvement on previous losses.
But BAF's problems were far from over. In February, 1971, 
Transmeridian Air Cargo announced that it planned to enter the car- 
ferry business and applied for licences to operate four routes: to 
Basle, Geneva, Milan.and Marseilles. Yet again the key to the 
profitable operation of the new services was to be the introduction 
of a different type of aircraft, this time modified Canadair CL-44s 
capable of carrying 36 passengers, 12-14 cars and 10 tons of cargo. 
Transmeridian was a relatively prosperous general charter carrier, 
making a pre-tax profit in 1970/71 of £ 1 1 5 , 3 1 9  on a turnover of 
£2,447,690. ^ It planned to inaugurate services to Basle and Geneva 
in April, 1972. But these intentions were never realised, for in 
October, 1971, Transmeridian purchased BAF from Air Holdings.
British Air Ferries retained its identity, selling-off its old 
Superfreighters and concentrating on Carvairs and CL-44s. At the 
time of writing it operates a total of eight routes: Southend to
3 3 . 'Flight', 7/ 12/6 7, p. 937 and 1 5/8/68, p. 248.
34. Ibid., 22/10/70, p. 6 36.
35. Ibid., 4/2/71, p. 145 and 4/ 1 1/7 1 , p. 737.
36. Ibid., 18/11/71, p. 794.
2 2 0 .
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Le Touquet, Ostend, Rotterdam and Basle; Coventry and Bournemouth 
to the Channel Islands; and Coventry to Ostend and Le Touquet. (The 
Coventry services are shortly to be discontinued).
221 .
Thus, the activities of such companies as Silver City, Channel
Air Bridge and their successors in the field of vehicle-ferry
operations formed an important episode in the post-war development of
the UK independent airlines. They managed to discover and successfully
exploit a highly specialised market, one to which their talents v,ere
particularly well-suited. But in the long run the market proved to
be extremely limited, partly because of the inherent difficulties of
operating what was basically a cargo service at low fares over ultra-
short stage-lengths, and- partly because of increased competition
37from surface carriers with lower costs. At one time vehicle-ferry 
services accounted by a large margin for most of the private sector's 
traffic in the areas of scheduled freight and international scheduled 
passenger journeys*. Today, however, such services are of strictly 
limited importance, being .operated by just one company, and the 
question is not whether air transport will be able to increase its 
share of the market, but whether it will be able to maintain its 
current small proportion. Y/ith the Channel Tunnel project on the 
horizon, this seems very doubtful*
37» Although th; 
efficient;
shipping 
desrite th
companies 
e fact th.
do not appear particularly
i t  cross-Channel fares are :he
highest in the world for a short sea journey, the sea-ferry 
companies on the whole have poor profit records; annual load- 
factors average only 26(3, reflecting the highly seasonal 
nature of the traffic*
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Chapter X
TOURISM
Part A Inclusive Tours
Someone once said that over the past 30 years there have been 
two great explosions - the H.-Bomb and holidays abroad. Certainly 
international tourism has been one of the fastest growing industries since 
the end of the Second World War, expanding at over 11# per annum since 
19501 compared with for world exports as a whole and only &  for those
of primary products. Of particular importance in Europe has been the
development of inclusive-tours (ITs) or 'packaged-holidays'. During 
the 1960s the inclusive-tour charter was the fastest growing sector of 
the European air transport scene, with an annual average growth of
J  n - f  r  2approximately 3 0  between 1963 and 1970. ' Each year more than £200
million are spent in Britain alone on buying over three million packaged-
3holidays. “The inclusive-tour charter," observes a recent US survey of
European charter airlines, “having established its respectability beyond
question, will be recorded by future historians as characteristic of the
standards of life in Europe which evolved during the third quarter of
the twentieth century." Similarly, the Edwards Report noted:
“We regard the record of IT traffic development as 
one of t.he most important credit items in the performance of 
British civil aviation in the recent past...We wish to stress *S
1. Midland Bank: "The Increasing Importance of Tourism", Midland B^rk 
Review, 1973« p.8.
2. »Flight', 21/9/72, p.391.
3»Camkin: 'The Camkin Report on Package Holidays,' 1972, p.2.
S  'The Times’, 7/9/7S  Supplement p.iv.
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here the great contribution made by the private 
sector in the development of inclusive tours. This 
was a field which was pioneered in Europe by the UK 
independent airlines." 5
Peters defines an inclusive-tour as "a trip undertaken for 
recreational purposes, planned in advance in all details (itinerary, 
accommodation, excursions, etc.) by a tour promoter for an 
inclusive price, paid for entirely prior to the commencement of the 
tour."^ Although the growth of ITs by air has been most marked 
during the 1960s, they in fact have a much longer history. They 
probably originated before the Second World War in the United 
States, operated between the northern cities of New York,
Washington and Chicago and the coasts of Florida, California,
Hawaii and the Caribbean. In Europe, packaged holidays by air 
had been offered by such airlines as Imperial Airways before the 
war, but their real growth dates from about 19^8 , appearing first 
in the UK and then spreading to Germany and Scandinavia. (These
7three countries still provide the bulk of IT tourists in Europe). 
^Initially ITs were mainly organised for groups with special 
interests, such as pilgrims, club members or students, for whom 
the tour had a specific purpose other than tourist travel! in 
other words, what today we would call ’affinity-groups'. Gradually, 
however, they became simply a cheaper and more convenient way of 
enjoying a foreign holiday, with travel agents selling tours 
directly to individual members of the public.
According to Freddie Laker, the inclusive-tour business was 
pioneered in the UK by Airwork in association with Polytechnic
OTours in 19^8. But most commentators seem to agree that the
5. ' p.22.
6. Peters: 'International Tourism', 1969» p.77.
7. Ibid., p.78.
8. 'Flight', 13/7/61, p.60.
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first real IT by air was organized by Horizon Holidays, a company 
formed by Vladimir Raitz in late 19*1-9* The following spring 
Raitz advertised in 'The Nursing Mirror* a special air holiday 
in Calvi, Corsica. His duplicated brochure announced that holiday­
makers would "live in large tents fitted with beds and mattresses, 
two to a tent...the best sanitation...meals are taken out of doors 
...departures every Friday by Douglas Air Liner of the Channel 
Island Air Transport Company.. .the cost of the unique holiday is 
£35»10s ." Although Raitz obtained very favourable rates from the 
airline, paying only £305 for each of 15 round-trips by a 32-seat
DC-3, heavy losses were incurred. 300 packaged-holidays were sold 
o
in 1950, a load-factor of 62.5 % , Horizon was forced to learn at 
a very early stage that the only way to make profits out of 
inclusive-tours, even in tents, is to achieve very high utilisa­
tion levels.
On the whole, it was the non-scheduled airlines that were
/
called upon to operate IT services. From 19;+9 any Independent
wishing to undertake a series of inclusive-tour charters had to
negotiate an associate agreement with BEA. Under the so-called
•New Deal* policy introduced in 1952, however, the privately-owned
carriers were actively encouraged by the Conservatives to expand
their IT activities, while the Corporations were prevented from
retaining obsolescent aircraft specifically for charter purposes.
According to the new terms of reference given to the ATAC, any
airline could apply for licences to operate, in parallel with normal
scheduled services, those
"services confined to the carriage of passengers
who pay an inclusive charge for air transport and
hotel accommodation,... provided that such services
are not likely materially to divert traffic which
would otherwise be carried by any operator already
authorised for the route." 10 «
9.
1 C .
•Aeroplane*, 15/7/65»
ATAC Annual Rc/ort, 1952/53, Appendix P» 31 •
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The procedure followed by the ATAC to control IT activity (and
essentially the same as that later employed by the ATL3) involved
the application by an airline, in association with a tour promoter,
for a licence to operate a specified number of services to a
*
particular destination. After hearing objections from interested
parties, the Council attempted to ensure that the total number of
services approved would not materially harm the established
11scheduled carriers on the route; in other v/ords, the ATAC 
controlled total capacity. In addition, as a second line of defence, 
minimum prices were established under the so-called 'Provision I' 
rule, which restricted the total price of an inclusive-tour to not 
less than the lowest fare on a normal scheduled flight to the 
same destination.
Table 10.1: THE INDEPENDENTS' INCLUSIVE-TOUR TRAFFIC,
1953/h A ~  1965/6 6"''.
Passengers Carried
1953/5/+ 7,750
1954/55 23,418
1955/56 45,995
1956/5? 92,081
1957/58 137,416
1958/59 180,014
1959/60 1 6 6 ,6 ? 1
19 6 0 /6 1 19 8 ,6 8 9
19 6 1/ 6 2 273,210
19 6 2/6 3 38 7 ,0 0 0
1963/64 526 ,0 0 0
1964/65 832 ,0 00
1965/66 1 ,19 1 ,0 0 0
Sources: : BIATA Annual Reports.
ATAC Annual Reports. 1
11. Wheatcroft: 'Air Transport lolicy', 1964 ,p.31“33.
growth of IT chartersThroughout most of the 1950« the
operated by the Independents was rapid and steady (see Table 10.1).
Between 1953/5^+ and 1958/39 the numoer of passengers carried on
such services rose from 7,750 to l80,0T'i. By the summer of 1956
British charter airlines were carrying on IT services 27/ of the
total air traffic from the UK to Spain, 21/ to Austria and Munich,
"1 P18% to France, 17/ to Northern Italy and 15/ to Switzerland.
Inclusive-tours, of course, still accounted for a relatively small
proportion of the Independents' total output, especially when
compared with trooping. But they represented an increasingly
important and profitable source-of revenue and most privately-
owned operators entered the market. Initially, at least, the field
was dominated by Air .Kruise, a company established in 19^6 and
taken-over by Silver City in 1955; at one time Air Kruise was
probably carrying more packaged-tourists than the rest of the
13private sector put together.
Opposition from BEAs
Such a rate of growth, despite the attempts at control,clearly 
presented a potentially serious threat to the European scheduled 
flag-carriers. The latter responded initially by introducing, 
in 19^9» a group travel discount. Pressured in particular by 
BEA and Air France, both of which were facing ‘increased competition 
from domestic private operators, the member-airlines of IATA passed 
the 'Common Interest Group Travel' resolution permitting companies 
to offer a discount of up to 10/ to each of a party of 15 or more 
passengers. A 10/ reduction wa-s-'considered adequate at the time 123
12. BIATA Annual Report, 1956/57t p.11.
13. 'Flight', 2/8/62, p.158.
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since competition came primarily from the chartering of an air­
craft by a single group, which meant that costs were forced up as a 
double flight for each of the party's journeys was usually necessary. 
From the spring of 1950 European airlines also began to allow
recognised tour promoters a discount of almost 1 ?/ off normal round-
1 btrip fares for IT passengers travelling on scheduled services. 
Numerous other such 'creative' fares were introduced throughout the 
1950s. On the more negative side, BEA consistently objected to most 
applications for IT licences because of the possible material, diver­
sion of scheduled service traffic. The Corporation relaxed its 
position somewhat from December, 195^» when it informed the ATAC 
that in future it would not oppose "on grounds of possible diversion 
of traffic applications for IT Services, even when these services 
were to be on BEA routes, provided that the flights were to be flown
on Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays during the months of duly, August 
15and September." But most other such applications continued to 
be opposed.
In fact, BEA appeared to benefit to a considerable extent from 
the expansion of international tourism. In most years during the 
■1950s the Corporation succeeded in carrying more inclusive-tour 
passengers on scheduled services than the whole of the private sector 
on charters, although it is very difficult to estimate how much of 
BEA's IT traffic was diverted from its own full-fare passenger 
traffic. Nevertheless, the nationalised airline remained constantly 
on the defensive and in the mid-1950s twice protested publicly, once 
to the ATAC and once in its Annual Report, about material diversion
of traffic. 16 Consequently, the European flag-carriers again went
1*W Wheatcroft:■’The Economies of European Air Transport', 19^6,p.155»
15. ATAC Annual Report, 195V55, p.12.
16. 'Flight', 7/11/58, p.?17.
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on the offensive, offering more competitive terms to travel agents 
who booked blocks of IT seats on their scheduled services to prime 
holiday resorts (now known as ITX fares). The new rates were un­
doubtedly very successful. Despite a general recovery in the traffic 
carried by British airlines, the number of IT passengers carried by 
the Independents in 1959/60 fell to 166,671 from 180,01^ the previous 
year. By 1960/61 ITX traffic in British aircraft exceeded by about 
35/ the IT charter traffic carried in aircraft of British registra­
tion to and from the Continent, and represented about 8.^/ of total 
UK air traffic over this region. Prospects seemed b o  poor for the 
private sector that in evidence to the ATLB Mr. Freddie Laker
suggested that special IT flights would be virtually finished in
17Europe within ten yearsl '
This success on the part of the scheduled operators was not 
simply, a matter of under-pricing their competitors; on the whole, 
the air fare part of a packaged-holiday continued to cost slightly 
less on a charter than on a scheduled service. But the scheduled 
airlines had a major advantage in being able to offer a customer 
greater comfort, better service, more modern and reliable equipment, 
perhaps more convenient departure times, and so forth. In addition, 
while profit potential for a tour promoter using a chartered aircraft 
was higher than using ITX fares, so was the risk. If, due to an 
unexpectedly low level of demand, he was forced to cancel an ITX 
booking he faced at most only a 'no show' fine; much more was at 
stake if he wanted to cancel a charter contract with a private air­
line. ITX fares also enabled the organisation of smaller and more 
flexible groups. Not all of the decline in inclusive-tour traffic, 
however, can be explained by the introduction of the ITX scheme. A 
second factor of some importance was the growth of 'closed-group' 
charters, both 'bone-fide' arid spurious.
17. Ibid., 28/12/61, p. 1001 and 13/7/61, p.6o.
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As we have seen, a closed-group (or affinity-group) may
be loosely defined as a group of persons which has an entity
of its own and which is not formed or constituted primarily for
the purpose of air travel. Services catering for such groups were
not included in Section 2'i of the 19^9 Air Corporations Act, which
reserved for BOAC, BEA and their associates, the exclusive right to
carry passengers on scheduled air services; in other words,
affinity-group charters did not require a licence from the ATAC.
Section 2k defined a scheduled journey as:
"one of a series of journeys which are undertaken 
between the same two places and which together amount 
to a systematic service operated in such a manner 
that the benefits thereof are available to members of 
the public from time to time seeking to take advantage 
of it." 18
The loophole, of course, was. the phrase "available to members of 
the public", and increasingly during the later~1950s the charter 
airlines attempted to exploit this situation to by-pass the 
licensing process by establishing spurious clubs and societies.
Large-scale exploitation of the closed-group anomoly began 
in'19 5 8.when an independent airline was challenged in the courts as 
to the legality of such charters. Hunting-Clan, on behalf of 
Milbanke Tours, had applied unsuccessfully to the ATAC for permission 
to operate a series of inclusive-tours to Palma, Nice and Perpignan. 
Instead, the prospective tourists were told that their holiday plana 
would be secure if they joined the International English Language 
Association, for which Milbanke were the official travel ..agents. It wa 
this action that was challenged in the courts. The magistrates of
l8. Quoted by tfheatcroft: 'Air Transport Policy', I S i k , p.lJl-2.
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Feltham, Middlesex, decided that in fact the whole business was 
perfectly legal; in other words, flights on behalf of closed-groups 
were not available to members of the public and were not, therefore, 
scheduled services or inclusive-tours within the meaning of Section 
2h of the 19^9 Act. J The magistrates' decision opened the flood­
gates and the number of affinity-group charters increased very 
rapidly. The Independents benefitted from the situation, despite 
the decline in their inclusive-tour traffic, since their aircraft 
were usually employed to carry the members of the often spurious 
clubs and societies that sprang up. But the practice reached such
proportions that in its 1959/60 Annual Report the ATAG claimed that
20 -it was seriously undermining the Council's work. The 19c0 
Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act attempted to remove the loophcle by 
licensing all flights for reward except those specifically exempted 
by the Minister. Unfortunately, this reform similarly proved to 
be open to misuse (see Part B below) .
The i960 Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act; ‘
The legislation of i960 also directly affected the Independents' 
inclusive-tour business as a result of the stipulation that the ATLB 
should investigate an airline's financial positon before awarding it 
s n  air service licence. The intention was simply to ensure that an 
applicant airline was capable, both financially and commercially, of 
operating any service it might be granted. When applied to inclusive- 
tour licensing, however, .the new regulations produced certain unfortun­
ate results. At first, the inevitable delays that occurred while the
19. 'Aeroplane', 17/V5S, p.^52.
20, p.6.
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ATLB undertook the necessary investigation into each company's
affairs forced many tour promoters to turn to foreign airlines.
But even after the initial batch of investigations had been completed,
the problem persisted. The whole licensing process, even for well-
established operators, now took much longer, as each application was
rigorously investigated. The inclusive-tour promoter, working within
a rigid and limited time-scale, often could not wait for the Board's
decision, especially as it was far from certain that the application
would be granted, and so was again forced to turn to foreign operators.
The latter had the major advantage that they were licensed by a
Government department and refusal of an application to operate a
non-schednled air service might result in a political incident (such
as reciprocal action by the airline’s Government against a British
carrier). Thus, it remained the case that if a UK airline was
refused a licence to operate an IT service, the travel agent concerned
would simply turn to a foreign operator in the knowledge that the
latter would almost certainly be authorised. In addition, there is
evidence to suggest that increasingly many tour promoters were
initially contracting with foreign airlines in order to avoid the
delays and difficulties that might result from employing a British
21carrier.
Such a situation clearly made nonsense of any attempt by the 
ATLB to control British inclusive-tour operadons. The effect on 
the airlines' IT business can be judged from Table 10.2. . Luring 
1962 and 1963 well over one-third of IT traffic between the UK and the 
Continent was carried by foreign airlines. In terms of revenue, this 
represented a loss of some £2 million in 1962 to British operators,
21. BIATA Annual Report, 1962/63» P»11,
among whom BUA was by now dominant in the field, carrying about
22150,000 passengers per annum. But foreign competition was not the 
only problem that faced the Independents. The JT charter market 
was also excessively depressed as a result of the policy of severe 
price-cutting on the part of a small number of newly-established 
private airlines. Although these companies usually had a relatively 
short life-expectancy,they managed to depress charter rates sufficient
to financially embarrass several other operators.
Table 10.2: UK IT C n A H T l * '■! T R A F F I C  ( O U T V /A R I )  J. A S S l i i i C E R S  C ,ARRIE D ) .
1961- 1971 (A?- r i l - C c t o b e r inclusive; 0 0 0 's) •
All
Airlines
o f
Change
' UK
Airlines
%  Foreign 
Change Airlines
o í/*'
Change
1961 295 - 225 70 -
1962 352 +20 222 - 1 130 +8?
1963 k k  1 +25 261 + 00 M CO O + 38
196^ 592 397 +52 195 +8
1965 7 k k +26 555 + O (-» CO 00 -3
1966 1,090 + h 7 898 +62 192 + 2
1967 1,255 +  15 1 ,00*1 +12 251 +31
1968 1 , M o M 1 ,3 3 1 109 -
1969 .1,759 + 22 1,629 +22 130 + 19
1970 2,170 + 23 2,051 +26 119 —8
1971 2,698 + 2 h 2,559 +25 139 +17
Nb. The statistics covering the pre-1968 period are not strictly 
comparable with those for the following period because of 
changes in the data to be included.
Source: ATLB Annual Reports.
Of particular note in this respect was a company called 
Overseas Aviation (Channel Islands), established early in 1958 by
22. 'Flight', 16/5/63, p.705-6,
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a Mr. Myhill. Overseas Aviation experienced a very rapid rate of 
growth, increasing its available capacity by approximately 600/ in 
less than 2 years. The company concentrated on inclusive-tour and 
general charter work, both within Europe and to points further afield, 
especially the Far East, Australia and South Africa. With its very 
fast rate of growth and price-cutting policy, Overseas Aviation 
clearly possessed the potential of being economically unstable. It 
was not a complete surprise, therefore, when the airline went into 
liquidation in August, 1961, stranding some 5 »COO passengers abroad 
and owing, among others, Holls-Royce and BP £2^0,000 each and BCAC 
£109,000. A few months before the crash Myhill had transferred 
Overseas' principal assets, the aircraft, to another company,
Overseas Aviation Ltd., jointly owned by himself and his wife, which 
led one newspaper to comment that "whatever may befall the creditors
of Overseas Aviation (Channel Islands) Mr. Myhill will be all right.
23 *Quite legally of course." Apart from damaging the reputation of 
the independent airlines, both with the public and the tour promoters, 
the activities of such companies had two other important results. 
Firstly, the ATLB came under pressure to investigate even further 
the financial standing of UK airlines, necessitating longer delays 
before a licence could be issued. Secondly, the financial losses 
incurred by many of the tour promoters led to a drastic re-thinking 
on their part of the whole concept of IT charters. The conclusions 
one or two of them came to were to have important repercussions on 
the packaged-holiday market, and on the Independents themselves, ; 
during the following decade.
23. Ibid., 1/V60, p.60, ct.al ' Aeropilane ' , 2/11/61, p.5o7.
A New Type of Airline - Britannia Airways
Universal Sky Tours, at the time Britain’s largest tour-
promoter specialising in holidays by air, estimated that its total
losses from the failures of independent airlines between 1958 and
2k1961 exceeded £250,000.' Such losses, together with the poor 
publicity that inevitably resulted from the stranding of thousands 
of holiday-makers abroad, were clearly unacceptable. Consequently,
Sky Tours, in association with a firm of aviation consultants,
J.E.D. Williams and Company Ltd., began an intensive study to 
determine how best to overcome the problem. The solution they 
eventually arrived at involved the establishment of an airline with 
two particular characteristics:
(i) it should be almost wholly owned by Sky Tours; in other 
words, the tour promoter and the airline should be vertically 
integrated, in order to take advantage of the ’systems 
design* approach (see below) to inclusive-tour development; 
and
(ii) it should be a highly specialised undertaking dealing 
almost exclusively with IT charters.
It was estimated that the implementation of these two fairly radical 
proposals would reduce the cost of a packaged-holiday from, say,;
£70 to about £ 3 5 i and at the same time greatly expand the potential 
market . ^
Such an airline was indeed established, based at Luton with 
J.E.P.Williams as chairman and managing director. The company was 
initially known as Euravia, reflecting the U K ’s expected new role as
2 k ,  ’Flight’, 7/ 2/6 3* p.1 8 2.
25. Ibid., 5/3/6V, p, 355-8; Williams: ’Holiday Traffic by Air’, 
Institute of Transport Journal. 1968, p.372.
a member of the Common Market, but later changed its name to a
more patriotic Britannia Airways. Operations began in Kay, 1962,
26with three Constellations acquired from El Al. Britannia differed 
from most other privately-owned airlines in a number of respects, 
apart from its specialist nature and close association with a tour 
promoter. For example, the prime aim of its founders was not 
profitability, but reliability. Similarly, greater emphasis than 
was normal among charter operators was placed on creating a standard 
of comfort and service comparable with that on international . 
scheduled services. The introduction to the airline's first 
brochure announced:
"The formation of a new charter airline in this 
country is not likely to win a prize for the best idea 
of 1962. Nevertheless, there is a need for a charter 
airline designed to provide the British inclusive-tour, 
passenger with scheduled airline standards of comfort, 
reliability and safety at a price the inclusive-tour 
operator can afford to pay. We think we have the formula 
by which this requirement can be met economically," 27
Britannia Airways v/as undoubtedly a very successful venture.
The company quickly established itself as one of the largest and
most important UK Independents. Traffic carried increased at a very
rapid rate, primarily inclusive-tour passengers (see Table 10,3).
In May, 1965, Thomson Industrial Holdings purchased the entire share
capital of Eiviera Holidays and Universal Sky Tours (including
Britannia), further strengthening the financial position of the
airline; Lunn-Poly was acquired at a later date. Today Thomson
Holdings, as the combined group is known, is the largest inclusive-
tour operator in the UK, while Britannia Airways will be operating
a fleet of 14 Boeing 737s by 1974.
235.
26. 'Flight', op.cit.; the new name was probably decided upon because 
by then the airline.operated Britannia aircraft.
27. 'Aeroplane', 17/12/64,p.17-18.;
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Table 10.3: BKITAKNIA AlkwAYS1 TRAFFIC
All Non-Scheduled 
Flights
Aircraft-miles 
(000's)
Inclusive 
Aircraft-miles 
(000's)
-Tours
Passengers
Carried
Passenger-Mil
(000's)
1963 856 829 64,342 55,611
1964 1,383 1 ,227 105,555 90,710
1965 2,329 1 ,5 1 0 168,203 149,076
1966 3,550 2 ,614 283,260 252,440
1967 3,026 2 ,687 302,238 269,389
1968 4,739 4,065 432,600 398,131
1969 6,852
CO
CO 668,814 587,410
1970 7,967 6,2.64 688 ,961 629,289
1971 10,480 8,532 ’ 1 ,049,256 1,024,263
1972 14,706 11,955 1,477,993 1,430,707
Source s: Board of Trade: 'Operating and Tra ffic Statistics of UK
Airlines’{ Board of Trade (Department of Trade and Industry) 
Business Monitor, Civil Aviation Series.
The success of Britannia, and the rapid expansion of IT traffic
'generally, inevitably led to the establishment of other airlines
specialising in packaged-holidays by air, Mr. Freddie Baker, for
example, after leaving BOA, formed Laker Airways and acquired
extensive travel interests. Monarch Airlines was established by two
former directors of British Eagle, before the latter's collapse,
and backed by the large Cosmos holiday and transport group. In
addition, airlines that had previously concentrated on scheduled
services or charter work such as trooping, began to enter the IT
market on a large scale. The integration of travel and airline
interests was far from new. In the early-1950s, for instance, Mr.
Harold Bamberg had borrowed £50,000 and purchased Sir Henry Lunn Ltd.,
after failing to interest Thomas Cook's in his plans for organising
?,8packaged-holidays by air* he already owned Air Liaison Ltd.
28. Jackson: 'The Sky Tramps’, 1965, p.30.
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But both thi scalo and' degree of vertical integration increased
substantially during the 1960s. The British experience in this
respect contrasts with that in several other European countries,
especially Germany, where horizontal integration has been more 
29common.
The Economics of Inclusive-Tours:
It is important to remember that air transport is not a
homogeneous product. In particular, one can differentiate between
two broad groups of air travellers. On the one hand are those who
travel to a specific destination for a specific purpose, perhaps to
conduct a business deal or visit an ill relative. In this case,
the price of the journey tends to be a secondary matter; the
individual will presumably not make the journey unless his relative
is ill. The normal way of satisfying this type of demand for air
transport in by means of ordinary scheduled services. For the
holidaymaker, on the other hand, price is usually the key parameter;
in other words, demand is highly price elastic. Within certain
limits , the actual destination is much less important to the
holidaymaker than it is to the businessman. Hence, as Williams
points out, a £35 holiday in Majorca does not compete with a £?5
holiday at the same resort, but it does compete with a £35 holiday 
30in Blackpool. This is the market catered for by IT charters ar.d 
creative fares on scheduled services.
Thus, because of the high level of price elasticity, the 
economies achieved by the*packaging' of holidays, especially the
See *Tho Economist*, 15/6/68, p . 61 
four of the leading German tour p 
stave-off the growing competition 
Quelle and Neckermann, who had en
; during 1967, for example, 
romoters combined in order to 
from the two mail-order houses 
tered the IT market on a large
♦
scale.
30. Cp.cit., p.371.
lower air transport cost element, led to extremely large increases
in demand. The charter concept has in fact been called the "chief
catalyst of tourism." It appears that a type of 'circular
process' was established, similar to that found by Deakin and Seward
31in transport generally, so that each round of traffic increases
resulted in further economies, and so greater demand. Mr. Torn
Gullick, formerly managing director of Clarksons, laid particular
emphasis on this role of falling costs in the generation of demand:
"No one can deny that .the revolution in package 
holidays over the past five years has been brought about 
by lower prices. In themselves the rates have broadened, 
the overseas holiday market to everyone's advantage.
I firmly believe that we have reached the current stage 
of market development only through the low-price policies 
of the major companies." 32
The outcome is obvious to anyone visiting: Spain during the peak 
summer months. The number of visitors arriving by air in the 'Black­
pool of Europe' has increased from 6COO,GC0 in 1961 to some 5»^00,000
’by 1971; UK tourists to Spain rose from an estimated 600,000 to
332 ,300,000 over the same period. J
The two main cost components in the price of a holiday are 
transport and accommodation. The cost of both of these elements to 
the individual holidaymaker is usually much higher than necessary, 
because neither the transport operator nor the hotel owner can 
guarantee permanent full utilisation of their respective businesses. 
Thus, if an airline is operating at a load-factor of only in
order to remain profitable it must obviously charge a fare almost 
twice as high as it need charge if it were operating at 10Of' load-
31 ,'Productivity in T r a n s p o r t 1969, p.198: "These results suggest 
a circular process by which, given an elastic demand, increases in 
output lead to economies of scale, falling relative costs and 
prices and to increased demand and output at a second...round. 5 the 
process'boinr reversible for the case of declining demand."
32. 'Financial Times', 13/10/71, p.?1.
33* 'International Tourism Quarterly', 1971 No,2, ppl3 and 6 3.
2 3 8 .
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factors. It is this problem that tour promoters attempted to
overcome by means of 'system design', a way of exploiting "the
potential capabilities of the components of a system to make the
34system, taken as a whole, as efficient as possible." When applied
to tourist travel this basically involved the simple concept of
'matching' hotel beds and transport seats. The system design of
holidays probably originated in 1930 when Hr. T.E. Langton, who
was later to found Universal Sky Tours, hired a surplus coach for a
whole season at a particularly low rate and made block bookings at
35boarding houses in Cornwall and Devon. The modern tour promoter
really only employs a more sophisticated version of the same basic
system. He might, for example, organise a series of 14-day holidays
using 100-seat aircraft, blocking-off 100 beds at a resort for the
entire season and booking a series of charter flights at fortnightly
intervals, each flight carrying 100 passengers to the resort and
bringing back the 100 passengers who have just finished their
holiday. In this way, both the airline and the hotel are relieved
of almost all utilisation problems and marketing costs, while the 
promoter
tour/is able to negotiate favourable contracts.
Broadly speaking, the rapid reduction in the real cost of a 
packaged-holiday was achieved in two ways. Firstly, as we have seen, 
the cost of transporting a passenger by air is almost invariably 
less on a charter than on a scheduled service (and the came principle 
can be applied to hotel costs). According to Doganis, other things 
being equal, a non-scheduled operation will in general cost 15-20fj 
less per aircraft-mile than a scheduled one because of lower ticket­
ing, sales, promotion and station costs. In addition, passenger- 
mile costs should be a further *¡0-50','£ lower because of the higher 
seating densities and load-factors on charter services. The cumula-
3^. Williams: 'Holiday Traffic by Air', oy-.cit., p,572.
55. Ibid., P37^.
ZhO
tive effect, therefore, is that fares on non-scheduled services
•Jr f
can be up to 65 or 70% below those on scheduled services.-5 The 
fact that most IT services today are effectively fairly large- 
scale scheduled operations, except for the latter's cost structure, 
serves to reinforce these advantages. The charter airlines also 
benefitted, perhaps even to a greater extent than their scheduled 
counterparts, from the improvement in aircraft productivity and 
reliability that resulted from the replacement of turbo-prop by 
jet equipment during the 1 9 6 0 s . S i m i l a r l y ,  there have been 
dramatic increases in the capacity of aircraft employed on IT 
charters. The Select Committee on nationalised Industries estim­
ated that if all other characteristics of design are held constant, 
each doubling of aircraft s i z e  will produce a 15% reduction in seat- 
mile operating costs . J  The combined effect of all these factors has
clearly been to greatly reduce total costs and hence stimulate the 
demand for packaged-holidays.
The second major area of cost reduction followed more directly 
from the application of system design to inclusive-tours and from 
vertical integration within the industry. By controlling both the 
tour promotion and transport aspects of a packaged-holiday, for 
example, companies were able to schedule aircraft departures through­
out the day, so greatly increasing utilisation. 'Week-end peaks were
36. 'Air Transport; A Case Study in International Regulations.'
Journal of Transrort Economics and Policy, 1975» p.121; see also 
A.M. Lester in; 'Conference; The Air Charter Market and the 
Restrictive Effects of Current Bilateral Agreements.' The , 
Aeronautical Journal, 1973» p.^0,
37» See Miller and Sawyers; ’The Technical Development of Modern 
Aviation', 1968, p.205-210.
3 8. 'BEA', 1967» p.J06; Mr. Freddie Laker has claimed that with his 
new BC-lOs he will be able to keep seat-costs constant for ten 
years by progressively increasing seating capacity from an initial 
300 to an eventual iiOO. ‘Flight', 2/3/72, p-310.
levelled out by introducing 10- and 12-day holidays. Gradually
the degree of vertical integration increased, so that today companies
such as Thomsons or Clarksons own not only airlines and the actual
tour 'packaging' concerns, but also travel agents, coach companies,
hotels, local bars and gift shops, excursion operators, car-hire
agencies, and so forth. Factors such as these again combined to help
reduce or stabilise prices. Camkin recalls that the Horizon brochures
for 1959 and 1971 both feature the same hotel in Majorca* In 1959
the hotel had few private bathrooms and no swimming pool 5 the
flight by DC-3 took over four hours. By 1971 the same hotel had a
private bathroom in each bedroom, a swimming pool and a paddling
pool; the flight by a modern jet took just over two hours. Yet,
’despite the rise in the cost of living and currency devaluations,
’ * 3 9the prices of the two holidays were the same* It is not surprising 
that the non-scheduled share of total UK-Spain air traffic has risen 
from 32%  in 1962, to 58% in 1967 and to 8 3 % in 1971.^°
The crucial factor, of course, in the profitable operation of
1
such a system is a high level of capacity utilisation, which inevit­
ably means fairly accurate estimation of future traffic trends* The 
importance of consistently high load-factors is illustrated in
1 if 1Table 10.‘f, adapted from a similar example quoted by Peters. Part 
A shows the cost of mounting an inclusive-tour from London to a 
popular Mediterranean resort such as Palma, selling at almost £A0 
per capita and utilising a 132-seat aircraft at a load-factor of 
at least 85% (that is 112 passengers). The distance from London 
to Palma is 8ll statute-miles, so that the air fare component of the
39* Op.cit. p.3,
h O , Edwards Report,' p*58; 'Flight', 21/10/71, p*631. 
h i ,  Op.cit., p.120-1 ,
tour represents 0,92 pence per passenger-mile. But if the load-
factor were increased from 85 to 1007;, the fare component is
reduced to 0.75 pence per passenger-mile and the net profit rise.' 
from £72 to £500, almost a seven-fold increase.
Table 10.4: COST BREAK-DOWN OF AN IKCLUSIVE-TOUR
A.
Amount
Cost item (£)
Charter aircraft 1,650
Aircraft catering 30
Hotel (14 nights) 1,725
Ancillary transport 225
Gross profit margin 808
Total £ 4,438
Gross profit margin 
Advertising and
808
promotion .. 280
Agent's commission 256
Running expenses 200
Net Profit £ 72
Cost per head
of total & P.
37.2 14
0.7 25
38.8 15 40
5.1 2 00
18.2 7 25
100.0 39
18.2 7 25
6.5 2 55
5.6 2 25
h . 5 1 80
1.6 6*5 T)
B.
Amount % of total Cost per head
Cost item £ £  P.
Charter of aircraft 1,650 31.5 12 , 50
Aircraft catering 32 0.6 25
Hotel (l4 nights) 2,033 38.9 15 4o
Ancillary transport 225 4. 3 1 70
Gross profit margin 1,290 24.7 9 77r
Total £■ h m 100.0 39 624
Gross profit margin 
Advertising a n d .
1,290 24.7 9 77i-
promotion 290 5.5 2 20
Agent’s commission 300 5.7 2 Z 7 l
Running expenses; . 200 , 3.8 1 50
Net profit £ ;:'500 9.7 3 80 :■
In order to sim plify matte rs somewhat we have so far co
trated solely on the effect of lower costs on the demand for
packaged-holidays. Undoubtedly, the economies achieved by the tour 
promoters were a major, perhaps even the prime, factor in stimulating 
demand. Customers v/ere clearly attracted from other types of holiday 
both abroad and at home. For example, by 1972 55% of British 
holidaymakers abroad went on packaged-tours, compared with only
/ /• k-220% in I960. An examination of European scheduled air traffic
shows a similar experience; the scheduled service contribution to
the holiday market remained almost static at 6-7 million passengers
per annum between 1965 and 1970, so that its share has fallen from
if 3more than two-thirds to well under half. But one must also take
into account the fact that disposable real incomes have been
rising over this period as well, and it would appear that inclusive-
tours have large price and income elasticities. According to Colley,
between 1957 and 1966, for every 1% rise in income per head, UK
Expenditure per capita on foreign travel rose by about 1.6%. An
additional factor may have been the trend towards longer holidays.
In 1951 only of all full-time workers in Britain enjoying a
basic holiday entitlement had more than two weeks paid holiday a
year; by 1971 this percentage had risen to 7?., with 67% receiving
if 5three weeks and over. It is, of course, impossible to place 
relative weights on each of these contributing factors; one can 
only say that, to a greater or lesser extent, they all had an 
effect in raising demand for packaged-tours,
42. Central Office of'Information; 'Britain and International 
Tourism*, 1972, p,17*
43» Pugh: 'Holiday Traffic', paper read at Royal Aeronautical Society 
Convention: 'Aviation *s place in Transport', Kay, 1972, p«5,
44, 'International Tourism Today', Lloyds Bank Rovic-w, 1967, p»?3;
Askari found similar evidence for inclusive-tours in the :United 
States: 'Demand for Package Tours,' Journal of Transport 
Economics and Policy, 1971* See also Pugh, op.cit., p*b,
4 5, Midland Bank, op.cit,, p.10.
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Table 10.5: UK AIRLIM ES OPERATl EG RESUL TS BY TYPE OF
SERVICE, 1966 (£m).
BOAC BEA Independents13 Total
1 . All Scheduled Services
£LOperating revenue 136.3 83.6 26.5 262.6
Operating expenditure 111.5 79.6 26.9 215.8
Surplus (Deficit) 22.8 6.2 (0.6) 26.6
Rev Ex ratio 120 105 98 112
2 . IT charters
Operating revenue - 1 .0 18.8 19.8
Operating expenditure - 1 . 1 17.6 18.5
Surplus (Deficit) - (0.1 ) 1 .6 1.3
Rev Ex ratio ' ** 91 108 107
3. Other Charters
Operating revenue 3.1 * 1 .8 20.3 25 .2
Operating expenditure 2.6 1.6 20.2 26 * 6'
Surplus 0.5 0.2 0.1 0.8
Rev Ex ratio 119 112 100 103
N.B. a = includes ITX passengers
*
b = financial year most clo sely corresponding to the
calendar year 1966 
Source: Edwards Report, p.33*
Finally, what effect did. the rapid exj>ansion of the 
inclusive-tour market have on the Independents, especially on 
their financial position? Table 10.5 shows that in fact by 
1966 IT charters were by far the most profitable type of activity 
open to the privately-owned airlines. They contrast significantly 
with the losses incurred on scheduled services, a field into 
which the Independents had constantly attempted to enter in' order 
to improve their economic stability (see Chapter XI). Although an 
excess of revenue over expenditure of 8?i is not particularly awe­
inspiring, it must be remembered that this is an average for the 
sector as a whole. Some airlines specialising in the carriage of 
IT traffic /were undoubtedly returning better results at this time.
Time-Charters
The economic power that resulted from large-scale operations 
became more and more important. Inevitably,' the value of individ­
ual contracts increased substantially and XT charters became very 
big business. For example, in June, 1966, Laker Airways signed a 
contract valued at well over £5000,000 to supply air transport to 
its sister-company, Lord Brothers, for the lattei’s 1967 
packaged-holiday programme; Lyons Tours awarded a £5 million 
contract in April, 1969, to Channel Airways covering the three 
years 1970-72; Autair (Court) and Dan-Air won contracts worth 
£30 million from Clarksons for the 'time-charter1 of ten aircraft 
for the 1970-7**- seasons; and early in 1971 British Caledonian 
signed a three-year time-charter agreement worth over £11 million
■ A6 ’with Horizon Holidays, The close association between tour 
promoter and airline that of necessity followed contracts as 
large as these, even where the companies were not part of the
^6. 'Flight', various dates.
2 b 5 .
same group, clearly had advantages for all the parties concerned.
But there were also inherent dangers. The collapse of British 
Eagle, for instance, was a major factor in producing a £1250,000
47loss for Lunn-Poly. Similarly, it was presumably a fear that 
its largest customer, Clarksons, would go bankrupt or be acquired 
by a rival travel company that led Court to purchase 85/ of the
48tour promoter’s shares early in 1973* Court had been trying 
for some time, with partial success, to reduce its reliance on 
Clarksons for the bulk of its IT business*
Nevertheless, it was on the basis of contracts such as these 
that the independent airlines were able to purchase fleets of 
expensive new jet aircraft. Unlike the charter operators of the 
1950s the' new ’holiday’ airlines are mostly forced to provide a 
standard of comfort and service comparable to that on scheduled 
services. Almost without exception, these carriers now operate 
modern jet equipment, usually BAC 1-11s, but also Boeing 737s 
(Britannia) and ?2?b (Ban-Air), This type of development would 
have been unthinkable in the days of the 'string and sealing-wax' 
charter companies. On the whole,it has been made possible by 
utilising the principle of 'time-charters’, the sale of equipped 
and staffed aircraft by the day, month or year. Buyers usually 
agree to purchase the equivalent of one or more aircraft (guarantee­
ing a minimum rate of utilisation) for a whole season or year. The 
airline's task of raising the capital to purchase new equipment 
(or more commonly nowadays, of leasing it) is thus made easier.
47. 'The Financial Times,1 22/1/71,
48. 'The Guardian', 21/4/73» p»22; Clarksons accounted for more
than 4C/ of Courtfc business arid lost £2,? million in 1971 
and an estimated ¿>4.8 million the following year. Both 
Thomsons'and American Express had held talks with the company 
with a view to purchasing an interest.
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The guaranteed high level of utilisation that such contracts
provided enabled Hr. Freddie Laker, for example, to establish his
own airline, (which he described as a "contract carrier to the
package holiday trade - a personalised airline") despite a capital
i 49requirement of well over £4 million. Court would clearly have 
been unable to purchase two Lockheed Tristars (costing altogether 
about £23 million) without the backing' of its five-year contract 
with Clarksons. In addition, airlines are able to offer tour 
promoters further flying-time on top of any minimum utilisation 
requirement at extremely attractive rates, because time-charters 
normally cover an aircraft^fixed costs for the full year. Horizon 
Midland's agreement with Britannia Airways provides for the use of 
a Boeing 737 between 1970 and 1974. Horizon has contracted to 
utilise the aircraft for a minimum number of flying-hours each 
year, with the hourly cost of chartering the Booing being reduced
BOprogressively with utilisation in excess of the contracted minimum.''
Similarly, in evidence to the ATLB in 1970, Britannia argued that
under its time-charter agreement with Thomson Holidays it was
guaranteed a level of summer flying which fully covered its fixed
costs throughout the year, so that it could regard as clear profit
virtually all revenue obtained from winter flying in excess of
91direct operating costs.
Relaxation of Provision I
BEA continued to oppose applications to the ATLB for licences 
to operate IT charters on the basis of material diversion of
49. 'Aeroplane', 10/2/66, p,10.
50. 'The Times', 1/5/72, p.18.
51. 'Flight', 29/10/70, p. 664.
scheduled traffic. Initially the Board adhered rigidly to the 
Provision I rule, limiting minimum packaged-holiday prices to the 
equivalent scheduled service fare. According to Viilliams, however 
the situation tegan to change from the summer of 196*1. Britannia 
Airways was able to satisfy the ATLB that despite REA's claim that 
its scheduled traffic to Palma had suffered because of IT over­
capacity, total scheduled traffic on the Palma route was actually
flourishing, but BSA's pool partner, Iberia, had managed to
52increase its share by offering improved services. Certainly, 
after 196*+ the Board ceased to restrict IT charter capacity, 
noting that:
"After four years 1 experience of the inter-action 
of (scheduled and IT) ....traffic, we can find no 
evidence that inclusive-tours have been responsible for 
any material diversion of traffic from the scheduled 
carriers. On the contrary, BBA's total passenger 
traffic continues to grow at much the same rate as 
before the inclusive-tour charter traffic reached its 
present proportions," 53
Nevertheless, Provision I continued to be quite rigidly enforced.
The Independents as a group did not in fact want the complete 
abolition of IT restrictions; they were far too worried about 
the possible repercussions of a price-war. But BIATA did persuade 
the ATLB in 1966 to recommend the relaxation of Provision I in two 
particular areas where, it was claimed, tour promoters were making 
excessive profits, namely short holidays during the winter ai-d 
those at remote destinations. The Board proposed, firstly, that
the UK member-airlines of IATA should attempt to secure the intro­
duction of special winter creative fares wherever such fares were 
available in the summer, and promote creative fares to other 
destinations where they, were not yet being provided at all.
52. »The Pole of Private Enterprise in British Air Transportation, 
Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society, 196?, p.*!?.1*,
53. ATLB Annual Be port, 196*1/6 5, p.5.
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Secondly, it recommended that Provision I should be relaxed where 
the lowest scheduled fare' was more than £75» Unfortunately, 
neither the scheduled operators nor the Government were particularly
cZj.receptive to the suggestions and they were dropped."'' With the 
devaluation of the pound, the President of the Board of Trade 
announced that for the winter of 1967/68 and the summer of 1968 
minimum charges for packaged-holidays would be maintained at pre­
devaluation levels. Meanwhile, an enquiry into such holidays was
r £»
set on foot.
As a result of this enquiry, it was announced the following 
April that the post-devaluation arrangements- would not be continued 
after October, 1968, with two. important exceptions:
(i) for holidays by charter flight to points outside Europe 
the minimum price was set at either the lowest public 
scheduled return fare or the minimum charge agreed by 
IATA for a tour using scheduled services to the same 
destination, whichever was the lower; and'
(ii) for an experimental period, winter holidays at most resorts 
in Europe and North Africa would be sold at of the 
normal tourist return fare, or 5 0 % in the case of a holiday
56of not more than eight days' duration.
It was clearly the latter that proved to be the major break-through. 
Most airlines specialising in packaged-tours did very little 
business during the winter months; between Christmas and March, 
1967, for example, Britannia made only one revenue flight. In­
evitably, this pushed down aircraft utilisation rates, and therefore 
forced up average costs. But by taking advantage of the marginally-
Ibid., 1966/6?,p.15- 1 8 .
55. Ibid., 1967/68,p.18.
5 6. Ibid.
the tourcosted rates he could obtain from hotels and airlines, 
promoter was able to offer very cheap short winter holidays abroad, 
and so create additional profits for everyone, 'fhe prices charged 
were often ridiculously low, perhaps only £ 9-£10 for a long week­
end in Spain, so that demand was quickly stimulated. The number of 
passengers travelling on winter inclusive-tours from the UK rose 
from 6,940 in 1965/64 to *f5'+,000 in 1970/71. Further, the trend 
seems to be accelerating and'shows no sign of reaching saturation 
point. Horizon Midlands winter IT traffic increased from 2,600 in 
1969/70 to 15,600 in 1970/71 and to 52,600 in 1971/72 . 57 As we 
shall see, however, such a rapid rate of growth also created problems 
for the industry. Provision I was finally abolished by the Civil 
Aviation Authority , with effect from October, 1973, primarily
because of the large-scale entry into the IT charter market of the
58scheduled operators (see below).
Retardation and Profitless Growth
The rate of growth of UK IT traffic during the 1960s was high
by any standard, the number of outward passengers rising from 295*000
in the summer of 1961 to 1,090,000 by i960. The independent airlines
were relying more and more on the holiday market, a situation v;hich
dramatically confliced with the view of 'The Econcmist' in 1957s
"A vigorous and well-equipped modern air transport 
• industry, fighting for trade'with international
competitors with the same vigour as the merchant marine,, 
cannot be developed out of the business of carrying 
holiday parties to the tourist resorts of Europe." 59
But the pace could not be maintained, and a retardation is the rate
57» 'The Times', op.cit.j in other words about one-third cf total 
IT output, the same as Thomsons.
5 8 . Ibid., 8/ 1 1 /7 2 .
59. 25/2/57, p. 657-9.
of growth began to appear during the 1967 season (see Tables 
10.2 and 10.3). By any normal standards traffic was still booming; 
compared with the previous few years, however, the slow down was 
marked. The ATLB claimed that the rate of increase of inclusive- 
tour passengers on British airlines during 1967/68 was the lowest 
it had ever recorded.^
The industry's troubles can partly be explained by the 
downturn in UK economic activity and the currency restrictions 
imposed by the Government, although the fact that other European 
countries experienced a rather similar trend suggests that other 
factors may also have been involved. It seems probable that after 
the initial success of the early 19oOs, the momentum had temporarily 
run out and tour promoters were experiencing difficulties in further 
reducing prices. Of -course,.since hotel beds and airline seats have to 
be contracted for some time in advance, the retardation in traffic 
growth inevitably meant large financial losses for the tour companies, 
exacerbated by growing competition. But the airlines did not escape 
lightly either. The traffic downturn coincided with the introduction 
of jet aircraft by several private carriers, increasing available 
capacity and depressing load-factors and profits even further. In 
any case, the increasingly close ties between tour promoters and 
airlines inevitably meant that any difficulties encountered by one 
sector of the industry would certainly affect the other*0 Some 
operators fared better than others. Particularly badly hit, 
however, was British Eagle, whose 196?'summer holiday traffic fell 
20% compared with the previous year and must have been a contributory 
factor in the company's collapse.
6G. ATLB Annual Report, 1967/68, p.l6.
61* These closer ties have meant an practice that the financial
results published by some airlines are practically meaningless; 
there is no way of telling, for example, whether Thomson 
Holidays pay Britannia a fair market rate for the use of its 
aircraft.
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IT traffic growth remained at a low level throughout 196? 
and 1968, though it began, to pick up again thereafter. It is 
indicative of the increasing importance of the holiday market for 
the Independents that one of the largest private operators, Court 
(Autair), abandoned all scheduled services from November, 1969, to 
concentrate on IT charters. Court's very rapid growth has mainly 
resulted from its close association with Clarksons, by the late 
1960s the largest package-tour promoter in the UK, if not the 
world. The Independent's IT traffic rose from just 56,000 in 
1967 to sor,2 e 900,000 by 1970 (see Fig. 10.1). It also managed to 
return overall profits, in spite of losses on scheduled services, 
of £217,000 in 1968, £4^0,000 in 1969 and £670,000 in 1970 . 62 But 
despite the improvement in the holiday market, the privately-owned 
airlines and the travel companies still faced a number of problems.
25?.
1970* ,1 1 6 ; »pi ight*, : /1 1 /7 1 , p .7 1 9 .62..'Air Pictorial April,
Figure 10.1 : Number of Passengers C a r r i e d  by Court
Line Aviation, 1963-1971.
One problem resulted from the growth of the scheduled operators’
charter activities, and in particular that of BEA. The Corporation
had decided upon a more aggressive policy in the holiday market as
early as 1966, cutting its summer IT charter rates by an average of
20$'. . The following April it established a subsidiary, - Silver. Wing '
k x
Surface Arrangements,to organise packaged-tours* BEA.’s main
assault on the market, however, was decided upon in February, 1969, 
namely the formation of a non-IATA charter subsidiary, BEA Airtours, 
to compete with the Independents on their own terms, In the 3ong
6 5. ’Aeroplane • , 8/7 / 6 5 , p.9Ï ’Flight• , 1 3 /V 6 ?, p.539.
run, Airtours aimed to capture 20/ of UK .inclusive-tour traffic. 
Equipped initially with seven Comet ¿-Es, purchased from its parent- 
company and replaced during 1972/73 by ex-BOAC '¡>07~k'j>Cs t the company 
had sold "the larger part" of its capacity to travel companies by
,  CkJune, 1969» nine months before it was due to start operations.
Early results were similarly encouraging for the public operator.
In its first year, Airtours carried 650,000 passengers (12/ of the 
UK-originating European IT market) and reported a profit of £15^,000; 
the following year 7^6,000 passengers were carried, although profit 
fell slightly to £1^5,086. J  A move on such a scale by a 
national flag-carrier (and BSA was not the only European airline to 
establish a charter subsidiary at this time) into a field tradition­
ally regarded as a near-monopoly for the private sector clearly 
presented a potentially very serious threat to the Independents.
The second problem that faced the travel industry was the fact 
that while traffic recovered and resumed a rapid rate of growth, 
profit margins slumped dramatically from about 1970. The main 
'explanation for the increasing losses lay not with the airlines, 
but with the tour promoters. The degree of competition among the 
latter had risen dramatically,with companies attempting to stimulate
6^. ’Flight1, 5/6/69, p.9*6.
65» BEA Annual Reports; there seems to be some doubt as to the strict 
accuracy of these profit figures. Almost everyone I spoke to 
in the independent airlines claimed to have certain ’proof* that
Airtours is cross-subsidised by BSA in some way, especially with 
regard.to the.capital cost of its equipment. Perhaps the fact 
that the private sector is so vciciferous in its criticism . 
indicates the potential threat it sees to its own position in 
the formation of Airtours. During 1972/73 Airtours carried 
873,219 passengers and made a profit of £2$?,CCD, a return on 
average net assets of 1^.7/. British Airways has'also recently 
established ’Enterprise Holidays’ to compete with. Clarksons 
and Thomsons in the lower-priced holiday market., British 
Airways Annual Report, 1972/73, p»115»
demand and increase their own share of the market by keeping
prices as low as possible. Aggregate figures published by the
ATLB for 57 of the largest tour operators showed that turnover
grew from £105 million in 1969 to £ 1^0 million in 1970 and £170
.million the following year. A profit of £1.57 million in 1969»
however, deteriorated into losses of £ 1.62 million and £ 8.67
66million over the same period. Further, on the whole it was
the larger operators who incurred the biggest losses. Clarksons
was probably the principal loss-maker, but far from the only one.
Both Thomsons and Lunn Poly were said to have lost well over
£500,000 each during 1970; one executive described Lunn Poly as
67"building up to a crescendo of mess", The ATLB warned that
"the steady downward dive of our prices will affect 
the charter rates -for aircraft and thus weaken the 
finances of airlines. Bankruptcies, too, may occur 
amongst tour organisers... The Board is now receiving 
representations from airlines about the serious inroad 
that is being made upon their revenues. The ambitions 
of the big tour organisers ana the natural desires of 
the travelling public will have to be tempered by this 
important consideration." 68 .
The inevitable result of such a situation was pressure on the
tour operators to cut margins closer ana closer, leaving little in
reserve to meet any unexpected problem that might arise. Hence
the spate of complaints from IT customers that hit the headlines
during 1971/72. For the airlines, schedules were often so tight
that a single delay could have a cumulative effect for hours or
even days afterwards. To a large extent, however, it might be
said that the industry created its own problems, Several of the
larger companies had clearly decided upon a low-price/high-volume
policy in order to stimulate demand, and perhaps even force some
of the smaller operators out of business, (despite the ease with
66. ATLB Annual Report, 1971/72» p'.lA 5 'The Times', 8/11/72.
67. Ellison: 'Scheduled Air Fares - Has Hiaoi the Answer?’ 
Unpublished paper, 1971» Charter« Institute of Transport;
'The Sunday Times* 29/10/72, p.19*
68. 'ATLB Annual Report, 1970/71, p.5-6.
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v/hich new companies can enter the packaged-holiday market). Kr.
Tom Gullick of Clarksons argued:
"The revolution in travel is by no means over.
Bigger profits lie ahead for us all. But let us get 
more people abroad before we start worrying about 
how the fruits of victory should be shared." 69
In other words: "We must beat the iron while it is hot, but we
may polish it at leisure" (Bryden). Unfortunately, the policy
came rather badly unstuck. "There is no doubt," said Kr. Syd
Silver, head of AS Travel (Horizon's low-cost subsidiary), "that
this price war has bitten much more deeply than any of us realised . " ^ 0
Faced with such a policy, however, the airlines acting individually
in the highly competitive IT charter market,especially those not
directly associated with tour promoters, had little hope of pushing
air charter rates back to a more profitable level. As Kr. Adam
Thomson, chairman of British Caledonian, pointed out:
"In the absence of effective price control, great 
purchasing power has been placed in the hands of tour 
organisers ana, while more than adequate capacity 
remains available for IT charters, tour organisers have 
effective control of rates." 71
Clarksons were the archetype of a successful packaged-tour 
company in the late~19o0s, setting their sights firmly on the 
"down-market," aiming at volume rather than profit* To a large 
extent, therefore, Clarksons mirrored and magnified the short­
comings of the industry as a whole. A very rapid rate of growth 
succeeded only in producing a considerable financial loss, up to 
£5 per holiday sold against a ,traditional, profit on packaged- 
holidays of £1 per capita, The sheer weight of the increased traffic 
volume seems to have proved too much for the company's managerial
69. 'Financial Times', 15/10/71, p.21.
70. Ibid., 2A/5/72.
71. 'The Changing Shape of Air Transjort in the 19?Cs’. Th_e 
Aeronautical Journal, 1973, p.127.
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structure, leading eventually to near-collapse. Clarksons’ owners, 
Shipping and Industrial Holdings, blamed the losses on two 
weaknesses:
. "First,in decisions on prices and other operational 
factors taken some time ago, and secondly on the 
explosive increase in the inclusive tours trade which 
proved too large for the organisational controls of 
the company."
Changes in relative currency alignments and adverse press criticism 
served only to exacerbate the situation, while ClarJcsons also succeed­
ed in alienating large sections of the retail travel trade, which 
accounts for 80/ of total inclusive-tour sales.' Thomsons, on the 
other hand, were rather more fortunate (or had better management) 
and by 1972 had replaced Clarksons as market-leaders.
• The remaining problems that faced the UK travel industry stemmed 
ironically from the very success of the winter holiday experiment.
The popularity of such tours caught everyone by surprise, and the 
number sold increased drmatically each year. But in the long run 
low-price winter inclusive-tours can only be viable as long as most 
fixed costs are covered by the full-price summer traffic. It soon 
became evident that the rate of growth of summer ITs was slowing ■ 
down, perhaps even grinding to a halt. For example, while total 
summer bookings taken between September, 1971 » and February, 1972, 
remained virtually static (they rose by less than 1/), winter 
holiday bookings over the same period increased by 75/» Early signs 
suggest that IT growth during the summer of 1975 will be less than 
5/ *
"All this would be fine if tour operators insured that 
their winter business was profitable,..«or at least 
contributed sufficiently, to overheads to improve summer 
profits. Unfortunately this has not worked out for all 
but a handful of companies." 73
?2. «Financial Times', 1?/10/?2 and 26/5/72, pJ<6.
73. Mr. Wilf Jones, managing director of Cosmos Tours. 'Financial
Times', 2/6/72, p.1* Unlike the losses incurred on summer ITs, tho 
during the winter appear to have mainly fallen on the smaller 
companies. The latter account for some 60/ of the winter market,
while over half of the summer traffic is handled by the big four 
oreratcro -Clerk sc ns, Thomsens, Harmon and Uorir.on.
The obvious conclusion to be drawn, therefore, was that a large 
number of tourists were taking their holidays during the winter 
months in preference to the summer. The downturn was especially 
noticeable during the so-called "shoulder months' of the season. 
Alternatively, there is some evidence to suggest that summer holidays 
were being spent in the UK and winter ones abroad. In other words, 
important changes were taking place in the country's holiday habits, 
few of which for once seemed to be evolving, initially at least, in 
a way that would benefit the tour promoters.
For the airlines, the growth of winter holidays naturally led 
to substantial increases in aircraft utilisation rates. Up to a 
point, this could only improve an operator's profitability. But 
it seems that the trend may have gone too far. Cne airline, for 
example, claims to have achieved an annual utilisation rate of some 
*»,000 hours on certain aircraft; when the aircraft in question 
were first introduced they were profitable at 2,300 hours, and a 
normal target level might be about 3,500. An excessively high level 
inevitably creates the danger of an insufficient margin in case any­
thing goes wrong, and delays can be very expensive. Reid and Allen 
note:
"More intensive use of aircraft reduces unit costs 
since fixed costs are spread over a longer operating period, 
though there is a level of annual utilisation beyond which 
rapidly rising maintenance costs (and the likelihood of 
delays - B.H.)make further use uneconomic." 7*»
Some independent airlines may well have reached that level.
One of the few bright spots for the travel industry appears 
to be the fact that previous failings are now fully recognised and 
steps are underway to correct them. Extensive managerial changes 
have been made throughout the industry, while most companies raised 
their 1973 prices by between 10 and 20% (representing a real in-
74. 'Nationalized Industries', 1970, p.157*
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75crease of up to 1C% ) . In addition, recent legislation' has 
brought the licensing of tour promoters as v/ell as airlines under 
the control of the Civil Aviation Authority and seems likely to 
result in closer scrutiny of the whole industry. "It looks as 
though," concluded a Thomson spokesman, "we are entering some 
semblance of a period of stability within the industry, in which 
prices can be allowed to reach realistic levels and proper attention 
can be given by all to the quality of holidays." Whether or 
not increased prices will have any major effect on demand (which 
they should if inclusive-tours are indeed as price elastic as is 
claimed, unless incomes rise rapidly) will have to be seen. For 
those independent airlines not closely associated with holiday 
interests, however, the major threat to their IT traffic appears 
to be the growth of competition from the principal European 
scheduled carriers (see below).
75* ’The Civil Aviation (Air Travel Organisers’ Licensing) 
Regulations 1972', No. 222.
76. ’The Financial Times,' 10/ 8/7 2 , p 10.
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Part B Affinity-Groups
As in the case of intra-European inclusive-tours,the exploita­
tion of the long-haul affinity-group (or closed-group) concept only 
really got under way on a large scale during the second half of the 
1960s. The development of this market in the UK was closely 
associated with a single independent airline , Caledonian Airways.
It was Caledonian that first realised and attempted to meet the huge 
latent demand that existed for relatively cheap air transport between 
North America and Europe:
MIt has always been the aim of Caledonian, even before 
the formation of the company, to develop North Atlantic 
inclusive tours along the lines of those pioneered by 
British independent airlines and tour operators in Europe 
with one essential and very important difference - that 
North Atlantic tours could be originated from both sides 
of the ocean." 77
In fact, of course, affinity-group charters rather than IT charters 
accounted for overwhelmingly most of the traffic carried by airlines such 
as Caledonian. European IT and general charters were also operated, 
but Caledonian’s main emphasis has almost always been on the North 
Atlantic.
The explanation for the lack of success of packaged-holidays on 
the European model across the North Atlantic lies primarily in the 
restrictions imposed by the US regulatory authorities. Certainly, 
there is little reason to suppose that a demand for such tours does 
not exist, and indeed they were fairly common in the United States 
before the war (see above). In order to protect the scheduled carriers, 
however, the Civil Aeronautics Board now requires that an inclusive- 
tour must be at least seven days in duration and stop in a minimum of 
three cities, each 50 miles or more apart, and that the total price is 
no less than 110% of the lowest available scheduled service fare over
* „
77* Mr. Adam Thomson; ’Aeroplane’, 31/5/66» P«15»
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the same routes. This makes the economies that result from 
bulk buying and the application of system design extremely difficult 
to achieve, and since most of the holiday traffic on the North 
Atlantic .originates in the United States, the demand for packaged- 
tours has been severely restricted. The failure of the scheduled 
airlines to provide cheap air transport, therefore, led to the 
popularity of the less rigidly controlled affinity-group charter 
market.
The idea for a company such as Caledonian seems to have origin­
ated with a group of British Eagle employees in North America, and in 
particular with Mr. John de la Haye. As we have seen, Eagle had also 
been primarily interested in the North Atlantic market; it had in
fact applied to the ATAC for licences to operate inclusive-tours on
79these routes as early as 1957« But for a number of reasons Eagle
failed to fully exploit the potential demand that clearly existed. De 
la Haye and his associates realised the possibilities and set about 
establishing their own specialised, low-cost charter airline. Finance
came mainly from Mr. Max Wilson, who operated cheap flights from
SoLuxembourg to Lourenco Marques (for South Africa), although 
capital requirements were minimised by extensive leasing and outwork 
agreements. The initial groundwork put in by Eagle proved to be an 
important factor in Caledonian's success. Equally, however, the 
airline was probably fortunate in choosing the right market at
78. Stratford: 'Air Transport Economics in the Supersonic Era*,
1973» P«198; see also Thomka-Gazdic: "Are Inclusive Tour Charter 
Scheduled or non-Scheduled Services 1, in McWhinney and Bradley (e 
'The Freedom of the Air', 1968, p.115-116.
79. 'Flight', 22/3/57, p.360. ' /
80. Wilson had previously used Overseas Aviation (Channel Islands) 
before its collapse, and indeed initially Caledonian occupied 
the bankrupt airline's premises. Wilson relinquished his 
majority shareholding in 1962. Mr. Adam. Thomson, previously 
deputy managing director, took over executive control from de 
la Haye in 1964. Ibid., 21/12/61, p. 968, et.al.
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the right time. In 1961, Hr. Ralph Cohen of IATA forecast:
"...little by little the upward trend in the standard 
of living in many countries is approaching the descending 
curve of airline fares,'and when they meet, there will 
be an explosion of tourism such as the world, has never 
seen before." 81
It appears that this is exactly what happened in the United S t a t e s ,
except that charter air fares were reduced to such an extent in a very
short period of time that they came within the reach of even the lower
income groups. In particular, the post-war population 'bulge' had,
by the late-1960s, resulted in the large-scale expansion of that
most mobile of the low income groups, students, who formed a large
proportion of the affinity-group market.
Caledonian received Presidential approval for a CAB foreign air
carrier permit in June, 1963» the first such permit issued for charter
operations. An initial sales drive in Canada and the United States
82— during 1963 was described as a "resounding success." From then on
the airline went from strength to strength, recording very rapid
increases in the number of passengers carried and in the size of its
fleet. Between 1965 and 1969 Caledonian's available capacity expanded
by 328.1%, compared with a non-scheduled capacity increase of ^5 *7%
by BUA and 7 8.5% by UK airlines as a whole. Its UK-USA charter
passenger traffic grew from some 1 5 ,0 0 0  in 1967 to almost 13 2 ,0 0 0  by
19 70, representing 2 k , 9% of the total market, against 3 9*9% for all 
83 .UK airlines. In addition, unlxke many privately-owned operators in 
similar circumstances, a rapid rate of growth was accompanied by 
relatively healthy profits (See tables 10.6 and 10.7)* By 1970» of 
course, Caledonian had become one of the two largest British independ­
ent airlines, capable of absorbing BUA to form the so-called 'second 
force*.
81. Quoted b y  Emery: ' T h e  Role of the US G o v e r n m e n t  a n d  U S  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
Air Carriers in Commercial Air Transportation over the North 
Atlantic.' Journal of the Royal Aeronautical Society,1962, p.56 3.
82. 'Flight', .27/6/6 3, P.1010 and 5/12/63.^*991* S3 . IbxdV, 2^/ 10/7 0 , $ .6 3 5  and 3/2/7 2 , p,l64.
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Table 10.6: CALEDONIAN AIRWAYS' TRAFFIC, 1963 - 1970.
Passengers Carried Passenger-Miles Performed (000
Inclusive-
Tours
Other Sep­
arate Fare 
Charters
Inclusive-
tours
Other Separate 
Fare Charters
1963 2 1 , 0 0 1 16 ,8 9 6 19,454 35,529
1964 59,336 2 2 ,3 0 2 57,601 5 8 , 1 1 1
1963 53,048 39,117 53,854 108,795
1966 69,378 5 2 ,8 7 8 74,322 169,440
1967 80,933 58,792 8 6 ,0 19 184,491
1968 8 7 ,8 16 85,159 87,343 334,713
1969 403,796 264,332 329,675 793,057
1970 447,270 339,323 399,929 1,334,446
Sources: Board of Trade: 'Operating and Traffic Statistics of
UK Airlines.'
Board of Trade (Department of Trade and Industry):
Business Kinitor, Civil Aviation Series
Table 10.7: Caledonian Airways' Financial Results, 1962/63 -
1969/7 0 (¿7 '
Revenue Pre-tax Profits
1962/63 966,947 2 8 , 1 1 8
1963/64 2,310,585 90,614
1964/65 3,400,000 86,883
19 6 5/6 6 4,605,512 205,085
19 6 6 /6 7 3 ,800,000 12 5 ,0 0 0
19 6 7 /6 8 6 ,000 ,000 22 0 ,0 0 0
1968/69 1 2 ,3 6 1 ,8 6 0 641,513
1969/70 1 6 ,6 9 7 ,059 549,544
Source : 'Flight' various dates; some figures rounded
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Growth and Abuse
Both Britannia and Caledonian, therefore, share a number of
common features: they were both pioneers in their own fields;
they both experienced very rapid rates of growth; and they v/ere
both, by airline standards, very profitable undertakings. Like
Britannia also, Caledonian attracted a number of imitators.
Firstly, several new airlines were established, such as Donaldson and
Lloyd International, specialising in long-haul charters, especially
affinity-groups. Secondly, many of the operators that had previously
concentrated on intra -European packaged-holidays or scheduled
services were atr acted by the profits and traffic potential of
the North Atlantic routes. By early 1971 almost every major British
Independent had received a CAB foreign carrier permit for charter
operations: British Midland, BUA, Britannia, Caledonian, Channel,
Dan-Air, Donaldson, Laker and1 Lloyd. Inevitably, competition on
this scale (and several Continental and American non-scheduled
carriers were also jumping on the bandwagon) adversely affected
Caledonian, whose share of the UK-USA charter market fell to 19.1/
S kin 1971 (from almost 23% the previous year). A major factor in 
the success of the private airlines in the long-haul market must 
have been the ready availability of a large number of surplus 
Boeing 707s and DC-8s, as the major flag-carriers re-equipped with 
7^7 •Jumbo’ jets.
The principal sufferers, of course, have been the scheduled 
operators, whose share of the North Atlantic market fell from 
to 78% between 19 6 3 and 1971 (see Table 10.8). According to IATA, 
at the present (1971) rate of growth charter traffic will have a 
30% share of the trans-Atlantic passenger market by 197^5 if the
8*1. Ibid., 3/2/72, p.16^; Britain’s share of the market rose from 39»9.
in 1970 to well over 50/  in 1971.
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situation is allowed to continue scheduled airlines would inevitably 
have to reconsider their future, "and specifically whether they will
be able to maintain a scheduled service operation on acceptable
' S 5economic conditions." An alternative way of looking at the
problem is the fact that between 1963 and 1971 the average annual
growth rate for non-IATA charter services on the North Atlantic
exceeded 5S°/ot compared with 15.2/ for IATA scheduled services and
8612.¿1 % for IATA charter operations. In addition, the Independents
also began to enter other long-haul markets, especially that to 
Australia and South-East Asia. One Australian source estimated the 
loss to the BOAC/^antas pool due to charter activity at £11 million 
in 1970. In this case, however, the Government took action and
allowed BOAC and British Caledonian to sell seats on charter flights
directly to individual members of the public, suspending any group-
87membership requirement (see Chapter XII).
. Table 10.8: NORTH ATLANTIC TABS ENGEIi TRAFFIC, 1963-1971
(percentage shares) •
I AT A IATA Non-IATA
Scheduled Charter Charter
1963 Bk Ik 2
1965 Bk 11 5
1967 83 9 8
1969 73 10 17
1970 7k 8 18
1971 68 10 22
1972 72 1 1 17
Nb. does not include figures for non-IATA scheduled services, 
amounting to 2• 3?« of total in 197?.
Source: IATA. .
85.
86
8 7 .
Ibid., 2/3/72, p.312.
IATA: •Agreeing Pares and Kates’, 1973» p»237.
•Flight’ 12/8/71» p.2^2.* The Government thus found itself in 
the ludicrous position of trying to police affinity-groups, 
while at the same time authorising, and therefore officially
n o t  c o n i c r m  t 0
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It might be relevent at this point to mention Hr. Freddie 
Laker's latest innovation, the Skytrain. If licensed by the 
American CAB, Laker intends to operate a limited, 'no-frills’ 
scheduled service between London (Stansted) and New York, at 
prices not only considerably below normal scheduled fares, but 
probably also competitive with charter flights. Diversion of traffic 
from other scheduled operators is minimised by restrictions on 
capacity and by limiting the period during which tickets can be 
purchased to a few hours before departure. In other words, although 
operated on a regular basis and without any group-membership 
stipulation, the Skytrain is in effect a charter-operation, aimed 
specifically at that sector of the market unable to afford full 
fares, but prepared to accept a measure of inconvenience. Laker 
ordered two DC~10s mainly for the nev; project and has already 
received authorisation from the CAA. The economics of the Skytrain 
are illustrated in Table'10.9, although it is far too early to say 
whether the figures will in fact prove to be correct. It could 
v/ell be, however, that if the service becomes as popular as Laker 
has forecast, its very success will attract so many imitators that 
everyone will lose money.
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Table 10.9 : THE ECONOMIC!S OF THE LAKEH S KYTRAIN
(London-New York Heturn Fli ght).
Direct Operating Costs (£) 707 DC-10
Fuel 1 ,311 .6 6 1,678.14
Landing Fees 216.77 353.58
Handling Fees 708.88 1,066.54
Navaids 1 3 1 . 10 177.88
Custoras/Immigration/IIealth 125.28 160.92
Crew Hotel/Allowances/Catering 212.90 262.*! 5
Cost per return flight a £2,706.59 £3,639.51
Total Costs (£) 707 DC-10
Direct Operating Costs 2,706.59 3,639.51
Aircrew Costs 5527.9^ *06.71
Cabin Staff Costs 15^.06 256.73
Aircraft Depreciation* 995.64 5,716.70
Overhauls .1 ,238.0^ 1 ,810.00
Hull, Third-Party, Loss-of- 
Use and Spares Insurance 118.59 926.14
Training/Testing 44 . 30 103.09
ARB/CAA Fees 10.28 18.53
Ticket Sales 56.96 113.93
Advertising 136.61 273.23
General Overheads 577.75 693.30
Legal Fees in Connection
with CAA Application 28.96 28.96
Cost per flight = £6,595.72 £14,016.83
Average net fare «s £63.98 £63.98
Passengers required to
break-even - 10 3 .2 219.4
Break-even load-factor 6 3.6/
* = for 707s, cost of hiring aircraft.
Assumptions: 3,272 hours per aircraft annual utilisation; average 
return flight time of 14.48 hours (chock to chock);
241 flights in summer, 211 in winter. Calculated 
at mid-1972 prices.
Source: »Flight* 27/7/72, p.116-117.
268
The closed-group concept was blatantly and widely abused.
Despite attempts to close the loopholes in the regulations in I960, 
as the decade wore on the whole system became more and more of a 
farce. Under British lav/, in order to take advantage of the low 
fares offered to affinity-group passengers, an individual had to be 
a member for a minimum period of six months of a club or society, the 
primary purpose of which was not simply to supply cheap travel to 
members. But such rules were very difficult to enforce, and travel 
agents and airlines v/ere easily able to establish phoney clubs and 
issue back-dated membership cards to ordinary members of the public. 
Thus, a Mr. White reported:
"We thought we were flying out yesterday. We were 
given forms to join the Dark Preservation Society of 
America. We didn't leave because the flight v/as over­
booked. ■ So today v/e v/ere told to join the Shakespearian 
Dramatic Society." 88 .
Illegal charters such as these v/ere widely advertised in the press, 
and there seemed little that the Government could do about them, 
apart from the occasional well-publicised raid by officials, and 
subsequent flight cancellation. One of the most important protective 
barriers erected around scheduled services, therefore, had been 
breached. But really the national flag-carriers had only themselves 
to blame. The rules governing affinity-group charters dated back to 
an IATA traffic conference in 1953» which adopted the famous 
Resolution 0^5 (this also included restrictions on IT prices, known 
in the UK as Provision I). Resolution 0^5 permitted IATA members to 
enter into agreements
"with one person on behalf of a group, whose principal aims, 
purposes and objectives are other than travel, and where the 
group has sufficient affinity existing prior to the applica­
tion for charter transportation to distinguish it and set it
apsart from the general public."
88. 'Flight', 3/ 2/ 7 2 . p.202.
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The vagueness of this statement led the Director General of IATA
to urge "the members to clarify what they intended." Unfortunately,
he was forced to report that "after hours of discussion, it was
decided that the language just quoted should remain on the books,
89although no one had a clear idea as to exactly what it meant." This
lack of clarity on the part of IATA became embodied in national 
legislation, and hence the problems of the late-1960s.
Difficulties
To a greater or lesser extent, the mass entry of the UK inde­
pendent airlines into the long-distance affinity-group market proved 
to be a near-disaster. Despite Caledonian's success, and the very 
rapid growth of USA-Europe air charter traffic, few Independents 
managed to earn profits. The principal explanation is not difficult 
to discover. Most of the private carriers had specialised in short- 
haul operations, usually intra-European inclusive-tours; they had 
little experience of the peculiarities and demands of long-haul air 
transport. Although quite large in terms of the average European IT 
operator, when compared with some of the charter airlines flying the 
North Atlantic, especially the American supplementals, the UK 
Independents appeared very small fry. Most had only one or two long- 
haul aircraft, a fleet size far below the economically optimum. In 
addition, they were entering one of the most competitive air markets 
in the world, with the level of competition increasing almost daily, 
particularly as a result of the diversion of capacity from the 
Pacific by the American supplementals w i t h t h e  de-escalation of the 
Vietnam war. (Altogether there were probably some JC airlines oper­
ating between Europe and North America). Thus, any small carrier
89. IATA-'Bulletins, quoted'by Filial: "The Air Net", 19 6 9 » p.15^-5.
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attempting to operate long-haul intercontinental services will 
inevitably have an excessively high cost structure, especially when 
compared with larger airlines; if, in addition, the long-haul 
market is characterised by a very high level of competition, the 
result is often disastrous for the small operator.
The situation was made worse for the charter sector as a whole 
by the resurgence of competition from the scheduled airlines. This 
took two forms. Firstly, the flag-carriers inaugurated a policy of 
very low creative fares, such as special rates for travellers aged 
under 2 5 , in order to attract traffic onto their regular services 
from the charter companies. Secondly, they followed the example of 
several European operators (or extended their own practice from the 
intra-European to the inter-continental markets) and established 
non-IATA charter subsidiaries. The new non-scheduled airlines 
either took the form of completely separate units, as in the case of 
BEA Airtours or Lufthansa's Condor, or of paper-companies, hiring- 
all equipment and staff from parent carriers, such as BQAC's 
British Overseas Air Charter Ltd. There can be little doubt of the 
success of the new strategy. BOAC Ltd., for example, earned £15 
million in revenue during its first year of operations, kb% above 
target; it contributed over £*)-.5 million to BOAC's overall finan­
cial position, half of its 2,2^9 flights being performed across the 
North Atlantic. ^  Non-IATA transatlantic charter traffic actually 
fell in 1972 for the first time for many years, while that carried 
on 1ATA. scheduled and charter services recorded both absolute and 
relative gains (see Table 10.8). According to IATA:
90. 'Financial Times', 2/A/73» p.^«
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"The figures demonstrate quite clearly that the 
IATA airlines have made a break-through in the 
provision of low-cost air travel for the mass vacation 
and pleasure-travel public, and are in fact already 
meeting the broad public demand and the various 
Governments’ objectives." 91
The combination of excessive competition and an inherently un­
favourable cost structure led most of the UK independent airlines to 
abandon their long-haul charter aspirations. During 1971/72 British 
Midland’s two Boeing 707s lost some £850,000, and BMA eventually
withdrew from the trans-Atlantic market after gaining a £3«3 million
92contract to operate Sudan Airways’ long-distance flights. Similarly,
Britannia burnt its fingers badly and withdrew, leasing its two 707s
to British Caledonian. The latter company itself, the pioneer UK
airline in the field, drastically cut-back its 1973 trans-Atlantic
charter programme from £8 million to million, because of increased
93competition and uneconomic rates. The rules governing affinity- 
groups were also more strictly enforced, especially by the CAB, and 
several carriers were fined. The fact that the trend in the European 
IT market was increasingly for holidays to be spent further afield 
made the retrenchment of companies such as Britannia doubly unfortun­
ate; already the exploitation of resorts in East Africa and the 
Caribbean is well under way. Ironically, the one major Independent 
that did not enter the long-haul charter market, Court, is probably 
now in the most favourable position to take advantage of the trend 
towards longer-distance ITs . Court has extensive hotel and air trans­
port interests in the Caribbean and in the UK recently purchased the 
Atlas group of companies, including the Airfair subsidiary, claimed 
to be Britain's largest independent Advanced Booking Charter organisa­
tion. Airfair's total capacity on the North Atlantic during 1973 will
91. Ibid., 8/1/73» P.27. : : : : ~~ —
92. 'Flight', 1/2/73, p.1^6 and 1/3/73, p.280.
93. Ibid., 5 / V 7 3 ,  P.530.
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amount to some 4-0,000 round-trip seats, mainly on BCAL and Pan Am 
93a
flights. In addition, of Court's three Tristar options still
outstanding, the final two will probably be long-range versions 
capable of crossing the Atlantic non-stop. (Court's current Tristars 
occasionally fly to the Caribbean, but have to re-fuel in the Azores).
In other words, Court appears to be in a position to minimise any 
cost disadvantage by operating a reasonably sized fleet of similar 
aircraft, and at the same time to have purchased a company with a 
sufficient number of passengers to fill those aircraft.
Early in 1973 an agreement was finally reached by the US Civil
Aeronautics Board and the UK Civil Aviation Authority on a formula
that would both meet the growing social pressures for cheap air travel
and stem the wide-spre.ad abuse of affinity-group charters, namely the
introduction of Advanced Booking Charters (ABCs), known as Travel
Group Charters in America. Basically, any individual can purchase an
ABC seat, providing he does so at least 90 days in advance of the
departure date and remains abroad for a minimum period of l k  days
(10 in the winter)* Closed-group charters are, therefore, superseded,
although remaining in existence for genuine affinity-groups. A typical
ABC rate is that offered by B0AC Ltd. of from £58 return between
London and New York, compared with Laker Skytrain's £75 end the cheapest
peak 22-44 day economy excursion fare on a scheduled service of about
£125* After strong protests from the American supplementals, however,
the CAB refused to accept the CAA's proposals for Advanced Purchase
Excursions (APEX) and their associated part-charter rates, similar to
BOAC's 'Earlybird* fares on cabotage routes - in other words, the
blocking-off of a section of each scheduled aircraft's seating capacity 
and its sale to a travel organiser at low cost. APeX seats would be
93a. ibid., 17/5/75, p . 7 3 0 Financial Times', 9/5/73, p.12.
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sold in the same way as ABCs and were designed to enable the
94scheduled operators to compete with charters. But the possibility
still exists that these rates will in fact be introduced in the fore­
seeable future. In its 1971/72 Annual Report BOAC commented that 
"it is high time that a degree of sanity and a semblance of order 
were restored" in the chaotic situation surrounding trans-Atlantic air 
fares. This is exactly what the regulatory authorities have attempted 
to' achieve, although whether they have been successful, and in 
particular whether new loopholes in the lav/ can be found, is as yet 
impossible to answer.
Conclusion
Tourism has been.one of the key growth industries since the end
-of-the Second World War. The British independent airlines have played
an important part in developing the industry, and in turn have been
greatly affected by it. Few of the privately-owned operators today
would be viable v/ithout the income obtained from holiday charters.
There seems little reason to suppose that the rapid expansion of
international tourism will not continue into the foreseeable future.
Certainly, a very large potential market exists; almost 4-0/ of the
adult population of Great Britain do not take holidays away from home
each year, and the proportion is higher in most other Western European 
95countries. Intra-European charter traffic is expected to exceed 
domestic scheduled traffic in Europe by 1980, when it will- probably 
number some 63 million passengers annually. A number of recent fore­
casts have indicated a continuation of the strong position already 
held by the inclusive-tour in Europe and beyond. A study undertaken 
by the British Aircraft Cor oration estimated that by 1973 approxim-
94. 'Financial Times', 10/3/7^i p.lb.
95» Peters, op.cit., p.8 .
ately 4,800,000 holidaymakers will travel on IT charter flights 
operated by UK airlines, and that two out of every seven will travel 
in the winter season. With foreign airlines contributing a further 
10%, the national total should be approaching 5*300,000. BAC fore­
cast a 20% annual growth during the early 1970s, falling-to 17% by 
1975 and 11% thereafter . 7 The Economist Intelligence Unit's estima­
tion, on the other hand,’ is that ex-UK IT sales will increase from over
2.8 million in 1971 to almost 6 million by 1980, with a similar slow-
97ing down m  the second half of the 1970s. Finally, recent calcula­
tions based on modified Roskill estimates suggest that over the next 
twenty years total air traffic between the UK and Europe and within 
the UK will increase 6.6-times, while IT traffic will record a 9 ‘5-
fold growth; in other.words, the IT proportion of total traffic will
98.increase from 45% to 60%. ... . Similarly, of course, rapid rates of 
growth can be expected in other holiday markets.
This does not mean, however, that the Independents will be able 
to maintain their share of the market. In particular, as we have 
seen, a major threat has developed from the scheduled carriers. Having 
stood back for many years and watched their prices under-cut and 
potential passenger traffic attracted away by the charter operators, 
the scheduled airlines at last stirred themselves into action* Their 
counter-attack, in the form of more competitive creative fares and 
the formation of charter subsidiaries, has proved remarkably 
effective. The smaller privately-owned operators stand little 
chance of surviving a price-war against the national flag-carriers, 
if one should develop. Further, recent developments bring into 
doubt the whole future growth pattern of packaged-holidays. Flans
96. 'The Times* 7/9/715 subsequent events suggest that the winter 
holiday estimate may be on the conservative side.
97» 'International Tourism Quarterly.' 1971* No.1, p.61.
98. Wilkinson{'Air Transport Develojrnent Between the UK and Europe - 
the Next Twenty Yearsi Aeronautical Journal, 1972, p.j44 .
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are being prepared to extend the ABC principal, and probably also
APEX and part-charters, to intra-European routes, as the Edwards
99Report recommended. Conceivably this could make the tour promoter
redundant, for with ABC or APEX fares and a suitable marketing
campaign by foreign hotel groups, it would be perfectly leasable for
an individual to organise his own packaged-holiday at a reasonable
price. But the greatest danger to the holiday airlines clearly
comes from part-charters on scheduled services. Already BSA has
experimented on flights to Spain and Portugal with an arrangement
whereby up to h0% of the capacity of a regular flight can be chartered
100in blocks of as few as ten seats at a time. If this experiment
were extended, in association with APEX fares, it would present the 
most serious challenge yet to-the IT charter airlines. The possibilities 
might well prove attractive to European air transport regulatory 
authorities, for such a plan would solve one of the most pressing 
current problems, namely the preservation of viable scheduled service 
networks. By 1971» for example, between Scandinavia and Spain $7%  
of total air traffic went by charter, and a number of scheduled %
101services had ^o be withdrawn. Thus, the future for the independ­
ent airlines in the field of international tourism is not as bright 
as it might have appeared a year or two ago.
99. p. 177.
100. 'The Economist,' 5/7/71 i P»?3} BEA also operates XPEX (Instant 
Purchase Excursions) to Scandinavia, where purchase of a ticket
, is limited to a few hours before take-off.
101. 'Financial Times', 29/9/72.
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Chapter XI
SCHEDULED SERVICES
The gradual expansion of the scheduled service networks operated 
by the British independent airlines since the war and the history 
of the licensing of those services have already been discussed. The 
purpose of this chapter is to examine scheduled services in more
*
general terms, especially in relation to the past and, more 
importantly, future development of the Independents.
A Change of Emphasis '
With the nationalisation of most of Britain’s air transport 
output at the end of the Second World War the remaining privately-owned 
operators were effectively limited to charter work. Such a position, 
however, proved to be untenable and gradually over the.years from 19^9 
the Independents have managed to obtain a fairly large share of 
scheduled service traffic as legislative restrictions were eased or 
removed. This has been basically true, as we have seen, irrespective of
’ i
the political party in power. As far as the Independents were concerned, 
throughout most of the period, in fact until the mid-1960s, it remained 
an unwritten law that the higher the proportion of scheduled activity 
in their total output the better. The most important factor in the 
efficient and profitable operation of an air transport company was, and 
remains, a regular, steady stream of business, with as little peaking of 
traffic and as few slack periods as possible. In theory, scheduled 
services met these requirements, offering both relative security and 
higher revenues. Most charter flying, on the other hand, was unreliable,
did not guarantee a high rate of utilisation of equipment, was very 
sensitive to business depressions and, because of the particularly
2 7 ?
competitive nature of the work, resulted in low revenue yield and 
profitability. Thus, a purely charter airline could expect to have 
an average life expectancy considerably less than that of companies 
that achieved a mixture of charter and scheduled traffic. The aim 
of most independent carriers, therefore, was to obtain licences to 
operate scheduled services.
It must be emphasised, of course, that such a statement is a
generalisation and that the better performance of the scheduled operators
was only relative. The services they were permitted to fly were hedged
with restrictions, and partly as a result the airlines operating them
experienced a high level of instability. For example, according to one
estimate, between 19^5 and i960 some 58 private carriers attempted to
run UK domestic scheduled services, and *15 actually succeeded, of which
by 1969 only two were still in existence under the same ownership. Of
the remaining 56 airlines, 9 were still'operating, but had been taken-
over by other companies, while the remaining k 7 had disappeared. It
was not until the passing of the Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act in i960
that the Independents were given the opportunity of competing on a relatively
equal basis with the Corporations and of creating viable route networks.
* •
Previously their regular services had been concentrated on the highly- 
peaked 'holiday' routes. The main exception to this rule, apart from 
vehicle air-ferries, had been the development of certain 'cut-price' 
services, such as Colonial Coach or Coach-Air operations. To a large 
extent, these were introduced as a direct result of the restrictions 
imposed by the Government. In other words, the private airlines were 
forced to. search for new, unexploited sectors of the air transport market 1
1 . 'Flight', 3/V69, p.507.
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to develop, and the outcome usually took the form of a service of 
lower than normal standard (in terms of journey time, frequency, type 
of aircraft, etc.) at a considerably lower fare.
During the mid-1980s, however, a significant change occurred in 
the attitude of the Independents towards the relative importance of 
scheduled services. This resulted almost totally from the very rapid 
growth of inclusive-tour and affinity-group charters, as described in
the previous chapter. Two related developments took place. Firstly, a
.  *
number of highly specialised IT and affinity-group operators were
established, concentrating almost entirely on holiday traffic and usually
closely associated with one or more tour promoters; such companies as
Britannia, Caledonian, Monarch, Laker, and so forth. Secondly, other
airlines, such as BMA, Dan-Air or Channel Airways, that had previously
aimed at as high a level of scheduled activity as possible, began to
divert a much larger proportion of their resources to IT and, later,
affinity-group operations. There took place, therefore, an important
and radical change in the make-up and orientation of the UK private
sector. A completely new type of airline emerged and the previous close
association of scheduled services with relative stability and profitability
was brought into doubt, if not reversed. IT work expanded to such an extent 
* »
that it could now provide the regular, steady flow of traffic necessary 
for viable air transport operation, although severe competition often 
reduced prices and profits. The most successful airlines in the second 
half of the I96O5 in terms of growth , and even profitability! were those
with a large proportion of their total output centred on the holiday 
market (see Table 10.5).
Britannia was the original airline to specialise in IT charters.
But the change of emphasis among the Independents is probably best 
illustrated by the decision of Autair (Court) to abandon scheduled 
services completely, briefly referred to in Chapter-X. Autair, a fairly
2 7 9
typical scheduled carrier among the UK private airlines, began fixed-
wing air transport operations on a charter basis in I960, although it
had previously flown helicopters. Towards the end of I963 the company
received its first licence from the ATLB for a scheduled service,
between Luton and Blackpool. Over the following few years the route
network gradually expanded until by 1969 it also included London, Tees-
side, Dundee, Carlisle, Hull, Belfast, Dublin and Amsterdam, representing
some 12$ of Autair*s total turnover. In 196*+ the airline carried
11»657 passengers (1,805,000 passenger-miles) on regular services, compared
with 7 8 ,3 18  (17«953»000) by 1968. But most of the routes operated, with
the noteable exception of the London-Tees-side service, were unprofitable,
losing some £150,000 per annum by 1969. Consequently, the company applied
to the Government for a subsidy, in line with the recommendation of the
Edwards Committee that in certain circumstances regional domestic services
2should be financially supported from general taxation. Some help was 
received from the development areas, but the Government refused assistance, 
and as a result Autair announced that it would cease to operate any 
scheduled service from October 31st, 1969. J
During 1965 control of Autair had been acquired by the shipping 
company, Court Line. In fact, what seems to have happened is that the 
management of Autair realised the huge growth potential that existed in the 
IT market at a fairly early stage and decided to get in on the act. As 
the deputy chairman, G.H.G. Threlfall, said in early-1969, the IT business 
had changed radically and was expanding, booming and profitable, "therefore 
what incentive is there for airlines such as Autair also to be in the very
2. p.191; similarly, the Toothill Beport on the development of the Scottish 
economy had concluded in 1962; "We regard the provision of adequate air ser­
vices for business as a matter of such urgency to the satisfactory develop­
ment of the UK economy...that we would be prepared if necessary to recommend 
an outright subsidy to provide it." (p.67).
3. 'Air Pictorial», 1970, p.ll^-?} 'Flight*, 7/8/69, p.192-3.
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difficult and far from profitable domestic-service field," To fully 
exploit the packaged-holiday market, however, required finance, and hence 
the association with Court. It seems likely that the decision to abandon all 
scheduled services was taken some time before the application for a subsidy. 
Since then, of course, it has become more than evident that the management 
of Autair, and Court Line, made the correct decision. The airline has 
expanded extremely rapidly, becoming the largest IT operator in Britain, 
and even more important, it has consistently produced relatively^healthy 
profits, especially when compared with such operators as BMA or Channel 
Airways, who continued to fly a large number of scheduled services.
Route Patterns and BAS
With the formation of the nationalised Air Corporations all the main
trunk routes were naturally operated by BEA and BOAC. This has meant that
since the war the Independents have been limited to seasonal routes, such as
those to the Channel Islands, or to low-volume ’business' routes linking
provincial cities within the OK and in the UK and Continent. There have,
of course, been numerous exceptions to this general rule, especially since 19 &C
Eagle and BUA flew in competition with BEA on certain domestic routes; BUA 
' *
operated extensively in South America and Africa; BCAL now operates a 
large route network, including London-Paris and London-New York; and so 
forth. But with the exception of British Caledonian today (and soon 
perhaps also Laker) it is still basically true that the Independents' 
scheduled services are limited to 'secondary' routes. The principal 
operators are British Midland Airways, Dan-Air/Skyways, British Island 
Airways, Northeast'and Cambrian. : None of these companies operate 
scheduled services to points outside Europe and their main emphasis
it. 'Flight', 3 /V 69 , p.509.
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at present would appear to be the generation of traffic between
provincial cities in the UK and Europe. Of these scheduled airlines
the roost important, in terms of the future development of UK air transport,
are probably the two carriers within the British Air Services group,
Northeast (known as BKS Air Transport until November, 1970) and Cambrian,
with a combined fleet by 1972 of b 1-11 500s, 3 Trident 1Es and 16 
5Viscounts.
BEA has had a financial interest in Cambrian since 1958 and in
Northeast since 196*f, and has in fact saved both airlines from bankruptcy
and liquidation on more than one occasion (see Chapter III). British Air
Services (BAS) was formed in February, 1967* to look after BEA's interests
in these two operators, and the following November BKS and Cambrian became
wholly-owned subsidiaries of the new company. By the end of the decade BEA
owned 7 0 of the shares in BAS, the balance being in the hands of private
shareholders.^ There were a number of possible reasons for the Corporation’s
investment in two small regional carriers. They were intended, for example,
partly to act as 'feeder' airlines, feeding traffic from the thinner routes on
to BEA's trunk services. Similarly, each operator was closely identified.
with a particular region of the UK, potentially an important factor in
generating air traffic from thatarea. But the principal justification for 
’ *
the Corporation's interest is clearly to be found in the economic sphere.
Aircraft operating costs on short-haul air services rise quite
o
dramatically as sector distances decrease. These increased costs are 
usually only partly covered by higher fares per mile, with the result that 
few very short-haul services are profitable. BEA, for example, told the
5» BAS Annual Report, 1971/72, p.6.
6, Ibid., 1970/71, p.7-8.
7. To a large extent this reflects the greater number of landings and take­
offs, reduced utilisation of aircraft and crew, etc., as well as a 
non-optimum use of the aircraft.
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Select Committee on Nationalised Industries that no route of less 
than 260 miles (with the occasional exception of London-Paris)
O
could be viable. Thus, it has been accepted for some time that 
any airline will experience considerable difficulties earning profits 
on very short, low density routes, especially if the airline in 
question has the cost-structure of a major national flag-carrier. A 
small, specialised company, however, with low overheads and relatively 
old equipment would probably be better placed to operate such routes, if 
not at a profit, at least at a reduced loss. Wheatcroft, in particular, 
has expounded this argument:
"My view is that the advantages of specialisation 
enjoyed by the small airline will outweigh the advantages 
of larger scale which the bigger airline may have. Indeed, 
the larger size of-the major airline may be a positive 
disadvantage because of the difficulties of adjusting 
its operating and commercial practices to meet the special 
requirements of the secondary routes." 9
.In addition, by forming a holing company to control Cambrian and 
Northeast it might even be possible to achieve, at least to some 
extent, the best of both worlds - the advantages of specialisation 
and the economies of scale. For example, apart from any advantage 
to be derived from an association with 3EA, Northeast has been able to 
close down its Southend engineering base and transfer most of its a i r ­
craft maintenance to Cambrian’s facility at Khoose (Cardiff) Airport,
10while both airlines can make use of the same computer services.
The Edwards Committee recommended that the BAS principle 
be extended, with the possible inclusion of other airlines»
8 . 'The Air Corporations', 1958/59» p.xxvii.
9. 'Ten Economic Lessons from Short-Haul Airline Operations', Journal 
of the Royal Aeronautical Society, 1961, p.229. In his study of 
Canadian air transport, Wheatcroft similarly concludes: "In the 
operation of secondary routes an entirely different type of 
service can be provided and costs can be cut very considerably.
It is very difficult, however, for a major operator to mix this 
type of service with the normal mainline standard." 'Airline 
Competition in Canada', 1958, p.36.
10. 'Flight', 19/8/71, p.282\
283
"We believe that the best pattern of UK domestic 
services for secondary business routes and holiday routes 
would be achieved by having, under the umbrella of an 
organisation like BAS, several small operating units 
which assumed the responsiblity for developing services 
to and from and within a specified geographical area...
We would hope that, in addition to Cambrian and BKS, the 
operating companies of the BAS group would include a 
Channel Islands airline (amalgamating the present services 
of BUIA and BEA), a Scottish airline,...perhaps an Isle 
of Man airline, and an East Midlands airline." 1 1
So far there has been only a limited movement towards meeting these
recommendations. It has been an open secret that BHA was, and
perhaps still is, keen to join such a group. But BAS has argued
that BMA's financial position and route network are not conducive
to a take-over. The regional group did, however, investigate the
possibility of acquiring Channel Airways when the company went
bankrupt. Although no further action was taken, there would appear
to be at least some willingness to consider the purchase of further
private operators.
Despite the fact that no other independent airline has yet been 
acquired BAS is being considerably expanded, particularly as a result 
of the reorganisation of the nationalised sector following the 
establishment of a British Airways Board (BAB). In its 'First 
Report on Organisation' the BAB made two recommendations concerning 
BAS. Firstly, it was proposed that the latter should become a 
subsidiary of the Board rather than of BEAj in other words, a third 
Corporation in addition to BOAC and BEA, to be known as British 
Airways Regional Division. Secondly, the Scottish Airways and 
Channel Islands Airways Divisions of BEA should also come within the 
ambit of BAS . 1 2  Thus, since Channel Islands Airways also operates 
extensively from the Midlands, the BAS group will cover most of the 
regions within the UK.
1 1 . p. 109-110.
12. 1972, p.lOj see also: 'Second Report on Organisation', 1975,
p.7 and 9. '■:*
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Table 11.1 BAS RESULTS- 1969/70 - 1971/72
Revenue 
(£000s )
Operating
Profit
(Loss)£000s
Load ton- 
Miles (000s
Passengers
)Carried
Passenger- 
Miles (OCOe
19 6 9 /7 0 12,346* (1 ,900)* 34,259 1,239,058 372,055
19 7 0 / 7 1 11,119 230 39,089 1,433,294 410,976
19 7 1 / 7 2 13,271 62 47,179 1,593,637 476,060
* «s l8 month period., 19 6 8 /70
Source : BAS Annual Reports.
Airlines within the BAS group, therefore, are basically small
regional scheduled operators. They do engage in some IT charter work,
but mainly only in order to raise the utilisation of their jet aircraft
to viable levels . 1 -5 Not unexpectedly given the nature and average
stage-lengths of the routes operated, neither Cambrian nor Northeast,
particularly the latter, has proved to be a profitable investment for
BEA, at least judged in isolation. Although losses have been
replaced by marginal profits (see Table 11.1), BAS has yet to pay any
dividend on its share capital and still has an accumulated deficit of
almost £4.5 million, covered by an interest-free loan from BEA. The
interest on this loan would normally cost BAS an additional £250,000 -
15£50 0 ,0 0 0 per annum.
It would appear, therefore, that in future years BAS (or more 
correctly British Airways Regional Division), backed by the consider­
able financial and operational resources of the British Airways Group, 
will be the prime operator of secondary air transport routes within
13* Charter work has increased from 17% of total output in 19&8/70 
to 24% in 1971/72, and will probably rise further as more jets 
are acquired * BAS Annual Reports.
14. In other words, it might be valid to make allowance for any 
additional traffic gained by BEA or BOAC as a result of the 
activities of BAS. Similarly, it might well be that BEA would
have felt obliged to operate some BAS routes in its own right had 
the regional group not existed.
1 5 . BAS Annual Report, 1971/72, p.8 *
2 8 5
Britain and between the UK and the Continent. What about the 
independent scheduled airlines? With some reservation, one must 
conclude that their future does not appear to be particularly bright. 
G.H.G. Threlfall has noted:
"It ocdurs to me that if airlines were forced to 
study the history of UK air services over the last 50 
years, they might then be slightly less keen on develop­
ing new domestic scheduled services themselves." 16
If the history of scheduled services operated by the Independents 
looks bleak, future prospects must seem even worse. Given the grow­
ing competition from surface carriers (see below), the only real 
growth areas are likely to be those services connecting provincial 
UK cities with European capitals and London with European provincial 
cities. Whether or not a small private airline would be able to 
construct a viable route network out of a series of such low-volume 
and disparate services appears doubtful. A more rational approach 
“would surely be to concentrate these types of operations within the 
Regional Division of British Airways. Nevertheless, some airlines 
remain optimistic, and there always appear to be new operators 
prepared to risk their hand. Companies such as BNA, despite the 
large losses incurred in recent years, argue that by utilising
• obsolescent aircraft of low capital cost, such as Viscounts, support­
ed by charter work, a viable scheduled operation is possible. BMA, 
gradually contracting its IT charter output, recently delivered its 
two BAC 1-11 500s to Transbrasil in exchange for three Handley Page 
Heralds; the latter will operate a new service linking London
• and Newquay.1^ Only the record of future bankruptcies can prove 
whether such a policy is right or not.
16. »Flight», 3/ V 6 9 .  p.507.
17. Ibid.,19/7/73, p.85.
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Surface Competition
In discussing the future size and shape of the scheduled air 
service network in Britain a further factor must be taken into 
consideration, namely competition from other modes of transport. 
Increasingly over the years the car has become the dominant form of 
transport, especially for journeys of less than 100 miles. The 
railways have their greatest comparative advantage in passenger 
transport in the dense flows between conurbations within the 10 0 - 
300 mile bracket. Above 300 miles the speed advantage of the 
aeroplane becomes a predominant factor. Since the end of the 
Second World War, however, the distance over which rail enjoys a 
distinct advantage has gradually been eroded, from below by the 
car (aided by the motorway programme) and from &ove by aviation; 
the rail share of total passenger-mileage, for example, fell from 
1 9. in 1957 to 9*5?o in 196?« ^  But it may well be that with 
the introduction of the Advanced Passenger Train (APT) in the UK 
the railways will be able to regain some of the passengers they have 
lost to other modes of transport, and in particular to the short- 
haul airlines#
The APT has been described, perhaps somewhat optimistically, 
as the "biggest single advance in land transport technology that
IQ
has ever taken place." Ironically, it incorporates a good deal of
aerospace technology and almost one-third of the designers employed 
on the project at British Rail’s technical centre at Derby were 
recruited from the aircraft industry; B R ’s advertisements even 
proclaim: "It’s the only way to fly - by train." To reach speeds
18. Thompson and Hunter: "The Nationalized Transport Industries”,
1973, p.15^-5.
19. ’Flight’, 19/10/72, p.5^0.
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of up to 125 m.p.h. the APT requires only one-third of the power 
that a conventional train would need, and it is already being 
designed for speeds of 150 m.p.h. and above. Its main advantage 
over other high-speed forms of land transport is that it can operate 
on most existing railway track; it does not require the kind of 
large capital investment that was necessary for the 13 6  m.p.h.
Tokaido Line in Japan. By 1974 BR hopes to have two prototypes in 
regular service, one electric and the other gas-turbine driven. By 
1977/78 APTs should be introduced at a rate of 30 or ^0 complete 
train sets per year, initially at 12 5  m.p.h., but gradually building 
up to higher speeds. The first route to be-operated will be the 
electrified London-Manchester-Glasgow line. From about I960 the 
gas-turbine powered APT will enter service on the London-Newcastle 
and London-Bristol lines. Between 1974 and 19 8 0 , however, BR also 
plans to introduce a new diesel locomotive on these non-electrified 
lines that will bridge the gap until enough AFTs are available. The 
High -Speed Diesel Trains (HSDTs) will..similarly be capable of 125 m.p.h* 
Thus, by 1980 half the country’s rail network will be operated by 
1 2 5  m.p.h. trains; by 1984/85 all of the trunk services will be
20operated at this speed, while some will have reached 15 0  m.p.h.
♦
The introduction of high-speed trains will obviously have some 
effect on short-haul air services within the UK. The exact effect 
depends on a large number of economic, technological, political and 
social factors over the next decade or so, and crystal-ball gazing 
is rarely a very rewarding pastime. But some idea of the likely 
results might be gained by examining the effect on the airlines of
20. ’Financial Times', 8/11/72, p.31-33» These dates are, of 
’ course, provisional; recent reports suggest that design changes 
and industrial action may have caused the project to slip by up 
to two years. 'The Guardian', .23/2/73» p.8 .
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the electrification of the London-Manchester railway line in the
mid-1960s. Electric train services, at an improved frequency and
travelling at up to 100 m.p.h., were inaugurated from London to
Manchester and Liverpool in April, 1966, and to Birmingham and
Stoke-on-Trent in March, 19 6 7 . Journey time between London and
Manchester was reduced from 3 hours ^8 minutes to 2 hours 35 minutes.
Unfortunately, because numerous promotional fare reductions accompanied
electrification and because services had been extensively disrupted
while the improvements were being carried out, it is difficult to
determine the exact effect of increased speed and frequency on traffic
trends. There can be little doubt, however, that it was considerable.
During the first year, for example, the number of rail journeys between
London and Liverpool rose by 55% and those between London and Manchester
by 5^/5» receipts grew by 38% and k0% respectively. According to a
British Rail study, over a six-year period rail passenger traffic on
the route as a whole increased by 90/5, of which an estimated 25% was
diverted from the airlines and 15% from the roads, leaving 60% of new,
generated traffic (see Table 11.3). (Evans, on the other hand,
22argues that very little traffic transferred from road to rail ) #
21. 'Financial Times’, op.cit.,p»31I Johnson; ’Main Line 
Electrification - A First Appraisal' Institute of Transport 
Journal,.1968, p.295-9; see-also Centre for Transport studies, 
University of Leeds? ’Intercity Modal Split in Great Britain;
Air v. Rail; Final Report', 1971•
22. Evans; 'Inter-City Travel.and the London-Midland .Electrification*’ 
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 1969«
Table 11.2: PASSENGERS CARRIED BY AIR ON THE LONDON-LIVERPOOL 
ANN LONDON-MANCHESTER 'ROUTES,’ 1958/59 - 1971^
2 8 9 .
London- London-
Manchester Liverpool
1958/59 7 6 ,8 0 2 6 ,9 0 2
1959/60 119,570 8,376
19 6 0 /6 1 185,930 15,744
19 6 1/ 6 2 249,727 57,043
19 6 2 /6 5 3 1 5 ,0 1 6 6 0 ,0 0 1
1963/64 382,774 84,382
1964/65 424,263 112,624
19 6 5/6 6 446,469 144,767
19 6 6 /6 7 336,190 115,574
19 6 7/6 8 326 ,0 0 0 124,706
1968 3 17 ,0 0 0 13 0 ,0 0 0
1969 3 2 9 ,10 0 89 ,800
1970 335,200 94,400
1971 3 19 ,8 0 0 10 7 ,8 0 0
London = Heathrow and Gatwick
Sources : Edwards Report, p.85.
Board of Trade (Department of Trade and Industry): 
Business I-ionitor, Civil Aviation Series.
Table 11.3: PASSENGER JOURNEYS BY RAIL BETWEEN LONDON
AND MANCHESTER , 1964- 1970.
Rail Total Gain From
Gain Air Road New Travel
1964 1 ,000 ,000 - wm «ft* -
1966 1,400,000 4co ,ooo 160,000 80,000 1 6 0 ,cco
1970 2 ,000 ,000 1p00,000 250,000 1 5 0 ,oco 600,000
Source : Jones : •High Speed Railway Running with Special
Reference to the Advanced Passenger Train'. Chartered 
Institute of Transport Journal, 1973, p.50.
Thus, prior to electrification air transport had been able to 
compete fairly effectively on the North-Western route and had gradually 
cut into the railways' share of the market; an estimated 2^  of all 
passengers travelling between London and Manchester went by air, compared 
with by rail. Now the route is very much a marginal one (in the sense that 
the continuation of viable regular air services is brought into doubt),
I
despite the fact that the airlines have been successful in regaining some of j
their lost ground, in particular with.the introduction of more modern, and |
i
faster, jet aircraft. Nevertheless, BEA claims to have lost business worth j 
approximately £12.6 million. J The inauguration of APT services will mean tha 
many more routes will enter this marginal category. For example, each year ove
700,000 passengers travel by air between London and Glasgow, the highest 
figure for a domestic route in Europe and exceeded by only ten domestic '■
routes in the United States. The rail share of the London-Glasgow passenger ;
market has fallen to 29^* against air's *»1$, and air service frequency is !'
: • zb inow greater than that of rail's. But the APT will reduce the BR journey
time from the present six hours to four, and perhaps even to 3*5 eventually.
Similarly, the 2s hour run from Manchester to London could be shortened by a
25further 30 minutes. Thus, with journey times between city centres and 
airports on the whole increasing because of traffic congestion, the speed 
advantage that the airlines now enjoy over other-forms of transport is 
likely to be considerably reduced, if not totally eroded, on all domestic 
routes. '
The reaction of the airlines to this situation seems to be a mixture 
of pessimism and optimism. Mr. C.A. Herring, chairman and managing director 
of BAS, has argued in a recent article that air transport is likely to remain
23. 'The Guardian', 3/2/73, p*l6,
2*+. Thompson and Hunter, op.cit., p.155-6.
25» 'Financial Times', op.cit., p . 3 1 and 33*
competitive on short-haul routes, such as London-Newcastle, for
four main reasons:
(i) AFT fares are not expected to be significnatly different 
from air fares;
(ii) air transport will still be more convenient if a passenger's 
destination is in West London or if he is inter-lining (i.e. 
continuing his journey by air) at Heathrow or Gatwick;
(iii) high frequency *walk-on’ air services could bo introduced, 
with no reservations, but a guarantee of a seat for every 
passenger, similar to that operated by Eastern Air Lines 
along the North-East Corridor of the U.S.A.; and
(iv) air journey tim.es could be cut considerably as a result of 
certain technological developments, such as quiet, short or 
even vertical take-off and landing aircraft (Q/S/VTOL), which 
would enable airports to be situated far nearer to city 
centres . ^
Some of Herring’s points, such as the development of 'walk-on*
27services, appear to be highly conjectural; ' others.seem clearly
over-optimistic. For example, already air travel within the UK
is on the whole considerably more expensive than travel by
rail and even then most airlines are losing money at current
2.8fare levels. The margin between rail and
26. 'Air Transport and its Contribution to Freight and Passenger 
Movement in the North-East Region.* Chartered Institute of 
Transport Journal, 1972,
27* Although it has recently been announced that British Airways are 
examining the possibilities of introducing such services on six 
domestic and international routes from 1975«
26. Domestic air fares seem particularly vulnerable to Government 
economic policy. The result is that not only are they below 
comparable international fares, but probably also often less 
than many US domestic air fares, despite greater competition 
and apparent airline efficiency in the American market * Gee 
Chapter V and 'Thé Economist', 25/9/71» P*90.
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air fares on domestic trunk routes, therefore, is probably sufficiently 
wide for the APT passenger to bear a sizeable premium and still be 
financially better-off than his air counterpart. Similarly, any chance 
within the foreseeable future of a major technological break-through in the 
area of civil V/STOL aircraft seems remote, without taking into account the 
huge additional cost involved in providing new equipment and city-centre 
airports. It is significant that earlyVTOL designs were replaced by 
STOL designs, and have now largely become 'reduced'TOL. Great things were 
also expected of the helicopter as a form of mass inter-city transport 
during the 1950s, but such schemes rapidly proved to be economically 
inviable. The concensus of opinion among experts today would probably be 
that a similar fate would befall any V/STOL experiment attempted in the 
near' future.
The main hope for the airlines, therefore, seems to be centred on the
inter-lining passengers. Such passengers represent a fairly large
proportion of domestic air traffic, accounting for approximately of air
traffic between London and Newcastle and almost 10C$ of the traffic on the
29ultra-short Birmingham to London route.  ^ It is easy to see that a 
passenger from a provincial city booked on a flight out of Heathrow can 
often save a great deal of time and inconvenience by using a domestic 
air service rather than surface transport to get to London, despite any 
additional expense. The question, however, is whether inter-line passenger 
traffic alone is sufficient to support the present structure of short-haul 
air services within the UK. This must in fact be viewed as very doubtful, 
for if we assume, not unreasonably, that a large proportion of other air 
traffic is diverted to the railways, the initial reduction in passenger 
numbers must also produce a corresponding fall in the frequencies of air 
services (unless smaller aircraft are used). This should mean that a
29» Herring, op.cit. It should also be noted, however, that inter-line 
traffic revenue is diluted, exacerbating the overall financial position 
of domestic air services.
proportion of current inter-line passengers will no longer find the 
domestic air services sufficiently convenient to off-set the payment of 
a surcharge, and they will also transfer to rail, probably resulting in a 
further reduction in frequency levels. In other words, a 'cobweb* could 
be established, and it seems very unlikely that a viable scheduled air 
service network on anything Ike the present scale would be left when the 
cycle has worked itself out.
One further factor has to be taken into consideration. Air transport
always has a distinct advantage over other forms of transport whenever
there are geographical or political barriers to the free,movement of traffic
Hence the importance of air services until quite recently to the economic
life of a city such as Berlin and the proliferation of services linking
provincial cities in Britain with fairly close Continental capitals. But
even this advantage might be challenged by a combination of the APT and the
proposed Channel Tunnel. Journey times (city centre to city centre) could
be reduced to 2 hours +^0 minutes between London' and Paris, compared with the
present 6 hours 30 minutes by rail and sea-ferry and 2 hours 30 minutes by 
30air. Already British Rail have plans to operate an extensive network of 
services via the Tunnel to various Continental cities, including an hourly 
service from London to Paris and Brussels and services from Manchester, 
Birmingham and Newcastle. BR estimate that the number of passengers using 
these services could be more than 8 million in the Tunnel's first year of 
operation, rising to 12 million by 1990, against about 3 million using the 
rail/sea services each year at present.^1
In conclusion, therefore, the first point to make is that there are 
immense dangers in attempting to forecast accurately future transport 
developments. There are simply too many variables involved. Nevertheless,
30. 'Financial Times', op.cit.,p.33*
31. 'The Sunday Times', 1/7/73. P-53.
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one might say with some confidence that on the basis of past experience 
the future of short-haul domestic air services in Britain does not appear 
particularly bright. With the introduction of high-speed surface transport 
not only will the competitive position of the airlines on such routes as 
London to Manchester deteriorate further, but a number of other routes 
will become highly marginal. For example, in 1962 69,000 passengers 
travelled by air between London and Newcastle, compared with almost
230,000 by 1972, an average annual increase of 13$; air transport now 
accounts for approximately 25$ of the total rail/air market on this route. 
But the inauguration of APT services to Newcastle (perhaps in 1977) will 
alter the situation dramatically. By 1980 some 90 high-speed trains could 
be operating along the East Coast route, each with the capacity of a 'Jumbo1 
jet, and the scheduled travelling time from London to Newcastle will be
reduced from the present’ 3 hours 50 minutes to 2 hours 0^ minutes, and
32 1later by a further 20 minutes. The airlines will undoubtedly find it
impossible to maintain anything like their present share of the market.
In I963 the Beeching Report on British Railways noted:
"Air transport is not competitive in terms of speed for 
inter-city distances of less than about 200 miles, nor is it 
competitive in terms of cost except while operating as the 
minority carrier able to keep a high load factor by creaming 
from the total flow. This restricts the routes over which 
air competes seriously with rail to the London-Mancheeter, 
London-Newcastle and London-Scotland routes." 33
The electrification of the London-Manchester line partially removed this
route from Beeching's list; the introduction of the APT will almost
certainly remove the Newcastle route and eventually perhaps even the
Scottish routes. The APT might well offer competition to air passenger
services on routes up to 500 miles in length. No wonder that Mr. J.C*
Smith, BR inter-city planning manager, can say with confidence: "We
32. Herring, op.eit., p.*^-,?; ’Flight', 19/10/72, p.5^°..
33* British Railways Board: 'The Reshaping of British Railways', 1963» p.13.
29*1.
think we'll slaughter the short-haul airlines." Obviously, 
in absolute terms, British Airways will suffer most from any decline in 
short-haul traffic, but proportionately the smaller carriers could well 
be hurt even more. The latter will probably be left with three basic 
types of short-haul scheduled services:
(i) the main trunk routes, especially to Scotland, but carrying 
markedly less traffic;
(ii) those services connecting provincial cities in the UK with the 
Continent and Ireland (although if the Tunnel is built the long­
term future of many of these might be brought into doubt); and
(iii) those services catering for the 'cream' of current domestic 
traffic, passengers who are prepared to pay a large premium for a 
relatively small saving in time on routes not particularly well 
served by surface transport (such as cross-country routes, although 
with the extension of the motorway network these are decreasing
in number).
Further, at present it seems likely that most of this remaining short-haul
air traffic will go to companies within the British Airways Regional
Division, with their large operational, financial and, perhaps, even
political support. (A good case might be made for the eventual transfer 
' *
of domestic trunk routes from BA European Division). Thus, the future for the 
privately-owned airline in the field of short-haul scheduled services 
would appear to be rather bleak.
295.
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3 b , 'Financial Times', op.cit., p.3 1 • Similarly, Mr. Richard Harsh,
BR chairman: "The modern jet aircraft is a fascinating vehicle, but 
it hasn't much future." The Guardian, 3/8/73,p.8.
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CHAPTiSH XII
C O N C L U S I O N
S u m m a r y
The primary aim of this study has been to examine the post­
war development and economics of the privately-owned British 
airlines in an attempt to explain the very high degree of in­
stability within the sector# It has been shown that with the 
accession to power of a Labour Government in 19^5 the independent 
airlines were effectively excluded from the operation of scheduled 
air services. Nevertheless, a very large number of charter com­
panies were established during the immediate post-war years, 
supported mainly by the boom in air travel, the disorganisation 
of the national carriers and certain international and national 
economic and political crises, such as the Berlin Airlift. To­
wards the end of the decade, however, competitive pressures and
declining potential traffic proved too much and the number of
*
operating air transport companies rapidly declined. At the same 
time, the Government's position similarly proved to be untenable 
and from 19^9 licensing restrictions were eased somewhat to enable 
the Independents to operate certain scheduled services as 'associates' 
of the nationalised Corporations.
The Conservatives returned to power in 1951 piedgedi to extend 
the opportunities open to the private sector. This they did by 
further strengthening the associate agreement principle. Unfortun­
ately, the new policy was not as successful as many in the private
sector had hoped. The Independents were still severely restricted 
and the Conservative Government did not appear prepared to face 
up to the inevitable result of the promises they had made, namely 
a reduction in the size of the public sector. Throughout the 
1950s the privately-owned airlines depended overwhelmingly on 
trooping and vehicle-ferry operations as sources of revenue and 
traffic. Instability remained one of the key characteristics.
The 1950s were also marked by a considerable amount of investment 
in the independent carriers by shipping companies and, allied to 
this development, by a gradual movement towards amalgamation 
within the industry.
Eventually the Government ha d _to respond to the growing 
economic and political pressures for reform. The Civil Aviation 
(Licensing) Act of i960 was in many ways a major victory for the 
Independents. They received a number of concessions, mainly at 
the expense of BEA and BOAC. But in the long run the Act failed 
to solve many of the basic problems facing the industry. Although 
the private operators were able to considerably expand their 
scheduled service networks and the movement towards amalgamation 
continued, the contradictions inherent in the Government’s approach 
to air transport licensing soon surfaced again. While publicly 
arguing in favour of expanding and strengthening the private sector 
the Government did not appear to be prepared to face up to the in­
evitable result of such a stance, namely a reduction in the size of 
the public sector. Further, the shipping companies began to with­
draw their capital from the industry, while trooping services were 
greatly curtailed. Increasingly, the primary source of revenue 
for the Independents became the holiday market, from inclusive- 
tour and affinity-group charters. This in turn resulted in a
297.
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major re-orientation of the private sector companies away from 
scheduled services. The perennial problem of bankruptcies and 
forced mergers, however, still remained.
The election of a Labour Government in 196^ probably made 
very little difference to the overall situation, despite the 
political rhetoric. The Civil Aviation (Licensing) Act had clearly 
not succeeded, yet there appeared to be a lack of political will 
to introduce a more radical policy. Consequently, a committee of 
inquiry, the Edwards Committee, was appointed to investigate the 
whole future of civil air transport in the UK. The Committee 
reported in 1969 and recommended, 'inter alia', the establishment of 
a new, more independent, licensing body and the strengthening of 
the private sector by the formation of a so-called 'second force' 
airline, a private enterprise third Corporation large enough to 
compete effectively in the international air transport market. 
Fortunately for the supporters of such reforms, a Conservative 
Government was returned to power shortly afterwards, for this 
created the political environment in which the changes could be 
carried out. In the event, BUA and Caledonian merged to form 
BCAL, aided by the award of a number of new routes, including 
some forcibly transferred from the Corporations. The previous 
licensing authority, the ATLB, was replaced by the CAA with, in 
theory, a more clearly defined air transport policy to pursue. So far 
the results of that new policy, in terms of economic stability, 
have not been particularly encouraging 
Conclusions;
Of the major conclusions that can be drawn from this study
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three factors seem to overwhelm all else: the political environ­
ment within which the airlines were forced to operate, the extent 
to which an individual company had access to financial backing 
and the apparently inevitable tendency among the Independents 
towards 'marginal operation'. These three factors were primarily 
responsible for the high level of instability within the private 
sector of the British air transport industry.
As we saw in the introductory chapter, politics are of major 
importance to civil aviation throughout the world, much more so 
than in most other industries. This has been even more true in 
the British context because of the continuing controversy about 
the relative merits of public and private enterprise; air trans­
port has been very much a 'political football'. But to a large 
extent such controversy is a red herring, for, despite the rhetoric, 
when in power the two main political parties have differed only 
marginally in their attitudes towards the privately-owned airlines 
in the UK. The Conservatives may have slightly 'tilted* the 
emphasis of their policy towards the Independents, and Labour 
towards the Corporations, but no more. It might be said that, to 
a greater or lesser extent,one of the primary aims of both Labour 
and Conservative policies 'vis-a-vis' the private sector has been 
to create a stable private enterprise air transport industry in 
order to avoid the dangers of an overly-competitive environment. 1
1. This seems to be true of the nationalised industries in general. 
Tivey, for example, writes: "It is an oversimplification...to 
present controversy about nationalization as a crude political 
issue, with the Labour Party in favour and the Conservative 
Party against. The currents of opinion within the parties, and 
outside them, have been too complex, and too fluctuating, for 
any such generalization. Yet it remains true that, on balance, 
and taking one thing with another, the attitudes of the Labour 
Party tend to be benign and those of most Conservatives suspicious." 
The Nationalized Industries since 1960. 1972v P*^5»
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Such policies roust, therefore, be judged to have largely failed, 
although the possibility exists that without government regula­
tions more entrants to the industry would have been encouraged.
Thus, neither party was prepared to fully implement the promises 
and threats made when in Opposition, with the result that the 
contradictions inherent in post-war air transport licensing policy 
never seemed likely to be eradicated. It v/as this licensing policy, 
however, that established the parameters within which the Independ­
ents were allowed to operate and so represents the prime cause of 
instability within the sector. It denied the private airlines high 
revenue services and viable route networks; it forced them to 
initiate cut-price operations in order to avoid legislative restric­
tions; it very often resulted in the Independents having to operate 
in excessively competitive markets; and so forth. The political 
environment, therefore, must take most of the blame for the instab­
ility of the independent air transport companies since the war.
Within the parameters set by licensing policy, however, the 
major cause of bankruptcy can be found in the failure to ensure - 
sufficient capital backing. The air transport industry is inevit­
ably prone to cyclical development. In the international context 
this takes the form of a re-equipment cycle and a very strong reaction 
to business depressions. The independent UK airlines have not on 
the whole experienced the former phenomenon, but they have fallen 
prey to trade recessions. It is in order to survive the'trough1 
years of such a cycle that a carrier requires considerable capital 
reserves. To a large extent this problem is reflected on an annual 
basis, with a peaking of traffic during the summer months, which 
explains why most airline failures occur during the autumn arid 
winter. But because of the very poor financial results achieved
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by the private sector , largely in itself a reflection of the 
political problems mentioned above, it is almost impossible for a 
small independent airline to build up sufficient reserves during 
the good years to carry it through the lean. Hence the need for a 
parent company to whom an operator can turn for financial support.
The Independents that survived and were relatively prosperous in 
the long run almost invariably had access to large-scale capital 
backing; those without such backing had a very short life-expect­
ancy. This may be a generalisation, yet it is clearly sufficiently 
near the truth to stand.
The third explanation.for the private sector’s record of in­
stability stems from the fact that entry into the air transport 
industry is relatively easy for a number of reasons; partly, for 
example, because of the difficulty of differentiating the end-product
and partly as a result of the limited economies of scale possible in
3the general charter market. The major reason, however, is to be
found in the surprisingly small amount of initial finance needed
to establish an airline, despite the fact that civil aviation is a
capital-intensive industry. Doganis notes that "to be competitive
one must have the latest jet aircraft, and to make any inroads into
the market several aircraft would be needed. This would need
b  . .enormous financial resources." Such a view, while on the whole 
correct, ignores two important points. Firstly, few new entrants
2
2 . For example, between 19&2 and 1967 the Independents achieved an 
average Rev Sx ratio of only 102, that is a margin of 2% of 
revenues over expenditures; "This figure perhaps more than any 
other, illustrates the unsatisfactory nature of the overall fin­
ancial results of the private sector of the airline industry."
Their average rate of return amounted to 5*2%» considerably below 
a commercial rate. The Edwards Report, p.29.
3» This does not mean, of course, that it is easy to become estab­
lished as a major, scheduled airline, particularly because of the 
political restrictions,
4. 'Air Transport - A Case Study in International Regulations.' Journal
of Transport Economics and Policy, 1973» p»123» Doganis is 
referring/particular to . the liT market.
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into an industry can expect to obtain a major share of the market 
immediately, so that the initial capital requirement is reduced.
Secondly, it is quite easily possible to lease most of the main
scapital items, in particular aircraft, as well as many peripheral 
services (such as passenger ground-handling, aircraft maintenance, 
etc.), or purchase older, obsolescent equipment in the first in­
stance. In practice, therefore, there have been few restrictions 
on entry into the non-scheduled air transport industry. The Civil 
Aviation (Licensing) Act, which required the ATLB to investigate 
a company's financial resources before granting.it a licence, made 
little difference, especially to the pure charter operator.
An airline established on these terms, of course, would have 
little hope of long-term success. But in the short run it could 
considerably unsettle ‘the market by resorting to price-cutting tactics 
in an attempt to establish itself. Probably the clearest example of 
this type of situation occurred in the early-1960s when several IT 
charter operators were forced out of business (see Chapter X).
Control of access to the industry by what one might terra the ’marginal 
carrier', therefore, has been a major problem throughout the post­
war period and no solution has yet been found. Certainly, the 
Edwards Committee offered only a very limited answer:
"If the Government announces its acceptance of an 
important future role for the private sector, and its 
intention to create conditions that will shape the private 
sector broadly along the lines which we have suggested, 
it is inevitable that the private airlines (no doubt 
seeking advice from the authorities) will themselves work 
through mergers towards a rationalisation of the structure, 
for it will be clear to them that this will give them the 
best chance of getting the licences which they want." 6
5 . Lost well-established airlines are * increasingly resorting to this 
practice, primarily for tax reasons. Bisk is minimal, as long 
as the owner is able to sell the aircraft on the second-hand 
market at a reasonable price.
6 . p. 1^ 1 .
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With due respect, such a statement exhibits a large measure of 
naivity. Any movement towards rationalisation within the private 
sector is of only secondary importance when compared with ease of 
entry into the industry, (witness what happened during the early- 
1960s under very similar conditions to those stipulated by 
Edwards). As long as the formation of a one-plane company remains 
relatively easy there is little long-term hope of economic stab­
ility in the private sector of the UK air transport industry, for
each bankruptcy and merger will almost invariably be matched by
6athe appearance of a new operator.
The political environment, finance and the tendency towards 
"marginal operation", therefore, are the three most important areas 
to which attention should be directed if one wants to understand 
why so many private air carriers are forced out of business each 
year. These three factors, of course, are closely inter-related, 
just as there are other elements that should also be borne in mind. 
For example, adequate financial backing is a necessary, but hardly 
sufficient component in the make-up of a surviving airline. There 
have been numerous cases where a parent company has come to the 
conclusion that private enterprise air transport in Britain has no 
future, has tired of the continuing losses or found a more pressing 
need for its capital elsewhere, and decided to pull out. But it 
is the problems associated with the political environment, finance 
and "marginal operation" that characterise the independent air 
transport industry within the UK.
6a, A similar type of argument has been put forward, and to a 
large- exteat discredited, in favour of tighter control of 
entry into the road haulage industry. Mainly for the reasons 
advanced in the introductory chapter, however, the air 
transport situation would seem to be rather different and to 
demand different solutions.
To a large extent, the post-war expansionist plane of the 
Independents and Corporations have been mutually exclusive, primarily 
because of the very small proportion of total output initially award­
ed to the private sector. Host countries that do not possess an 
exclusively nationalised or private enterprise air transport system 
have faced a similar problem. Many have succeeded in overcoming 
the contradictions involved by establishing firm guidlines to 
delineate specific areas within which the representatives of each 
sector are permitted to operate (the examples of Canada, France, or 
even Australia, come immediately to mind). Other countries, however, 
have been no more successful than Britain in this respect and, as 
in the UK, the result has often been economic instability among the 
less-favoured airlines. During the 18-month period ending October, 
1972, for example, five West German charter carriers were forced to 
cease operations, including the country's second largest non-
scheduled airline,- Atlantis, whose bankruptcy resulted in 20,000
7passengers being stranded abroad. Even in Scandinavia eleven
0
charter companies went out of business between 1963 and 1970.°
As the study has progressed attempts have been made to arrive 
at certain other conclusions, especially about possible future 
developments in the private sector. It is quite clear, for example, 
that while the Independents will probably continue to operate troop­
ing and vehicle-ferry services on a relatively modest scale, such 
operations will not account for a large proportion of their total 
output within the foreseeable future. In the field of scheduled 
services, prospects for British Caledonian appear to be fairly 
assured. But the future for the smaller operators is not so bright, 
in particular with the growth of British Airways Kegional Division
7 . «Financial Times», 20/10/72,p.30.
8 . «Flight», 3/ 12/70, p. 865.
3 0 5 .
and such developments as the APT and Channel Tunnel on the 
horizon. The most important growth area for the Independents is 
undoubtedly the holiday market, and prospects here seem much better, 
especially for those airlines closely associated with the major 
tour promoters. Even in this market, however, potential dangers 
exist, particularly the growing threat from the larger national 
flag-carriers and excessive competition among the tour operators 
themselves. It is probably too early to determine whether or not 
the recent changes in licensing policy will be successful, and in 
any case much depends on the whims of politicians, but there is 
certainly some cause to doubt their complete effectiveness.
Finally, it has often been argued that one of the most 
important 'raison d'etre' for.a private sector within the air 
transport industry is its innovatory role. There can be little 
doubt that since the end of the Second World War the Independents 
have been very important commercial innovators, as well as acting 
as a 'ginger group' to spur the nationalised Corporations. 3ut 
it is easy to exaggerate such a role, and BOAC and BEA have 
probably done their share of innovation (in the use of computers 
and the development of blind-landing, to take two obvious examples). 
As we have seen,the primary reason for the entry into and develop­
ment of new markets by the independent airlines has had little to do 
with any inherent advantages to be found in private enterprise 
companies. Rather it reflected the Independents' distinctly 
inferior position (in the sense of a lack of sufficient opportun­
ities for expansion) and their attempts to circumvent legislative 
restrictions. Such a view would appear to square with Caves' 
conclusions from his famous study of air transport in the United
States. He found that large carriers, historically the more
profitable, contribute most of the technical innovations, while
small carriers (or large ones suffering from an unsatisfactory
market situation) generally provide the marketing innovations:
9"Innovation for better or worse, is born of desparation."
The ’Typical* Airline Failure:
Each airline failure is obviously unique, with its own 
particular causal factors. Nevertheless, if one were to general­
ise sufficiently it might be possible to construct a 'model' of a 
typical post-war independent airline. Such a company would, in 
all probability, be essentially a .small carrier virtually excluded 
from the high revenue scheduled service market and consequently 
forced to search for-other types of v/ork. The only real hope of 
long-term success, or even survival, in these circumstances would 
seem to lie in finding a small niche in the market where the 
possibility existed of an unsatisfied, latent demand for air 
transport. Unfortunately, because most private airlines are 
relatively small, the only way to fully exploit the potential of 
such an opening would be to utilise a very largo proportion, if 
not all, of a company's resources; in other words, the airline 
must specialise. Having done so, however, even if the venture is a 
success, the carrier will find itself in a potentially precarious 
position, for it is extremely vulnerable to developments completely 
outside its own control, especially of a political nature. Almost 
invariably just such a development will force the company to 
cease business or seek a merger with a more fortunate fellow airline.
9« 'Air Transport and its Regulation*, 19^2, p.^25»
1Such a model is, of course, a gross generalisation and 
numerous examples can be found that do not even remotely approxim­
ate to it. But at the same time a surprisingly.large proportion of 
the history of the Independents can be profitably considered in 
these terms. A few examples will suffice here. The two main 
vehicle-ferry operators, Silver City and Channel Air Bridge, were 
very successful during the 1950s, capturing a large proportion of 
total cross-Channel traffic by exploiting the shortcomings of the 
surface carriers. Eventually, however, they were forced to merge 
and cut back on the scale of their operations because of two factors 
almost entirely outside their control: greatly increased competition 
from the sea-ferry companies and an inability to obtain economically 
viable aircraft (see Chapter IX). Similarly, the history of troop­
ing services illustrates how decisions that have considerable effects 
the Independents are often taken without any reference to their inter­
ests. Political and strategic considerations dominated the original 
decision to allow the private airlines to participate in trooping 
and it was primarily for political reasons that they were later 
deprived of this traffic (see Chapter VIII).
A more recent example involving a single company might be that 
of Lloyd International, formed in 1961.as.a long-haul charter airline. 
By 1972 Lloyd had a fleet of three Boeing ?0?s and four Britannia's 
and operated extensively as an affinity-group carrier on the North 
Atlantic. But its main interest really lay in the Far East. It 
had built up a considerable amount of 'ad hoc' freight traffic to 
and from this region and also operated a large, and rapidly growing, 
number of affinity-group flights. At this time it was very difficult 
to obtain cheap air passages to Australasia because of the unwilling-
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ness of the Australian. Government to permit charter operations.
Companies such as Lloyd exploited what clearly appeared to be a large 
latent demand, by flying charter groups, very often not s t r i c t l y  v / i t h i n  
the letter of the law, to places such as Singapore or Kuala L u m p u r ,  
from where passengers were able to continue their j o u r n e y  to A u s t r a l i a  
by a scheduled air or sea service. The potential financial s a v i n g  
from this unorthodox route was sufficient to attract a c o n s i d e r a b l e  
volume of traffic, sufficient indeed to also attract c o m p l a i n t s  from 
the scheduled carriers. The British Government eventually r e s p o n d e d  
by permitting both BQAC and B C A L  to introduce low-far 'exempt' c h a r t e r s  
to India and South-East Asia, in other words to do openly what the n o n -  
scheduled carriers had been doing surreptitiously for some time ( s e e  
also Chapter X). - -
Unfortunately for Lloyd this decision had- the immediate effect 
of eliminating a large proportion of its total traffic. Few passengers 
wanted to travel on what was widely regarded as dubious, if not illegal, 
services, expecially with the extensive publicity that had recently 
been given to stranded charter customers, when they could fly perfectly 
legally for the same cost with a reputable, world-famous airline.
^Almost overnight, the bottom fell out of Lloyd's main market and the 
carrier eventually had to appoint a receiver. It is not surprising 
that a note of acrimony crept into its press statement;
"The policy of successive British Governments in creating 
a privileged position for one private airline ("The Second 
Force"), culminating in the decision last year to exempt 
both British Caledonian and the national flag carrier (BGAG) 
from normal restrictions of air charter licensing on key 
routes to the Far East, has resulted in the almost total 
destruction of a substantial passenger business built up by 
Lloyd over 11 years." 10
10. 'Financial Times,' 17/6/72, p.30; Lloyd was unable to divert 
spare capacity to the only other possible market, the Forth 
Atlantic, because of further restrictions on charters on that 
route.
Thus, having discovered an unexploited market for air transport
with a high price elasticity, and therefore considerable latent
demand, and having found a way of developing that market by getting
around the legislative restrictions, Lloyd was suddenly excluded
from it by governmental action designed to protect the national 
11flag-carriers. It often seems tnat as far as the Independents 
are concerned there is only one thing worse than failure, and that 
is success.
Why do People Invest in Independent Airlines?
Compared with other industries the profit record of civil
1?aviation has been very unimpressive. But that of the UK Independ­
ents has undoubtedly been even worse than most other airlines. In
1923 someone bitterly remarked that "the only people who make
13
profits out of aviation are the petrol people The situation
can hardly be said to have improved out of all recognition in the 
ensuing 50 years. Why then, despite a poor financial record and a 
clear tendency to bankruptcy, do people still invest their money 
in private enterprise air transport? The first point one must 
make is that the vast majority of potential investors wisely steer 
well clear of the industry. It remains true to this day that since 
the war no British airline has ever had a public quotation in its
11, The actions of Lloyd and the Government are reported here simply 
to illustrate a point, without any comment on the morality of 
their respective positions,
12, dtraszheira, for example, writes; "The rate of return of all 
ICAO firms on operating revenues for the years 1955-63 was
0,94%. Capital-output ratios vary widely, with G.8Q an 
approximate industrial mean. This implies an operating 
return on capital of 1.1% over a 1*4— year span, compared with 
a normal return on private industry investments of perhaps 
6-8% or even more." ’The International Airline Industry',
. : 1969,‘p.26. See also Appendix VII.
13, Quoted by Birkhead: 'The financial failure of British Air 
Transport Companies, 1919-2^'• Journal of Transport history,
1959-60, p. 137. :
own right on the Stock Exchange; Hr. Freddie Laker has described 
this as "the biggest single indictment against British Civil 
Aviation policy." Of those organisations that have invested
widely in air transport most fall into one of two groups:
(i) shipping companies, whose primary aim was to secure 
a relatively cheap insurance policy; and
(ii) tour promoters, who were attracted by the potential 
economies resulting from the vertical integration of the 
packaged-holiday industry.
But this still leaves a large number of individual investors 
who have bought their way into, or more usually established their 
own,'airlines. Perhaps the phenomenon can partly be explained by 
the peculiar attractions that aviation has for those engaged in the 
industry; it often seems to become almost an obsession. In study­
ing the post-war history of the privately-owned airlines in the UK 
one cannot help but notice how the same names keep re-occurring, 
despite bankruptcies and mergers. Wg. Cdr. Hugh Kennard, for 
example, has been associated since the end of the Second World War 
with Air Kruise, Silver City, Air Ferry, Invicta Airways and BMA. 
Messrs. Barnby, Keegan and Stevens, in addition to establishing 
BKS Air Transport, had previously founded Crewsair; Keegan now 
controls Trans Meridian Airways and BAF, while Stevens is associated 
with Invicta Airways. One airline employee suggested that the main 
attraction of air transport was the gamble involved. Someone else 
argued that the prime stimulus was simply greed; despite the record 
of airline failures, there is always that pot of gold on the horizon, 
and this time success is assured!
iV. 'Private Enterprise in British Air Transport*. Journal of 
' the Royal Aeronautical Society, 1 9 o 6 % p.35^-
?10.
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Wheatcroft alludes to both of these possibilities in 
turning for an explanation to Adam Smith's discussion in 'The 
Wealth of Nations' of the curiously low rate of profit in hazardous 
trades. Smith accounts for this by. the fact that most men have an 
"absurd presumption in their own good fortune." He continues;
^Bankruptcies are most frequent in the most hazardous 
trades. The most hazardous of all trades, that of a 
smuggler, though when the adventure succeeds it is like­
wise the most profitable, is the infallible road to 
bankruptcy. The presumptuous hope of success seems to 
act here as upon all other occasions, and to entice so many 
adventurers into those hazardous trades, that their 
competition reduces their profit below what is sufficient 
to compensate the risk."
The comparison of the proprietor of an independent airline with an 
eighteenth-century smuggler might, in a number of cases, seem 
particularly apt, although no-one has made a fortune out of air 
transport in the UK.
15
Despite the implementation of many of the Edwards Committee's 
recommendations, there seems little in the present structure of the 
private sector of the air transport industry about which to be 
optimistic. The likelihood appears to be that things will continue
1 6more or less as they have been in the past. Several of the twenty or 
so independent airlines still operating in the UK are probably losing 
money; certainly the sector as a whole is producing a relatively 
poor rate of return on its capital. During the 1971 and 1972 *
15. 'Licensing British Air Transport'. Journal of the Royal Aeronautical 
. Society, 1964, p.171.
16. Assuming the current chaos resulting from oil shortages does not 
permanently alter the situation. At the time of writing it is
* much too early to see how in the long-term the Independents will 
be affected.
3 1 2
calendar years no less than six carriers either closed down 
completely or were forced to merge with other companies (Skyways,
BAF, Channel, South West Aviation, Lloyd International and Sagittair). 
These were not small, unimportant operators - Channel,, Skyways and 
BAF could all trace their history back to the early-1950s and 
beyond.' It might be argued that such failures indicate that recent 
legislation is in fact working. The weaker airlines are being 
weeded-out, and a smaller, but stronger, private sector will be 
left. Unfortunately, the sane two years saw the establishment of 
six new air transport companies. (Air International, Airline Services, 
Orientair, Ulster Airways, Alidair and International Air Services.) 
Thus, there would not appear to have been an improvement, or for the 
foreseeable future any real hope of an improvement, in the level of 
economic stability among the Independents. Following the failure of 
his ovm small airline, Mayflower Air Services, Philip Cleife wrote 
in 1966:
"And with the conclusion of my story comes the end of 
an era, for it is my conviction that I ext the last of my 
line. The day is gone when the founding of an airline can 
ever be the creation of a single-handed dreamer," 17
Fortunately or unfortunately, he was wrong.
1
/
1?, ’Airway to the Isles’,.1966, p.222.
Appendix I
List of UK Independents, 1945 - 1975.
This list is intended purely as an indication of the 
annual casualty rates among UK independent airlines. It 
makes no claim to he exhaustive. Little is known about many 
of the early companies, while numerous dates remain 
speculative. It is often difficult, for example, to 
distinguish between the date on which a company is 
registered and that on which it begins operations or to 
determine when exactly the separate identity of an airline 
taken over by another company actually disappears. For 
those interested, fleet lists for a number of the airlines 
are contained in Merton Jones : 'British Independent 
Airline Operators Since 1946.'
Code : (?) = doubt about actual year.
(M) = merged with or taken over by
another operator.
S.O. = still operating, (summer 1973) 
* = absorbed by BEA following
nationalisation.
** « new part of British Airways
Regional Division.
Company Founded Ceased Operation
1. ACE Freighters 1964 1966
2. Aeriel Enterprises 1968 1970
3* Air Anglia 1970 S.O.
4. Air Bridge Carriers 1972 3.0.
5. Air Charter 1948 I960 (M)
6. Air Charter Experts 1947 ?
7. Air Commerce 1938 1947*
8. Air Condor 1959 I960
9. Air Contractors 1946 (?) ?
10. Air Couriers 1938 ?
'll. Air Enterprises 1946 (?) 1955
12. Air Ferry 1961 1968 (n)
13. Airflight 1948 ?
14. Air Freight 1946 1952
15. Air Freight 1971 S.O,
16. Air International 1971 1973
17. Air ICruise 1946 (?) 1961 (M)
18. Airline Services 1971 S.O.
19. Airiinks 1948 (?) ?
20. Air Safaris 1959 1962
21. Airspan Travel 1948 (?) ?
22. Airtech ? ?
23. Air Transport 1947 1950
(Air Transport Charter(Cl)) ■ /■
24. Airways Individual 
Reservations 1946 1 9 4 7
25. Airwork 1928 I960 (H)
26. Alidair 1972 S.O.
27. Allied Airways 1934 1947
28. Anglian Air Charter 1950 1970 (il)
C ompany Founded Ceased Operations
29» Aquila Airways
30. Atlas Airways
31. Aurigny Air Services
32. Barclays International 
Airways
33. Bardock Aviation
3 4. Bees Flight
35» Birkett Air Services
3 6. Black Isle Air Services
37. Black Lion Aviation
38. Blue-Air
39. Blue-Line Airways
4 0* Bond Air Services
4L. Britannia Airways 
(Buravia)
42. Britavia
43. British Air Ferries 
(BUAF)
44* British Air Transport
45* Britißh-American Air 
Services
46. British Caledonian 
Airways
47* British Eagle Internat» 
(Cunard Eagle)
(Eagle Airways)
48. British Island Airways 
(BUIA)
4 9. British Midland Airways 
(Derby Aviation)
50. British Nederland Air 
Services
51* British United Airways
1948 1958
1946 1948
1968 S.O.
1947 (?) ?
? 1965
1947 (?) ?
1947 1949
1961 (?) ?
1957 ?
1959 I960
1946 (?) 1949
1946 1950
1961 S.O.
1945 1962 (it)
1963 1971 (K)
1939 1951
1947 (?) ?
1970 S.O.
1948 1968
1963 S.O.
1938 S.O.
1946 (?) 1 9 5 1
I960 19 7 0 (M)
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52. British United (GI) 
Airways
53. British United (Manx) 
Airways
54» British \7estpoint 
Airlines
55* Brooklands Aviation
56. Brymon Aviation
57« Caledonian Airways
58. Calabrian Airways
59» Carbia Transport
60. Carlisle Air Navigation 
and Training
61. Channel Air Bridge
62. Channel Airways 
(Bast Anglian Plying 
Services)
63. Channel Islands Airways
64. Chartair
65. Ciro’a Aviation
66. Continental Airlines
67. Court line Aviation 
(Autair)
68. Creweair
69. Culliford Airlines
70. Ban-Air Services 
(Ban-Air/Skyways)
71. Dennis Aviation
72. Donaldson' International 
Airlines
75, Bon Overall Aviation
74. Bragon Airways
Coiripany Founded Ceased Operations
1962 1963 (M)
1962 1963 (M)
1962 1967
1947 ?
1972 S.O.
1961 1970 (M)
1935 S.O.**
1973 S.O.
1948 (?) ?
1954 1963 (M)
1946 1972
1945 1947*
1946 ?
? ?
1957 I960
I960 S.O,
1946 1953
1947 1948
1953 S.O.
? ?
1969 •o•CO
1957 I960 (M)
1953 1957 (M)
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75. Emerald Airways
76. Eros Airlines
77. Executive Air Transport
78. Fairflight Charters 
79» Falcon Airways
80. Finglands Airways
81. Goodhew Aviation
82. Great Western and 
Southern Air lines
83. Hastings and East Sussex 
Air Services
84. Highland Airways
85. Hornton Airways •
86. Humber Airways
87. Hunting-Clan Air Transport 
(Hunting Air Travel)
88. Hyland Automobiles
89. Independent Air Travel 
(Independent Air Transport)
90. Inter-City Air Services
91. International Airways
92. International Aviation 
Services
93. Intra Airways 
(Intra Air Charter)
94. Invicta Airways
95. Invicta International 
Airlines
(Invicta Air Cargo)
96. Irelfly
97. Isle of Han Air Services
98. Island Air Charter 
(Island Air Services)
C cmpany Founded Ceased Operation
1965 1967
1962 1964
I960 1962
1968 ?
1958 1961
? ?
9• ?
1938' 1947* '
? ?
? 1947*
1946 1950
1968 S.O.
1946 1960 (M)
? ?
1 1956 1959
? ?
1946 1949
1972 S.O.
1969 1 S.O.
1964 / 1969 (M)
1969 S.O.
1966 1967
1937 1947*
1946 (?) ?
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Company Founded Ceased Operations
99. James Stuart Travel ? ?
100, Jersey Airlines 1948 1962 (M)
101. J.F.Airlines
(Jersey Ferry Airlines) 1971 S.O.
102. Kay Rings I960 1961
103. Kearsley Airways 1946 (?) 1950
104. Kenning Aviation 1947 1950
105. Kestrel Aviation
(Kestrel Internat. Airways) 1970 1972
106. Lancashire Aircraft
Corporation 1946 (?) 1955 (M)
107. Laker Airways 1966 S.O.
108, Lees-Hill Aviation
(Birmingham) ? ?
109. Lloyd International Airways 1961 1972
110. Lockwcod Flying Services 1947 ?
111. Loganair 1962 S.O.
112. London Aero and Motor
Services 1946 1948
113. Londonderry Air Charter 1946 ?
114. Loxhams Flying Services ? ?
115. Luton Airways 1958 ?
116« Macedonian Aviation 1972 S.O.
117. Manning Airways ? ? '•
118. Manx Air Services j
(Manx Air Charters) 1947 ¡ 1 9 5 6  (H)
119* Mayfair Air Services ?
/
?
120. Mayflower Air Services 1961 1963 (M)
121. McDonald Aircraft ? ■ ? ■ : ■
122. Mediterranean Air Services ? ?
123. Melba Airways ? ?
124. Merchant Airways 1951 ?
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Company Founded Ceased Operations
125. Mercury Airlines I960
126. Meredith Air Transport
(African Air Safaris) 1952
1 2 7 . Midland Air Cargo 1970
128. Modern Transport ?
1 2 9 . Monarch Airlines 1967
1 3 0 . 'Morton Air Services 1945
131. Newman Airways ?
132. Nor-Air I973
1 3 3 . Northeast Airlines
(BKS Air Transport) 1952
134. North Eastern Airways ?
135» Northern Air Charter 1946
136. North Sea Air Transport 1948
137. North South Airlines I960
138. North West Airlines 1948
139* Olley Air Services 1934
140. Orientair 1971
141. Orion Airlines I957
142. Overseas Aviation 1958
143. Patrick Aviation 1947
1 4 4 . Patrick Laing Air Services I947
145. Payloads (Charter) 1946
146. Pegasus Airlines 1958
147. Peters Aviation 1967
148. Phoenix Airlines I968
149. Progressive Airways
(Tyler Aviation) 1970
150. Raceways ?
1 5 1 . Railway Air Services 1933
152. Rig-Air 1969
1964 (M) 
?
1973
?
5 . 0 .
1968 (M) 
?
5 . 0 .  .
s.o .*#
19 4 7*
1948
1951
1961
1951
1953 (M) 
S.O.
1960
1961 
1956
1949
1950 
i 1961
S.O.
1970
1971
9
1947’
1970 (M)
153. Sagittair
154. Scillonia Airways
155. Scillonian Air Services
1 5 6 . Scottici* Airlines 
(Scottish Aviation)
157. Scottish Airways
158. "Severn Airways
1 5 9 . Shorts Air Charter
160. Silver City Airways
161. Silver City Airways
162. Sivewright Airways
163. Skyflight
164. Skyfreight
165. Skytravel
166. Skyways
167. Skyways Coach-Air 
(Skyways International)
168. Solar Plying Services 
(Solar Air Services)
16 9. Solair Plying Services
1 7 0 . Somerton Airways
171. South Airlines
1 7 2 . South Coast Air Charter 
(Stramsway)
173. Southampton Air Services
174. South West Aviation
1 7 5 . Spalding Airways
176. Starways
1 7 7 . Steiner Air Services
178. Straight Corporation
1 7 9 . Surrey Plying Services
Company
320.
Pounded Ceased Operations
1970 19 7 2
1965 1969
19 6 2 1966
1939 .
1937 
1973 
?
1946 
1973 
1946
1946
1947 
1946 (?)
1946
1953 1972 (H)
? ?
1962 1965
? ' ?
1959 ?
1963 1966
i
1946 J : , 19 4 7
1966 ' 19 7 2
? ?
1948 1963 (M)
1946 1948
? ■ ? ■.
1955 (M)
?
1947*
5 . 0 .
?
1963 (M)
5 . 0 .
1951 
1949
1948
1949 (?) (M)
1952 (M)
1951
321.
180. Tangiera Transport (London)
181. Tipper's Air Transport
182. Tradair
1 8 3 . Tradevr’.nds
184. Trak-Air
185. Transair
186/ Trans European Aviation
187. Transglobe 
(Air links)
188. Trans Meridian Airways 
(Trans Meridian Air Cargo)
189. Trans World Charter
190. Treffield Aviation 
(Treffield Internat.Airlines)
1 9 1 . Trent Valley Aviation
1 9 2 . Tyne Tees Airways.
1 9 3 . Ulster Air Transport
1 9 4 . Ulster Airways
1 9 5 . Ulster Aviation
1 9 6 . Union Air Services
1 9 7 . Universal Flying Services,
1 9 8 . Universal Airlines
(Swiss Universal Air Charter)
1 9 9 . West Coast Air Services
200. West Cumberland Air Services
2 0 1. Western Airways
2 0 2. Western Isles Airways
2 0 3. Westminster Airways
204. Westward Airways
205. William Dempster
206. Wolverhampton Aviation
207. World Air Freight
208. World Wide Airways
Company Founded Ceased Operations
? ?
1963 1967
1957 1962 (M)
1968 S.O.
1968 1970
1946 (?) 1958 (M)
1959 1962
1959 1968
1962 S.O.
•>• 1952 (M)
1966 1967
? ?
1961 1965
.1967 1970
1972 S.O.
1946 I95O
1946 1949 (?)
1947 1 9 5 1
1959 1961
1936 1946*
1948 j 1949
1933 / 1949 (?)
? 1947*
1946 1949
1969 1 9 7 0
1950 1953
1946 (?) 1954 (M)
1947 1949 (?)
I960 1962
A ppendix I I  : L i s t  o f  a c t i v e  in d ep en d en t a ir  t r a n sp o r t
com p an ies in  o p e r a t io n  in  A p r i l ,  1949 .
Name Number o f  
a ir c r a f t
Scheduled
S erv ices
BACA
member
Represented on 
B a lt ic  Exchange
1 . A ir Charter 6 ft - - *
2 . A ir Couriers 11
3 . A ir E n terp rises 10 ft ft ft
4 . A ir f l ig h t 2
5 . A ir F reight
6 .  A ir Kruise
7 . A ir Transport 
( C h a r te r t e .I .  )
* # ft
8 . A ir lin k s 1 * '
9* Airspan Travel 3 . *
10. Airwork 49 A ft
11 . Aquila Airways 12 A ft
1 2 . Barclays In tern a t. 
Airways
12 * ft
1 3 . Bees F lig h t 2
14 . B irk ett Air S e r v ic e s * ft
1 5 . Blue Line Airways 10 * ft
16 . Bond Air S erv ices
17 . B r it is h  A ir Transport
18. B ritish-A m erican A ir  
S erv ices
3 *
19 . B ritish -N ederland  A ir  
S erv ices
1
20. Brooklands A v ia tion 6 • ■ * 1
21, Cambrian Air S e r v ic e s 10 #
f.
# 7
22. Chartair 6 «
23 . C iro 's  A via tion 3 *
24. Crewsair
25. Derby A viation
26. Eagle A viation 3 « . ft
Name Number of Scheduled BACA Represented on
aircraft Services member Baltic Exchange
2? . East Anglian  
F lying S erv ices
5 A *
28. Goodhew A viation 5 A
29 . H astings and East
Sussex Air S erv ices
30 . Hornton Airways 7+ * , *
31 . Hunting A ir Travel 8 * *
3 2 . In ter -C ity  Air S e r v ic es 10
33* Islan d  Air Charter « * *
34* Island Air S e r v ic e s 1
35* Islan d  Air S erv ices  
(London)
2
3 6 . Jersey  A ir lin e s
37. K earsley Airways 4
38 . Kenning A viation  
39* L an cs.A ircraft Corp. 42 * • *
4 0 . L e es -H ill Aviation(B'ham ) 3
4I .  Lockwoods F ly in g  S e r v ic e s
42 . Loxhams F lying S e r v ic e s *
43 . Manx Air Charters 4 .... # ,.
44* McDonald A ircra ft 4
45. Morton Air S e r v ic e s 13 A * *
46. Newman Airways 5 *
47. North Sea A ir Transport * #
4 8 . North-West A ir lin e s 14 * Has ap p lied : *
49» Northern Air Charter • -  f V
50 . O lley  Air S erv ice 13 #
j
*/"j *
5 1 . P a tr ick  A viation 9 *
52, Payloads A v ia tion  *
53. Raceways 1
54« S c o tt is h  A ir lin e s 8 # . * •
55 . Shorts Air Charter S erv ice• 4 ♦
Karne Number o f  Scheduled BACA Represented on 
a ir c r a f t  S e r v ic e s  member B a lt ic  Exchange
324-
56 . S ilv e r  C ity Airways 1 1 •
57. Sivew right Airways 9 *
58. Skytaxi 1
59. Skyways *
60. Solar Air S e r v ic e s 3
61. Somerton Airways 6
62. Spalding Airways 4
63. Starways
64» S tra ig h t Corporation 20 #
65* Transair 10
6 6 . Trent V alley  A v ia tion 3
67. U lste r  A viation 6 *
6 8 . U niversal F ly ing  S e r v ic e s
69. Western Airways 9 *
7 0 . Westminster Airways 7
71. Wolverhampton A viation 10
7 2 . World Air F reigh t 2
*
* *
*
* •
* ■ 
*
«
♦
*
P
*
A « a p p lic a t io n  fo r  scheduled se r v ic e  pending. 
P « p a r e n t  company i s  a member.
Source : » F lig h t» , 24 / 4/ 4 9 , e t  a l . .
i
3 2 5 .
A x> von ô i x TIT
1T ,<“S V» 4* ’ >  ^ "1 «■*» V* 4* f* , . a , „„ bA ar o .n r' T e a T>a s s n 'n ■N r r 7 re, P,.1 i_•. ... . W/  ^ .1.  j  ■ _■ '
A i r *.. % c h a n g e S e a * % c h a n g '
m e 253 + 21 501 + 21
19**9 273 + 0 652 + 30
1950 3 17 + 16 691 + 6
1951 3^ +2 + s  _ 710 + 3
1952 k k  8 + 3 1 B k k . + 19
1953 523 + 1 7 892 + 6
1954 581 + 1 1 •938 + 5
1955 692 + 19 962 • + 3
1956 835 + 21 1,011 + 5
1957 1,019 + 22 1 ,0 2 7 + 2
1953 1,292 + 2 ? 96** - 6
1959 1,5V) + 19 881 - 9
i960 1,929 + 25 879 -
1961 2,176 + 13 785 -  1 1
1962 2,537 + 19 820 + 5
1963 2,836 + 10 810 -  1
196** 3 , 5 5 1 + 25 715 -  1 2
1965 **,092 + 15 61*9 -  9
1966 **>700 + 15 603 -  6
1967 5,505 + 17 50 V -  16
1968 5,753 + 5 57k - 26
1969 6,777 + 18 338 -  1 0
1970 8,018 + 18 252 -  25. '
*  F i g u r e s  s h o w n  r e p r e s e n t  t h o u s a n d s  j 
a  =  I A T A  a i r l i n e s  o n l y  f
o =  T r a n s - A t l a n t i c P a s s e n g e r  S t e a m s h i p . C o m p a n i e s  •
: ■ IATA V / o r l d  A i r  T r a n s p o r t  S t a t i s t i c s ,  ,S o u r c e
326.
A "on e n i IV
}:inisters Lesponsible for Air Transport
Ministry of Civil Aviation •
Cct 1911 - Aug 1915 Viscount Ov/inton
Aug 1915 - Cct 1916 Lord Minster
Oct 1916 - May 1913 Lord ITathan
June 19*18 - June 1 9 5 1 Lord Pakonharn
June' 1931 - Oct 1951 Lord Cgmore
Ministry of Bransport and Civil Aviation :
Nov 1951 - Hay 1952 tX»S #Ta£1C X ety
*ri ¿U-J 1992 - July 1951 A.Lennox-Boyd
July 1951 - Doc 1955 J.A.Boyd-Carpenter
Deo 1935 - Oct 1959 H.A.V/atkinso n
Ministry of Aviation :
: Oct 193$ - July I960 D.Sandys
July I960 - July 1962 C,S,P.Tho rneycr0 ft
July 1962 - Oct 1961 J.Amery
Oct 1961 - Dec 1965 N.H.Jenkins
Dec 1965 - Jan 1967 F.M.Hulley ;
Jan 1967 - Feb 1967 J.Stonohouse
Board of Oracle :
Feb 1967 - Oct 1967 D. Jay
Oct 196? - Oct 1969 C.A.P.Croslandr+»oO I960 - Hay 1970 1?.Nason
Juno' 1970 - Oct 1970 : H ,Noble ■ 1 ; • ;
Ministry of Aviation -Supply : . . . . ; p m 1  :p.
! " O c t  ' 1 9 7 0  -  A p r 1 9 7 1 :F.Corfield 1
M i n i  s t r y  f o r  A c r o ?  ' .n e e  :
A p r  A :1971;.:- A p r : 1 9 7 2 F.Corfield
A p r ; 1 9 7 2  : - A; H.Hoseltine
Appendix V
The Edwards Report : P r in c ip a l Recommendations
The Committee regards the fo llo w in g  as i t s  p r in c ip a l  
p r o p o sa ls : .......... —  -............................. .....................
The Government should prom ulgate, by s ta tu to r y  instrum ent 
from time to time as n ecessary , c le a r  statem en ts o f  c i v i l  
a v ia t io n  p o licy  in d ic a t in g  the importance to  be a ttach ed  to  
the various o b je c t iv e s .
The primary long-term  o b je c t iv e  should be to s a t i s f y  the  
in d iv id u a l customer a t  the low est p r ic e , c o n s is te n t  w ith an 
economic return on the investm ent and a l e v e l  o f  s a fe ty  equal 
to  the b est in  the world. Short-term  p o lic y  must, however, 
r e f l e c t  the co u n try 's  urgent balance o f  payments problem s.
B r it ish  c i v i l  a v ia t io n  in  the 1 9 7 0 's  should  in c lu d e  a 
p u b lic  se c to r , a mixed se c to r  and a p r iv a te  s e c to r .
The S ta te  C orporations should he confirmed in  th e ir  r o le  
as the major op erators o f  B r it is h  scheduled a ir  s e r v ic e s  and 
should a lso  engage in  in c lu s iv e  tour and ch arter  o p e r a tio n s .  
The p u b lic  se c to r  sh ou ld , however, be reorgan ised  w ith  a 
N ational Air H oldings Board having f in a n c ia l  and p o lic y  
c o n tro l over BOAC and BEA. The o b je c t iv e  would be to  ensure  
the most e f f e c t iv e  deployment o f  op eratin g  f a c i l i t i e s ,  
m arketing stren gth  and t r a f f i c  r ig h t s .
BOAC and BEA should  r e ta in  th e ir  in d iv id u a l i d e n t i t i e s .  
There should be safeguards to  avoid o v e r -c e n tr a lis a t io n  in  
the H oldings Board, a m ajority  o f  whose members would a lso  be 
on the boards o f  one o f  the Corporations or B r it is h  A ir  
S e r v ic e s  (BAS).
BAS should be developed a s  a group o f  mixed ownership  
r eg io n a l a ir l in e s  for  dom estic rou tes (ex c lu d in g  the trunk 
r o u te s )  with some c o n tin e n ta l con n ection s. Some su bsid y  i s
justified for certain domestic routes on grounds of regional 
policy. The public investment would be held by the National 
Air Holdings Board.
The private sector should be encouraged to create a 
•second force' airline, which should be licensed to operate a 
viable network, covering scheduled and inclusive tour/charter 
traffic, both long-haul and short-haul. Where it is decided 
to license a second British operator on a route it should be
ithis 'second force' airline. It must be financially and 
managerially strong, should embrace more than one of the 
existing airlines and will, probably take time to arrange. 
Viability will require some limited concession of Corporation 
territory. In exchange, and according to the size of the 
concession, the National Air Holdings Board should be 
entitled to take a financial stake in convertible loan stock 
or equity and also to appoint one or more directors to the 
'second force'.
There will be room for other private airlines in inclusive 
tour and other passenger and freight charter operations where 
licensing and tariff regulation policies should be liberal. 
There will be increasing need for financial and managerial 
strength to maintain safe and efficient operations and we 
envisage fewer private airlines than the present number.
The private sector should be given a fair opportunity; 
no-one should be forced to sell out to the State, equally no- 
one should be bought out at more than true worth, j
Good staff relations are essential to morale, efficiency 
and safety, and recommendations are made for improvements.
The Government statements of policy should constitute the 
terms of reference of a new statutory Civil Aviation Authority, 
This Authority would be responsible for the economic and safety 
regulatory functions at present dispersed between the ATLB, the
Board of Trade and the ARB. It should also be responsible for 
the civil side of the joint National Air Traffic Control 
Services, for operational research, for long-term airport 
planning and for the main work of traffic rights negotiation. 
The financial and managerial resources of airlines should be 
thoroughly probed and monitored by the Authority on grounds 
•inter alia' of stability and safety.
The air transport business is changing substantially and 
rapidly. Holiday and personal travel is becoming increasingly 
important; the patterns of traffic and operating techniques 
will also continue to change. This will call for reappraisal 
of the roles of scheduled and non-scheduled operations and of 
pricing and of price control. The Civil Aviation Authority 
should use its influence in favour of flexibility and 
experiment. Competition should be regulated to the extent 
necessary to achieve the purposes of public policy, within 
the institutional and international framework.
Appendix VI
UK Air Transport Output in 1972.
Available tonne- Percentage of all
kilometres performed tonne-kilometres
(000‘s) performed ($)
BOAC 4,156 50.38
BEA 1,207 14.63
BCAL 1,062 12.87
Britannia 290 3.52
Dan-Air 253 3.07
Court 187 2.27
BEA Airtours 156 1.89
Laker 126 1.53
Tradewinds 118 1.43
DMA 103 1.25
Monarch 102 1.24
Irans-Meridian 90 1.09
Donaldson 90 1.09
Lloyd 74 0.09
Eortfceast 55 0.67
Cambrian 54 0.65
Invicta 32 0.39
BAP 25 0.30
BUL 19 0.23
Skyways 13 0.16
Others ■■■■■■■*
(33 operators)* 37 0.45
Includes air-taxi operators. 
Source : Civil Aviation Authority*
Passenger - Miles Performed (000'e), 1972
Internat. 
Scheduled
Domestic
Scheduled
Inclusive
-Tours
Other Separate 
Fare Charters
Total
BOAC 8,767,245 - 47,528 1,122,796 9,937,569
BEA 2,944,678 812,168 37,339 817 3,795,002
BCAL - 564,385 159,326. 1,141,955 993,669 2,859,335
Britannia - - 1,430,707 271,006 1,701,713
Dan Air/ 
Skyways 31,760 19,809 1,260,119 274,936 1,586,624
Court - - 1,141,948 60,721 1,202,669
BEA
Airtours » 732,686 101,503 834,189
Laker - - 378,112 135,907 514,019
Monarch - - 425,882 31,623 457,505
BMÀ 8,432 95,489 192,851 110,537 407,289
Hortheast 30,416 110,295 129,703 4,459 274,873
Donaldson «■* 4M» 71,715 183,798 255,513
Cambrian 32,256 82,171 103,052 4,262 221,741
Invicta - - 72,076 9,138 81,214
BIA 8,751 51,357 85 1,332 61,525
BAF 37,991 651 3,476 1,883 43,981
lib. The table does not, of course,
1
include1 freight/operators and operations. /
Source : Dept, of Trade and Industry * Business Monitor, 
Civil Aviation Series.
Output of UK Independent Airlines, 1953-1972.
*
Source : Civil Aviation Authority.
Appendix YII
UK Independent Airlines, Profit and (Loss) Statement, 1962 - 1970 (£jn).
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
Operating Revenue 22.3 31.2 39.5 49.6 • 63.6 65.9 52.0 79.3 101.5
Operating Expenditure 
Profit (Loss) on
(23.2) (30.3) (37.5) (47.9) (62.5) (65.0) (48.7) (73.2) (95.6)
Operating Account 
Profit (Loss) after
(0.9) 0.9 2.0 1.7 1.1 0.9 1.4 3.4 5.3
Taxation (1.5) 3.3 2.7 1.7 2.0 • 0.3 0.7 2.3 2.9
Transfer to Reserves (1.5) 3.2 2.6 1,1 1.7 0.1 3.9 4.0 4.7
* as Excludes British Eagle and Transglobe
Sources î Edwards Report, Appendix 15
Board of Trade (Dept, of Trade and Industry) : Business 
Monitor, Civil Aviation Series.
B I B L I O G R A P H Y
There appears to be a need for a comprehensive bibliography of publications 
relating to post-yjar UK air transport. An initial, and undoubtedly imper­
fect, attempt is made here to fill this gap. All the books, articles,etc, 
listed below are of either direct or indirect relevence to the general 
subject. Those actually referred to in the text are marked with an asterisk,
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........ ........................
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(iii) the aggregate share of total traffic that is secured by the
British airlines is likely to be increased to an extent
that will more than offset any lasting diseconomies, or
(iv) where the British share of capacity is pre-determined, the
licensing of a second airline within that share is likely to
increase the total traffic secured by British airlines more
rapidly than would otherwise be likely (para. 16)
In addition, shortly afterwards the Government had a change of mind and
handed over to the CAA, rather than the Department of Trade and Industry,
30responsibility for the approval of IATA fare resolutions.
Route Transfers
While the new legislation was being drawn up and introduced British 
Caledonian had rapidly established itself as the second force airline. 
With the support of the Government it had greatly expanded its scheduled 
service network by means of dual designation on the North Atlantic and 
the’ transfer of certain routes from the Corporations. BOAC was forced 
to hand-over its services from London to Lagos, Kano and Accra in West 
Africa, valued in terms of revenue at approximately Zb million per 
annum. BCAL began operating these routes from April 1, 19?1. The 
following June BOAC's service to Tripoli was added to the list. From 
BEA the Independent obtained a portion of the considerable London-Paris 
traffic. British United had held a licence for a scheduled service 
between Gatwick and Le Bourget (Paris ) for some years, but had been 
unable to implement its plans because of the unwillingness of the French 
authorities to allow an expansion of the British share of the total 
market, This problem was overcome by giving BCAL a proportion of BEA's 
permitted capacity, leaving Air France's 5G* shore untouched. Thus,.the
second force was granted up to 2S flights per week from November 1, 1971,
30. 'Flight; 6/y??, p .  l\C>ti.
